Ontario (Attorney General) v. Doe, 2026 ONSC 1568

COURT FILE NO.: CV-26-00005208-0000

DATE: 20260314

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

The Attorney General of Ontario

Applicant

– and –

John Doe, Jane Doe, Logan Doe and Persons Unknown Organized or participating in the Al-Quds Committee, the Palestinian Youth Movement, Lebanese4palestine, and Samidoun

Respondents

J. Thomas Curry, Monique Jilesen, Christopher A. Wayland, and S. Zachary Green, for the applicant

Shane Martinez, for the respondent the Al Quds Day Committee

HEARD: March 14, 2026

Robert CentA J.

1The Attorney General of Ontario seeks an interim, interlocutory, and permanent injunction pursuant to s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. The Attorney General seeks relief in respect of a rally to be held at 3:00 p.m. on March 14, 2026. The protest is taking place on Al Quds Day. The rally is set to commence at the United States Consulate located at 360 University Avenue. The parade route will proceed north to Dundas Avenue West and then east to Bay Street, south to Queen Street, and west to University Avenue. The Attorney General asked the court to issue one of two different orders.

2First, the Attorney General sought an order enjoining all persons with knowledge of the order from participating in an “Al Quds Day protest in the City of Toronto on March 14, 2026, or on any other day” and an order authorizing the Toronto Police Service to arrest and remove anyone contravening the order. I have attached this proposed order to these reasons as Schedule A.

3In the alternative, the Attorney General sought an order enjoining anyone participating in the rally from violating the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, committing property crimes, interfering with access to buildings (including hospitals), causing a nuisance, or engaging in hate speech, and authorizing the Toronto Police Serve to arrest anyone breaching this order, along with other relief. I have attached the alternative order sought to these reasons as Schedule B.

4I received the Attorney General’s application record and factum at 10:52 a.m. this morning. I received the respondent Al Quds Committee’s factum at 11:44 a.m. The hearing commenced at 12:00 noon. Given the fact that the rally was to begin at 3:00 p.m., I issued my oral decision dismissing the application at 2:05 p.m. At that time, I said:

Time is very much of the essence. I will release reasons for my decision later today. Given the urgency of the situation, here is my bottom line decision.

The application is for an interim interlocutory injunction is dismissed.

I am not satisfied that the Attorney General of Ontario has met the test for a quia timet injunction to prevent all persons from engaging in the Al Quds Day protest. In the record before me, there is insufficient evidence to satisfy me that:

a. The police see this injunction as necessary to preserve the peace

b. This protest in prior years has given rise to significant criminality or an inability of the police to maintain the peace

c. An anticipatory and blanket injunction interfering with the Charter rights of the participants is reasonable or proportionate in the circumstances of the case.

I am also not persuaded that the alternative relief sought by the Attorney General is appropriate. The court expects the participants not to engage in any criminal or tortious activity during the protest. The court expects the police to enforce the law. No order of this court is necessary to achieve either of these ends.

The right to assemble and speak freely must be maintained in times of global conflict. Perhaps at no other time is the protection of our civil liberties more important. At the same time, the security of all members of the public depend on the police enforcing the laws that are on the books.

I thank all counsel for their hard work and flexibility. I thank the court staff for making themselves available to facilitate this court session on short notice.

5These are the reasons for my decision.

1. The material filed on this application

6The Attorney General seeks an anticipatory, prohibitive injunction. It is an anticipatory injunction because at the time he commenced the proceeding, the rally had not started and there was no unlawful conduct underway. The Attorney General has an important role in securing compliance with the laws of the land.¹

7The Attorney General filed an affidavit from Kenneth Weatherill, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Safety for the Solicitor General of Ontario. Mr. Weatherill previously worked as a police officer, including as Deputy Chief of the Hamilton and Barrie Police Services. His affidavit provided information about the rally and its history, the groups expected to be in attendance at the rally, possible counter-protest activity, the current military conflict in the Middle East, escalating anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, and anti-U.S. violence around the world, international restrictions on Al Quds rallies in England, the rise of anti-Semitic violence in Canada from 2023 to 2025, the recent escalation in such violence, the rise of Islamophobic and anti-Muslim violence in Toronto, violence targeted at Iranian-Canadian activists, the shots recently fired at the U.S. consulate, and the Toronto Police Service involvement.

