ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Yasmin Zaki Sayed Ali Youseff
Self -Represented
Applicant
- and -
Emad Fathy Shehata Hassanien
Anthony Colangelo, for the Respondent
Respondent
HEARD: December 1, 2,3 2025 January 20, 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FRAGOMENI J.
1The focused trial in this matter took place over three days, namely December 1, 2 and 3, 2025. I heard submissions on January 20, 2026.
2The evidence in chief consisted of the parties’ affidavits filed for the motion heard May 26, 2025 by me. I released my endorsement on the motion on June 24, 2025.
3At paras. 31 to 33 of my endorsement I set out the following:
[31] This matter will, therefore, proceed to a trial on the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the court and whether the Applicant voluntarily attorned to the jurisdiction of the Egyptian Court.
[32] The affidavits filed by the parties will constitute their respective evidence in chief with the opposing party permitted to cross-examine them accordingly.
[33] The record is now fixed, and no further affidavits can be filed by the parties.
4The March 14, 2025 affidavit of the applicant is filed as Exhibit 1. The affidavit of the applicant sworn May 2, 2025 is filed as Exhibit 2. The affidavit of the respondent sworn April 16, 2025 is filed as Exhibit 3.
5The issues for me to determine are the following:
- Did the applicant attorn to the jurisdiction of the Egyptian court?
- Does this court have jurisdiction to vary a valid Egyptian court order for child support made under an Egyptian Divorce Order.
- Does this court have jurisdiction to retroactively vary the Egyptian child support order.
- If not does this court have jurisdiction to make a fresh order for child support pursuant to section 33 of the Family Law Act and if so, can this order be made retroactively.
Overview of the facts:
6The parties met in or around late 2015 or early 2016 in Egypt. The parties were married on December 30, 2016.
7The applicant had immigrated to Canada in 2013 as a permanent resident with her parents and siblings from Egypt. After the marriage, she returned to Canada in January 2017 to continue her studies, work, and file a spousal sponsorship application for the respondent.
8The parties have one child, Rayan, born on April 4, 2018.
9In May 2018, the applicant travelled to Egypt with Rayan. In September 2019, the applicant returned to Canada to resume her career and began working with PLASP Child Care Services. Rayan was enrolled in Bright Path Daycare in Mississauga.
10In November 2019, the applicant’s spousal sponsorship application was approved and the respondent obtained permanent residence status in Canada. The parties separated in June 2020. The applicant deposes that the relationship deteriorated as a result of the respondent’s verbal and physical abuse.
11In her Affidavit sworn March 14, 2020, the applicant sets out the following chronology of events:
- On July 1, 2020, the respondent informed the applicant and her parents that he would be away in Montreal for four days attending a stock training session.
- On July 3, 2020, the applicant received a call from Mohamed El-Rashidy, the respondent’s lawyer, who advised her that the respondent has departed for Egypt and was seeking a divorce. The applicant states that she had no prior knowledge of his intention to seek a divorce.
- On July 17, 2020, the applicant learned from a neighbour in Egypt that the respondent was removing belongings from the parties’ matrimonial home in Egypt.
- On July 18, 2020, the applicant filed a legal claim through her lawyer in Egypt for the return of her belongings. The applicant was still residing in Canada at this time.
- In August 2020, the applicant travelled to Egypt with her child, Rayan. Her intention in doing so was a hope to reconcile and allow the respondent to fulfill his role as a father. However, he only sent $700 to cover Rayan’s travel expenses and refused to pay for the applicant’s return to Canada. The respondent did not provide any financial support to the applicant or the child. As a result, the applicant was left with no alternative. The applicant filed for child and spousal support in Egypt, relying entirely on her family’s assistance.
- In January 2021, the respondent filed a case in Egypt to prevent Rayan from traveling outside Egypt and effectively trapping her and Rayan in Egypt.
- In June 2021, the applicant was issued a divorce certificate by an Egyptian Court. This decision was finalized without her knowledge or consent.
- In March 2022, the applicant returned to Canada and resumed work at Brian W. Fleming School with the Peel District School Board.
- In July 2022, during an agreed upon visit to Egypt, the respondent abducted Rayan and severed all contact with her. The applicant filed a police report and with the assistance of legal counsel she regained custody of Rayan.
- On October 3, 2023, the applicant returned to Canada with Rayan, enrolling him in school at Sherwood Mills School for Senior Kindergarten.
- After her return to Canada, the applicant retained counsel and issued the Ontario action on January 31, 2024.
Position of the Applicant
12The applicant submits that the respondent has repeatedly exploited the Egyptian legal system to manipulate and delay preventing Rayan’s return to Canada and imposing immense emotional and financial strain on her.
13The applicant maintains that she did not voluntarily attorn to the jurisdiction of the Court in Egypt. The applicant deposes that her filing of matters in Egypt for child and spousal support are due to her insecure condition after their sudden separation.
14The applicant submits that the Egyptian child support order of about $85 per month is wholly inadequate and not in the child’s best interests.
15The applicant and the child are residents in Ontario and are both Canadian citizens. Rayan was born in Ontario and has lived here since, except for the period of time he was in Egypt.
Position of the Respondent
16The respondent disputes the narrative set out by the applicant in her affidavits sworn March 14, 2025 and May 2, 2025.
17The respondent submits that the foreign Court in Egypt has already dealt with child and spousal support and this Court ought to recognize these orders. The applicant should not be allowed to re-litigate these issues and the respondent relies on the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel.
18The respondent’s belief is that the applicant chose to litigate this matter in Egypt on the basis that the Egyptian Court would be more favourable to her on the issue of spousal support. The respondent argues that given the short duration of the marriage she would not have obtained spousal support and an order for housing maintenance in Canada as she did in Egypt.
19At paras. 7-14, the respondent sets out in detail the extent of the Egyptian orders relevant to the issue of jurisdiction:
I attach to this my Affidavit as Exhibit “A” a copy of the divorce judgment in Egypt, confirming a divorce was granted in Egypt.
