V.H. v. V.R.K., 2026 ONSC 1745
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE1: V.H., Applicant
-and-
V.R.K. and L.P., Respondents
COUNSEL: Jeffrey Behrendt, for the Applicant
Achille Kabongo, for V.R.K.
BEFORE: V. Naik, J.
HEARD: September 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, and 25, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
1This matter concerns the sanctity and finality of Adoption Orders in the context of stepparent adoptions. It calls upon the Court to determine the consequences that arise when an Adoption Order is based on what is ultimately found to be false and incomplete evidence.
2This question is especially significant given the strict language of Section 216(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Service Act 2017, S.O. 2017, c.14, Sched.1 (CYFSA), which underscores the final and conclusive nature of an Adoption Order, once granted.
3Aside from the adoption issue, this matter deals with parenting and child support orders for two children – DJ and EF as between two of the three parties to this litigation, the Applicant, V.H. and one of the Respondents, V.R.K.
4The matter arises from a unique and complicated set of facts.
Parties and Children
5The Applicant, V.H., is the adoptive mother (stepparent) to the child DJ who is now just over ten years old. She is also the biological mother of the child EF who is now three and half years old. V.H. lives in Ottawa, Ontario. She is Caucasian and Franco Ontarian.
6One of the Respondents is V.R.K. He is the biological father of both children. He is from the Dominican Republic (DR). He is Black and his mother tongue is Spanish.
7V.H. and V.R.K. married in the DR on December 28, 2018. Following the marriage, V.H. and DJ remained in the DR. V.H. visited both of them by travelling back and forth between Ottawa and the DR over the next couple of years.
8Shortly after the marriage, V.H. made an application to sponsor V.R.K. and DJ’s immigration to Canada.
9In and around December 2020, V.R.K. and DJ were granted Permanent Residency status enabling them to immigrate to Canada.
10V.R.K. immigrated to Canada in late December 2020.
11In and around February 2021, DJ immigrated to Canada as a Permanent Resident. DJ is now a Canadian citizen.
12V.H. brought a stepparent Adoption Application in and around October 2021.
13V.R.K. consented to V.H.’s stepparent Adoption Application.
14V.H. and V.R.K. separated in and around December 16, 2021, when V.R.K. was visiting the DR.
15At the time and since then DJ has remained in V.H.’s care.
16A final Adoption Order was granted on May 1, 2022, after the parties had separated.
17EF is DJ’s half-sister. She was born after V.H. and V.R.K. separated. She has resided in the primary care of her mother since birth. V.R.K. has no relationship with EF.
18The second Respondent is L.P. She is the biological mother of DJ. She lives in the DR.
19Despite being provided many opportunities to file responding materials in these proceedings L.P. did not file an Answer.
20Following a contested motion, L.P. was noted in default in this proceeding by Justice Audet on May 14, 2025, nearly three years after she was added as a party.
21Although L.P. was noted in default she participated in this trial as a witness called by V.R.K.
Brief Facts
22V.H. and V.R.K. began their relationship in 2018 when DJ was only two years old.
23At that time, DJ was living primarily with his paternal grandmother, R.A., in the DR. V.R.K. lived in the same home but appears to have worked in nearby cities such that R.A. was DJ’s primary caregiver.
24V.R.K.’s position on DJ’s relationship with his biological mother, L.P., has changed through the course of this litigation.
25When filing materials for the adoption proceedings, V.R.K. swore documents to indicate that L.P. had abandoned DJ in his family home when DJ was only 4 months old and that she had no interactions with him other than a brief period between December 2020 and February 2021 when his mother, R.A. took DJ from his family home and left him in L.P.’s home.
26At trial, V.R.K.’s position was different. While he maintained that DJ was in his and his mother’s care from when he was four months old to the time they immigrated to Canada, he noted that L.P. had an ongoing relationship with DJ that included parenting time during DJ’s school summer holidays and special occasions.
27L.P. testified that DJ lived with her until he was 10 months old, at which time she went to reside in Istanbul, leaving DJ in the care of his father and paternal grandmother.
28When she returned to the DR, DJ was already in school and because she didn’t want to destabilize him, DJ remained with R.A. and V.R.K. She states that she continued to have a relationship with DJ as he would be with her during his school vacations and other holidays.
29I find that while L.P. may not have been DJ’s primary caregiver, she did, in fact, have a relationship with DJ before he immigrated to Canada.
30Notwithstanding this relationship between L.P. and DJ, V.R.K. made plans with V.H. to immigrate with DJ to Canada. He put together documentation required for immigration purposes.
31There is significant discrepancy in the evidence of all three parties regarding L.P. consenting to DJ immigrating to Canada. The Court heard extensive testimony surrounding immigration documents that were prepared for DJ’s immigration. I will deal with this aspect when addressing credibility of parties in subsequent paragraphs.
32One such document that formed part of the immigration package was the ‘Declaration from Non-Accompanying Parent/Guardian for Minors to Immigrate to Canada’ (Non-Accompanying Parent Declaration).
33This document was filed with Citizenship and Immigration Canada with what appears to be L.P.’s signature. The document was notarised by a lawyer in the DR who died prior to the commencement of this trial.
34This Non-Accompanying Parent Declaration essentially confirmed to the relevant authorities in Canada that L.P. consented to DJ immigrating to Canada. By signing this document L.P. ostensibly acknowledged that she may be permanently separated from DJ.
35I find that L.P.’s signature on the Non-Accompanying Parent Declaration was forged. L.P. had no knowledge of this document until she was presented with the document during this litigation.
36V.R.K. testified that he sought out a notary in the DR who forged L.P.’s signature and notarised the document for them. He asserted that V.H. was aware that this document was forged and that she was the one who paid for the notary’s services in the DR.
37V.H. denies this entirely. She states that she was not involved in the creation of this document. This was one among many documents that was needed for immigration purposes and when it was ready, V.R.K. sent it to her to add to the immigration package that she ultimately submitted to Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
38After DJ and V.R.K. were granted Permanent Resident status in Canada, they were scheduled to immigrate together and accompany V.H. back to Canada in December 2020.
39This plan did not go as expected.
40On the day they were to leave the DR, the paternal grandmother, R.A. took DJ to L.P.’s home without informing V.R.K. or V.H.
41V.R.K. and V.H. made efforts to locate DJ in the DR, without success. Ultimately after a few days they travelled to Canada without DJ.
42DJ remained with L.P. from December 2020 to February 2021.
43In and around February 2021, DJ made a phone call to his father. Upon receipt of this call, V.R.K. and V.H. immediately travelled to the DR.
44V.R.K. and V.H. met with DJ at L.P.’s residence.
45Within the next couple of days, V.R.K. and L.P. negotiated an agreement that permitted DJ to travel and remain in Canada with V.R.K. and V.H. for a period of 3 months.
46None of the parties contest the authenticity of this agreement.
47As a result of this agreement, DJ travelled to Canada with V.R.K. and V.H. in and around February or early March 2021. DJ was 5 years old at that time.
48Upon arrival in Ottawa, DJ was registered in school and began to adjust to life in Ottawa, Canada.
49DJ did not return to the DR in May-June 2021, as expected pursuant to the terms of the agreement between L.P. and V.R.K.
50Around December 5, 2021, V.R.K. travelled to the DR leaving DJ in the care of V.H. He says he travelled there to visit his family and friends as well as to complete his studies. He travelled on a one-way ticket without a set return date.
51V.H. and V.R.K. separated shortly thereafter, while V.R.K. was still in the DR.
52At the time, V.H. was pregnant with ER.
53In and around January 2022, L.P. commenced a proceeding related to DJ in the DR. It is unclear if this is a civil or criminal proceeding.
54The only evidence before the Court as relating to the proceedings in the DR is a certified translation of a ‘Notice to Appear Request’ sent to by the Chief Public Prosecutor for Boys, Girls and Adolescents from the Mons. Nouel Judicial District dated February 9, 2022. This Notice required V.R.K. to attend the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor with DJ on April 20, 2022.
55It is unclear if non-compliance with this Notice will result in criminal sanctions. L.P. asserts that V.R.K. will be incarcerated if he does not comply.
56V.R.K. returned to Canada around February 2022. He made it clear to V.H. that he intended to come to Canada to collect DJ and return with him to the DR.
57Upon arrival in Canada, he attended at the family home. The locks had been changed, and he was not able to meet with V.H. or DJ.
58In the period between February 2022 and the commencement of this proceeding, there was conflict between the parties.
59V.R.K. called the police alleging that V.H. had kidnapped his son. The police contacted V.H. They took no steps to remove DJ from V.H. They advised V.R.K. to retain legal counsel.
60V.R.K. himself did not take any concrete steps to deal with this until V.H. commenced this Application in June of 2022.
61In the interim period, EF was born and DJ’s Adoption Order was granted.
Litigation History
62I do not intend to recount the entire litigation history in this matter. However, it is important to note that this matter has been a high conflict file from commencement in 2022 up until trial in September 2025.
63There have been no less than 15 hearings, not including this two-week trial, in this matter. Nearly all appearances have been contentious, leading to significant costs orders made against V.R.K., all of which remain unpaid to date.
