CITATION: Wilson v. Bratko, 2026 ONSC 1764
COURT FILE NO.: FS-26-00001290-0000
DATE: 20260324
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MARK WILSON
Applicant
– and –
MARY BRATKO
Respondent
Ruchira Kulkarni, for the Applicant
Self-Represented
HEARD: March 23, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
Overview
[1] As a result of the respondent removing the parties’ children from Mexico in an apparent breach of a non-removal order issued by the Mexican Court (described in detail below), the applicant now brings this ex parte motion seeking a variety of relief pursuant to, inter alia, the Children’s Law Reform Act (“CLRA”) and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”).
[2] Some of the relief sought on this ex parte motion is investigative in nature, while other relief sought by the applicant at this stage is protective in nature. As discussed hereinafter, a preliminary issue (admittedly identified by counsel for the applicant) is the extent of this Court’s jurisdiction to make some or all of the orders sought by the applicant today.
Summary of Relevant Facts
[3] Both the applicant and the respondent are Canadian citizens. They were married from August 8, 2016 until their separation on November 1, 2024. The parties have two children (twins who are currently eight years of age), who are also both Canadian citizens.
[4] The parties have lived in Ontario, Poland and since September 2021 in Mexico.
[5] After the parties separated, parenting and custody proceedings were commenced in Mexico (“the Mexico proceeding”). On May 19, 2025 a non-removal order was issued by the Court in the Mexico family proceeding.
[6] On August 15, 2025, the respondent was granted provisional custody over the children by the Mexican Court, with the applicant being granted remote supervised parenting time due to allegations of theft, domestic stalking and aggression made by the respondent against the applicant in the Mexican proceeding.
[7] In or around early January 2026, the applicant learned from a third party that the respondent had removed both children from Mexico, contrary to the Mexican non-removal order, and brought them into Canada. This was a significant surprise to the applicant, especially since he was the parent that apparently held the children’s passports
[8] Once the applicant learned of the respondent removing the parties’ children from Mexico to Canada, the applicant exerted significant efforts to try and confirm the children’s whereabouts. The applicant obtained a video from a friend apparently showing the children entering Canada at Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Ontario.
[9] The applicant has since contacted the Ontario Provincial Police, the Ottawa Police Services, the Mexican Family Court, Canada Border Services Agency, Passport Canada, Global Affairs Canada, Missing Children Services and Border Watch.
[10] In addition, the applicant retained the services of a private investigator, who has (regrettably without providing specific supporting evidence) advised the applicant that while the respondent and two children arrived in Canada sometime in or around mid-December 2025, the respondent departed Canada in or around late January/early February 2026. The applicant assumes the respondent fled to Poland, as she has extended family there.
[11] Most importantly, the investigator could not confirm whether the children left Canada with the respondent. Accordingly, while the children’s last known whereabouts appear to be the greater Toronto area, there is no positive evidence before this Court that the children currently remain in Ontario.
Decision - Jurisdiction
[12] To begin, on the record before this Court I am satisfied that the applicant’s motion is properly made without notice to the respondent pursuant to all the subsections of Rule 14(12) of the Family Law Rules. While I have yet to be provided with any evidence from the respondent, and thus have only been presented with the proverbial “one side of the coin”, based upon the evidence proffered by the applicant there is a significant risk of the children being removed from Ontario (if they are here), and since the respondent has apparently already breached a non-removal order, service of the applicant’s motion upon the respondent would likely have serious consequences.
[13] There is no dispute that the children were not habitually resident in Ontario at the commencement of this application. They did not reside together in Ontario with both parties, they did not have the applicant’s consent to be in Toronto, and there is no evidence that they have resided in Ontario with someone other than a parent on a “permanent basis for a significant period of time”. As such, this Court cannot take jurisdiction under section 22(1)(a) of the CLRA.
[14] Similarly, this Court cannot take jurisdiction under section 22(1)(b) of the CLRA as there is no evidence that the children are physically present in Ontario as at the commencement of this application.
