R. v. Trask, 2026 ONSC 1593

CITATION: R. v. Trask, 2026 ONSC 1593

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-00000722-0000

DATE: 2026-03-17

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

Natasha Trask

M. Sokolski, for the Crown

K. Sajid, for the Defence

HEARD: February 27, 2026

Corrected decision: On March 19, 2026 corrections were made to typographical errors as underlined in paragraphs 1, 9 and 45. In para. 49 the word “plea” was removed in the first line.

No other changes to content were made.

THE HONOURABLE JUstice A. J. Ohler

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

1After a trial by judge and jury, on December 5, 2025, Natasha Trask was convicted of one count of failing to provide the necessaries of life pursuant to s. 215(3) of the Criminal Code. The victim was her adult, autistic brother, John-Paul Trask, referred to during trial and in these reasons as J.P.

2The Indictment reads:

Between the 1^st day of March in the year 2022, and the 17^th day of June in the year 2022, at the City of St. Catharines in the Central South Region, did, being under a legal duty as a person in charge of another person, namely John Paul Trask, to provide necessaries of life, as that other person was unable by reason of autism to withdraw from that charge and was unable to provide himself with necessaries of life and who was requiring all daily activities including administering medication, personal hygiene and nutritional sustenance, that, if not received would endanger his life, fail without lawful excuse to perform that duty, contrary to Section 215, subsection (3) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

3The maximum term of imprisonment, when prosecuted by indictment, is five years.

The facts of the offence

4J.P was born on November 22, 1995. At the time of trial, he was 30 years old. J.P is autistic, and non-verbal, though he can communicate his likes and dislikes. He takes daily medication to control seizures. It was not contested at trial that J.P. relies on others to provide him with the necessaries of life, including food, water, shelter, medical treatment and protection from harm.

5Until October 2021, J.P. lived with his mother, Leslie. He received regular visits from a personal support worker, Delvin Moore, arranged through Community Living Welland Pelham (“Community Living”). In March 2020, as a result of restrictions put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic, Mr. Moore was no longer able to provide support to J.P.

6Over the summer of 2021, Ms. Trask contacted Community Living with concerns about Leslie’s ability to care for J.P. She took videos inside Leslie’s home, which were made exhibits at trial. There is no question that Leslie’s home was dirty and to some extent, unsafe.

7Theresa Terreberry, Manager of the Family Support Program at Community Living, testified that with Leslie’s consent, the organization began to look for a group home for J.P. Until a group home could be found, Community Living supported J.P. living with Ms. Trask.

8In October 2021, J.P. moved in with Ms. Trask. At that time, she was living with her then- boyfriend, Shawn Running. He worked as a long-haul truck driver and needed to get sufficient sleep on his days off, which was difficult to do when J.P. was home. On days Running was at home, J.P. would stay with Leslie.

9Dustin Michaud, a friend of Ms. Trask, worked as a personal support worker for J.P. Michaud provided support at both Leslie’s and Ms. Trask’s homes.

10Both Mr. Running and Mr. Michaud testified that when J.P. moved in with Ms. Trask, he was very thin. Photographs taken by Ms. Trask around that time establish that he was indeed, very thin, with little muscle or fat on his limbs. These photos were made an exhibit at trial.

11For some months there was no concern as to Ms. Trask’s care of J.P. In the spring of 2022, things began to change. Ms. Trask testified that in March 2022, J.P. became ill and lost weight. Ms. Terreberry testified that in-person meetings with Ms. Trask and J.P. were cancelled or rescheduled to be conducted by videoconference because J.P. was unwell.

12On May 19, J.P. had a seizure at Ms. Trask’s home. She called an ambulance, and he was taken to the hospital. He was diagnosed with COVID-19. He stayed in the hospital for three days before he was released. Ms. Trask testified that the week before he had the seizure, J.P. was not well. He was refusing to eat and spitting out his seizure medication, which was administered as a liquid. While he was in the hospital, his medication was changed to a pill so that he could not spit it back out. Ms. Trask acknowledged that after his hospital stay, J.P. lost weight; she bought him protein drinks and shakes to try and build his reserves. His energy level was low, and he was lethargic; she did not take him to the doctor because he was symptomatic for COVID-19.