8In Mr. Weatherill’s affidavit he noted that “On March 13, 2026, Ontario Premier Doug Ford made a public announcement that he would be instructing the attorney general to pursue an injunction to stop the Al Quds rally, scheduled to proceed on March 14, 2026, outside of the U.S. consulate.” (emphasis added). In response to a question from me, counsel for the Attorney General confirmed that the Attorney General himself determined that it was appropriate to bring this application in the public interest and that “the decision to seek this injunction rests with him and him alone.” I accept the representation of the counsel for the Attorney General.

9I have concerns regarding the timing of this injunction. The Attorney General has known for at least a year that the Al Quds rally would take place at around this time. The Attorney General relies on statements made by protest organizers that date back to 2016. The province of Ontario did not pass any laws or regulations to deal with this event. It did not invoke the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9. Even allowing for rapidly moving current events, the Attorney General should not have come to court mere hours before the rally was set to start. There was no possibility of cross-examination on any of the affidavits and the oral argument was necessarily truncated. Such a compressed timetable puts the court in an difficult position.

10Despite the short time frame, the respondent, the Al Quds Committee, filed five responding affidavits and a factum.

2. The test for obtaining an interlocutory injunction

11In a typical motion to obtain an interlocutory injunction, the moving party must demonstrate that there is a serious issue to be tried, that there will be irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, and the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction.² In his factum, the Attorney General accepts that when he seeks an injunction in the public interest, the test is modified and the appropriate test to be met at the first stage is one of strong prima facie case:

The standard test is slightly modified where the Attorney General seeks an injunction in the public interest. In particular, on proof of a strong prima facie case that the Defendants’ conduct violates the law or constitutes a public nuisance, an injunction will follow. Generally, irreparable harm need not be established, because violations of the law irreparably harm the public interest in seeing the laws obeyed.

12In CBC, the Supreme Court of Canada explained the strong prima facie test standard.³ CBC involved an application for an interlocutory mandatory injunction in the context of a citation for contempt. CBC refused to remove information from its website identifying a victim, allegedly contrary to a publication ban that was issued after the CBC had posted the information. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that the test for an interlocutory mandatory injunction requires, at the first stage, that the applicant demonstrate a strong prima facie case, and not simply a “serious issue to be tried.”. After setting out the various formulations of the meaning of a strong prima facie case, Brown J. noted, at paras. 17-18, that all of the formulations require the moving party to show a case of such merit that it is very likely to succeed at trial. He then set out the test:

upon a preliminary review of the case, the application judge must be satisfied that there is a strong likelihood on the law and the evidence presented that, at trial, the applicant will be ultimately successful in proving the allegations set out in the [statement of claim].

13I note at the outset that the Attorney General seeks an ambitious order. He asks the court effectively to ban a protest rally before it has even started. The Attorney General does so because he fears that there could be criminal activity at the rally. Given the obvious Charter implications of such a request, it is imperative that the Attorney General deliver evidence capable of justifying such an order.

A. No strong prima facie case

14The Attorney General submits that it has made out a strong prima facie case:

Given the recent pattern of violence and the nature of the Rally, there exists a strong case that the Rally will constitute mischief, a public or common nuisance, unlawful assembly, intimidation, rioting, and/or the incitement or wilful promotion of hatred of antisemitism or as against another identifiable group, within the meaning of sections 63, 54, 175, 319, 423, and 430 of the Criminal Code.