[15] Under section 23 of the CLRA, this Court may take jurisdiction to make a parenting or contact order if a child is physically present in Ontario, and the Court is satisfied that the child would, on the balance of probabilities, suffer serious harm if (a) the child remains with a person legally entitled to decision making responsibility (b) the child is returned to a person legally entitled to decision making responsibility, or (c) the child is removed from Ontario. Despite the able and creative arguments of the counsel for the applicant, in the absence of direct evidence that the children presently remain in Ontario (or perhaps more fulsome evidence from the applicant’s private investigator explaining how and/or why the children did not accompany the respondent when she apparently left Canada), I simply cannot conclude that the CLRA confers jurisdiction upon this Court to make any of the protective orders sought by the applicant at this stage. Simply put, there needs to be additional, confirmatory evidence that the children are currently in Ontario.
[16] Ironically, this places the applicant in a difficult position as despite his best efforts (detailed above), he has been unable to obtain that confirmatory evidence to date.
[17] In Patton v. Mindle et al (June 21, 2023), Toronto, CV-23-00698587 (S.C.J.) Justice Sanfilippo summarized the Court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction as follows:
“In N. v. F., 2021 ONCA 614, at para. 96, the Court of Appeal explained that the parens patriae jurisdiction is “founded on necessity, namely the need to act for the protection of those who cannot care of themselves.” In E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, 1986 CanLII 36 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388, at paras. 74-75, the Supreme Court stated that the ‘categories under which the [parens patriae] jurisdiction can be exercised are never closed’, that the jurisdiction is broad, and can be invoked where ‘a necessity arises to protect a person who cannot protect himself’.”
[18] While I appreciate that the Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction is one of last resort to be used with caution, it is to be exercised in accordance with the fundamental underlying principle of doing what is necessary for the protection of persons for whose benefit it is exercised, and not for that of others.
[19] In my view, this Court has inherent jurisdiction to entertain the investigative orders sought by the applicant at this early stage. If the evidence of the applicant’s investigator is true, then there is a chance that the respondent has left Ontario without the children. The underlying need to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves bestows a broad inherent jurisdiction upon the Court.
[20] This Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction is reserved for situations exactly like the one before me. It is entirely both plausible and possible that the children may be in danger and/or at risk, and to grant the various investigative orders is necessary to achieve the paramount objectives of both the CLRA and the Hague Convention in the event the children are indeed currently in Ontario.
[21] As such, I have signed a revised version of the draft Order provided by counsel for the applicant which, inter alia, directs the Ontario Central Authority designated under the Hague Convention to take all appropriate measures (under Article 7 of the Hague Convention) to assist the applicant in locating the children including but not limited to coordinating with appropriate law enforcement authorities, liaising with passport, border and immigration authorities, and coordinating with any foreign Central Authorities as may be necessary.
[22] Rather than adjourning the balance of the applicant’s motion to be heard by me once the applicant is able to determine whether the children currently remain in Ontario, I am instead ordering that the applicant need only file a supplementary affidavit detailing the results of the Ontario Central Authority’s efforts, together with a supplementary factum (if needed) and a revised draft order setting out the various protective orders sought by the applicant should the children continue to be in Ontario. All of those documents may be uploaded directly to my assistant Harleen Purewal at harleen.purewal@ontario.ca, and I will consider the applicant’s request for protective orders in writing.
[23] In the event the Ontario Central Authority determines that the children are no longer in Ontario, I ask counsel for the applicant to update my office accordingly.
[24] I am reserving the issue of the costs of today’s attendance to myself in the event the applicant wishes to seek any costs. In the event I make any future protective orders on an ex parte basis upon being provided with the supplementary evidence that the children currently remain in Ontario, the motion shall be brought back before me thereafter on notice to the respondent in accordance with Rule 14(14) of the Family Law Rules.
Diamond J.
Released: March 24, 2026
CITATION: Wilson v. Bratko, 2026 ONSC 1764
COURT FILE NO.: FS-26-00001290-0000
DATE: 20260324
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MARK WILSON
Applicant
– and –
MARY BRATKO
Respondent
ENDORSEMENT
Diamond J.
Released: March 24, 2026