13In the spring of 2022, Ms. Trask was awaiting sentencing following a conviction under the Provincial Offences Act. The offence was one which could result in a term of imprisonment. Ms. Trask asked Ms. Terreberry for a letter she could provide to her lawyer, explaining that she was J.P.’s caregiver.

14Ms. Terreberry’s letter dated May 16, 2022, was made an exhibit at trial. It states that Ms. Trask was providing temporary care for J.P. while Community Living took steps to find a residential placement for him. The letter concludes: “in case of an emergency situation or if JP required immediate care a temporary location would be found within Niagara for JP to live.”

15On Friday, June 17, 2022, Ms. Trask was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and immediately taken into custody. Mr. Running testified that he did not know of any arrangements made for J.P.’s care. Both Mr. Running and J.P. were present in court on the day of the sentencing; Mr. Running took J.P. to their home.

16On Monday, June 20, Ms. Terreberry read in the newspaper that Ms. Trask had been incarcerated. She called Mr. Running, who advised that J.P. was with him at Ms. Trask’s home. Ms. Terreberry told Mr. Running that she was coming to pick up J.P.

17Ms. Terreberry described J.P. as very thin, gaunt, and weak. He put up no resistance to leaving with her. He needed physical support to walk to her car. Ms. Terreberry testified that J.P. smelled very badly of urine and his clothing was dirty. She took J.P. to the Community Living office and offered him food; he ate very quickly, shoving the food into his mouth.

18Community Living contacted Mr. Moore to assist in J.P.’s care. When Mr. Moore arrived, he fed J.P. then took him for a shower. As he undressed J.P., Mr. Moore saw his physical condition and decided to take photos to show his supervisor. These photos were made an exhibit at trial.

19The photos are difficult to describe. They are disturbing. J.P. appears to be in a state of extreme malnutrition and quite frankly, starvation. J.P.’s face is extremely thin; his cheekbones protrude, and his face is drawn. Every bone in his spinal column is visible. His shoulder blades and clavicle protrude. Every rib is visible, and his rib cage protrudes. His arms and legs are extremely thin; his kneecaps are larger than his thighbones. He has an open bedsore. His feet are red and swollen.

20Community Living did not take J.P. to hospital. Three days later, he was taken to see his family doctor. J.P. was prescribed an antibiotic for the bedsore and a water pill to reduce the swelling in his feet.

21J.P. resided in the respite suite at the Community Living office until September 2022, at which time he was placed in a group home. He had no trouble eating or drinking, though he would eat very quickly, increasing the risk of choking. He required training on how to eat and drink slowly and safely.

22A photograph of J.P. taken on the day he was moved to the group home shows him to be in a dramatically improved condition. His face is no longer thin and gaunt; his colour is robust. He has clearly gained a substantial amount of weight. It would appear J.P. has made a full recovery and has not suffered permanent damage to his health.

23There was no evidence at trial as to J.P.’s weight at the time he went into Ms. Trask’s care. I accept on the basis of the photos taken around that time, that he was extremely thin. There was no evidence at trial as to his weight on June 20, when Community Living took him into their care. However, having compared the photographs of J.P. shortly after he went into Ms. Trask’s care to those taken on June 17, it is obvious that J.P. lost a significant amount of weight. He is significantly malnourished, and quite obviously, starving.

24I find that the jury’s verdict establishes that Ms. Trask, without lawful excuse, failed to provide the necessaries of life to J.P. namely, to provide him with adequate nutritional sustenance from the period of March 1 to June 17, 2022.

Circumstances of the offender

25Ms. Trask is 31 years old. She does not have a criminal record.

26In her testimony at trial, Ms. Trask testified that she is older than J.P. by 13 months. She has an older half-sister, Kristen. Their mother Leslie was an alcoholic and so Kristen and Ms. Trask assumed responsibility for much of J.P.’s care. Her parents separated in 2009. The following year, the Children’s Aid Society removed both J.P. and Ms. Trask from Leslie’s home. In 2012, J.P. was returned to Leslie’s home. Ms. Trask did not return and has been on her own since 2010.

27In 2014, Ms. Trask graduated from Niagara College. She has been employed as a personal trainer but was not working at the time of sentencing.