Pleadings
64V.H.’s Application was issued on June 29, 2022. She amended her Application in December 2022 to include the child EF who was born on [redacted] 2022.
65In her Amended Application she seeks several orders including divorce, sole decision-making and primary care of DJ and EF, parenting time between the father and the children, child support, a non-removal order, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and a restraining order.
66V.R.K. served his Answer on September 13, 2022, seeking only spousal support and a restraining order.
67His Answer was later amended to seek decision-making responsibility for both children, parenting time, child support and an order that DJ be returned to his care so that he may take DJ back to his “native country”.
68Although the claims in his Answer are muddled and not properly articulated, V.R.K. also makes a claim relating to setting aside the Adoption Order.
69It is V.R.K. who added L.P. as an added Respondent to these proceedings. His pleadings do not assert any claims against L.P.
70At a motion heard on March 6, 2025, V.R.K. withdrew his claim for spousal support. He has no other financial claims before the Court.
71At trial, V.R.K.’s evidence focussed almost entirely on two claims i.e. setting aside the Adoption Order and permitting him to return to the DR with DJ.
L.P.’s Position
72After L.P. was added as a party, the Court took several concerted steps to ensure that L.P. could properly participate in these proceedings.
73On multiple occasions, the Court ordered that a Spanish interpreter be made available for hearings. The Court translated important Endorsements to Spanish so that L.P. would have the benefit of clearly understanding what steps she needed to take to file an Answer and become an active participant in these proceedings.
74As already indicated despite many extensions of time that were granted for L.P. to file her Answer, she never did.
75Following a contested lengthy motion that included materials filed by L.P. (even though she had not filed an Answer, the Court accepted her materials for this motion), Justice Audet found that L.P. was in default and was not entitled to participate in these proceedings any further, other than as a witness.
76As such, L.P. has no independent claims before the Court.
77I note, however, that L.P.’s position on all occasions that she has attended this court, including as a witness at this trial, has been that:
a. She never consented to DJ immigrating to Canada;
b. She did not sign the Non-Accompanying Parent Declaration;
c. She provided written authorization for DJ to travel to Canada for a period of 3 months starting in February 2021;
d. She did not consent to V.H. adopting DJ;
e. The Adoption Order was obtained fraudulently and, therefore, it should be set aside;
f. She would like DJ to return to the DR.
Interim Parenting Orders
78Over the course of these proceedings, the Court has made several interim orders related to parenting between V.R.K. and the child(ren). These include:
October 20, 2022 – Telephone or video parenting time between V.R.K. and DJ at least once a week for 45 minutes.
April 12, 2023 – Resume virtual parenting time as per the October 20, 2022, order and supervised in-person parenting time between V.R.K. and DJ at the Supervised Access Program, Family Services Ottawa.
October 3, 2023 - Virtual parenting time between V.R.K. and DJ once per week, and supervised parenting time with both children at a supervised access facility for one hour every three weeks.
October 3, 2023 – Sole interim Decision-making Responsibility for both children granted to V.H.
March 6, 2025 – Virtual parenting time between V.R.K. and DJ once every other week for up to 30 minutes, if V.R.K. missed two calls, his virtual parenting time would be reduced to once per month on the first Sunday of every month. If V.R.K. attended four consecutive calls, his virtual parenting time would increase to each Sunday.
79Parenting time between V.R.K. and DJ and EF did not proceed as anticipated under any of the above temporary Orders.
80Starting in 2022 right up until the trial, V.R.K.’s parenting time remained sporadic. When they did proceed, they were not always positive.
Issues
81The issues to be determined are as follows:
Notwithstanding the finality of an Adoption Order as contemplated under Section 216 (1) of the CYFSA, should the final Adoption Order in favour of V.H., dated May 1, 2022 (Adoption Order) as relating to the child, DJ be set aside on the basis that it was obtained by fraud?
Regardless of the validity of the Adoption Order, what parenting orders are in the child DJ’s best interest as between V.H. and V.R.K.?
What parenting orders are in the child, EF’s best interest as between V.H. and V.R.K.?
What child support and section 7 orders should the Court make as relating to the children DJ and EF?
Credibility
82Credibility is an important factor in this case.
83Both V.H. and V.R.K. ask that I prefer their evidence over the other. They also ask that I prefer the evidence of each of their collateral witnesses.
84I do not have to believe or disbelieve the evidence of either of them or any of the other witnesses in its entirety. I may accept none or part of their evidence, and I may also attach different weight to different parts of their evidence.
85Where I make credibility findings, I have been mindful of 2:
a. Inconsistencies and weakness in the witness’s evidence.
b. Independent evidence that confirms or contradicts a witness’s testimony.
c. Assessing whether the witness’s testimony is plausible.
d. To a very limited extent and with a great degree of caution, the demeanour of a witness, including their sincerity and use of language.
86To the extent that I have relied on the last criteria above, I have only done so when considering the witness’s testimony as a whole and have not based it on a response to a particular question or set of questions.
87Other than a few discrete aspects of her testimony which undermined her credibility on certain very specific aspects (which I will address as and when they arise in this decision), I found V.H. to generally be a credible witness. By and large, she testified in a straightforward manner and made a few concessions even though they were not to her benefit.
88I reject V.R.K.’s suggestion that V.H. should not be believed at all.
89In contrast, I found V.R.K. to be significantly less credible.
90V.R.K. presented as an intelligent and sophisticated individual. He testified in Spanish with the assistance of a certified interpreter. He was articulate and frequently offered lengthy responses, often suggesting that the questions posed were illogical and/or redundant. On several occasions, he quoted philosophers and repeatedly asserted that his position in this proceeding was sound “logically, culturally, and anthropologically.”
91When convenient, however, he claimed to have no knowledge of documents or contents of documents that he had signed for immigration and adoption purposes. His main basis for this assertion was that the documents were in English and had not been translated for him into Spanish.
92Overall, the evidence heard at trial is inconsistent with his narrative and testimony. He casts himself as a victim of circumstances orchestrated by V.H. through fraudulent English-language legal documents as follows:
a. First, V.R.K. himself testified that to have a job in the DR he needed to understand basic English, French and Russian. Indeed, V.R.K. has held several jobs in the DR including one as a Master of Ceremonies at a resort frequented by tourists.
b. Second, his mother testified that when she required assistance in teaching her younger son English, she would video call V.R.K. who would help his younger brother with English.
c. Third, on multiple occasions during the trial, the Court had to alert V.R.K. to put on the headphones through which he could hear the simultaneous Spanish interpretation of the court proceedings.
d. Finally, by his own admission, V.R.K. did not come to Court with clean hands. He admitted to obtaining the Non-Accompanying Parent Declaration fraudulently. He admitted to misleading L.P. by promising to return with DJ to the DR in 3 months after she provided consent to travel, knowing fully well that the intention was for DJ to come to Canada as a Permanent Resident.
93As with V.H., where I find V.R.K.’s evidence lacks credibility on particular aspects, I refer to the factors that I have relied on to reach the credibility finding.
The Adoption
94V.H.’s evidence is that the idea of her adopting DJ was very much a part of discussions with V.R.K. and his family right from the very initial stages of their relationship and well before DJ immigrated to Canada.
95This is supported by text messages that were adduced into evidence, between V.H. and R.A. going back to September 2018.
96I find that V.R.K. was very much aware of the adoption plan and assisted V.H. in taking steps that were necessary to bring this plan to fruition.
97In keeping with this plan, about eight months after DJ immigrated to Canada, in October of 2021, V.H. commenced an Adoption Application seeking to adopt DJ as a stepparent.
The Adoption Application
98As part of the initial Adoption Application package V.H. and V.R.K. prepared several documents including but not limited to the following:
Form 8D – Adoption Application
Form 14B – Motion Form seeking an order to dispense with consent of the biological mother, L.P. for V.H. to adopt DJ
From 14A – An affidavit sworn by V.H. in support of the motion seeking to dispense with L.P.’s consent to DJ’s adoption
Form 34A – Affidavit of Parentage sworn by V.R.K.
Form 34D – Affidavit of Adoption Applicant
Form 34H – Affidavit of Adopting Stepparent
Form 34I – V.R.K.’s Consent to Adoption by Spouse.
99V.H. testified that while she typed the documents, preparation of these documents was a collaborative effort between her and V.R.K.
100V.H. was forthright in her admission that her English reading and writing skills were better than V.R.K.’s and, therefore, she would read the documents to him in English. If there were words that he didn’t fully comprehend he would ask her, and she would explain those words to him in Spanish. If he wished to make changes or corrections, he would say so and those changes would then be incorporated into the documents and re-read to him before he signed the document(s).
101V.R.K. testified that he blindly signed all documents that were put to him because he trusted his wife and, at the time, would do anything that she asked of him.
Obtaining Independent Legal Advice (ILA) for V.R.K.
102Prior to filing the required documents in Court, in and around August 2021, V.H. contacted Ms. Lisa Sharp, a family lawyer in Ottawa to enquire if she can provide assistance related to the adoption.