It is evident from the case history record in Egypt, a copy of which I have obtained and attach as Exhibit “B”, that the Applicant Mother has been the party taking substantial steps in Egypt on various issues. As is evident from the records, the Applicant Mother continues to try to obtain “custody” Orders in Egypt starting in March 27, 2024, after she commenced the case here. She should not be permitted to run parallel cases in two courts.
On October 25, 2022, a Judgment for spousal support was made against me in Egypt. This was done at the Applicant Mother’s request. I note that there were various services issues and issues with the authenticity of documents provided by the Applicant Mother to the Egyptian court throughout the proceedings, however, the important point is that these child, spousal support, and maintenance orders were requested by the Applicant Mother in Egypt and made in Egypt at her behest. I attach to this Affidavit as Exhibit “C”, a copy of that spousal support judgment, translated into English. Despite obtaining this order, and seeking enforcement penalties against me, including seeking orders to imprison me in Egypt, the Applicant Mother still commenced this court proceeding seeking spousal support in Canada in 2024.
10.The Applicant Mother applied also to increase the amount of child support and maintenance in Egypt. On March 16, 2022, she obtained a judgment confirming 3,000 Egyptian pounds per month for child support and 3,000 Egyptian pounds a month for marital alimony (spousal support). I attach to this my Affidavit as Exhibit “D” a copy of the March 16, 2022 translated judgment.
11.As part of the requirements of the Egyptian court, I have to maintain an apartment lease and pay for the monthly rent so that the Applicant Mother and the child have a place to stay. I presently have to maintain this obligation and do so, an obligation that would not have been made under Canadian law. I attach to this my Affidavit as Exhibit “E” a copy of the dismissed appeal dated February 14, 2024. The Applicant Mother uses the apartment, rents it, or has her friends stay there at my cost. The apartment costs me approximately 13,000 (an amount that is increasing each year with interest) Egyptian pounds per month, in addition to the other support obligations.
12.Pursuant to the orders, I have and continue to remain obligated to deposit funds into the Egyptian court. In 2021, funds were also sent from my HSBC accounts to the Respondent, totalling 71,400 Egyptian pounds. Once the Respondent started claiming in Egypt that she did not receive particular amounts or misrepresent what funds were sent for, payments started to be made directly to court. I asked my lawyer to obtain some records of what had been deposited in Egypt on my behalf late last year pursuant to the orders and attach this record as Exhibit “F”. Also enclosed within Exhibit “F” are copies of the funds in 2021 that went to the Respondent. I have also made payments as recently as last month that will need to be reflected in the updated court records from Egypt.
13.Execution procedures also resulted in 50,000 Egyptian pounds being removed from my account in or around May 2023, as per Exhibit “G”.
14.Lastly, as above on the custody issue, the Applicant, despite commencing this proceeding in Canada in January 2024, continues to use the Egyptian court to seem various orders, while simultaneously pursing the case here in Canada. Enforcement procedures continue to persist there, despite the Applicant somehow suggesting this should all be dealt with in Canada.
20In his affidavit sworn April 16, 2025 at paras. 36 to 42. the respondent responds to the applicant’s allegations. I will not repeat those paragraphs here but will summarize them as follows:
- The Respondent denies that he was emotionally and physically abusive.
- It is not true that the Applicant had no alternative but to file her claims in Egypt. The Applicant acknowledges in her Affidavit that she travelled to Egypt with the intention of reconciling and to foster a relationship between Rayan and the Respondent.
- The Applicant was not prevented from travelling out of Egypt. In 2021-2022, the Applicant and Rayan travelled to England and Turkey. In 2023, she took Rayan to France and London. Further, the Respondent points out that the travel ban request was dismissed by the Egyptian Court.
- The Applicant was not forced to chose Egypt as the forum to file. The Respondent sets out that she did so as the Egyptian Court would make a more extensive spousal support order which would not have been ordered in Canada considering the very short duration of the marriage.
- The Applicant was in fact ordinarily resident in Egypt during various periods of the child’s life. She was working as a teacher in Egypt.
21At the trial of this matter both parties testified and both parties were cross-examined by each other. I will review the trial testimony of the parties separately.
Applicant:
22The applicant referred to her May 2, 2025 affidavit and attached Exhibits to set out the chronology of events that ultimately led to her filing the Ontario application.
23At Exhibit 2 of her May 2, 2025 affidavit, the applicant attaches her lawyer‘s email to the respondent relating to the respondent’s sudden separation and responding to the respondent’s lawyer’s earlier email. The applicant’s lawyer’s sets out the following:
I have now had a chance to review your correspondence of July 20,2020 with my client. It is my client’s position that an individual claiming to be from your office contacted my client on July 2, 2020, and indicated, “do not contact your husband again he has landed in Egypt”. Your client moreover misled my client in stating he was going to Montreal but rather flew to Egypt. These are suggestive that your client did not have intention to return.
With respect to my client’s travel, you are fully aware that consent to travel is not be unreasonably withheld. Interestingly, your client himself is in Egypt. My client does not have any support here, and Rayan has dual citizenship with Canada and Egypt as well; she requires assistance from her family as well as your client as she does not have any here.
While my client is agreeable with primary residence with her and generous and liberal access to your client, we require full financial disclosure with respect to the correct quantum of child support payable. Prior to drafting any such agreement, I suggest both parties exchange disclosure within 30 days and by August 20. Kindly confirm if this is agreeable.
24In the respondent’s lawyer’s July 3, 2020 email his lawyer had advised the applicant not to contact the respondent. The respondent had travelled to Egypt and wanted a divorce.
25The applicant testified that at no time did the respondent send a draft Separation Agreement for her to review. The respondent had blocked the applicant from having any communication with her.
26On July 17, 2020 the applicant had learned from a neighbour in Egypt that the respondent was removing belongings from the matrimonial home in Egypt. The applicant acknowledged that she did travel to Egypt with the child Rayan, without a court order or the respondent’s consent. However, she had to travel there to recover the items the respondent was removing from the matrimonial home.
27In her May 2, 2025 affidavit the applicant sets out the following :
- On August 7, 2020 I traveled to Egypt with Rayan, hoping to reconcile with the Respondent and allow him to fulfill his role as a father.
