Sheldon v. Seraphim, 2026 ONSC 1580

CITATION: Sheldon v. Seraphim, 2026 ONSC 1580

COURT FILE NO.: FC-23-328

DATE: 2026/03/16

BETWEEN:

Mark Sheldon

Applicant

– and –

Tashina Seraphim

Respondent

Self-Represented

J. Long & K. Kumba, for the Respondent

HEARD: In writing

The honourable Justice D. Piccoli

[1]. The court heard a 7-day trial in September 2025 which ended September 23, 2025, and released its decision on November 21, 2025. As it relates to costs, the court ordered:

The parties shall confer to determine if they are able to resolve the issue of costs. They are strongly encouraged to resolve costs, and they must engage in settlement discussions regarding this issue. If the parties are not able to resolve the issue of costs, they shall each serve and file written submissions on costs by December 15, 2025. The narrative portion of costs submissions for this trial shall not exceed five pages, not including the bill of costs and offers to settle. The written submissions shall be typed, double spaced and have characters of at least 12-point size. Both parties shall submit bills of costs with their submissions. Submissions shall be directed to my attention by email to Kitchener.SCJJA@ontario.ca. If a party does not serve and file submissions respecting costs in accordance with these deadlines there shall be no costs payable to that party, although costs may still be awarded against that party.

[2]. Cost submissions were received by both parties on December 15, 2025. However, the submissions provided by the Respondent (the “mother”) lacked clarity, and both parties failed to provide affidavits of service related to the offers to settle referred to in their submissions. As a result, the parties returned before the court on January 15, 2026, to clarify their positions on costs.

[3]. The Applicant (the “father”) seeks $20,000 in costs. He submits that there has been divided success, that the mother’s behavior has increased his costs, and that the mother’s counsel was inadequate and not properly prepared which increased the costs. He also argues that the mother’s legal fees are being paid by her parents and that there has been a “deliberate and malicious” attempt by the mother to “financially ruin” him. He submits that he has made numerous attempts to correspond with the mother’s counsel to no avail. Finally, he submits that he is unable to pay any costs order, and any such order would be emotionally and financially debilitating to him. He attached to his submissions offers of settlement made by him on November 7, 2024, June 3, 2025, and June 26, 2025, which the mother confirms she received.

[4]. Despite the attendance on January 15, 2026, counsel for mother was not able to fully clarify her submissions. She made numerous contradictory statements about page 2 of Tab B of her costs submissions, which states: “Invoices are included with description of work done* For this Honourable Court’s ease of reference attached, all entries for which costs are being sought (as per the invoices from GELMAN & ASSOCIATES AS ATTACHED) are highlighted for this Court’s ease of reference.” The amount highlighted totalled approximately $20,000 before HST and disbursements. Conversely, paragraph 19 of her submissions set out that she had incurred $154,809.22 in costs and that these costs “are entirely reasonable given the length of trial (seven days), the seriousness and importance of the issues…”. At no point in her written submissions did she specifically state what amount of costs she was seeking.

[5]. During the attendance on January 15, 2026, mother’s counsel conceded that her written submissions were confusing. She also made several contradictory submissions regarding the statement quoted above in paragraph 4 and then concluded by saying that the highlighted items represent invoices from the law firm “Gelman and Associates” only. This submission has also proven to be incorrect.

[6]. At this attendance, the mother’s counsel clarified for the court that she seeks $154,809.22 in costs. Although counsel for the mother asserts these costs are mostly related to the trial, the invoices date back to mid June 2024. The mother’s reasoning in seeking costs from mid June 2024 is that the father acted in bad faith, that he increased costs by sending her lawyer hundreds of hostile emails, and that his conduct was abusive, threatening, aggressive and controlling towards the mother, her family, various counsel and staff, and the supervised access centre. Furthermore, she maintains that she was more successful than the father and refers to the offer she made in her settlement conference brief of July 4, 2024, served on July 15, 2024. Although, she acknowledges that this was not a Rule 18 offer.

[7]. For the reasons that follow, this court cannot award the quantum of costs sought by the mother. However, this court does order that the father pays to the mother the sum of $20,000 in costs.

The Law

[8]. Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, provides that subject to the provisions of an Act or rules of court, costs are in the discretion of the court, which may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid. This section must be read in conjunction with Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (“the Rules”), which set out numerous principles to guide the court in the exercise of its discretion in the family law context.

[9]. The modern rules respecting costs aim to foster the following four fundamental purposes:

a. To partially indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation;

b. To encourage settlement;

c. To discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants; and

d. To ensure that cases are dealt with justly, in accordance with the primary objective of the Rules set out in r. 2(2).

Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867, at para. 10.

[10]. The provisions on costs in the Rules changed on January 22, 2025. Parties are now required to confer in advance and be prepared to argue costs at each stage in a case governed by the Rules: see rr. 24(17) and (18). In this case, the father has outlined his attempt to confer. The mother has not.

[11]. The determination of costs is a two-stage process. First, the court must decide whether any party is liable for costs. If liability is established, the court must then determine the appropriate amount of the costs award.

[12]. Rule 24(3) creates a presumption of costs in favour of the successful party. Consideration of “success” is the starting point in determining costs: Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, (2000), 2000 22584 (ON SC), 6 R.F.L (5th) 430 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 2.

[13]. In J.M.M. v. C.R.M., 2025 ONSC 3631, Justice Chappel discussed what the court must consider in assessing the success of each party, at para. 13:

In assessing the success of each party, the court must consider the positions that they took in their pleadings and the specific relief that they pursued at the hearing if it was different (Lazare v. Heitner, 2018 ONSC 4861 (S.C.J.), at para. 16; Kyriacou v. Zikos, 2022 ONSC 401 (S.C.J.), at para. 6; Todor v. Todor, 2021 ONSC 3463 (S.C.J.), at para 17; White, at para. 7). Positions taken in Offers to Settle will also be relevant in determining a party’s overall success (Johanns v. Fulford, 2010 ONCJ 756 (O.C.J.), at para. 13; Todor, at para. 17; S.W.S. v. R.S., 2022 ONCJ 11 (O.C.J.), at para. 10; Habibi, at para. 32; Balzano, at para. 23). However, the primary focus of the success analysis … is what each party actually sought during the litigation, rather than in Offers to Settle (Lazare).

[14]. Where the court concludes that success was, in fact, divided, it has considerable discretion as to how costs should be determined. Some factors to consider are: The reasonableness of litigation conduct must be gauged over the totality of the proceeding; A court can order increased costs to express disapproval of unreasonable conduct; The amount may be higher where a party has had to incur unnecessary added expense as a result of the other party’s unreasonable conduct: John v. John, 2020 ONSC 6437, at para. 41; O’Brien v. Chuluunbaatar, 2019 ONCJ 882, at paras. 44 to 46; Habibi v. Aarabi, 2022 ONSC 240, at para. 34.

[15]. Unreasonable behavior “in relation to the issues” includes behavior that: (1) is disrespectful of other participants or the court; (2) unduly complicates the litigation; (3) increases the cost of litigation. Harper v Smith, 2021 ONSC 3420, at para. 3; T.I. v. F.I., 2023 ONSC 3435, at para. 16; Rastkar v. Soltani, 2024 ONSC 2460, at para. 15.

[16]. There must be some causal connection between the offensive behaviour and the conduct of the litigation, resulting in unnecessary steps or increased costs: Kisten v. Kosewski, 2020 ONSC 3380, at para. 41; Freitas v. Christopher, 2021 ONSC 5233 , at para. 32.

[17]. Poor litigation decisions and advancing unreasonable claims or filing meritless and incomplete pleadings may also justify an elevated costs award: Hughes v. Hughes, 2024 ONSC 1119 , at para. 7; Ali Hassan v. Abdullah, 2023 ONCJ 186, at para. 34.

[18]. A high or full recovery costs award may be justified where a party persists in advancing unreasonable claims or arguments. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 2017 ONCJ 431, at paras. 32, 58-60; M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2023 ONSC 3748, at para. 77; Thomas v. Charles, 2024 ONCJ 138, at para. 27; Churchill v. Elliot and Ward, 2024 ONSC 2757 , at para. 3.

[19]. “Reasonableness” and “success” are distinct considerations:

a. Lack of success will not, in itself, attract enhanced costs. Being unsuccessful is not necessarily the same as being unreasonable. But an unsuccessful party pursuing an unreasonable legal position may be liable for enhanced costs: Climans v. Latner, 2020 ONCA 554, at para. 90; Nour v. Youssef, 2021 ONSC 5539, at para. 14; Wauthier v. McAuliff, 2019 ONSC 5302, at para. 8; Enyedy-Goldner v. Goldner, 2024 ONSC 2727, at para. 26.

b. A successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a step in a case may be deprived of all or part of their costs or ordered to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs: rule 24(7).

[20]. In considering the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, the judge deciding costs should also address their mind to whether they have complied with court orders and the Rules during the proceeding. Rules 1(8)(a) and 1(8.1) provide that if a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case or with the Rules, the court may deal with the failure by making an order for costs: M.A.B. v. M.G.C , at para. 45; Uwaezuoke v. Uwaezuoke, 2025 ONCJ 89, at para. 31.

[21]. An important function of costs is to uphold the integrity of our justice system. Costs are one way of ensuring the resources of the justice system are not unduly drained by clearly unreasonable claims and ill-advised litigation strategy: Weber v. Weber, 2020 ONSC 6855, at para. 15.

Analysis

[22]. As it relates to success, when comparing the pleadings to the orders made, the father sought decision making (he did not specify sole or joint) and almost equal parenting time. The father did not seek any orders for child or spousal support or equalization. He was self-represented when he served and filed his application. He did not serve and file a reply.

[23]. In her answer and claim, the mother asked that:

a. the child(ren) reside primarily with her;

b. she have final decision-making responsibility;

c. the father have specified parenting time with the child (only one was born at that time);

d. the child(ren) not be removed from Ontario without the other party’s consent;

e. there be a right of first refusal should one parent be unable to care for the children for a period of four hours or more;

f. the child not be left alone with any third parties other than family members known to both parents, daycare or a school unless agreed upon;

g. there be an equal sharing of holidays as determined by the court;

h. the parties communicate through WhatsApp; a neutral third party exchange;

i. the father be responsible for transportation; and

j. the father complete a four week anger management course.

k. that the father pay full guideline child support retroactive to August 2023, that he pay his proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses ongoing and retroactive, and that he pay spousal support to the mother (ongoing and retroactive). She set out no amounts for what she was seeking.

l. that father maintain health benefits for the children and the mother, an order that mother be named irrevocable beneficiary of his life insurance with a “TBD” amount, and an order for equalization, and costs.

[24]. In this matter, parenting issues were very problematic. As a result of the father not having parenting time with the child for 69 days, he brought an urgent motion. That motion was resolved on December 13, 2023, by way of a consent interim order which saw the child in each parent’s care on an almost equal basis commencing in January 2024. On May 8, 2024, by way of interim order, the father’s parenting time with both children (the younger child was born on March 6, 2024) was ordered to take place at a supervised access centre. By the time the trial started, the father had not seen the children since July 12, 2025.

[25]. The relief sought by mother in her pleadings was very different than the relief she sought in the trial. In her Application she set out a plan for father’s parenting time. At trial she sought and argued strenuously that father have no parenting time with the children.

[26]. At the end of the trial in this matter, the court was required to determine 10 issues: (i) the father’s parenting time, if any, with the children; (ii) whether the father should be consulted before a decision was made related to the children; (iii) ancillary parenting issues such as the mother being able to apply for and obtain government documents for the children and whether she be able to travel with the children without the father’s consent; (iv) retroactive child support and ongoing contribution towards section 7 expenses; (v) security for support; (vi) retroactive spousal support; (vii) ongoing spousal support including whether income should be imputed to the mother; (viii) a final restraining order and whether it should be expanded as requested by the mother; (ix) equalization; and (x) the granting of a divorce.

[27]. Before the trial, the father had conceded that the children would continue to reside primarily with the mother. In the opening days of the trial, he also conceded that the mother will make decisions referrable to the children – although, he sought consultation. The father had never removed the children from his health care plan and agreed that an order could be made in that regard.

[28]. During the trial, mother withdrew her request for retroactive section 7 expenses. She also acknowledged that because she had not filed a marriage certificate, the divorce could not be granted.

[29]. On the final day of trial, certain orders were made related to the father’s pension and the provision of an NFP calculation. The court also required counsel for the mother to revise her retroactive support calculations and net them out for tax. It is of note that even when submitted to the court following the trial, the retroactive support and NFP calculations were done incorrectly.

[30]. When comparing the pleadings to the result at trial, the mother was more successful as it relates to the parenting issues. This court ordered that the father’s parenting time continue to be supervised first by Bayden Supervision and then, upon satisfaction of certain criteria, by his parents and his stepmother Amy. The parenting portion of the trial focused on the father’s behaviour, the mother’s request that the father have no parenting time, and her opposition to his parents being the supervisors of father’s parenting time. The mother was also successful as it relates to her request for security for support. The mother did not get the order she sought during the trial as it related to father’s parenting time; even though she was more successful than her pleadings, she was not as successful as her offer to settle or her position at trial.

[31]. The father’s offers were all non-severable offers; in each of his offers he sought unsupervised parenting time. As such, he cannot be found to be successful on any issue because all issues were intertwined in his offers.

[32]. The mother acknowledged that the offer in her settlement conference brief is not a Rule 18 offer to settle and that it was an offer to settle only some issues. Despite that, a court can consider any written offer of settlement in determining the issue of costs. In this case, because the offer made was severable, the mother did achieve success on certain issues.

[33]. The mother’s success as it relates to the other issues:

a. Travel: The mother was granted the ability to travel with the children without the father’s consent, but only to Hague Convention countries and with the requirement that she advise him in advance. This was not addressed in either her pleadings or her offer.

b. Government documents: The mother was given authority to obtain government documents without father’s consent. This request was not addressed in either her pleadings or her offer.

c. Consultation related to decision making: The father was granted nominal consultation related to section 7 expenses for which he is being asked to contribute to. This request was not addressed in either her pleadings or her offer.

d. Security for support: The father insisted that the paternal grandmother be the beneficiary of his life insurance in trust for the children. However, the mother was successful as the court ordered that she be the irrevocable beneficiary in trust for the children.

e. Communication App: Despite asking for communication through the App in her pleadings, by the time of the trial, the mother did not want any communication with father. The court ordered limited communication. The mother did not address this in her offer and her position at trial was much different than in her pleadings.

f. Health/Medical/Dental: The children had always been maintained on the father’s plan. The mother withdrew her request for herself.

g. Ongoing child support: The father offered more than mother asked for. The mother was not successful.

h. Retroactive child support: The mother did not specify the amount sought in her pleadings. In her offer, the mother sought $15,204, the father offered $7,000 and this court ordered $11,700. The mother was not successful as it relates to her pleadings or her offer.

i. Restraining order: The father opposed the continuation of the order. The mother sought a more significant order. The court ordered a less expansive order than requested by mother.

j. Spousal support: The mother did not request an amount in her pleading, although, her July 4, 2024, offer was $500 monthly with no review or termination. The father sought an imputation of income, and as part of his non-severable offer, offered $200 per month for the period October 2025 and ending March 2028. The court imputed income to the mother commencing June 2026 and ordered $687 per month in spousal support until then. Once income was imputed, although the mother still had entitlement, there was no quantum payable in the range. On this issue, the mother was not successful.

k. Retroactive spousal support: The mother did not specify an amount in her pleadings, but she sought $26,708 in her offer. The father offered $5,000 and this court ordered $8,140. On this issue, the mother was not successful.

l. Pension division: Both parties agreed the pension could be divided at source. Each blamed the other for the delay in submitting the pension documents and the court could not make a definitive finding based on the evidence before it.

m. Equalization: The mother did not specify an amount. Disclosure was an issue with both parties providing disclosure during the trial. It cannot be said that either party was successful.

n. Credit card repayment: The mother abandoned her request to seek repayment of her credit card as set out in her pleading. As such, it cannot be said that mother was successful.

[34]. During the trial, the mother sought payment towards daycare expenses but admitted those expenses were not incurred for the purposes set out in s. 7 of the Guidelines. By the end of trial, she abandoned that claim.

[35]. Both parties bear some responsibility for the increased costs of the trial.

[36]. The father’s motion to remove counsel of record for the mother at the commencement of the trial was not reasonable even if it is the case that the mother’s lawyer sought to “friend” him on social media, made disparaging comments about him in a confirmation form and played a role in informing lay media who broadcasted a podcast about him.

[37]. The court also found that father had gained little insight into his behaviour, and this continued during the trial.

[38]. The mother was represented by two lawyers, and, at times, a law clerk was present. Despite this, counsel was late and often unprepared. Court either had to end early or be stood down as a result. Further, counsel for the mother continually referred to the father as “Mr. Seraphim” despite the court’s constant reminders that his surname was Sheldon, and that if counsel had difficulty she should refer to him as “Sir”. This only inflamed matters given Mr. Sheldon’s strained relationship with his father-in-law, Mr. Seraphim.

[39]. The mother also sought relief that, before the father could bring a motion to change, he be required to participate in and obtain a fully forensic psychological assessment, completed by a qualified expert at his cost and provide a true copy of said entire report to mother. She provided no explanation for this and no evidence as to an appropriate person to conduct this assessment, why that relief was required, or what it even meant. Further, the mother sought an expanded position related to the restraining order between the commencement of the trial and the end of the trial which was not supported by the evidence. She also sought a divorce but had not filed the marriage certificate with the court. These are examples of mother’s counsel not being properly prepared for the trial which also increased the length of the trial.

[40]. As it relates to father’s text messages to counsel, although counsel has made the submission that hundreds of text messages were sent to them, those “hundreds” of text messages were not provided to the court. Further, a number of the text messages tendered at evidence in the trial were text messages that were before Justice Breithaupt Smith when she ordered costs against father in the amount of $16,950. Finally, some of the communications from the father related to the mother’s delay in completing the documents related to the commencement of the father’s supervised access.

[41]. As such, the court finds that mother was successful on the issues of primary residence, final decision making and security for support. Further, this court did order that before father can bring a motion to change parenting time, he is required to provide mother a report from a therapist confirming that he attend for anger management and conflict resolution counselling, meaningfully participated and gained insight into the concerns regarding his anger management skills and demonstrate an ability to implement those tools appropriately to manage his anger. The issues of primary residence and decision making were largely resolved by the start of trial. The security for support issue took very little trial time.

Bad Faith

[42]. Pursuant to Rule 24(10), if a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately. A fairly high threshold of egregious behaviour is required for a finding of bad faith and, as such, a finding of bad faith is rarely made: Cozzi v. Smith, 2015 ONSC 3626, at para. 28; Scipione v. Scipione, 2015 ONSC 5982, at para. 99.

[43]. This court finds that the mother has not established that the father met the threshold of egregious behaviour in this case. Although the court found that the father had not gained an insight into the behaviour addressed by Justice Breithaupt Smith and that his pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour did not stop during the trial, that is not synonymous with a finding of bad faith.

[44]. There is a difference between bad faith and unreasonable behaviour. The essence of bad faith is when a person suggests their actions are aimed for one purpose when they are aimed for another purpose. It is done knowingly and intentionally: S.(C.) v. S. (M.), (2007) 2007 20279 (ON SC), 38 R.F.L. (6^th) 315 (Ont. SCJ), at paras. 16 and 17. Bad faith is not synonymous with bad judgment or negligence. Rather, it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Bad faith involves intentional duplicity, obstruction or obfuscation: Scipione, at para. 96.

[45]. In this case, father genuinely believed his behaviour was justifiable and in the children’s best interests. This is bad judgment on his part but does not amount to the conscious doing of a wrong for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.

Quantum of Costs

[46]. The Rules emphasize the importance of reasonableness and proportionality in the court’s approach to setting of costs: Mattina, at para. 10; Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840, 143 O.R. (3d) 519, at para. 4. An award of full recovery costs does not necessarily mean that the Applicant will receive the full amount of costs claimed. The claim must still be reasonable and proportionate. It must also reflect, to some extent, the reasonable expectations of the paying party: Tintinalli v. Tutolo, 2022 ONSC 6276, at para. 20.

[47]. Rule 24(15) provides that any claim for costs respecting fees or expenses shall be supported by documentation satisfactory to the court. My order following the trial as it relates to what was required in the cost submission was clear, yet mother did not comply. She has not submitted satisfactory documents to support her request for costs and, as such, I am left having to estimate reasonable and proportionate amount based on the facts of this case Van Eck v. Pham, 2019 ONSC 2030, at para. 17; Saroli v. Saroli, 2021 ONSC 7491, at para. 79.

[48]. In this case, the mother has not submitted a bill of costs, despite submitting a document titled “Bill of Costs”. What she has submitted is a page setting out each person’s hourly rate and over 70 pages of invoices from at least two different law firms. A bill of costs is not the statement of account sent to the client. A bill of costs is a detailed, itemized list of legal fees and expenses that one party claims from the other. It sets out what legal services were provided, how much time was spent, the hourly rates and any disbursements. The hourly time should be broken down by date and task. It should be organized chronologically and calculated.

[49]. In this case, not only is there no bill of costs, but the invoices provided have been incorrectly totalled and, at times, the final invoice for a certain period of time is indecipherable.

[50]. The court spent a considerable amount of time attempting to make sense of the invoices in order to determine what costs should be payable. The following has been discerned by the court:

a. There is more than one lawyer’s time being charged for the same issue, whether it be trial prep or pre-trial time. It appears that, at times, even a third person’s time (perhaps the law clerk) was billed to this client. None of this was warranted.

b. Administrative work is included in the bill of costs which should be part of a lawyer’s hourly rate.

c. The hourly rates and time are not always properly reflected. For example, September 16, 2024, shows 2.5 hours of JE time at 475 = $1,187.50 and not $1,287.5.

d. There was an inordinate amount of time spent preparing for trial both in June 2025 and then again in September 2025.

e. The highlighted dockets have nothing to do with being at two separate firms (which was the final submission made by the mother).

f. Even on the bills themselves, at times the description of what was done has been redacted in whole or in part.

g. Time was billed for the settlement conference when counsel for the mother said it was not.

h. Some invoices have an improper total (see, for example, invoice 57).

[51]. In addition to not providing a bill of costs as ordered, this court cannot rely on the invoices provided. Further, there was no need for two lawyers and, at times, an additional law clerk.

[52]. In this case, by the time the trial started, the father had conceded primary residence and decision making to the mother. In essence, it is the time prior to the trial and the portion of the trial related to security that is most relevant. It is not possible on the voluminous but inconsistent and improper costs submission made by the mother to conduct a proper assessment of the fees incurred or the reasonableness of those fees.

[53]. In Sethi v. Sethi, 2025 ONSC 5079, Justice McGee denied costs to the successful party and relied on Rule 24(7) and 24(14). Her Honour made the following comments, at para. 81:

While this may be an unusual outcome, particularly on an uncontested trial in which the applicant has been successful, I find it necessary to reflect an expected standard of practice. Courts promote what they permit. To permit costs in this case would be to promote uncareful pleadings, an assumed entitlement to substantial damages without provision of any legal precedent and an inflated Bill of Costs.

[54]. In this case, the court has been provided with little helpful information regarding costs. In determining the appropriate quantum, the court should consider the amount the unsuccessful party could reasonably have been expected to pay in the event of lack of success in the litigation: Arthur v. Arthur, 2019 ONSC 938, at para. 28. The father himself seeks $20,000.

[55]. As it relates to the father’s ability to pay costs, difficult financial circumstances are a factor but are not always a reason to deprive a successful party of costs or to reduce the amount of costs: Beaulieu v. Diotte, 2020 ONSC 6787, at para. 9. Ability to pay will be less of a mitigating factor when the impecunious party has acted unreasonably, or where their claim was illogical or without merit: D.D. and F.D. v. H.G., 2020 ONSC 1919, at paras. 44 and 57; Gobin v. Gobin, 2009 ONCJ 278, at para. 24.

[56]. Those who can least afford to litigate should be most motivated to seriously pursue settlement and avoid unnecessary proceedings: Mohr v. Sweeney, 2016 ONSC 3238, at para. 17; Balsmeier v. Balsmeier, 2016 ONSC 3485, at para. 47.

[57]. In this case, the father’s ability or inability to pay costs is not a determinative factor.

[58]. Finally, the fact that the mother’s family ‘loaned” her the money for legal fees cannot be factored into an assessment on appropriate costs.

[59]. In this case, based on all of the factors to be considered as set out herein, it is fair, reasonable and proportionate that the father pay to the mother the sum of $20,000 in legal fees.

D. Piccoli J.

Released: March 16, 2026