103V.H., V.R.K. and Ms. Sharp maintained contact over the next few months during which time, there was e-mail communication between V.H. and Ms. Sharp. There was also telephone and face-to-face contact between V.R.K. and Ms. Sharp.
104Ms. Sharp’s e-mail correspondence with V.H. makes a few aspects abundantly clear:
In her email of September 8, 2021, to V.H., Ms. Sharp states that V.R.K. had explained to her that the Court was helping them with the Adoption Forms, and she understood that to mean that V.H. did not have a lawyer helping her with the adoption proceedings.
Ms. Sharp lists the documents that she wished to review before her appointment with V.R.K.
Ms. Sharp draws attention to the fact that she informed V.R.K. that the biological mother would need to sign a Consent as well but that he didn’t seem to think that this was possible.
Ms. Sharp warns both parties that a judge may not grant the adoption if the biological mother has not consented.
Ms. Sharp reiterates that her role is “only to help V” (referring to V.R.K.) and that she was simply providing all this information to both since they are a couple.
105I underline some portions above specifically to draw attention to the fact that Ms. Sharp and V.R.K. clearly had some communications in English whereby V.R.K. provided specific information to Ms. Sharp.
106Ultimately, Ms. Sharp provided V.R.K. with ILA via telephone, as this occurred when COVID-19 restrictions were in place. Following this telephone meeting, she met with V.R.K. in her office to confirm his identity, sign and commission the necessary documents.
107Much like his position on L.P.’s involvement with DJ, V.R.K.’s position regarding the ILA he received changed several times during this litigation as well as at trial such that I draw a negative credibility inference against him in this regard.
108First, during this litigation, he asserted that he did not receive any ILA and did not know who Ms. Sharp was.
109Following a motion, the Court made an order on August 17, 2023, for Ms. Sharp to release her file related to the ILA she provided to V.R.K. It appears that solicitor-client privilege was not raised at the time nor was it raised when Ms. Sharp testified at trial.
110Ms. Sharp complied with the order and released the electronic file that she had in her possession for this ILA matter to counsel for both parties.
111V.R.K. then took the position that he didn’t understand the ILA he received from Ms. Sharp because it was provided in English, and he did not understand English adequately enough to discern legal concepts.
112He suggested that Ms. Sharp should have offered to have a Spanish interpreter for this ILA meeting with him as he spoke English with an accent, and this should have alerted her to the fact that his English comprehension was inadequate.
113At trial, V.R.K. suggested a few other possibilities to demonstrate the deficiencies in the ILA process including:
After he spoke for a few minutes with Ms. Sharp on the phone during the ILA meeting, he handed off the phone to V.H. to continue and end the ILA meeting.
The individual who attended Ms. Sharp’s office to sign the documents following the ILA meeting by phone may not have been him.
114I do not find this evidence to be credible.
115Ms. Sharp confirmed that she verified V.R.K.’s identity by requesting a copy of a government issued ID, although she was not able to produce it at trial because she couldn’t access her paper file as she had shut down her physical office in 2024.
116Ms. Sharp testified that she reviewed the relevant forms with V.R.K. and explained the concept of stepparent adoption specifically drawing attention to the fact that he was “not giving up his parental rights” but that V.H. would have equal decision-making authority for DJ with him and that he would have a certain number of days within which to revoke his consent to the adoption.
117Finally, she testified that she would have asked him if he understood the contents of the forms he was signing, the impact of an adoption order, his right to revoke his consent and then have him swear to the truth of the documents before he signed the documents.
Motion to Dispense with L.P.’s Consent
118Justice Mackinnon reviewed the Adoption Application and the motion to dispense with L.P.’s consent.
119On November 1, 2021, Justice Mackinnon released an Endorsement in which she cited several issues with the Adoption Application.
120Relevant to this litigation, is Justice Mackinnon’s comment that the affidavit in support of the motion to dispense with L.P.’s consent to adoption, contained secondhand information from V.H. and given the serious nature of the order sought and the application itself, she required an affidavit directly from the father setting out his firsthand knowledge.
121Upon receipt of this Endorsement, with the assistance of V.H., V.R.K. completed an affidavit that effectively reiterates the same information contained in V.H.’s affidavit as related to L.P.
122In essence, the evidence of both V.H. and V.R.K. regarding L.P, as it relates to the motion to dispense with her consent to DJ’s stepparent adoption by V.H., can be summarized as follows:
DJ had been residing with V.R.K. and his family in the DR since he was 4 months old.
L.P. had “abandoned” DJ at V.R.K.’s family home.
L.P. had not made any efforts to be present or participate in DJ’s life except for a brief period just prior to DJ immigrating to Canada.
On the day that V.R.K. and DJ were supposed to immigrate to Canada, V.R.K.’s mother, R.A took DJ to L.P.’s home, without their consent and knowledge.
They were unable to locate DJ, resulting in V.R.K. immigrating to Canada in December 2020 without DJ.
In February 2021 they received a call from DJ. They immediately returned to the DR. V.R.K. and L.P. had discussions following which L.P. signed a permission letter allowing DJ to “immigrate to Canada”.
123Both parties then attended the Courthouse, met with the Adoption Clerk, Ms. de Haan, who commissioned V.R.K.’s affidavit and accepted the filing.
124Ms. de Haan testified that before she commissioned V.R.K.’s sworn affidavit, she followed the standard protocol of asking the affiant “do you swear that contents of this affidavit are true” and only upon receiving an affirmative response did she commission his affidavit.
125Her evidence in this respect was not undermined despite robust cross‑examination.
126The Adoption Order was signed by Justice Mackinnon on May 1, 2022.
127V.R.K. adamantly insists that the Adoption Order should not have been signed without L.P.’s consent.
128Justice Mackinnon was satisfied that the evidence before her allowed her to dispense with L.P.’s consent and grant the Adoption Order. This trial is not a mechanism to relitigate the issue of dispensing with L.P.’s consent.
Unable to Locate the Original Adoption File
129A collateral issue related to locating the original adoption file, arose in this litigation, both at the pre-trial and trial stage.
130V.R.K. took the position that this was yet another basis on which the Court should conclude that the Adoption Order was obtained fraudulently and, as such, I will make specific findings related to this issue.
131V.H. and V.R.K. did not maintain a copy of the complete adoption file including signed copies of the Adoption Application and all sworn affidavits.
132Ms. Sharp who provided ILA to V.R.K. was also not able to provide copies of affidavits sworn by him in her office. Ms. Sharp’s electronic file that was released to the parties pursuant to the August 17, 2023 order only contained unsigned and unsworn documents.
133Lastly, due to a convergence of highly unfortunate circumstances, the original Court file was also misplaced.
134Despite Ms. de Haan’s extensive efforts detailed in her testimony, the file could not be located.
135At trial, the Court was left with only two original documents from the Adoption file. The Endorsement of Justice Mackinnon dated November 1, 2021, and the Final Adoption Order of Justice Mackinnon dated May 1, 2022.
136While it is regrettable that the court file could not be recovered, I am satisfied that the contents of the unsigned/unsworn Adoption file documents produced during the trial by V.H. and Ms. Sharp mirror the original signed/sworn documents that were filed with the Court.
137I reach this conclusion on the basis that both V.H. and V.R.K.’s evidence surrounding this time period, prior to their separation. The steps taken by them as a couple align with the rest of the evidence the Court heard at this trial.
138In fact, V.R.K. stated on multiple occasions that when they were together as a couple, he loved and trusted V.H. and signed documents in support of her Adoption Application.
139Where V.R.K.’s testimony relating to attending the Courthouse and meeting with Ms. de Haan to sign and file adoption documents contradicts the testimony of Ms. de Haan, I prefer Ms. de Haan’s evidence over his for several reasons including the following:
At various points in his testimony V.R.K.’s evidence was internally inconsistent and did not accord with common sense.
For example, although he was present and heard Ms. Sharp and Ms. de Haan’s testimony both in chief and cross a day prior to his own evidence, when statements from their evidence was put to him, he stated that he did not know their names or who these individuals were.
When he was reminded of their presence and testimony in Court just the day prior, he changed his testimony on what had occurred in his interactions with these two witnesses, once again falling back on his narrative that these interactions were in English, and he did not understand what had occurred.
V.R.K. makes the assertion that Ms. de Hann or other court staff deliberately destroyed the file to cover up mistakes, or that a third party, presumably V.H. gained access to the file and destroyed it.
140V.R.K. makes these assertions on the premise that Ms. de Haan processed the Adoption file even though it lacked required documents such as a Home Study and a Parent Resource Information Development and Education (PRIDE) certificate.
141There appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of V.R.K. about the nature of the Adoption Application in this matter.
142Relative or Stepparent Adoption Applications are unlike private domestic or international adoptions or adoptions via a child welfare agency (also known as public adoptions). Relative and Stepparent adoptions do not require a Structured Analysis Family Evaluation (SAFE Home Study) nor PRIDE certification.
143I specifically reject the assertion that the Court counter staff acted with malice or that a third party, presumably V.H. gained access to the court file and destroyed it.
144The fact that the file was misplaced or lost and was unavailable during this trial is simply an unfortunate coincidence.
Should the Adoption Order be Set Aside
145It is against this background that the Court is tasked with determining whether this Adoption Order should be set aside.