15I do not accept the Attorney General’s submission that a civil injunction will be granted to restrain anticipated Criminal Code offences. In Robinson, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held:

The equitable jurisdiction of a civil court cannot properly be invoked to suppress crime. Unlawful acts which are an offence against the public, and so fall within the criminal law, may also be the foundation of an action based upon the civil wrong done to an individual, but when Parliament has, in the public interest, forbidden certain acts and made them an offence against the law of the land, then, unless a right to property is affected, the civil courts should not attempt to interfere and forbid by their injunction that which has already been forbidden by Parliament itself.⁴

16In addition, there is no evidence in the record that there were criminal charges arising out of last year’s Al Quds rally in Toronto, or at the rallies in any of the prior 30 years. There is no evidence that participants at last year’s rally incited hatred or engaged in hate speech. There is no evidence before me of any criminality arising out of this rally in the past, much less evidence that could satisfy me that there is a “strong case” that there will be criminal activity this year.

17I am also not satisfied that there is a strong likelihood that the rally will constitute a public nuisance. A nuisance is public if it “materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience” of members of the public. There is no evidence before me that any prior Al Quds day rally in Toronto constituted a public nuisance. I would have expected to see such evidence in support of an injunction like this.

18For example, in City of Waterloo v. Persons Unknown, Gibson J. approved both an interlocutory statutory injunction and a quia timet injunction against certain “nuisance parties.”⁵ In support of its application, the City of Waterloo provided affidavits from

a. the Director of Municipal Enforcement Services of the Community Services division of the City of Waterloo;

b. the Deputy Fire Chief and Alternate Emergency Management Coordinator for the Waterloo Fire Rescue Division of the City of Waterloo;

c. the Superintendent, Operational Support, Waterloo Regional Police Service; and

d. letters in support of the request from Wilfried Laurier University, the University of Waterloo, Conestoga College, Grand River Hospital, and the Regional Municipality of Waterloo.⁶

19Justice Gibson outlined the substantive history of the relevant “Nuisance Parties”, as defined in the municipal by-laws. The city of Waterloo tracked attendance at these parties starting in 2014 and found that “these unsanctioned events involve nuisance behaviour, property damage, road blockages, public safety risks, and leave the City with unrecoverable costs amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars”: at para. 6. The student parties at issue were held since before 2014, and the following information was established regarding the following St. Patrick’s Day events:

2015: 8,000 people attended, and the city suffered from issues of “open alcohol consumption, property damage, public urination, impeding emergency vehicles, noise amplification, and glass bottles and other objects being thrown”.

2019: 33,000 people attended, the Waterloo Regional Police Service laid 232 charges and made 18 arrests, while the city’s Municipal Enforcement Service issued 32 noise and nuisance penalties. The 2019 response cost approximately $750,000.

2022: between March 17 to March 20th, 4,000 people attended, 552 police calls were made, 193 charges laid, and 22 arrests, costing a total of $141,177 in police staffing.

2023: 8,000 people attended, 497 calls, 232 charges, and 18 arrests, costing $226,114 in police staffing.

2024: 9,500 people attended, 387 calls were made, 238 charges were laid, 10 arrests, and $317,531 in police staffing.

The total costs to the city prior to 2025 exceeded $1,000,000.⁷

20While I am not saying that I would necessarily have exercised my discretion to issue the injunctions requested by Waterloo, the Attorney General has not provided the type of granular and detailed operational evidence that formed the record in that case.

21I accept the Attorney General’s submission that protest activity that attracts or encourages violence may constitute a nuisance.⁸ However, there is no evidence in the record before me that this rally will attract or encourage violence. Again, there was no evidence that any criminal charges were laid in prior years. There is simply no evidence in the record to make out the Attorney General’s submission that there is a material risk that conduct at the rally “may also endanger the lives, safety and health of the public and cause injury.”