- The Respondent changed the lock of the matrimonial home so I could not get in did not have a place to stay. I was then obligated to go stay at my family’s place. He was informed by the court officers that he has the option to arrange for a rental place for me to stay or to allow me to return to the matrimonial resident, but he did not choose either.
- Instead of appreciating my efforts to reconcile, the Respondent ceased to provide any financial support in Egypt. This was during the COVID-19 pandemic. There were strict airport restrictions and immunization requirements, which made international travel extremely difficult. I had no money to return to Canada.
- Left with no alternative, I filed for child and spousal support in Sept 2020, in Egypt, relying entirely on my family's assistance. The Respondent refused to provide financial disclosure, and I was unable to obtain official income documents from his workplace in Saudi Arabia. He works in an international company and gets paid in US dollars. He is on a work visit visa there which requires him to stay 30 days in Saudi Arabia and 30 days off. The court refused the paystub I had from his work because it was outdated and lacked a signature. Therefore, the court had to determine child support based on minimal imputed income.
- The Respondent then filed a case for an obedience order to which I objected in Dec 2020. Obedience order is a kind order that provides for husband's obligation to provide for his wife subject to the latter's legal duty to obey him. The Respondent thus escalated matters. I had to comply to the obedience order and had to attend physically the whole court sessions with lasted several months and I couldn't travel back to Canada till this case was dismissed.
- In June 2021, I was issued a divorce certificate by an Egyptian court-a decision finalized without my knowledge or consent.
28At trial she was cross-examined about the timing of these events. She acknowledged that she did file for child and spousal support in Egypt and that she did so before the Obedience Order was issued. She stated she was stuck in Egypt and had no ability to return to Canada. The respondent was not supporting her or the child.
29At Exhibit 5 of her May 2, 2025 affidavit the applicant sets out a chart of court proceedings, including her objection to the Notice of Obedience.
30Also set out at Exhibit 5 is the January 30, 2022 dismissal of the respondents request for a travel ban.
31The Divorce Order sets out that the child support amount is $85 per month (Canadian) plus a spousal support order which consists of the respondent providing an apartment for her and the child until the child reaches the age of 16.
32In her May 2, 2025 affidavit the applicant sets out the following as it relates the support issue:
- The Respondent has sent me in total about 71,000 Egyptian pounds (about $1931.20 CAD) for Ryan's interim and temporary daycare/schooling during our stay in Egypt (while we were stuck and trapped), which I initially disagreed with because I wanted to come back to Canada and enroll him here. However, Rayan didn't finish his daycare over there as he couldn't feel included, and we came back to Canada in March 2022 and resumed work at Brian W. Fleming School with the Peel District School Board.
- According to Egyptian family law, the father is obligated to provide the matrimonial home for the children and their mother until the children reach the age of 16 (even after divorce). This is to ensure the children's stability and well-being during their formative years.
- Similarly in this case, the matrimonial home's (an apartment) key was left with me. No one lives there nor is it rented as I am not allowed to rent it. As we have a family tie in Egypt, I might live there with Ryan if we visit Egypt, just like we briefly went there last summer. Once the child turns 16, the respondent will get the apartment back even if the child decides to live with me, unless he voluntarily decides to let me stay in it with the child. The apartment is already paid off by the Respondent. I am not sure when he paid it off as he owned a few properties as investments during our marriage, but he told me that it was paid off. On Feb 2023, he filed a claim at the Egyptian court to get this apartment back, but the court decided he will be able to take it back only when the child is 16 or if I get remarried, as per Egyptian law. (see Exhibit 4)
33The respondent appealed the child and spousal support orders and Exhibit 4 of the applicant’s May 2, 2025 affidavit is the appeal judgment. The judgment sets out the following:
Such allegation is groundless, as evidenced by the fact that she divorced the appellant on 19.0632021, pursuant to a divorce certificate. Therefore, her three types of spousal maintenance was forfeited, and the minor remains in her custody, as he was born in 2018. Therefore, the aforementioned appellant cannot claim the marital house as the appellee was divorced from the appellant, and the minor has not reached the legal age for the appellant to claim this house.
The first instance court dismissed the preliminary court, as duly served. This court upholds the appealed judgement , as will be stated in the operative part.
Regarding the costs, the court orders the appellant to pay them, in accordance with Article 184.1, 240 of the Code of Procedures and Article 187.1 of the Lawyers Code.
34With respect to spousal support Exhibit 3 of the applicant’s May 2, 2025 affidavit sets out the following:
Judgment No. 2381/2022 Ain Shams Family.
And since it was established from appealed Judgement No. 13161 of the 138th judiciary year confirms the defendant’s liability, which the court primarily relies on as the basic for imposing the alimony of the waiting period. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled, as previously mentioned, to alimony shall not of a duration less than two years, so it becomes 3000 x 24 months because he divorced her without her consent an the reason for divorce was not her fault, which necessitates the court issuing a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to pay her monthly 3000 Egyptian pounds as a waiting period alimony until the end of her waiting period according to Islamic Sharia as following in the Judgment’s wording.
Regarding the expenses and attorneys’ fees, the court shall charge the defendant by virtue of Article No. 184/1, Code of Procedure and Article N. 187/1, Code of legal Practice replaced with Legislation No 10/2022.
Thus,
The court issued a judgment:
Obliging the defendant to pay the plaintiff a waiting period alimony of three thousand pounds as the date of her divorce, which occurred on 29/06/2021, until the end of her waiting period (Iddah) on 29/09, 2021. Additionally, the court obligated him with the conciliatory payment amounting to seventy-two thousand pounds and charged him to cover the expenses and seventy-five pounds for attorney’s fees.
35The applicant summarized her position as follows:
- My filing of matters in Egypt for child support and other claims were due to my insecure condition after sudden separation, an impression from the Respondent that he will not come back to Canada due to his work requirements, and for the other compelling circumstances as mentioned above. After returning on October 3, 2023, I initiated this matter in Ontario which was eventually got issued on January 31, 2024.
- The Respondent is a permanent resident of Canada, and both Rayan and I are residents in Ontario and Canadian citizens. Rayan was born in Ontario and has since lived here except for the instances where the Respondent's actions forced his travel or temporary abduction to Egypt.
- The Egyptian child support order of about $85/month for an Ontario's habitually resident child is not in his best interest and probably that court had no Jurisdiction to order for a habitually Ontarian child's support either.
- Unlike Ontario, the courts take forever in Egypt because the Egyptian population is over 119 million and judges are off from August to the end of September every year.
- I respectfully request this honorable court to assert jurisdiction and establish a fair and enforceable child interim support order, as Ontario is the appropriate jurisdiction for this matter.
- I also request that the court recognize the inadequacy of the Egyptian orders and provide spousal support under the Family Law Act, considering the real and substantial connection to Ontario and the financial dependency created by the Respondent's actions.
- I am willing to let go off any of my right to the Egyptian matrimonial home if the Respondent provides me Spousal Support here. But I believe Rayan as his only child still has a right to that house, which I have no right to waive off.
- Similarly, the child support or any other amounts that the Respondent deposited in the Egyptian court for the period of 2020 to 2022, I am willing to let go off that or refund upon receipt of retroactive child support here, if that is decided fair by this honourable court.
- During my most recent visit in Egypt last year between July and Sep 2024, I did not attempt to withdraw any of these deposits because I filed this matter here in Ontario and I have no intention of getting double paid. Any matter that continued after my filing here was either for proving my custody of the child due to my insecurity during my trips in Egypt with the child or automatic continuation of past filings.
- While I stand with my decisions and deny of any allegations of forum shopping; if my actions as a mother for asking supports in Egypt was wrong while being trapped in there, I ask this honorable court not to deprive my child of his right to child support that he deserves as a Ontario resident and in his best interest as a child.
Respondent:
36In cross-examination, the respondent acknowledged that the applicant and child are Canadian citizens and residents and that they have dual citizenship. The child, Rayan, was born on April 4, 2018 in Ontario. The primary residence of the child is with the applicant and the applicant and Rayan live with her parents at her parents’ home.
37The respondent acknowledged that from 2015-2019 the applicant was enrolled in college studying full time. In November 2019 the applicant sponsored the respondent to come to Canada.
38At para. 19 of his April 16 2025 affidavit, the respondent states:
[19] When the Applicant Mother finished school and started working, I asked her about paying her debts and paying household expenses, but the Applicant Mother refused. The Applicant Mother started an argument and she called the police in June 2020 to try to get me out of the home. However, when the police came, it was the Applicant Mother who was removed from the home because she behaved badly and lied to the police, knowing that she was the one who called them.
39The applicant cross-examined him on this statement and referred him to the police report regarding this incident. The police report is attached as Exhibit 1 of the applicant’s May 2, 2025 affidavit. It sets out the following at page one:
Analysis
Sophia Bishop On 29/07/2020 10:57
The file has been approved for case closure.
Balbir Kandola On 25/07/2020 22:09
Verification and case closure
#9594033
Worries:
Past harm
The present concerns were brought to the attention of the Society by the Peel Regional Police. The Society became involved with this family following a referral from the Peel Regional Police. They provided the following information: ‘The parents have been married for three years and share one son, Rayan 2….. On June 08, 2020 at 8:51pm, the mother contacted the police to advise that she wants (blank) to be removed from the residence because they are arguing about getting a divorce. When the police attended the home, the mother advised that she has had enough of (blank) and they keep arguing with each other over the divorce process.
The mother advised police that she is willing to leave the residence for the night to calm down and get away from things for moment. She left the residence in her vehicle to go to a friend’s house for the night. The parents agreed to communicate better and work on their problems together to get through the divorce. The Police determined that no further police involvement was required.’
40The applicant pointed out to the respondent that the report states that she was willing to leave not that she was removed and there is nothing in the report about her behaving badly.
41The respondent testified that he did draft a Separation Agreement, but no agreement was ever reached. He acknowledged that at the time he did not provide financial disclosure. He had the intention of doing so but was only given a week. The applicant referred the respondent to her lawyer’s July 21, 2020 email to the respondent’s lawyer, Mohamed El-Rashidy (Exhibit 2 of her May 2, 2025 affidavit and pages A-183 and 184) which states in part:
I have now had a chance to review your correspondence of July 20, 2020 with my client. It is my client’s position that an individual claiming to be from your office contacted my client on July 2, 2020, and indicated, “do not contact your husband again he has landed in Egypt”. Your client moreover misled my client in stating he was going to Montreal but rather flew to Egypt. These are suggestive that your client did not have intention to return.
With respect to my client’s travel, you are fully aware that consent to travel is not to be unreasonably withheld. Interestingly, your client himself is in Egypt. My client does not have any support here, and Rayan has dual citizenship with Canada and Egypt. My client is seeking to travel to Egypt with Rayan while your client is in Egypt as well; she requires assistance from her family as well as your client as she does not have any here.
While my client is agreeable with primary residence with her and generous and liberal access to your client, we require full financial disclosure with respect to the correct quantum of child support payable. Prior to drafting any such agreement, I suggest both parties exchange disclosure within 30 days and by August 20. Kindly confirm if this is agreeable.
42The respondent testified that the applicant filed for child support before he obtained the Obedience Order. In cross-examination he denied that he was relying on the Egyptian Court to assert control over her.
43On June 23, 2021 the Egyptian Court dismissed the Notice of Obedience.
44The respondent testified that the applicant requested and wanted the divorce in Egypt. On this point the applicant referred the respondent to the divorce judgment which states in part:
Whereas the legal provision stipulated four conditions for entitlement to conciliatory payment. Firstly: the wife should the legally consummated by virtue of a legal marriage. Secondly: Divorce has taken place whether revocable or irrevocable divorce. Thirdly: Divorce has taken place without explicit or implicit consent from the wife. Fourthly: The reason for divorce was not her fault.
Since the conciliatory payment's condition were fulfilled which are the divorce of legally consummated wife was without explicit or implicit consent from and the reason for divorce was not her fault.
45The document states that the divorce took place without her consent or knowledge.
46With respect to the travel ban the respondent testified that it did not apply to Canada, only to other countries. He stated as well that she had his consent to travel from Egypt to Canada.
Governing Legal Principles
47The respondent relies heavily on the decision Yan v. Xu, 2023 ONSC 1288, a decision of Diamond J. dealing with essentially the same factual matrix as the case at bar. After reviewing Myer J.’s helpful summary of the principles of attornment, at para. 32 of his decision, Diamond J. sets out why he concluded that the applicant did attorn to the jurisdiction of the Chinese Court at paras. 33 to 41, as follows:
[33] In my view, a review of the record before this Court shows that the applicant clearly attorned to the jurisdiction of the Chinese court. Indeed, during argument, counsel for the applicant effectively conceded this point. Nevertheless, it is important to review these facts to support the finding that the applicant did attorn.
[34] According to Wang (and she was not explicitly challenged on this evidence), Articles 58 and 59 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China provide that a party to a legal proceeding may appoint one or two persons to act as his/her agent(s) ad litem. The agent can be a lawyer, legal worker or a close relative of the party. Where a party appoints an agent to act on his/her behalf in litigation, that person must submit a power of attorney bearing his/her signature or seal to the Court.
[35] Article 62 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China deals with agents ad litem in family proceedings, and provides that even where a party has appointed such an agent, he/she shall still appear personally in court unless he/she is incapable of expressing his/her own will. Any party who is unable to appear personally in court for those reasons shall then submit his/her views in writing to the court.
[36] On the record before this Court, the applicant clearly abided by and complied with Articles 58, 59 and 62 of the Civil Procedure Law of the people’s Republic of China. In the Chinese proceedings, the applicant signed two separate powers of attorney (dated August 25, 2016 and January 16, 2018) authorizing her parents to represent her as the applicant’s agents. Both powers of attorney were certified by the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Toronto.
[37] The applicant did not personally attend in China to appear before the Chinese court. However, she prepared two separate written submissions to the Court filed in the divorce proceeding and the “after divorce” proceeding. Those submissions were signed by the applicant (and her parents) on October 25, 2016 and March 22, 2018 respectively. I have reviewed the English translations of those written submissions and note that the applicant did not take any issue with the jurisdiction of the Chinese court but instead recounted her experiences with the respondent during the marriage, including allegations of infidelity, questionable parenting on the part of the respondent, and financial issues between the parties.
[38] In addition, it cannot be ignored that the applicant also appealed the original judgment in the division of property proceeding to a higher Chinese court and sought to revisit the same issues in the “after divorce” proceeding.
[39] Even though the applicant commenced this application, she clearly abided by the Law.
[40] The applicant wanted her voice heard by the Chinese court before any decisions were rendered. It cannot possibly lie in the applicant’s mouth at this stage to challenge the jurisdiction of the Chinese court after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction and participating on the merits.
[41] The applicant clearly attorned to the jurisdiction of the Chinese court, and thus the issue for this Court’s determination is whether the applicant can avail herself of any of the narrow defences open to claims of enforcement of foreign judgments.
48At para. 57 of his decision, Diamond J. states:
[57] The respondent was free to commence the Chinese proceedings. The applicant was free to decide whether or not to participate in those Chinese proceedings. She did and did so voluntarily. The fact that the amount of child support awarded by the Chinese court did not fall within the same range that the Ontario Child Support Guidelines would have dictated does not offend or shock the conscience of this court. The Chinese court had jurisdiction to deal with the issue of child support, and the principles underlying the Ontario Child Support Guidelines are arguably irrelevant to the Chinese court’s disposition of the issue. The Chinese court’s decision regarding child support ought to be respected by this Court.
49It is important to note that Diamond J. finds as a fact that the applicant voluntarily participated in the Chinese proceedings.
50As set out in the Mehralian v. Dunmore, 2023 ONSC 1044 ( referenced at para. 32 of Diamond J.’s decision):
“Attornment is common law principle for recognition of foreign judgements. A party’s decision to voluntarily submit a foreign jurisdiction has been a basis for recognition of foreign judgments for hundred of years…”
51Again, a reference is made that the party must voluntarily submit to a foreign jurisdiction.
52The Court of Appeal dealt with this issue in Cheng v. Liu, 2017 ONCA 104. Hourigan J. A. writing for the court identified the issues on appeal as follows:
Thus the appeal raises the following issues:
Does an Ontario court have jurisdiction to hear and determine a corollary relief proceeding under Divorce Act following a valid divorce in a foreign jurisdiction?
Does an Ontario court have jurisdiction under the FLA to determine the issue of child support after a foreign court has issued a divorce?
53At para. 3, Hourigan J. A. states:
[3] I accept the submission of the appellant that the trial judge erred in finding jurisdiction based on the Divorce Act and in distinguishing Okmyansky. However, for reasons I will explain below, I am of the view that Ontario Superior Court has jurisdiction to determine the issues of child support and equalization of net family property pursuant to the Family law Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. F. 3 (the”FLA). There is, in my view, no jurisdiction under that legislation, or otherwise . for the Superior Court to order spousal support on this case.
54Hourigan J. A deals with these issues as they relate to the Divorce Act as follows:
[27] I accept that the facts of the present case are significantly different then the facts of Okmyansky. Notably, the respondent's application in Ontario predated the Chinese application, whereas in Okmyansky the Ontario application was commenced after the foreign divorce was issued. However, the court's analysis in Okmyansky was based on an exhaustive review of the legislative history of the Divorce Act, and not on the particular facts of the case. Having undertaken that analysis, Simmons J.A. concluded, at para. 33, that there is "nothing in the legislative history of the Divorce Act to indicate that Parliament intended the 1993 amendment to confer jurisdiction on Canadian courts to hear and determine a corollary relief proceeding . . . following a valid divorce in a foreign jurisdiction". [page179]
[28] Okmyansky is clear and unequivocal authority that an Ontario court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a corollary relief proceeding under the Divorce Act following a valid foreign divorce. Simmons J.A. held, at para. 38, that without a divorce granted in Canada, a support order could not properly be viewed as "corollary relief"
[29] Various superior court cases have followed Okmyansky in the last ten years. Thus, the court in Stefanou v. Stefanou, 2012 ONSC 7265, [2012] O.J. No. 6163, 47 R.F.L. (7th) 385 (S.C.J.) held, at para. 170, that "[i]f the divorce is not granted pursuant to the Divorce Act, then there is no divorce to which corollary relief may be incidental". The British Columbia Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion in V. (L.R.) v. V. (A.A.), 2006 BCCA 63, [2006] B.C.J. No. 264, 52 B.C.L.R. (4th) 112, holding that the Supreme Court of British Columbia has no jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to grant corollary relief founded upon a foreign divorce.
[30] In my view, the trial judge erred in law when he attempted to distinguish this case from Okmyansky. That case was binding authority, and nothing in the unique circumstances of this case serves to confer jurisdiction where the statute does not provide jurisdiction. Simply put, there is no jurisdiction for an Ontario court to grant corollary relief under the Divorce Act after a foreign court has validly issued a divorce.
[35] The question that remains is whether an Ontario court has jurisdiction under the FLA to award child support after a foreign court has issued a divorce. This is an issue that was not considered in Okmyansky.
55In the case at bar the Egyptian court made an order for child support. This is not a situation where a foreign court grants a valid divorce but does not deal with child support. At paras. 46 and 48 Hourigan J.A. notes:
[46] Counsel for the appellant does not argue that there is any impediment in the FLA to the court assuming jurisdiction after the issuance of a foreign divorce. His argument is that relief under the FLA is not available due to the constitutional doctrine of paramountcy. According to the appellant, given that the respondent initially sought an order for child support under the Divorce Act, a remedy under the FLA is not available. I would not accede to this argument for the following reasons.
[48] The case law makes clear that there is no operational incompatibility between the Divorce Act and provincial family law legislation. Child support can be claimed under provincial legislation following a divorce. Thus, in Gomes v. Gomes, [1985] B.C.J. No. 2683, 47 R.F.L. (2d) 83 (S.C.), the court decided that there was no conflict between the Divorce Act and the British Columbia provincial legislation in terms of child support. It held, at para. 34: [page183]
56In Zeineldin v. Elshikh, 2020 ONSC 1160, at para 15 Engelking J. states the following:
[15] With respect to the issue of child support, the Court of Appeal found in Cheng that there is no statutory prohibition against utilizing the FLA in circumstances where a foreign court grants a valid divorce, but does not deal with child support in it and that “the use of the FLA to provide a remedy is entirely consistent with the statuary objective of ensuring that parents provide support for their dependent children.” Hatem submits that Cheng can be distinguished from the case at bar on the basis that the Chinese court in the former specifically held that the support issues could more properly be dealt with in Ontario. That is not, however, in my view, what Cheng stands for; rather, it stands for the proposition that where child support has not been dealt with in a validly issued foreign divorce, it can properly be sought by a party resident in Ontario under the FLA, whether the foreign court has prescribed that it can or not. [footnote omitted]
57In Rubio v. Joslin, 2018 ONCJ 167, O’ Connell J. deals with a fact situation that is most similar to the case at bar. The analysis conducted by O’Connell J. is informative and helpful. At para. 1, O’Connell J. identifies the issue before her as follows:
The Respondent father, Mr. Timothy Joslin, seeks a summary decision on the legal issue of this court’s jurisdiction to make a new child support order or to retroactively vary the child support provisions of the Divorce Order of the 16th Family Court, Bogotá, Colombia dated November 7, 2006.
58In Rubio the parties divorced on November 7, 2006 pursuant to a Divorce Decree of Luis Guillermo Arbodela Martinez J. of the 16th Family Court of Bogota. The Orders incorporated the terms of the parties’ custody and child support agreement dated October 20, 2006 (“the Colombian Order”).
59On November 16, 2016, approximately two years after the mother immigrated to Ontario, the mother brought an application to this court for sole custody of her child and child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines for Ontario.
60In her analysis commencing at para. 39 of her decision, Justice O’ Connell states:
“In the case before me, for the following reasons, I find that this court does have jurisdiction to consider the mother’s claim for support under the Family Law Act, notwithstanding the existence of the Colombian divorce order and the ancillary child support provisions.”
61At paras. 45 and 46 O’Connell J. notes:
[45] In Ontario, a foreign child support order made under a foreign divorce should be altered or varied under the procedures set out under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act (“ISOA”). The ISOA permits the Ontario Court of Justice to change or vary support orders from any foreign reciprocating jurisdiction, including those support orders made corollary to a foreign divorce order or by a federally appointed judge. The level of the foreign court does not matter, so long as the procedural requirements of the ISOA are met. See Rothgiesser, supra, at paragraph 20.
[46] However, in this case, the ISOA is not applicable. Colombia is not a reciprocating jurisdiction under that legislation. The mother therefore has no recourse to alter or vary the Colombian support order under the ISOA.
62In the Cheng v. Liu case the Chinese court granted a divorce and awarded the wife custody of the child but declined to make a child support order. The wife subsequently applied again in Ontario for child support. Hourigan J.A. determined that Ontario Courts have authority to award child support under s. 33 of the Family Law Act. There is nothing in the legislation that restricts that authority in situations where a divorce order has been granted outside of Canada.
63The question that arises in the case at bar is: can the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Cheng v. Liu be extended to permit an applicant to claim child support under the Family Law Act if the foreign divorce contains a support order?
64That issue was squarely before O’ Connell J. in Rubio, at paras. 57 and 58. Justice O’ Connell states that:
[57] This case can be distinguished from the case before me for a number of reasons. In Sun v. Guilfoile, the mother and the children were residing in Hong Kong at the time that she brought her application for child support in Ontario. The children were not habitually resident in Ontario. Further, Hong Kong is a reciprocating jurisdiction under the ISOA. The mother acknowledged that she had the ability to change the Tokyo order in Hong Kong but brought her application in Ontario because the child support tables were higher than Japan. The father was only in Ontario on a temporary work assignment and not residing here on a permanent basis. The court was clearly concerned that the mother was “forum shopping”. Finally, the Tokyo order had only been made two years prior to the mother bringing her application. There was no evidence before the court that the Tokyo child support order was unfair or unreasonable.
[58] In the case before me, Ms Rubio and Nicole had been residing permanently in Ontario for almost four years. The mother has no other forum in which to reasonably seek relief. While the mother in Sun v. Guilfoile could vary the Tokyo order under the ISOA legislation in Hong Kong, Ms Rubio has no such option since Colombia is not a reciprocating jurisdiction. Ms Rubio is clearly not engaged in forum shopping as she had been residing in Ontario for more than two years before she commenced this application and she had been planning to come to Ontario since 2013. Further, the mother is seeking to update a child support order that is more than ten years old. There have been a number of significant changes in circumstances over the past decade. The father’s income has more than tripled from what he himself claims was his income at the time that the child support order was made in Colombia 2006, almost twelve years ago.
65At para. 77, O’ Connell J. sets out her reasons for finding that Ontario has the jurisdiction to determine the issue of child support, including any retroactive claims.
66In Yan v. Xu, Diamond J. dealt with the issue of the defence of public policy. Justice Diamond sets out the following at paras. 51 - 55:
[51] In Beals, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly held that when a party seeks to challenge the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the defence of public policy involves the impeachment of that judgment by condemning the foreign law on which the judgment is based (my emphasis). This defence must be applied narrowly as “the expansion of this defence to include perceived injustices that do not offend our sense of morality is unwarranted”.
[52] In Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf, the Court of Appeal for Ontario equated public policy with foreign law invoking “our instinctive moral repugnance” so that enforcing a foreign judgment would shock our moral conscience and place our society’s fundamental values at stake.
[53] In Sangi v. Sangi 2011 BCSC 523, the Court was asked to refuse enforcement of an Iranian judgment on the basis that the doctrine of unconscionability was not available under Iranian contractual law. The Court rejected that submission and enforced the Iranian judgment, holding as follows:
“Is it contrary to ‘essential public or moral interest’ or our view of basic morality for foreign law of contract to admit a doctrine of unconscionability? In my view, it is not. The doctrine of unconscionability is an important protection for the vulnerable under our law of contract. However, it is not so essential a part of our law that its omission would shock the conscience. The defence of public policy has a narrow application, which is consistent with the principle of comity.”
[54] An example of a foreign divorce judgment being unenforceable for public policy is found in Kariminia v. Nasser 2018 BCSC 695. In that case, the Court refused to recognize two orders denying a divorce to a woman in Iran on the basis that an Islamic divorce was exclusively available in Iran to a man, and not a woman. The Court held that it was against Canadian public policy to recognize a divorce that was solely the right of a man. Clearly, such a result would run contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the equality of sexes jurisprudence.
[55] In assessing the public policy defence, it is essential to remember that the Court should only be concerned with alleged repugnant law, and not repugnant facts. Whether or not a foreign judgment is unenforceable for reasons of public policy is a question based upon the underlying foreign law, and not the merits of the foreign dispute or the conduct of any of the parties. A public policy defence turns upon whether the foreign law is contrary to our view of basic morality.
67Returning to the case at bar and with these legal principles in play, for the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that Ontario has jurisdiction to deal with the issue of child support notwithstanding that the Egyptian Court dealt with it in the Divorce Order.
Habitual Residence
68I am satisfied that the applicant and the child Rayan are habitually resident in Ontario. They were habitually resident in Ontario prior to 2020 when the applicant and child travelled to Egypt. They were habitually resident in Ontario after they returned from Egypt. At the time the applicant commenced this application for child support in January 2024 she and Rayan were habitually resident here.
69I am not satisfied that the time she spent in Egypt broke the chain of her habitual residence here in Ontario. She travelled to Egypt in 2020 to deal with the sudden separation from the respondent who had left her and Rayan without financial support.
Applicant Did Not Voluntarily Attorn To The Jurisdiction Of The Egyptian Court
70The evidentiary record before me establishes that the respondent misled the applicant when he left Ontario and travelled to Egypt in July 2020. I accept the applicant’s testimony at para. 15 of her May 2, 2025 affidavit when she states: “I was shattered and felt cheated and angry that my husband who slept with me, and then the next day travelled without informing me that he was leaving not only the country but me as a wife.”
71I also accept her evidence that one of the reasons she travelled to Egypt in the summer of 2020 was to deal with the removal of her belongings from the matrimonial. At para. 16 of her May 2, 2025 affidavit she states:
“On July 17, 2020 I was horrified to learn from a neighbour in Egypt that the respondent was removing my belongings and furniture from our matrimonial home there where we had our wedding reception and lived for some months returning to Canada. The neighbour provided photographic evidence which I still have.”
72I am satisfied that the evidentiary record supports a finding that the applicant did not voluntarily attorn to the jurisdiction of Egypt.
73The respondent did not make arrangements to provide reasonable spousal or child support. As a result and while in Egypt the applicant filed for spousal and child support. The applicant has counsel in Egypt and Ontario. I cannot comment on the legal advice she would have received from her lawyer here in Ontario and whether consideration was given to having the applicant return to Ontario to commence her application here.
74The chronology of events in Egypt complicated the applicant’s position.
75She had to deal with the respondent’s Notice of Obedience filed in Egypt and she took steps to have that Notice of Obedience dismissed.
76The applicant also had to deal with the respondent’s imposition of a travel ban which she was required to comply with.
77There is no doubt and I so find that it was always the applicant’s intention to return to Ontario where she was employed and where Rayan was attending school.
78I am also satisfied that it was the intention of the applicant to resolve the matrimonial issues in Ontario by way of a Separation Agreement. This finding is amply supported by the contents of the July 21, 2020 letter sent to the respondent by the applicant’s counsel.
79According to the applicant, the spousal and child support provisions set out in the Divorce Order are not such that they provide any long-term support for the child. At paras. 28 to 31 of her May 2, 2025 affidavit the applicant states:
[28] In Jan 2022, the Respondent filed another case, this time it was to prevent Rayan from returning to Canada, effectively trapping both me and my son (Rayan) in Egypt without any financial
support. Though I was retained by the Peel District School Board as a casual educational assistant; I had to request leave after the Respondent's multiple attempts to prevent Rayan from traveling back to Canada, and as a mother, I couldn't leave my son.
[29] The Respondent has sent me in total about 71,000 Egyptian pounds (about $1931.20 CAD) for Ryan's interim and temporary daycare/schooling during our stay in Egypt (while we were stuck and trapped), which I initially disagreed with because I wanted to come back to Canada and enroll him here. However, Rayan didn't finish his daycare over there as he couldn't feel included, and we came back to Canada in March 2022 and resumed work at Brian W. Fleming School with the Peel District School Board.
[30] According to Egyptian family law, the father is obligated to provide the matrimonial home for the children and their mother until the children reach the age of 16 (even after divorce). This is to ensure the children's stability and well-being during their formative years.
[31] Similarly in this case, the matrimonial home's (an apartment) key was left with me. No one lives there nor is it rented as I am not allowed to rent it. As we have a family tie in Egypt, I might live there with Ryan if we visit Egypt, just like we briefly went there last summer. Once the child turns 16, the respondent will get the apartment back even if the child decides to live with me, unless he voluntarily decides to let me stay in it with the child. The apartment is already paid off by the Respondent. I am not sure when he paid it off as he owned a few properties as investments during our marriage, but he told me that it was paid off. On Feb 2023, he filed a claim at the Egyptian court to get this apartment back, but the court decided he will be able to take it back only when the child is 16 or if I get remarried, as per Egyptian law. (see Exhibit 4)
80In all of the circumstance set out in the evidentiary record before me I am not satisfied that the applicant voluntarily attorned to the jurisdiction of the Egyptian court.
Forum Shopping:
81I am also not satisfied that this is a case of forum shopping. The applicant started her application for child support in January 2024 on the basis that the $85 per month is totally inadequate
82The respondent submits the $85 per month should not be looked at in isolation from the rest of the support provisions. He points to the fact that he is obligated to provide an apartment for the applicant and Rayan until Rayan is 16. However, the applicant explains why such an order is not helpful for her.
83Further the applicant is prepared to undertake not to enforce the Egyptian court order if the Ontario court makes an order for child support.
84The applicant and the child have been residing in Ontario since he was born with the exception of the time they were in Egypt after the respondent suddenly and without notice to the applicant left her and the child and moved back to Egypt.
85The applicant and the child live in Ontario. The circumstance have changed since the Egyptian support orders were made. The applicant does not live in Egypt. Having an apartment there has no value to her. She deposes that the apartment is already paid off by the respondent so his financial obligations to pay for it do not arise and the respondent did not contest or refute that statement by the applicant.
86Further, the respondents income is now well over $100,000. The significant change in circumstances, including the respondents income and the needs of the child while residing here in Ontario, supports the applicant’s position that she is not forum shopping.
ISOA
87The applicant cannot proceed with a variation under the ISOA because Egypt is not a reciprocating jurisdiction under that legislation.
88In Gavriluke v Mainard, 2013 ONSC 2337, at paras 11 and 12 the court states the following:
[11] The statement of the motions judge that “there are no other parties to this litigation” is technically correct. However, a parent claims child support not only as his or her own entitlement but also as a proxy for his or her child. Furthermore, the rationale and purpose of child support is to defray or share the costs of raising children. It is most appropriate that the quantum of child support should be connected to the costs the custodial parent is incurring in the jurisdiction where they reside.
[12] If, as is the case here, Ontario law would result in a more generous award, it is difficult to answer the question of why these children - Ontario residents who have an independent legal right to be supported by their father under s. 31 of the Family Law Act - should be denied their full entitlement under that Act on the basis of their father’s residency. There may be a good answer to that question. However, it should be decided by a trial judge, not by the denial of the opportunity to even advance the child support claim.
Public Policy:
89As noted in Gavriluke v Mainard, at para. 11 “it is most appropriate that the quantum of child support should be connected to the costs the custodial parent is incurring in the jurisdiction where they reside.”
90On an income of $120,000 table child support for one child would be $1,068 per month. The amount being paid under the Egyptian Order is the equivalent of $85 per month. That is a difference of $973 per month.
91I start with the fact that child support belongs to the child. Does the $85 ordered by the Egyptian court offend our view of the basic morality or does it offend or shock the conscience of the court? In my view it does.
92Without a full record of the Egyptian proceedings and without expert evidence assisting the court on how the spousal and child support amounts were arrived at in the Egyptian proceedings, I cannot find and conclude that the support orders were within the guidelines set out in Egyptian Law.
93However, if the orders were made on the basis that the applicant and Rayan would be residing in Egypt the $85 is wholly inadequate for the child who is in fact residing in Ontario.
94Further the fact that the order contained a term that the respondent provide an apartment in Egypt is of no value to the applicant and Rayan. They do not reside there. The apartment is already paid for by the respondent. Once Rayan reaches the age of 16, the respondent no longer has that obligation, but Rayan will continue to need child support after the age of 16.
95In all of these circumstance. I am satisfied that a public policy consideration supports a finding that Ontario has jurisdiction to deal with the issue of child support.
Conclusion
96I find that this court does have jurisdiction to determine the issue of child support including any retroactive claims. The applicant shall provide a written undertaking that she will not enforce the Egyptian Order.
97Any payments made by the respondent will be taken into account at the time the child support order is made.
98I am seizing myself of the matter. As such the parties shall contact the trial office to canvass dates for the hearing of the issue of child support.
99The parties shall exchange the following financial disclosure 45 days prior to the hearing:
- Sworn Financial Statements setting out their income from all sources and setting out their assets and liabilities.
- Income Tax Returns and Notice of Assessments for the years 2025, 2024, 2023 and 2022.
- Their most recent paystubs.
- Any relevant employment contracts that set out remuneration and benefits available through their respective employers.
100In the event that the parties cannot resolve the issue of costs of this focused trial the following timeline shall apply:
- The applicant shall serve and file her written submission on costs within 20 days (not to exceed 3 pages with a Bill of Costs attached).
- The respondent shall serve and file his responding written submissions within 20 days thereafter (not to exceed 3 pages with a Bill of Costs attached).
- The applicant shall serve and file any reply within 15 days thereafter (not to exceed 2 pages).
Released: March 11, 2026