146The analysis begins with section 216(1) of the CYFSA, which reads as follows:
216 (1) An adoption order under section 199 is final and irrevocable, subject only to section 215 (appeals), and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court by way of injunction, declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus or application for judicial review.
147The wording is very strict to promote the best interests and wellbeing of children and to provide them with stability and finality.3
148I note that the legislation does not carve out an exception for adoption orders obtained by fraud.4
149Pursuant to this section, the finality of an adoption order is only subject to an appeal which is governed by narrow timelines under the Family Law Rules. O. Reg. 439/07, s.1.
150There are sound policy reasons underpinning the strict wording of this provision. Finality of an adoption order is central to promoting stability and permanence for children.
151The protection afforded to adoption orders applies regardless of the context in which they are granted, be it private domestic or international adoptions, public adoptions, or stepparent (relative) adoptions.
152The strict language of section 216(1) is built on the procedural and substantive integrity involved in any adoption process commenced in Ontario.
153The statutory and regulatory framework governing adoptions in Ontario requires a significant degree of rigor in the preparation and filing of the materials that form the basis of an adoption application.
154The mechanisms by which this integrity is protected, however, differ depending on the type of adoption.
155Private and public adoptions incorporate numerous procedural safeguards. These typically include the involvement of an Adoption Licensee, an Adoption Practitioner, completion of a SAFE home study, PRIDE training and certification for prospective adoptive parents, independent legal advice for birth parents, and the issuance of a Director’s Statement by a Director appointed under the CYFSA by the Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services, without which a final adoption order will not be granted.
156Stepparent adoptions under section 199 (2) (3), in contrast, do not have the same embedded oversight mechanisms. In these cases, the Court’s determination rests almost entirely on the documents prepared, signed, sworn and filed by the parties.
In this case, that record was essentially prepared by V.H. and V.R.K.
Rules 25(19) (a) of the Family Law Rules
157The mechanism to change an order (which includes setting aside an order) that a party alleges was obtained by fraud is contained not in the CYFSA but in Rule 25 (19)(a) of the Family Law Rules.
158The Rule reads as follows:
Changing order — fraud, mistake, lack of notice
(19) The court may, on motion, change an order that,
(a) was obtained by fraud;
(b) contains a mistake;
(c) needs to be changed to deal with a matter that was before the court but that it did not decide;
(d) was made without notice;
(e) was made with notice, if an affected party was not present when the order was made because the notice was inadequate or the party was unable, for a reason satisfactory to the court, to be present. O. Reg. 151/08, s. 6.
Fraud
159There is substantial jurisprudence on what constitutes fraud, the standard of proof to be applied and other factors to be considered when the Court is looking at fraud as a factor in setting aside a court order.
160These principles were laid down by Courts both in the context of the Family Law Rules and Rules of Civil Procedure.
161I outline the relevant principles below.
Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules is not only limited to changing an order. The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined that Rule 25(19) includes the authority for courts to set aside an order.5
The definition of "fraud" within Rule 25(19)(a) does not have a special meaning outside the common meaning. It requires a high threshold.6
Allegations of fraud must be strictly pled and proven. The onus is on the person alleging the fraudulent statements.
The party alleging fraud by the other party must prove that the other party:
a. made a false representation
b. knowingly, or
c. without belief in its truth, or
d. recklessly, careless whether it be true or false, and
e. did so with wrongful intent.
The fraud alleged must be proved on a reasonable balance of probability.
The more serious the fraud, more cogent the evidence is required.
The fraud must be material, going to the foundation of the case.
The evidence must be clear and convincing.
In assessing an allegation of fraud, the totality of the evidence must be considered, not just separate pieces of evidence assessed in isolation
The evidence of fraud must not have been known at the time of trial by the party seeking to rely on it. The party must show that there has been a new discovery of something material, in the sense that fresh facts have been found, which, by themselves or in combination with previously known facts, would provide a basis for setting aside the order.
If a litigant wishes to challenge a procedural irregularity in a court order or pleading, they should do so promptly. They should not be taking substantive steps in a case and waiting until a later time to proceed with the procedural challenge. This is known as the “fresh step principle”. While the “fresh step” principle is not an absolute bar to the court considering a procedural attack on an order after a substantive step is taken in a case, consideration of the principle is consistent with the primary objective in rule 2 when determining whether it is just in the circumstances to set aside or change an order.
A party misspeaking, without intent to mislead, is not fraud. Inconsistency in sworn statements does not automatically amount to fraud. Omissions and other factual disagreements do not automatically amount to fraud.7
Adoption Orders and Fraud
162While there are several cases where fraud under Rule 25(19)(a) was considered when setting aside a court order, I am unaware of any case in Ontario where an adoption order was set aside on the basis of fraud.
163There is uncertainty surrounding the jurisdiction of a Court to set aside adoption orders in the face of the strict wording contained in section 216(1) of the CYFSA.
164Even where Courts have considered invoking inherent jurisdiction to consider setting aside an adoption order, this possibility has only been entertained if the child is in danger or to protect the person for whose benefit such jurisdiction is exercised.8
165It should be noted that in A.M. v. Chatham Kent Integrated Children’s Services, 2007 ONCA 411, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that pursuant to section 157(1) of the CFSA (now 216(1) of the CYFSA) a final adoption order precluded the hearing of a motion to set aside. However, the Court goes to state the following at paragraph 21:
21While we refrain from determining whether a motion to set aside could succeed in different circumstances, we are of the view that it certainly cannot in the circumstances of this case.
166At least in one case, a Court has interpreted this statement to mean that there may be “some circumstances” when an adoption order can be challenged despite the wording in the legislation. 9
167I have also considered decisions made in other jurisdictions in Canada.
168The Alberta Court of Appeal dealt with this very issue in JSG v Alberta (Director of Child, Youth and Family Enhancement), 2021 ABCA 364.
169The relevant Alberta legislation, section 73.1 of the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act RSA 2000, c C-12, provides that an adoption order may set aside where such an order has been procured by fraud, in which case it may be set aside only if it is the best interests of the adopted child.
170I note that the Alberta legislation (not subordinate legislation like the Ontario Family Law Rules) include within it the possibility of setting aside an adoption order obtained by fraud.
171In any event, the Alberta Court of Appeal did not set aside the adoption order.
172The Alberta Court of Appeal cited the British Columbia Supreme Court’s decision in G.M.J. v. S.J.S., 2015 BCSC 531. The Court in that case considered section 40 of the Adoption Act which permits the Court to set aside an adoption order obtained by fraud but only if the Court considers setting aside an adoption to be in the best interest of the child.
173Much like Alberta, the British Columbia adoption legislation itself contemplates setting aside an adoption order obtained by fraud as long as it is in the best interest of the child.
174The British Columbia Court did, in fact, set aside the adoption order made in favour of the common law partner of the biological mother who had since died.
175The facts of that case are entirely distinguishable from this one. Of note, the person seeking to set aside the adoption order (the biological father) in the British Columbia case, was not the person who participated in the fraud.
Application of the Law to the Present Case
176I find that the Adoption Application, along with the associated affidavits and supporting documentation to be problematic.
177On the totality on the evidence, and on a balance of probabilities, I find that the Adoption Order was obtained fraudulently. V.R.K. knowingly made false representations to the Court. He was reckless and careless about the truth of his evidence.
178Despite this finding, however, I am not prepared to set aside the Adoption Order for reasons outlined below.
179I find V.R.K.’s testimony related to the adoption process is of little value to the Court. In short, it is entirely self serving.
180He admits to fraudulently obtaining the Non-Accompanying Parent Declaration which was relied upon by him and V.H. while seeking an order to dispense with L.P.’s consent. He insists, unconvincingly that he understood nothing of the adoption process.
181He simply lays the blame entirely on V.H. and now wishes to rely on the fraud that he perpetrated and seeks to set aside the Adoption Order.
182V.R.K. is not before the Court with clean hands. He cannot profit from his own wrongdoing.
183I do not absolve V.H. of all blame.
184I accept that V.H. was provided information by the paternal grandmother about L.P. that led her to believe that L.P. left DJ in the care of the paternal family when he was a baby and that it would not be in DJ’s best interest for L.P. to resume DJ’s care. This assertion made by V.H. is supported by many text messages between V.H. and R.A.
185I also accept that V.H. was not aware that the Non-Accompanying Parent Declaration was fraudulently obtained. I prefer V.H.’s evidence over V.R.K.’s as it relates to this aspect, because during the course of this litigation, V.H. made significant efforts to contact the notary in the DR who notarised this document. She was able to establish that the notary had since died and that her efforts to locate his file in the DR were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, V.R.K. himself made no efforts whatsoever.
186What I do not accept is V.H.’s assertion that she had no means of contacting L.P. throughout the adoption process. I find that V.H. intentionally chose to remain ignorant in this regard, particularly after December 2021.
187Two important developments occurred between November 1, 2021, when Justice Mackinnon released her Endorsement and May 1, 2022, when she signed the Final Adoption Order.