22Indeed, the Attorney General’s own evidence suggests that the rally organizers are committed to holding a peaceful rally:

Certain individuals who appear to be members of the Committee, including an individual by the name of “Ali Mallah”, have been quoted in the media as spokespeople for the Rally and its organizers. Mr. Mallah gave quotes to CBC on behalf of the Committee, saying that the Committee “condemns any acts of terror, or so-called terror, or acts of violence against any synagogue” and that “the Committee always have been participating in a peaceful and civil gathering and march and speeches”. A CBC article with the quotes from Mr. Mallah, dated March 12, 2026 can be found at this link: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ont-al-quds-day-9.7126287

23To cast doubt on the sincerity of Ali Mallah’s statement, the Attorney General points to certain remarks Ali Mallah made ten years ago, in 2016:

It appears Mr. Mallah has been involved in organizing Al Quds day rallies and protest activities since at least 2016. For example, at Toronto’s 2016 Al-Quds Day Rally, Mr. Mallah attended the protest and delivered remarks as a keynote speaker, which was recorded on YouTube. I am aware that during those remarks, Mr. Mallah stated that “in the United States, if somebody makes a mistake and walks into someone’s home they will be shot, and right here in Canada, if somebody attacks us, we will attack them and shoot them, so why is it okay then for Israel to occupy Palestinian land and to oppress Palestinian people”. Later in his remarks, Mr. Mallah went on to encourage resistance of the occupation “by any means necessary”.

24In response to my question, counsel for the Attorney General confirmed that there was no evidence that any charges were laid against Ali Mallah as a result of his comments in 2016. There is no evidence in the record that Ali Mallah has committed any acts of violence in the ten years since he made the comments set out above.

25I do not accept the Attorney General’s submissions that either Deana Sherif or Samidoun are properly described as organizing the Toronto rally. Just because unsavoury persons promote a rally on social media does not mean that they are organizing that event.

26The police have many powers to arrest and charge protestors for a host of illegal behaviours:

That being said, there are a number of well-known offences in the Criminal Code that give police officers the power to arrest and charge protesters for a host of illegal behaviours, such as the various assault provisions (sections 266, 267, 270 and 270.01), carrying weapons to a public meeting (section 89), causing a disturbance by fighting/shouting/swearing, causing a disturbance by impeding/molesting persons, or disturbing occupants of a dwelling in an apartment complex (section 175), fleeing a police officer (section 320.17), fraudulently concealing property (section 341), inciting hatred in public place (section 319), and intimidating by blocking or obstructing a highway (section 423).⁹

27If the rally posed a clear and present danger of violence, I would have expected to see affidavit evidence from the Toronto Police Service stating that they believed the rally would endanger lives and safety or that they did not have the resources available to ensure public safety.

28There was no evidence at all from any member of the Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Indeed, the only evidence before the court is that the rally organizers have been working with the Toronto Police Service in advance of the rally to ensure that it proceeds safely.

29The Attorney General points to horrific acts of anti-Semitic violence around the world as the context for its request for an injunction. However, there is no evidence before me to link those terrible acts to this rally. The Attorney General’s approach comes dangerously close to asking me to hold some people responsible for the conduct of others.

B. Irreparable harm

30I will assume without deciding that the Attorney General cannot be adequately compensated in damages for unlawful conduct.¹⁰

C. Balance of convenience

31The Attorney General submits that the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction. I disagree.

32The primary relief sought on this motion, the injunction banning the protest, would limit the right of freedom of assembly, which has constitutional protection in s. 2(c) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal for Ontario recently explained the contours of s. 2(c) in Hillier.¹¹ In that case, Lauwers J.A. outlined the contours of s. 2(c) as follows (internal citations omitted):

[36] I pick out, adapt, and adopt the following propositions as correct statements of the law in building out the contours of s. 2(c):

“[T]he act of assembling is the relevant constitutional event, and the value of it inheres in and attaches to the assembly, qua assembly.” As the “collective enactment or embodiment of individual expressive activity,” a s. 2(c) peaceful assembly can advance the democratic goals of “self-government, truth seeking, and self realization”. Moreover, the “capacity to empower unheard, marginalized voices is at the core of s.2(c)”.