28The defence filed two reference letters on the hearing. Richard Crossman, Ms. Trask’s roommate, has known Ms. Trask since 2022. He is a retired teacher. They met at church. Mr. Crossman writes that Ms. Trask is a wonderful roommate, a kind, caring and compassionate person who is always looking to help. She offered advice on stretches and exercises to assist Mr. Crossman with his arthritic knees. John Taylor, another friend from church, describes Ms. Trask as a caring person who spends time at his home with his children. Both Mr. Crossman and Mr. Taylor were aware of the charges and Ms. Trask’s conviction; both speak of her shame and regret for her actions.

29The defence also filed a letter from Melanie Fowler, a psychotherapist who treated Ms. Trask from 2021 to 2024. The letter is unusual, in that it is not on letterhead and is undated. It reads like a summary of clinical notes. Ms. Fowler recounts Ms. Trask’s history, including her experience of intimate partner violence and “recent” diagnosis of autism. I have considered this letter, though its frailties necessitate that it receives limited weight.

30Finally, the defence filed a letter from Haldimand & Norfolk Women’s Services, a non-profit organization offering services for women who have experienced abuse. On February 9, 2026, Ms. Trask attended an intake assessment and has been placed on a waitlist for a therapy program.

31Ms. Trask addressed the court and provided a letter which was made an exhibit on this hearing. She states that she accepts the jury’s verdict and responsibility for her actions; she apologizes to J.P. and acknowledges that she failed him. She discloses that she suffers from autism and PTSD, which makes it difficult for her to process prolonged periods of stress. She blames her failure to act on a period of overwhelming stress.

Victim impact

32Again, J.P. is autistic and non-verbal. He did not provide a victim impact statement on the hearing. I am prepared to infer that J.P. suffered as a result of his malnutrition and that his suffering would have occurred over a series of weeks, if not months.

The position of the parties

33The Crown asks this court to impose a sentence of 18 to 24 months imprisonment, to be followed by three years probation. In addition to the statutory conditions, the Crown asks this court to impose a counselling condition, no contact or communication with J.P., and not to act in a position of trust or caregiver for a vulnerable person. As s. 215(3) is a secondary designated offence, the Crown asks this court to order Ms. Trask to provide a sample of her DNA.

34For the Crown, the paramount sentencing principle must be denunciation and deterrence. While under Ms. Trask’s care, J.P. suffered extreme malnourishment and starvation. The only reason J.P.’s condition came to anyone’s attention was luck; had Ms. Terreberry not read of Ms. Trask’s incarceration in the newspaper the result and harm to J.P. may have been far worse.

35The Crown submits that a term of imprisonment is required in this case given the gravity of the offence and Ms. Trask’s high moral blameworthiness; Ms. Trask voluntarily took on responsibility for J.P., then without explanation, allowed him to starve. She failed to seek medical attention for him when it was obvious he was not thriving, despite having access to the staff at Community Living, and despite the availability of funds to pay for personal support workers.

36The Crown asks this court to find as an aggravating factor that Ms. Trask took steps to conceal his condition, cancelling in-person meetings and insisting they take place via Zoom. The Crown also asks this court to infer as an additional aggravating factor that Ms. Trask did not ask for help because she wanted to rely on her role as caregiver to obtain a non-carceral sentence for her conviction on the provincial offence charge. Finally, the Crown submits that as Ms. Trask paid her close friend to act as personal support worker for J.P. it is open to the court to infer a financial motivation for keeping J.P. in her care.

37The defence submits that an 18-to-24-month conditional sentence of imprisonment would be a proportionate sentence, given the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. Ms. Trask is a relatively youthful first-offender. For months, Ms. Trask provided appropriate care for J.P. She did not deny J.P. medical care; when he had a seizure, she called 911. The offence took place during the COVID-19 pandemic, when access to support services and in-person medical treatment was difficult to obtain.

38For the defence, there is no evidence Ms. Trask was attempting to keep J.P. in her care to obtain a benefit on sentencing. Similarly, there was no evidence at trial to establish that Ms. Trask received any financial benefit from being J.P.’s caregiver. Ms. Trask was simply overwhelmed by stress at that time in her life and did not intend to cause J.P. harm. Finally, J.P. has made a full recovery.

39The defence agrees that a three-year term of probation is appropriate and takes no issue with the conditions proposed by the Crown, non-communication or DNA order.

The principles of sentencing

40In determining the appropriate sentence for Ms. Trask, I must impose a sentence that gives effect to the fundamental purpose of sentencing, as set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code; to protect society and contribute to respect for the law, and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society.

41The sentence imposed must serve one or more of the objectives set out in s. 718:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

42Section 718.04 provides that when a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances, the court shall give primary consideration to the objective of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

43The fundamental principle of sentencing is codified in s. 718.1: a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

44A proportionate sentence is arrived at by considering all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. This includes the statutory aggravating factors set out in s. 718.2(a). The statutory aggravating factors relevant in this case include:

(ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a member of the offender’s family; and

(iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim;

45Finally, the principle of restraint is codified in s. 718.2(e) – that all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders. The principle of restraint includes that when incarceration is necessary, the court must impose the shortest sentence of imprisonment that will achieve the various purposes of sentencing: R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, 93 O.R. (3d) 643, at paras. 32-35; R. v. Ali, 2022 ONCA 736, 164 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 40-42; R. v. A.B. 2023 ONCA 254, at para. 55. The principle of restraint applies with particular force in sentencing a first offender: R. v. Priest (1996), 1996 1381 (ON CA), 30 O.R. (3d) 538 (C.A.), at p. 545, [1996] O.J. No. 3369 (C.A.), at para. 23.

The range of sentence for s. 215(3)

46While every case is unique, similar sentences should be imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances: see s. 718.2(b).

47A review of the cases provided by the parties establishes that sentences imposed for this offence range from lengthy conditional sentences up to the maximum five years imprisonment.

48Lengthy terms of imprisonment have been imposed where the victim of the offence has died, either as a direct result of the failure to provide necessaries of life, or shortly thereafter.

49In R. v. Lis, 2020 ONCA 551, the offender pled guilty to failing to provide the necessaries of life to her nine-year-old daughter. The victim was developmentally delayed due to cerebral palsy; she died as the result of complications of malnutrition and dehydration over a period of five-and-a-half weeks. The trial judge imposed a 17-month term of imprisonment.

50On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge failed to give primacy to denunciation and deterrence, as provided for in s. 718.01 of the Code, and failed to consider the five-year maximum sentence of imprisonment as an indication sentences for this offence must increase. In substituting a three-year sentence of imprisonment, the court found the duration of the offence was a factor warranting consideration in the assessment of the gravity of the offence and moral blameworthiness of the offender.

51In R. v. Davy, [2015] O.J. No. 939 (S.C.), a husband and wife were both convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to Mrs. Davy’s elderly mother, who suffered from dementia. The victim was in the charge of the offenders for close to three years. The offenders moved residence regularly, and kept the victim isolated from other members of the family. Mrs. Davy eventually called 911 for medical assistance for her mother; first responders found the victim emaciated, covered in bedsores, with a broken hip. After treatment in hospital, the victim was transferred to a nursing home where she passed away a few months later. The sentencing judge found that given the paramountcy of the principles of denunciation and deterrence, and the lack of insight demonstrated by the offenders, a conditional sentence of imprisonment would not be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offenders. The trial judge imposed a 12-month sentence of imprisonment for both.

52As another example, in R. v. Dahl, 2023 BCCA 336, the Court of Appeal overturned a conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed where a paid caregiver failed to provide the necessaries of life to her charge, resulting in the victim’s death. In that case, the offender had been the caregiver for a 55-year-old woman with Down Syndrome for many years; by all accounts, the two had a close, loving relationship. Over time, the victim began to show disinterest in food and eventually stopped eating. The offender believed that the victim was close to the end of her life; she did not obtain any medical assistance for the victim as she did not believe it would be in her interest to enter palliative care. The victim died of severe malnutrition. The court held that given the aggravating circumstances – including the abject vulnerability of the victim, significant breach of trust, and many months of starvation – a conditional sentence of imprisonment could not give effect to the primary sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence and a 15-month term of imprisonment was imposed.

53Terms of imprisonment have also been imposed in cases where the victim of the offence has made a full recovery. In R. v. Brush, 2022 BCSC 1194, a paid caregiver was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for failing to provide the necessaries of life to a non-verbal woman in her early 70s with significant physical and cognitive challenges. The offender had provided support services to the victim for nearly 13 years and was responsible for all aspects of her care. In that case, the offender had not brought the victim to her family doctor in almost two years. When she did bring her to the appointment, the victim was emaciated, dirty, unkempt, and had untreated bedsores. The victim required hospitalization but subsequently made a full recovery and was thriving at the time of sentencing. In imposing the term of imprisonment, the court noted that s. 718.04 required the court to give primacy to the principles of denunciation and deterrence, given the vulnerability of the victim. A term of imprisonment was required, given the offender’s high moral blameworthiness as a paid caregiver.

54The defence has provided a series of cases in which conditional sentences have been imposed. In every case, there were significant mitigating factors that contributed to the offence, including evidence that the offender suffered from mental health and/or substance abuse issues, and made efforts towards rehabilitation prior to sentencing. Each of these cases involved guilty pleas.

55For instance, in R. v. A.L., 2022 ONCJ 656 and R. v. M.M., 2022 ONCJ 657, a mother and father were sentenced to conditional sentences of imprisonment for failing to provide the necessaries of life to their two-year-old daughter. In A.L., the court found the mother’s struggles with post-partum depression, undiagnosed mental illness, and significant steps towards recovery were significant mitigating factors. In M.M., the court found as mitigating that the absent father did contact authorities to obtain medical assistance for the child, resulting in her full recovery.

56Similarly in R. v. N.G.H., 2020 SKPC 14, a mother and father were sentenced to conditional sentences of imprisonment for failing to provide the necessaries of life to their two children, both of whom made a full recovery. In that case, the court found the mitigating factors included extensive rehabilitative efforts taken by both parents to treat substance abuse and mental health issues.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

57There are three statutory aggravating factors present in this case.

58First, section 718.04 provides that when a court imposes a sentence for a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances, the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. The words “primary consideration” prescribes an ordering of sentencing objectives; while other sentencing objectives are still relevant and must be considered, the effect of s. 718.04 is that other sentencing objectives cannot be elevated to equal or higher priority: Lis, at paras. 47-48.

59I have no difficulty concluding that J.P. is a vulnerable person for the purpose of s. 718.04. He was, and is, entirely dependant on others for the necessaries of life.

60Second, pursuant to s. 718.2(iii), it is an aggravating factor that an offender is in a position of trust in relation to the victim.

61Ms. Trask was in a position of trust, having taken on responsibility for J.P.’s care. Indeed, her assumption of responsibility for J.P. when she was not obliged to do so, increases the gravity of the offence and her moral blameworthiness. Ms. Trask was not legally obligated to care for J.P.; she was not his parent, and he was not her child. Ms. Trask was not a paid caregiver. She voluntarily assumed responsibility for his care.

62I accept that Ms. Trask had valid concerns and good intentions in bringing J.P. into her home. From at least October 2021 to March 2022, Ms. Trask provided good care. Her later failure is unexplained. I accept that facing a term of incarceration is no doubt overwhelming and stressful, but it does not explain how Ms. Trask allowed her brother to deteriorate to the condition he was in on June 20, 2022.

63Ms. Trask had access to resources to assist in her care for J.P. As established at trial, there were funds available to pay for qualified personal support workers. Ms. Trask was well acquainted with the staff at Community Living. This is not a case of an unsophisticated or socially isolated individual who does not have the skills to access appropriate resources. While I accept that COVID-19 restrictions may have impacted access to some resources, the evidence at trial established that Community Living was able to arrange for J.P. to see his family doctor, in person, within three days.

64Third, pursuant to s. 718.02(ii) it is aggravating that Ms. Trask, in committing the offence, abused a member of her family.

65There are other aggravating factors in this case.

66In sentencing an offender for failing to provide the necessaries of life, the duration of time is a factor to be considered in assessing the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender: Lis, at para. 70. J.P.’s condition was not the result of a momentary lapse in judgment, or the product of being in the sole care of Mr. Running for three days. This was the product of a course of conduct over some weeks, if not months.

67However, I am not prepared to find as an aggravating factor that Ms. Trask took steps to deliberately conceal J.P.’s condition from Ms. Terreberry by cancelling appointments or insisting that they take place via Zoom; I simply cannot make that inference, given the evidence that Ms. Terreberry’s schedule made it difficult to arrange a convenient date, and that J.P. was actually unwell in May, requiring hospitalization. Nor am I prepared to find that Ms. Trask had a financial motivation for keeping J.P. in her care; the evidence at trial did not establish that Ms. Trask was in receipt of any of J.P.’s funds.

68The Crown has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Trask did not seek help for J.P. because she intended to rely on her role as primary caregiver to avoid a term of imprisonment. The evidence does not support such a finding; I find it equally plausible that Ms. Trask simply ignored J.P. while she was dealing with her own issues, was in denial as to her own jeopardy, or was unable to accept that she was unable to care for him. It would have been open to the Crown to file a transcript of the submissions of the defence on Ms. Trask’s June 17, 2022 hearing to support the suggested inference.

69That said, I do rely on Ms. Terreberry’s letter as evidence that Ms. Trask had actual knowledge that in an emergency, Community Living would find a place for J.P. to live. A sentencing hearing, in which one faces the potential for incarceration, is an emergency. I treat as aggravating Ms. Trask’s failure to make any arrangements for J.P.’s care, should she be required to step into custody on June 17; in failing to do so, she entirely abdicated the duty that she took on when J.P. first came into her care.

70There are mitigating factors present in this case.

71Ms. Trask has no criminal record. She has complied with the conditions of her release since her arrest in March 2023. I accept that Ms. Trask was concerned about J.P.’s living conditions when she first brought them to the attention of Community Living. I also accept that for some months, she provided good care for J.P. There is nothing to suggest that the offence was motivated by malice or ill-will towards her brother. Ms. Trask is remorseful for her conduct; I accept her statement to the court on the sentencing hearing as genuine. She has support in the community and has taken steps to obtain counselling to address her own underlying mental health issues. These are positive steps towards rehabilitation.

The appropriate sentence for Ms. Trask

72The Crown and the defence agree that it is open to the court to impose a conditional sentence of imprisonment, if statutory conditions have been met: (i) there is no mandatory term of imprisonment; (ii) a conditional sentence will not endanger the public; and (iii) a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing.

73I have seriously considered whether a conditional sentence of imprisonment would be a fit sentence in all the circumstances of this case.

74There is no mandatory term of imprisonment following a conviction under s. 215(3). I am also satisfied that a conditional sentence would not endanger the public. Ms. Trask is a first offender. The victim was her brother. The risk to the public should Ms. Trask attempt to act in a caregiving role to another vulnerable person could be mitigated by the imposition of appropriate conditions on the conditional sentence and as a term of probation.

75However, I am not satisfied that a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing, namely the statutory imperative to give primacy to denunciation and deterrence.

76Given the statutory aggravating factors, the length of time over which this offence occurred and Ms. Trask’s high degree of moral blameworthiness, a conditional sentence of imprisonment would not result in a proportionate sentence. Taking into account the aggravating and mitigating factors, discussed above, and the imperative to give denunciation and deterrence primacy in sentencing offenders who commit offences against vulnerable victims, a term of imprisonment must be imposed.

77The principle of restraint demands that where a term of imprisonment must be imposed, the court must impose the shortest sentence of imprisonment that will give effect to the purposes of sentencing.

78A sentence of 12 months imprisonment is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and Ms. Trask’s moral blameworthiness, expresses society’s denunciation of her conduct, provides deterrence to others who would take charge of vulnerable persons, and provides specific deterrence to Ms. Trask. It takes into account the harm to J.P. and his weeks-long suffering, as well as his full recovery.

79The 12-month term of imprisonment will be followed by a three-year probation order on the terms agreed to by the parties:

Keep the peace and be of good behaviour

Report as directed by probation officer

Notify probation officer of any planned change of address at least 48 hours in advance of any change

Take and complete any counselling as recommended by probation, and sign required releases to confirm same

Not to be in a position of trust or caregiving role for a vulnerable person

Have no contact or communication directly or indirectly and not to attend within 100 metres of the known place of residence of John-Paul Trask

80There will be a non-communication order with respect to J.P., pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Code. Finally, given the vulnerability of the victim in this case, it is in the interests of justice that Ms. Trask provide a sample of her DNA pursuant to s. 487.051.

81Given Ms. Trask’s financial circumstances, there will be no victim fine surcharge.

A.J. Ohler, J.