- In December 2021 on his way to the DR, V.R.K. provided V.H. with L.P.’s phone number and asked that DJ call L.P. as she wished to speak with him. Indeed, it appears that V.H. made a call to assist DJ speak with L.P.
Even if I accept that V.H. did not have contact information for L.P. before this date, she now had L.P.’s contact information, about four months before the Adoption Order was granted.
- Later in December 2021, by V.H.’s own evidence, the parties separated while V.R.K. was still in the DR.
V.H. took no steps as the Applicant in the Adoption Application to inform the Court of this critical change in the relationship status.
188On his part, although V.R.K. returned to Canada in February 2022 he too, took no steps to determine if the adoption had been finalized and what, if anything, he could do to inform the Court of the change in the status of his relationship with V.H. or that he no longer consented to the adoption.
189It was incumbent on him to take immediate steps upon his return to Canada in 2022, and he failed to do so.
190When questioned about this at trial, he simply stated that he did not think the Adoption Order would be granted without the biological mother’s consent. This, despite the fact that he had sworn an affidavit seeking to dispense with her consent.
191The Court, therefore, continued to operate on basis that the information contained in the Adoption Application and the accompanying affidavits was accurate and current.
192The true aggrieved party is L.P.
193Unfortunately, despite several opportunities, L.P. did not take the steps necessary to file a proper Answer in this Court. Her evidence on whether or not an Answer was prepared on her instructions is not credible. At questioning that occurred in March 2024 she claimed that a signature on what was purported to be her Answer was forged and at trial she claimed that some part of the Answer was signed by her, and other parts were not. In any event, even that Answer was never filed.
194Accordingly, the Court is left with no pleadings and formal claims made by L.P.
195The following additional principles further inform my decision not to set aside the Adoption Order:
Although the law governing adoptions in Ontario changed from the CFSA to the CYFSA in 2018, the section as relating to finality of adoption orders remained unchanged as between the two legislations.
There have been other amendments to the CYFSA since, but section 216(1) has remained unchanged. Notably, fraud has never been identified within this section of the legislation as a factor to be considered when determining whether an adoption order should be set aside.
In these circumstances, I resolve the tension between the subordinate legislation i.e. Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules and CYFSA statute i.e. section 216 (1), in favour of the statute, in keeping with the clear intention of the legislature.
If I am incorrect in my analysis and I can rely on Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules instead of the clear wording in the CYFSA to set aside an adoption order obtained by fraud, I am nevertheless satisfied that my application of the law should be consistent with the adoption legislation in provinces such as Alberta and British Columbia. Those statutes expressly provide that, even where fraud is established, an adoption order may be set aside only if doing so is in the child’s best interests.
This approach is entirely consistent with the overarching purpose of the CYFSA, which is to advance the best interests, protection, and well‑being of children.
196I have no difficulty in finding that setting aside the Adoption Order would not be in DJ’s best interest.
197I will undertake a comprehensive analysis of the best‑interests test when determining parenting orders. That analysis applies equally to my conclusion that the Adoption Order should not be set aside.
Decision-making Responsibility
198V.H. seeks sole decision-making responsibility DJ and EF.
199V.R.K. seeks sole decision-making responsibility for DJ and joint decision-making responsibility for EF along with V.H.
200In making any parenting orders in this matter, the Court is guided by Section 16 of the Divorce Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.)) which reads as follows:
Best interests of child
16 (1) The court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order or a contact order.
Primary consideration
(2) When considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), the court shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
Factors to be considered
(3) In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
Factors relating to family violence
(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph (3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
Past conduct
(5) In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a contact order.
Parenting time consistent with best interests of child
(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
201Having considered each of the relevant factors listed above, I have little difficulty in concluding that V.H. should have sole decision-making responsibility for both children.
202By all accounts, L.P. was DJ’s caregiver only for a few months after his birth. DJ’s primary caregiver in the DR was his paternal grandmother, A.R. There is ample evidence before the Court that prior to DJ’s immigration to Canada, it is A.R. who took care of his needs, including registering him at school, immunizations etc.
203I also find that after V.H. and V.R.K. commenced their relationship, and even before DJ immigrated to Canada, V.H. took on a significant interest in DJ’s care and schooling. She communicated with R.A. on a regular basis by text and provided funds to V.R.K. and R.A. to obtain school and other supplies for DJ.
204While V.R.K. may have spent time with DJ, I find that V.R.K. was content to leave much of the responsibility related to DJ’s care to his mother while DJ was in the DR.
205Through the two weeks of trial, the Court heard very little testimony from V.R.K. related to specifics of what steps he took towards discharging his responsibility to care for DJ through most of DJ’s life. His testimony in this regard, consistent by and large of broad statements asserting the fact that he is DJ’s father and, therefore, it should be obvious to the Court that he cared for DJ and was responsible for him.
206Other witnesses called by V.R.K. provided similar accounts, but their evidence offered little assistance to the Court, given that it was largely historical, even if accurate.
207In contrast, V.H.’s evidence in this regard was specific and included significant details surrounding the steps that she took.
208Since DJ’s immigration to Canada, it is V.H. who has cared for and met all of DJ’s physical, developmental, psychological and financial needs including the following:
a. Registering DJ in school
b. Being with him during online schooling during COVID-19
c. Adding him to her medical benefits plan
d. Ensuring he is followed by a family doctor
e. Ensuring that he received extensive dental treatment
f. Ensuring that he participates in activities including soccer and art
g. When it became necessary and at the recommendation of the family doctor, ensuring that DJ had support of a psychotherapist, Karine Roy.
209V.R.K. asserts that V.H. made unilateral decisions relating to DJ.
210To illustrate this point, V.R.K. in his direct testimony focused on two aspects.
211First, he expressed outrage and displeasure about V.H. baptizing DJ in a Catholic church without his knowledge or involvement, even though DJ had already been baptized in the DR. He asserted that a second baptism is a sin in his religion.
212V.R.K.’s evidence in this regard was entirely discredited in cross examination.
213V.H. put into evidence, pictures of V.R.K. being present at DJ’s baptism in Canada.
214In response, initially, V.R.K. acknowledged that the pictures seemed to depict an event at a church, that the person in the pictures “appeared” to be him, and that the water contained in the baptismal font “looked like water” but that there was no way to tell that it was “holy water”.
215In his re-direct examination that occurred the following morning, V.R.K. started by acknowledging that the event was indeed a baptism, that he was present during the event and that he had simply forgotten that it had occurred. He stated that he had made a mistake and when he saw the pictures his memory was refreshed.
216I do not accept V.R.K.’s explanation. Contrary to his evidence during re-direct, the pictures put to him did not refresh his memory. In fact, he doubled down to make statements that defy common sense.
217V.R.K. is an intelligent man. Having had time to think over his testimony overnight, his explanation during his re-direct examination was a weak attempt to resurrect his credibility before the Court.
218In fact, as it turns out, DJ had not been baptized in the DR. Both R.A. and L.P. testified that children in the DR are not baptized until they are 12 years old. Instead, children are “presented” at the church. DJ was presented at their church. It appears that V.R.K. was unaware of this nuance, although he testified that this religious event in the DR was significant for DJ.
219V.R.K.’s strongest objection to V.H. making unilateral decision for DJ related to DJ receiving services from his psychotherapist, Ms. Karine Roy. I will deal with this separately as it relates more to the issue of parenting time between DJ and V.R.K.
220As for EF, by the time EF was born, the parents had separated. V.H. did not expressly inform V.R.K. about EF’s birth. He says that he learnt about EF’s birth when the parties attended Court for a Case Conference in December 2022.
221V.H. does not deny that she did not inform V.R.K. of EF’s birth. She says that he was aware of her pregnancy, that she announced EF’s birth on her social media and that there was nothing preventing him from asking her about EF’s birth, but that he chose not to do so.
222In making these claims, V.H. states that V.R.K. was unhappy when he learnt that EF was going to be a girl child and that he preferred a boy instead and, hence his lack of interest.
223I do not find this assertion to have any merit. V.R.K. simply stated that, in his view, it is easier to raise a boy than a girl. This statement on his part does not lead me to conclude that he was disappointed that EF is a girl child.
224Regardless, the evidence before the Court is uncontested that V.H. has made all major decisions relating to EF since her birth and, in fact, V.R.K. has shown little interest in EF. His focus has essentially been on returning to the DR with DJ.
225Communication between the parties after V.R.K. returned to Canada in February 2022 have been notably poor.
226V.R.K. has made threats to V.H. and her family via texts and voice-notes by and large related to her unwillingness to allow him to leave with DJ to the DR.
227In fact, other than communications between counsel as relating to choice of a psychotherapist for DJ, there is little evidence before the Court that the parties communicated in any meaningful manner about the children’s needs.
228Other than some issues that DJ has experienced connected to parenting time with his father, by and large both DJ and EF are doing well. Each child’s needs were met at every stage of their development by V.H.
229On his part, V.R.K. has not presented a plan to meet the needs of the children other than to say that DJ will spend his time between the DR and Canada.
230In these circumstances and having considered all the best interest factors in section 16 of the Divorce Act, I see no basis to change the Interim Order of October 4, 2023, granting V.H. sole decision-making responsibility for both children.
231The only aspect on which I make a specific order as relating to education of the children is to require V.H. to ensure that the children attend Spanish language classes offered through their school board or via private lessons.
Parenting Time
232V.H.’s pleadings do not specify a parenting time schedule between V.R.K. and the children.
233At trial V.H. asked that parenting time between V.R.K. and the children occur as agreed between the parties in advance and in writing. Specifically with regards to DJ, she sought that his views and preferences be taken into account along with recommendations made by DJ’s psychotherapist, Karine Roy or any other psychotherapist treating DJ.
234In his pleadings, V.R.K. seeks primary caregiving of DJ and supervised parenting time between DJ and V.H. He makes a claim for “liberal parenting time” with EF but does not provide any details. In his testimony, he did not address any aspects of parenting time with EF including a specific schedule.
235It is undisputed that V.R.K. has not exercised parenting time with either DJ or EF as per the many Interim Orders made by this Court since October of 2022.
236V.R.K. provides two main reasons as to why he was not consistent with attending his supervised parenting time, either virtually or in person.
237First, he says that DJ was being influenced and manipulated by V.H. such that the virtual parenting time did not always go well, as DJ did not want to spend time on the virtual call.
238Second, V.R.K. noted that the expectation that he be supervised by a third-party during parenting time made him very uncomfortable.
239V.R.K. strongly objected to the fact that his parenting time was to occur on a supervised basis. The primary basis for this objection was that the interim parenting time orders “removed his rights as a parent” and the notion that he was a “threat” to his son was “ridiculous”.
240Many times during the trial, V.R.K. strongly and consistently stated the following:
a. I am not a criminal, I am not a violent person, there is no report that I abused my children.
b. I am educated, my mental faculties are appropriate, why should I be supervised when seeing my children.
c. My right as a father was not being respected. I don’t demand anything else or less than my rights as a father.
d. I have had to come to Court to ask for my rights as a father which are naturally, biologically, anthropologically and socially mine.
e. As a father I do not need to prove anything because I have already proved it.
241V.R.K. does not seem to appreciate that the primary basis for supervised virtual parenting time order, initially made by Justice Parfett on October 20, 2022, was because he had made it clear that his intention was to leave Canada with DJ. Justice Parfett makes a specific note of this in her Endorsement.
242It is only as time went by, and V.R.K. began to exercise some supervised parenting time with DJ, that additional issues came to light in terms of the impact that this parenting time was having on DJ, thereby requiring ongoing supervision.
243These issues included DJ’s behaviour deteriorating in school, difficulties with emotional regulation and his struggles with V.R.K.’s inconsistent attendance.
244It is primarily because of these issues that DJ began seeing a psychotherapist, Karine Roy.
Karine Roy – DJ’s Psychotherapist
245Ms. Roy testified in this trial as a participant expert.
246Before I deal with her testimony in the context of parenting time between DJ and V.R.K. I will address the objections made by V.R.K. related to Ms. Roy’s involvement with DJ and his allegation that she lacked neutrality.
247V.R.K.’s main objections include the following:
a. Ms. Roy was selected unilaterally by V.H.
b. Ms. Roy was retained and paid for by V.H. and, therefore, is beholden to V.H. in how she approached DJ’s treatment and the recommendations she made.
c. Ms. Roy has never made efforts to contact or obtain information from him while treating DJ.
248V.H. testified that she identified Ms. Roy after the family doctor recommended that DJ receive some support to deal with his mental health. Specifically, V.H. states that DJ began experiencing anxiety when virtual parenting time with V.R.K. commenced.
249Via his counsel, V.R.K. objected to DJ seeing Ms. Roy without input from him as to choice of psychotherapist.
250Notwithstanding this objection, DJ began seeing Ms. Roy.
251DJ benefitted greatly from Ms. Roy’s support, including being able to manage the parenting time interactions with V.R.K.
252It is undisputed that V.H. has paid for Ms. Roy’s services. V.R.K. asks this Court to find that this, in itself, is sufficient to taint Ms. Roy’s neutrality, such that the Court should simply disregard her entire testimony.
253I disagree.
254Ms. Roy is a Registered Psychotherapist and a Member of the College of Registered Psychotherapists of Ontario (CRPO) since 2022. She spoke about her qualifications, training and certification programs that she has taken over the years. Of note, she spoke about a specific training program that she completed in 2021 related to Integrated Trauma and Attachment Treatment Model (ITATM) through which she developed skills to treat trauma in children in a safe manner.
255Ms. Roy has worked with children since the beginning of her career.
256Suffice to say that Ms. Roy was well qualified to support DJ.
257I found Ms. Roy to be a competent mental health professional with clear understanding of her role. Her testimony was well within the parameters of her role as DJ’s treating psychotherapist.
258Ms. Roy acknowledged that she accepted DJ as her client despite not having input from V.R.K. She noted that psychotherapists are governed by strict parameters put in place by CRPO in this regard and give priority to needs and safety of the child.
259Ms. Roy spoke with V.H. to obtain initial information. She also connected with DJ’s doctor and school. When it became clear to her that DJ needed tools to navigate the challenges he was facing, she placed his need as the priority over the involvement of both parents in the process.
260Ms. Roy told V.H. that V.R.K. could reach out to her if he had any questions.
261Despite rigorous cross examination I find Ms. Roy’s neutrality was not undermined.
262Ms. Roy was a dispassionate witness. It is clear from her evidence that she was focused entirely on DJ’s best interest and worked hard to assist him with tools to manage his emotions, including as they relate to his relationship with V.R.K.
263Ms. Roy began seeing DJ in October 2022. At the time of trial, she had completed approximately sixty sessions with DJ.
264Other than the first few sessions when V.H. was present at the beginning to provide some comfort to DJ, all sessions were private with only Ms. Roy and DJ being present.
265V.H. had filed several affidavits and letters from Ms. Roy during the course of this litigation. Excluding any hearsay contained in those documents, Ms. Roy adopted the contents of those affidavits and letters as her testimony. These include:
Letter dated January 19, 2023
Affidavit sworn March 20, 2023
Letter dated June 14, 2023
Affidavit sworn September 27, 2023
Affidavit sworn August 26, 2024
Affidavit sworn February 25, 2025.
266To be clear, in assessing Ms. Roy’s testimony I have not considered any hearsay statements for truth of their contents including statements made by DJ, V.H., DJ’s schoolteachers, DJ’s family doctor etc.
267Although a voir dire was held with respect to a couple of statements made by DJ to Ms. Roy, I do not find it necessary to admit those statements for the truth of their contents. There is sufficient direct evidence on the basis of which I am able to reach conclusions on the issue of parenting time between DJ and V.R.K.
268At most, any hearsay statements, including those identified during the voir dire have simply provided context for Ms. Roy’s direct observations and work with DJ.
269Ms. Roy described DJ as an articulate, curious and spontaneous child. She used different modalities to connect with DJ including play therapy, art therapy, cognitive behavioural therapy, dialectical behavioural therapy and other activity based therapeutic exercises.
270Ms. Roy usually engaged in open-ended conversations with DJ in a setting that was child appropriate. She was also vigilant about DJ being potentially influenced by V.H.
271Ms. Roy’s testimony essentially speaks to the following:
a. Soon after virtual parenting time commenced between V.R.K. and DJ, DJ began having nightmares.
b. DJ was triggered by people raising their voice at him.
c. DJ was having conflicts with his classmates in school.
d. DJ was both angry and sad after phone calls with his father.
e. She observed DJ regress during sessions when speaking about the calls with his father, including on one occasion when he hid under a table.
f. DJ wanted a relationship with his father but was afraid because his father had mentioned that he would take DJ to the DR.
g. DJ became angry with V.H. because she was encouraging him to give his father a chance.
272Initially, given the behaviours that DJ was presenting and V.R.K.’s inconsistent attendance, Ms. Roy recommended that virtual parenting time be suspended temporarily.
273Ms. Roy then worked with DJ’s school to develop a safety plan.
274Ms. Roy’s work with DJ developed slowly as he began to trust her and respond to the tools that she was empowering him with during her sessions. Over time, DJ was able to express his emotions, understand the reasons behind his emotions and use the tools that he had learnt during the therapy sessions to better regulate his emotions.
275When parenting time was re-instated, knowing that her letters and affidavits were part of the litigation, and that V.R.K. would see her documents, she made specific recommendations applicable to V.R.K, including:
a. Demonstrating a willingness to participate in calls.
b. Acknowledging DJ’s worries.
c. Repairing their relationship.
d. Being proactive and engaged during the calls.
276V.R.K. chose not to engage with Ms. Roy.
277When he was questioned about this during his cross examination, first he claimed that he was not aware of any of Ms. Roy’s letters or documents filed in these Court proceedings despite the fact that he has been actively engaged in the litigation process.
278Following a series of questions where he acknowledged that each document provided by Ms. Roy had contact details including phone and email, he fell back on his assertion that she was not a neutral professional. He asserted that well-known psychologists like Freud and Jung would find the therapeutic approach taken by Ms. Roy to be problematic and that there would be little point in him reaching out to Ms. Roy as she would simply parrot V.H.’s assertions.
Parenting Time & Best Interest Analysis
279It is with this background in mind that I consider the best interest factors outlined in section 16 of the Divorce Act.
280Based on the testimony of V.H., V.R.K., A.R., L.P. and L.A. (V.R.K.’s cousin) I make the following findings relevant to the best interest analysis:
V.R.K. has not seen DJ in person since May 2024. His last virtual call with DJ was on April 13, 2025.
At various points in this litigation, V.R.K. has chosen not to continue to exercise parenting time pursuant to interim parenting orders, primarily because he felt that supervision did not accord with his rights as a parent.
V.H. is the parent who provides both children a sense of physical, emotion and psychological safety, security and well being.
Since DJ was at least 5 years old, it is V.H. who has met his needs and ensured that he has stability. For EF, she has met those needs since birth.
It is clear that both children are attached to V.H.
EF does not know her father.
DJ’s relationship with his father is fraught with complications that requires ongoing therapeutic work.
DJ and EF have a strong sibling connection.
V.H. has taken some steps to encourage DJ to have a relationship with his father, more specifically, as it relates to complying with the interim parenting orders.
V.H. did not take steps to ensure that EF would have a relationship with her father. Immediately following her birth, V.H. excluded V.R.K. from all aspects related to EF. She says that she did so because she made a determination that it was not in EF’s best interest. Unfortunately, this meant that V.R.K. has built no relationship with EF. That said, V.R.K. has not sought a relationship with EF either.
DJ is a bi-racial child. His first language until he moved from the DR to Canada was Spanish. For the past five years, V.H. has raised DJ in a Franco-Ontarian home.
V.H. tries to speak Spanish from time to time with the children, but DJ has started to forget some of his Spanish. This is one the reasons the phone/video calls between DJ and V.R.K. did not go well as DJ would not always understand what his father was saying to him and that would upset V.R.K.
V.H. has taken some steps to preserve the children’s cultural heritage including their Dominican heritage. She cooks some special dishes from the DR in their home, celebrates King’s Day, engages the children in bachata dance, and has T-shirts for them with both the Canadian and the DR flag.
V.R.K.’s plan for DJ to share his time between the DR and Ottawa lacked any meaningful detail. Other than the fact that R.A. has sufficient financial resources, an appropriate and safe home in the DR where DJ can live and attend school, there were no further details. It is unclear who DJ’s health care providers will be, when he will see V.H. and his half sister EF, and who would pay for his travel back and forth. In short, the plan proposed is not realistic nor viable.
The evidence before the Court as to V.R.K.’s own ability to meet DJ’s needs was minimal. At best, the Court is able to discern that he was part of DJ’s paternal family before DJ immigrated to Canada and that he spent time with DJ while DJ’s primary caregiver was R.A.
V.R.K. has not complied with Court orders made in these proceedings. He has not provided financial disclosure pursuant to Associate Justice Fortier’s order of December 14, 2022, he has not paid several costs orders made against him, he has chosen not to exercise parenting time pursuant to interim orders.
281I conclude that V.R.K.’s plan before this Court does not focus on DJ’s best interest. Instead, it focused on his rights as a parent and L.P.’s rights as DJ’s biological mother, which only gained relevance in his mind when L.P. commenced a proceeding in the DR.
282V.R.K.’s participation in this proceeding has been motivated, by the proceedings initiated by L.P. in the DR and the impact that this may have on his ability to visit and/or live in the DR.
283In these circumstances, I find that it is in DJ’s best interest for V.R.K.’s parenting time to occur in Ottawa and on a supervised basis, once per week commencing with virtual parenting time.
284Such parenting time shall begin after V.R.K. engages with Ms. Roy (or another psychotherapist who may have taken over from Ms. Roy) to craft a plan to reinstate parenting time on terms that account for DJ’s well-being through the transition process.
285After V.R.K. has exercised consistent parenting time with DJ for a year and abides by the recommendation of DJ’s psychotherapist, the need for supervision may be reviewed, subject to V.R.K. depositing DJ’s DR passport with the Court.
286I make no order as relating to parenting time between V.R.K. and EF as there is simply no evidence before the Court on the basis of which I can make such an order.
287DJ was born and raised in the DR until he was five years old. He had a connection with L.P. and R.A. As DJ ages he may express an interest in his birth country, maternal and paternal extended family.
288Although there are no formal claims made by L.P. or R.A. before this Court, I find that it is in DJ’s best interest to leave the door open for some potential contact in the future, with them, at his discretion.
289A detailed Decision-making, Parenting Time and contact order is contained in the Orders section of this decision.
Child Support & Section 7 Expenses
290V.H. seeks child support for the benefit of both children based on V.R.K.’s actual income or minimum wage, whichever is greater. She also seeks to share Section 7 expenses proportionate to their respective incomes.
291V.R.K. has paid no child support for either child. His evidence is that he cannot afford to pay child support or section 7 expenses because he has no income and that he is not able to earn an income due to health issues.
292By his own testimony, V.R.K. is an industrious man. In the DR he held many jobs and earned a good income. He was a police officer, worked as an entertainer in a resort, was an animator and ran a business selling merchandise. He stated with evident pride that he had no difficulty providing for his son and meeting all his needs.
293However, once he came to Canada, he did little to continue to meet some of those responsibilities.
294While I do not discount the barriers that a new immigrant may face in obtaining employment, I find that there is no evidence before this Court that V.R.K. made any independent attempts at all to obtain and maintain employment.
295A few months after V.R.K. immigrated to Canada, V.H. found employment for him with an insulation company and then at a meat packaging factory. V.R.K. was not able to keep either of these jobs for long.
296V.R.K. now claims that he is unwell and cannot work.
297Other than his own testimony that he is dealing with some health issues that impede his ability to seek and maintain employment, the Court had no medical evidence either in the form of documents or testimony from medical professionals.
298Without independent evidence, I am not prepared to rely entirely on V.R.K.’s testimony to absolve him of all child support obligations.
299V.H. has borne the financial responsibility for both children entirely on her own.
300I find that V.H.’s request for ongoing child support and proportionately sharing section 7 expenses for the children to be reasonable.
301V.H. makes a claim for arrears in child support and section 7 expenses.
302V.H. has calculated child support based on minimum wage income for each year following separation. The total arrears up to and including September 2025 are $23,022. V.H. is prepared to fix the arrears at $20,000.
303I grant this order with the caveat that the child support arrears shall be paid by V.R.K. in equal monthly instalments of $150.00 until it is fully paid.
304Over the years V.H. has incurred expenses that are not covered by her benefits including dental and therapy expenses for DJ and occupational therapy expenses for EF.
305V.H. has also incurred reasonable day care expenses for EF so that she can continue to maintain her own employment.
306Finally, V.H. has incurred reasonable expenses towards extracurricular activities for the children including swimming, soccer, dance, summer camps etc.
307On August 18, 2025, V.H. served upon V.R.K. four Requests to Admit. These Requests were categorized as follows:
Request to Admit (facts)
Request to Admit (genuineness)
Request to Admit (Vero Income)
Request to Admit (S.7)
308On September 8, 2025 V.R.K. responded only to the Request to Admit (facts).
309As relating to the Request to Admit for Section 7 expenses, V.H. included all receipts. V.R.K. did not file a Response to this Request to Admit, nor did he contest any of these facts at trial.
310I find that the expenses incurred by V.H. for the children are section 7 expenses and are reasonable.
311Accordingly, I fix the arrears of section 7 expenses up to and including July 2025 in the amount of $6000. This amount shall be paid by V.R.K. in equal monthly instalments of $150 until the arrears are paid off completely.
Non-Harassment Order
312V.H. seeks a mutual non-harassment order. She states that following separation, V.R.K. has harassed her on social media, threatened her via voice-notes and sent her text messages in which he stated, “you need to die, you and your family”.
313Her testimony in this regard was uncontested. V.R.K. did not offer an explanation for these texts.
314There needs to be some communication between V.H. and V.R.K. to allow for planning of V.R.K.’s parenting time with DJ. However, this communication should be limited and in writing via email.
315Given the parenting order that the Court is making, there is no reason for the two parties to maintain extensive contact with each other which, in turn, may expose the children to conflict.
316I am, therefore, prepared to grant a straightforward mutual non-harassment order. To be clear, this is not a Restraining Order.
Divorce
317V.H. and V.R.K. have been separated for well over a year.
318V.H. has filed the necessary documents for a Divorce Order to be granted. The Divorce Order shall contain the parenting and support provisions.
Order
319The Court makes the following final Order:
Divorce
- The parties are hereby divorced.
Adoption Order
- V.R.K.’s claims relating to setting aside the Adoption Order of Justice Mackinnon dated November 1, 2021, are hereby dismissed
Decision-making Responsibility
V.H. shall have sole decision-making responsibility for the children DJ and EF (full legal names and dates of birth may be included in the Form 25A order).
V.H. shall ensure that both children shall attend Spanish language lessons through their school board(s) or by private lessons. The cost, if any, associated with these language lessons shall be deemed a section 7 expense.
V.H. shall be permitted to obtain a passport for the children without V.R.K.’s consent or signature.
V.H. shall be permitted to travel with the children outside of Canada without V.R.K.’s consent.
Communication
V.H. and V.R.K. shall communicate with each other via email. Within 7 days of this Order, the parties shall exchange e-mail addresses at which they can receive and respond to communications relating to the children.
All communication shall be child focused and shall include disclosure to be exchanged for the purposes of calculating child support and section 7 expenses each year.
In the event DJ’s psychotherapist changes from Ms. Karine Roy, V.H. shall provide V.R.K. with all contact details for the new psychotherapist.
Parenting Time
V.R.K. shall have virtual supervised parenting time with DJ once per week each Thursday (or another day as agreed to between the parties) from 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Such parenting time shall be arranged after V.R.K. engages with Karine Roy (or another psychotherapist who may have taken over from Ms. Roy) to craft a plan to reinstate parenting time.
After V.R.K. has exercised consistent virtual parenting time with DJ for six months and abided by the recommendation of DJ’s psychotherapist, subject to further recommendations made by Ms. Roy (or another psychotherapist who may have taken over from Ms. Roy) he may begin to exercise supervised in-person parenting time.
After V.R.K. has exercised consistent in-person supervised parenting time for a further period of six months, the need for supervision may be reviewed subject to:
a. Recommendations made by Ms. Roy (or another psychotherapist who may have taken over from Ms. Roy).
b. V.R.K. depositing DJ’s DR passport with the Court.
All supervision shall be carried out by a professional supervised program/facilitator.
Any costs associated with supervised parenting time shall be borne equally by the parties.
In the event V.R.K. does not exercise the above ordered parenting time consistently, i.e. he misses 3 scheduled parenting times in a 5-week period, his parenting time with DJ shall occur at V.H.’s discretion.
V.H. shall exercise such discretion in keeping with recommendations made by DJ’s psychotherapist.
Possibility of Contact between DJ and L.P and/or R.A
- If and when DJ makes such a request, V.H. shall facilitate virtual contact between DJ and L.P. and/or R.A. To allow for this to occur, within 14 days of this order, V.R.K. shall provide current phone number for L.P. and R.A. to V.H.
Child Support
- For the purposes of determining child support for DJ and EF, V.R.K.’s income shall be the greater of:
a. His actual income; or
b. the Government of Ontario's current minimum wage multiplied by 40 hours per week multiplied by 50 weeks per year.
Commencing on April 1, 2026, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter, V.R.K. shall pay V.H. $536.48 as child support for the benefit of the children based on Ontario Government's current minimum wage multiplied by 40 hours per week multiplied by 50 weeks per year, being $35,200.
The parties shall adjust the Table amount of child support paid each calendar year based on the parties’ respective income for the previous calendar year as follows:
a. By no later than June 1 of each year, the parties shall exchange copies of their income tax return, as filed, for the prior calendar year (the “applicable calendar year”) and notice of assessment upon receipt.
b. The parties shall then determine their respective Table child support amount for the applicable calendar year, in accordance with the Guidelines. The parties shall also review any changes to the current minimum wage rate set by the Ontario Government to properly confirm the respondent's income for ongoing child support purposes. Any change in the amount of child support shall be effective on July 1 every year.
By no later than June 1 of each year, the parties shall exchange copies of their income tax return, as filed, for the prior calendar year (the “applicable calendar year”) and notice of assessment upon receipt. The first review shall occur on June 1, 2027.
The parties shall then determine their respective Table child support amount for the applicable calendar year, in accordance with the Guidelines. The parties shall also review any changes to the current minimum wage rate according to the Ontario Government to properly confirm the respondent's income for ongoing child support purposes. Any change in the amount of child support shall be effective on July 1 every year.
Section 7 Expenses
Commencing October 1, 2025, the parties shall share, in proportion to their respective incomes as determined pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, special and extraordinary expenses (as contemplated by section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines) after taking into account any tax deductions or credits associated with the special and extraordinary expenses incurred by either parent for the benefit of a child who is entitled to support. V.H.’s current proportionate share is 69.6% and the V.R.K.’s current proportionate share is 30.4%.
Within 14 days of providing any section 7 receipt(s) to V.R.K., he shall reimburse his proportionate share of the expense to V.H.
At the time of the annual review for child support, the parties shall also determine and update accordingly the proportionate ratio for sharing the children's ongoing section 7 expenses.
Arrears for section 7 expenses for up to and including September 30, 2025, are fixed in the amount of $6000. This amount shall be paid by V.R.K. in equal monthly installments of $150 until the arrears are paid off completely.
Section 7 arrears between October 1, 2025, and March 31, 2026, shall be calculated after V.H. has provided necessary receipts and disclosure to V.R.K. So long as the expenses incurred are reasonable section 7 expenses such as dental and medical payments not covered via V.H.’s benefits, any day care expenses and no more than one extra-curricular activity per child, these arrears shall be added to the arrears owed above and paid as part of the equal monthly installments of $150.00.
To be clear, V.R.K. shall pay the $300.00 per month (towards child support and Section 7 arrears) in addition to the ongoing child support amount.
Life Insurance
V.R.K. shall apply for a life insurance policy, in the amount of $50,000, designating V.H. as beneficiary in trust for the children. He shall take any medical examinations or tests required to obtain the policy.
As long as V.R.K. is obligated to pay child support to V.H., as security for his child support obligations he shall:
a. keep the policy in force;
b. not borrow against the policy and shall ensure that the policy remains unencumbered; and
c. irrevocably designate and maintain V.H. as a beneficiary in trust for the children for the $50,000 of the proceeds of the policy.
Within thirty (30) days of this Order, V.R.K. shall provide V.H. a copy of the life insurance policy and the irrevocable beneficiary designation.
Within 14 days of each anniversary date of the policy, V.R.K. shall provide V.H. proof that he has paid the premium.
When V.R.K.’s obligation to pay child support to V.H. terminates, his obligation to maintain the policy and to maintain V.H. as the irrevocable beneficiary of the policy ends. V.H. shall execute any documentation necessary to release the irrevocable beneficiary designation. If V.H. refuses to release the irrevocable beneficiary designation, V.R.K. may obtain a court order directing the insurer to do so. V.H. shall be responsible for the costs that V.R.K. may incur in obtaining such an order.
Mutual Non-Harassment
- Neither V.H. nor V.R.K. shall harass or speak ill of the other in the presence of the children or attend each other’s homes or places of work without the other’s consent.
General Terms
Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Office of the Director of the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the support order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.
This order bears post-judgment interest at a rate of 4 % per annum effective from the date of this Order. Where there is a default in payment, the payment in default shall bear interest only from the date of default.
Costs
320V.H. is clearly the successful party in this trial.
321If the parties are unable to resolve costs, as the successful party, V.H. shall file written costs submissions not exceeding five pages, double spaced, twelve font size, excluding Bill of Costs and any Offers to Settle by April 10, 2026.
322V.R.K. shall file his costs submissions by May 1, 2026. His submissions shall also not exceed five pages, double spaced, twelve font size, excluding Bill of Costs and any Offers to Settle.
323Costs submissions are to be sent to scj.assistants@ontario.ca marked to my attention.
Justice V. Naik
Date: March 23, 2026
The Applicant sought various orders under the Divorce Act, while the Respondent sought, among other relief, an order setting aside an Adoption Order made pursuant to s. 199(2)(c) of the Children, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA). A significant portion of the trial evidence concerned the Adoption Application and the resulting Adoption Order.
In light of the publication prohibition set out in s. 87(8) of the CYFSA, I find it appropriate to use initials for the parties, the children, and any witnesses who are members of the child(ren)’s family.
Footnotes
- Note on initializing names – The parties did not request anonymizing of names. I have nevertheless chosen to do so on my own initiative.
- See: R. v. D.R. 1996 207 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291; R. v. J.H. 2005 ONCA 253; Zaidi v. Zia 2026 ONSC 291; J.M.G. v. L.D.G., 2016 ONSC 3042; Christakos v. De Caires, 2016 ONSC 702; R. v. Mah 2002 NSCA 99; Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 252 (BC CA), 1951 Carswell BC 133
- M.A. v. C.P., 2010 ONSC 5481
- As opposed to adoption legislation in Alberta and British Columbia, both of which account for adoption orders obtained by fraud
- Gray v. Gray, 2017 ONCA 100
- Gupta v. Gupta, 2019 ONSC 20; Hatuka v. Segal, 2017 ONSC 5623; Mohamed v. Mohamed, 2018 ONCJ 530
- For points 3 to 12 – See: P.M. v. S.M., 2014 ONCJ 496; Hutter v. Hutter, 2024 ONSC 785; Anker v. Sattaur, [2007] O.J. NO. 5257 ; Rosati v. Reggimenti, 2018 ONSC 2; Gupta v. Gupta 2019 ONSC 20; Hatuka v. Segal 2017 ONSC 5623; Russell v. Thompson, 2021 CarswellOnt 189; Telford v. Waite, 2021 ONSC 2264; Mohamed v. Mohamed, 2018 ONCJ 530
- M.A. v. C.P., 2010 ONSC 5481
- P.H. v. Children and Family Services for York Region, 2010 ONSC 4686