An assembly is a “form of collective, not individual, action,” and “[t]he right of peaceful assembly is, by definition, a group activity incapable of individual performance”.

“[A]n assembly is a concerted bodily enactment”, or “a plural form of performativity”. It need not accompany “verbalization” to be a form of expressive political action.

An assembly includes a physical gathering of individuals in a physical space. There are two corollaries applicable to physical assemblies. First, freedom of assembly “includes activities that are ‘integral’ to the assembly, such as mobilizing resources, planning, preparing, and publicizing a gathering, and travelling to and from the assembly.” Second, “digital connectivity facilitates” but neither displaces nor replaces collective forms of expression; it “complements traditional means of participating in public assemblies.”

A public assembly can “leverage a message of protest or dissent, forcing the community to pay attention and become involved in redressing grievances.”

The core issue in determining whether the government limited s. 2(c) is assessed by analyzing whether “the government discouraged the collective pursuit of a common purpose by restricting or prohibiting a public gathering or assembly.”

“[B]lanket bans that exclude or restrict an assembly because of its message or purpose are especially problematic They are “an ‘excessive restriction’ and ‘presumptively disproportionate’ for that reason. “In particular, assemblies with a political message should receive a ‘heightened level of accommodation and protection’.”

33In its primary request for relief, the Attorney General seeks a blanket ban on the Al Quds assembly because of its message or purpose. As Hillier explains, that is especially problematic. It is an excessive restriction, which is presumptively disproportionate. The Attorney General today seeks to prevent the rally from taking place. That ban cannot be minimally impairing of the right on the record before me and thus could not survive a proportionality review.

34I accept that violent assemblies would not be deserving of the same level of Charter protection. However, as outlined above, the Attorney General has not proved that any previous Toronto rally on Al Quds day was violent or that there is reason to believe that today’s rally will be violent. The blanket ban is excessive and disproportionate. The balance of convenience favours permitting the rally to proceed.

35In the alternative, the Attorney General sought an order enjoining anyone participating in the rally from violating the Criminal Code, committing property crimes, interfering with access to buildings (including hospitals), causing a nuisance, or engaging in hate speech, and authorizing the Toronto Police Serve to arrest anyone breaching this order.

36Respectfully, there is no need for the court to issue this alternative relief. No one is permitted to violate the Criminal Code, commit torts, or engage in hate speech. No police officer requires a court order before arresting and charging people who are breaking the law. The court expects people attending rallies to follow the law. While there is no basis for directing the police to enforce an order arising out of a civil proceeding,¹² the court expects the police to enforce the law and preserve the peace.

37The application is dismissed.

Robert CentA J.

Released: March 14, 2026

Schedule A

THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for service, filing and confirmation of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby abridged so that this Motion is properly returnable today.
THIS COURT ORDERS that an interlocutory injunction is granted, effective March 14, 2026 at 3:00 p.m. pursuant to section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 40.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Respondents and each of them, and any and all persons having knowledge of this Order, be and hereby are restrained and enjoined from directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever, engaging in an Al-Quds Day protest in the City of Toronto, on March 14, 2026, or on any other day.
THIS COURT ORDERS that any police officer with the Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police, and any other police authority (the “Police”), shall have authorization to arrest and remove any person who has knowledge of this Order and who the Police have reasonable and probable grounds to believe is contravening or has contravened any provision of this Order.
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Police shall have authorization to remove any vehicles, personal property, equipment, structures, or other objects that impede or block access to public roadways in the City of Toronto.
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Police shall retain discretion as to the timing and manner of enforcement of this Order, and specifically retain discretion:

(a) as to the timing and manner of arrest and removal of any person pursuant to this Order;

(b) to detain and release any person without arrest who the Police have reasonable and probable grounds to believe is contravening, or has contravened, any provision of this Order, upon that person agreeing to abide by this Order; and

THIS COURT ORDERS that any police service or peace officer who arrests or arrests and removes any person pursuant to this Order be authorized to:

(a) release that person from arrest upon that person agreeing in writing to abide by this Order and to appear before this Court at such time and place as may be fixed for the purpose of being proceeded against for contempt of Court or fixing a date for such proceeding;

(b) where such person has refused to give a written undertaking to abide by this Order or to appear before this Court, or where in the circumstances the peace officer considers it appropriate, to bring forthwith such person before this Court in Toronto, Ontario, or such other place as the Court may direct, for the purpose of being proceeded against for contempt of Court or for fixing a date for such proceeding; or

THIS COURT ORDERS that notice of this Order shall be given in the following manners:

(a) to counsel for any person or party appearing at this motion;

(b) by the creation of a URL whereby this Order can be viewed and downloaded, with the Attorney General of Ontario issuing press releases containing the URL linking to the Order;

(d) by reading the Order to any person, including but not limited to reading the Order over an amplification system;

(e) by publishing this Order online; and

(f) any other manner deemed appropriate by the parties or the Police.

THIS COURT ORDERS that the Notice of Application is hereby issued, and the time for service of the Notice of Application and the materials filed in support of the application is abridged.
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Respondents and anyone with notice of this Order may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this Order or so much of it as affects such person, but anyone wishing to do so shall provide the Applicant’s solicitors with at least twenty- four (24) hours notice thereof, and no such motion shall in any way excuse that person from compliance with the terms of this Order.

Schedule B

THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for service, filing and confirmation of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby abridged so that this Motion is properly returnable today.
THIS COURT ORDERS that an interlocutory injunction is granted, effective March 14, 2026 at 3:00 p.m. pursuant to section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 40.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Respondents and each of them, and any and all persons having knowledge of this Order, be and hereby are restrained and enjoined from directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever, while engaging in an Al-Quds Day protest in the City of Toronto, on March 14, 2026, or on any other day, from:

(a) watching, besetting or picketing, physically preventing, impeding, restricting or in any way physically interfering with, or counselling others to watch, beset or picket, impede, restrict or in any way physically interfere with access to the United States Consulate General located at 360 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario;

(b) damaging or destroying any property, utilities, or other infrastructure at the United States Consulate General;

(c) physically preventing, impeding, restricting or in any way physically interfering with, or counselling others to impede, restrict or in any way physically interfere with access to residences, commercial premises, businesses, or other property in the City of Toronto, including but not limited to Mount Sinai Hospital;

(d) causing or attempting to create a public nuisance within 100 meters of the locations listed in paragraphs (i) and (ii) above;

(e) engaging in or attempting to engage in speech that constitutes hate speech under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;

(f) engaging in or attempting to engage in violence;

(g) engaging in unlawful assembly, mischief, intimidation rioting, nuisance, or the creation of a disturbance within the meaning of sections 63, 64, 175, 180, 423, and 430 of the Criminal Code.

THIS COURT ORDERS that the Respondents and each of them, and any and all persons having knowledge of this Order, be and hereby are restrained and enjoined from directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever,

(a) engaging in or attempting to engage in speech that constitutes hate speech under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;

(b) engaging in or attempting to engage in violence;

(c) engaging in unlawful assembly, mischief, intimidation rioting, nuisance, or the creation of a disturbance within the meaning of sections 63, 64, 175, 180, 423, and 430 of the Criminal Code; or

(d) engaging in conduct that breaches any lawful direction of the Toronto Police Service;

while engaging in an Al-Quds Day protest in the City of Toronto, on March 14, 2026, or on any other day.

THIS COURT ORDERS that any police officer with the Toronto Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police, and any other police authority (the “Police”), shall have authorization to arrest and remove any person who has knowledge of this Order and who the Police have reasonable and probable grounds to believe is contravening or has contravened any provision of this Order.
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Police shall have authorization to remove any vehicles, personal property, equipment, structures, or other objects that impede or block access to public roadways in the City of Toronto.
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Police shall retain discretion as to the timing and manner of enforcement of this Order, and specifically retain discretion: