CITATION: Aitken v. Aitken, 2026 ONSC 1382

COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00000445-00ES

DATE: 20260309

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CATHERINE ELIZABETH AITKEN, deceased

Applicant

– and –

ROBERT WILLIAM AITKEN, LINDEN ALAN AITKEN and JOHN RODERICK AITKEN

Respondents

David P. Gould, for the Applicant

Naomi Sayers, for the Respondents Robert William Aitken and Linden Alan Aitken

Maggie MacDonald, for the non-party Grenkie & Reynolds LLP

HEARD: February 23, 2026, at Kingston

RYAN BELL j.

REASONS FOR decision on motions

1On February 23, 2026, I heard two motions brought within an application to prove a copy of Catherine Elizabeth Aitken’s lost will. Catherine died on January 3, 2023. Her husband, William Aitken, predeceased her on November 12, 2022. Catherine and William’s four children, Muriel, Robert, Linden, and John are, respectively, the applicant and the respondents in this proceeding.¹ John has not participated in the proceeding and did not attend on the hearing of the motions. No certificate of appointment has been issued in the Estate.

2The application is scheduled to proceed on March 16, 2026. On her motion, Muriel requested:

(i) an order striking the notices of examination dated December 17, 2025, addressed to Muriel and Christine LaPrade and the certificates of non-attendance dated December 19, 2025;

(ii) an order prohibiting Robert and Linden from bringing further motions or commencing further proceedings with respect to Muriel or Catherine’s Estate until the application is determined, except with leave of the court; and

(iii) an order that the application proceed as scheduled on March 16, 2026.

3Robert and Linden moved for:

(i) a Mareva injunction in respect of the Estate assets and Muriel’s personal assets, including an order that various financial institutions freeze any accounts held in the name of Catherine, William, Muriel, or the Estate;

(ii) an order compelling Muriel to provide an accounting of all Estate assets and her dealings therewith;

(iii) an order requiring Muriel to pass her accounts as estate trustee de son tort;

(iv) Norwich orders requiring the financial institutions, Grenkie & Reynolds LLP, and Dubé Law to disclose relevant records concerning Catherine, William, and the Estate; and

(v) an order striking the affidavits of Muriel and Ms. LaPrade from the application record or, in the alternative, an order compelling Muriel to attend for re-examination, and an order compelling Ms. LaPrade to attend for cross-examination.

4On February 25, 2026, I released an endorsement providing my decisions on these motions, with reasons to follow:

(i) In respect of Robert and Linden’s motion, Grenkie & Reynolds LLP shall disclose and deliver to counsel for Robert and Linden, at their expense, within seven business days, all records relating to wills and powers of attorney prepared by Edward Castle in or around August 20, 1997 and any other testamentary documents, estate planning correspondence, or client files relating to Catherine and/or William. Any privilege and confidentiality attached to the records, notes, and files of Edward Castle arising from the preparation of the testamentary documents of Catherine and William, and any privilege and confidentiality with

respect to the lawyer-client relationship between Edward Castle and Catherine and William arising from the preparation of their testamentary documents is waived.

(ii) The balance of Robert and Linden’s motion is dismissed.

(iii) The certificates of non-attendance dated December 19, 2025 are set aside. Muriel is not required to attend for re-examination and Ms. LaPrade is not required to attend for cross-examination.

(iv) No further motions in the application may be brought, except with leave of the court.

(v) The application will proceed on March 16, 2026 as scheduled, and notwithstanding the productions ordered to be disclosed by Grenkie & Reynolds LLP.

(vi) The timetable for the service and filing of application materials is amended, with the applicant’s materials to be served and filed by March 2, 2026, and Robert and Linden’s materials to be served and filed by March 12, 2026.

5These are my reasons for decision on the motions, together with my decision on costs.

The underlying application and procedural history

6In her application, Muriel seeks to prove that Catherine’s will dated February 2, 2000 is Catherine’s last will and testament and is valid and subsisting. The application was issued on November 29, 2024. Muriel relies on her affidavits affirmed December 3, 2024 and April 17, 2025 (discussed below), John’s affidavit affirmed December 13, 2024, and Ms. LaPrade’s affidavit affirmed September 19, 2023. Ms. LaPrade worked as a secretary with Edward Castle, and affirms that on February 2, 2000, she witnessed Catherine sign the original will. Ms. LaPrade also affirms that in accordance with the law firm’s regular practice, following the will’s execution, she prepared a true copy of the will.

7At the first appearance on January 16, 2025, Robert and Linden requested financial, medical, and solicitors’ files in relation to both Catherine and William. Justice Carey adjourned the application to a date to be set by counsel on agreement and ordered that Robert and Linden serve their motion for directions seeking productions on or before February 28.

8In their motion for directions, Robert and Linden sought only financial records from Muriel. A consent order was agreed to by the parties. Muriel was required to produce the following documents in her possession, control, or power: a list of all Catherine’s bank accounts at the time of her death and, for each account, copies of the bank transaction histories for the period January 3, 2018 to January 3, 2023; information and documents relating to the Estate’s assets and current liabilities; and copies of Catherine’s estate planning documents (collectively, and together with Muriel’s April 17, 2025 affidavit, “Muriel’s Productions”).

9Muriel’s Productions were served on Robert and Linden on April 17, 2025. Robert and Linden did not bring a motion for further directions within the agreed 30-day period or at any time thereafter.

10On June 10, 2025, the parties consented to a timetable for the application: affidavits relied on by Robert and Linden to be served by July 25; cross-examinations to be conducted by September 5; and the application to proceed on October 6.

11In July 2025, Robert and Linden asked to have the copy of Catherine’s will examined by an expert and for an extension of time to file their own responding affidavits. Muriel reluctantly agreed.

12On September 25, 2025, the parties attended before Muszynski J. to set a new timetable on consent: Robert and Linden’s affidavits to be served by October 1; cross-examinations to be conducted by December 19; and the application to proceed on March 16, 2026.

13In the end, Robert and Linden served only an expert affidavit.

14In late November and early December 2025, counsel exchanged correspondence and agreed to a timetable for cross-examinations. Robert and Linden advised they wished to cross-examine Muriel; nothing was said about cross-examining Ms. LaPrade.

15On December 9, 2025, Muriel was cross-examined on both her affidavits. At approximately 2 p.m., counsel for Robert and Linden concluded Muriel’s cross-examination stating, “[t]hose are all the questions I have.”

16On December 15, 2025, Muriel cross-examined Robert and Linden’s expert witness and Robert, as scheduled. Also on December 15, for the first time, Robert and Linden, through counsel, indicated they wished to cross-examine Ms. LaPrade. Muriel’s counsel provided Ms. LaPrade’s contact information.

17On December 17, 2025, at around 1:45 p.m., Robert and Linden served two notices of examination by e-mail, both returnable on December 19, at 10 a.m.: one addressed to Muriel to re-attend for further cross-examination on the same affidavits and one addressed to Ms. LaPrade to attend for cross-examination. Ms. LaPrade was also served personally with the notice of examination on December 18. Robert and Linden did not confirm Muriel’s availability, Ms. LaPrade’s availability, or the availability of Muriel’s counsel before serving the December 17 notices of examination. On December 17, Muriel’s counsel e-mailed counsel for Robert and Linden to explain why neither Muriel nor Ms. LaPrade would be attending on December 19.

18On December 19. 2025, Robert and Linden obtained a certificate of non-attendance in respect of Ms. LaPrade. The next week, they obtained a certificate of non-attendance in respect of Muriel.

19On December 26, 2025, Robert and Linden sought an urgent case conference, alleging asset dissipation and breach of fiduciary duty by Muriel. On December 29, Muriel delivered her motion record, returnable January 8, 2026, seeking relief regarding the notices of examination and certificates of non-attendance.

20Muriel’s motion did not proceed on January 8, 2026; instead, an urgent case conference was held on January 7 at which Kaufman J., noting the parties’ wish to maintain the March 16 hearing date for the application, endorsed a timetable for the motions, with a hearing date of February 2.

21On February 2, 2026, following comments made by Robert and Linden’s counsel at the hearing, Tranmer J. mistried the motions. The motions proceeded before me on February 23.

The certificates of non-attendance are set aside

22Muriel submits that Robert and Linden failed to exercise reasonable diligence in their efforts to compel Muriel to re-attend and Ms. LaPrade to attend on December 19, 2025 for further cross-examination and cross-examination, respectively. Robert and Linden’s position is that they acted with reasonable diligence; they assert they “could not trust” what was being said on Muriel’s cross-examination, they were expending a large amount of resources in a short period of time, and they needed to assess whether further cross-examination of Muriel was required.

23For the following reasons, I agree with Muriel.

24The right to cross-examine on a pending motion or application is not absolute. It must be exercised with reasonable diligence, and the court may refuse an adjournment of the hearing for the purpose of cross-examination where the party seeking the adjournment has failed to act with reasonable diligence: r. 39.02(3), Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. Rule 34.05(1) provides that where the person to be examined resides in Ontario, they shall be given not less than two days notice of the time and place of the examination, unless the court orders otherwise. Rule 34.15 provides the court with broad remedial powers when a person fails to attend an examination including, in my view, the power to set aside a certificate of non-attendance.

25While Robert and Linden did not request an adjournment of the application hearing, there can be no question that an adjournment would have been required had I ordered Muriel and Ms. LaPrade to attend for cross-examination as requested (by way of alternative relief) by Robert and Linden.

(a) Muriel

26Muriel was cross-examined on her affidavits (including Muriel’s Productions) on December 9, 2025. While Robert and Linden submit that counsel for Muriel produced his client at the “last minute”, the date of Muriel’s cross-examination was well within the window for cross-examinations as agreed to by the parties and endorsed by Muszynski J.

27Robert and Linden exercised and concluded their right to cross-examine Muriel on December 9. In fact, their cross-examination of Muriel concluded early, at approximately 2 p.m. Robert and Linden gave no indication at that time that they wished to ask additional questions of Muriel about her affidavits or the application more generally. Muriel’s Productions were delivered in April 2025, eight months before her cross-examination.

28Having concluded their cross-examination of Muriel on December 9, counsel for Robert and Linden then took approximately a week to assess whether they needed to cross-examine Muriel on what they describe as new allegations of harassment that arose on the cross-examination. In my view, this is not a reasonable explanation for the delay. Robert and Linden have not explained why these issues could not have been explored during the cross-examination on December 9, particularly when the cross-examination was concluded early. They had been in possession of Muriel’s Productions for months. Robert and Linden then compounded the problem by setting a date for Muriel’s re-attendance – December 19 – unilaterally and on less than two days notice as required by r. 34.05(1).

29I find that Robert and Linden were not entitled to compel Muriel’s re-attendance on December 19, and further, that they failed to exercise reasonable diligence in respect of the proposed re-attendance.

(b) Ms. LaPrade

30Robert and Linden’s failure to exercise reasonable diligence is even more pronounced in regard to Ms. LaPrade. Ms. LaPrade’s affidavit was served on Robert and Linden in December 2024. The agreed-upon deadline of December 19, 2025 for cross-examinations to be completed was endorsed by Muszynski J. in September 25. It was only on December 15 – after Robert’s cross-examination and the cross-examination of Robert and Linden’s expert witness were completed – that Robert and Linden, for the first time, indicated they wished to cross-examine Ms. LaPrade. Counsel requested and was provided with Ms. LaPrade’s email address at that time. Two days later, at approximately 1:45 p.m., Ms. LaPrade and Muriel’s counsel were served by email with the notice of examination unilaterally set for 10 a.m. on December 19. Muriel was served personally with the notice of examination the next day, December 18.

31On December 17, after receiving the notice of examination, Muriel’s counsel emailed Robert and Linden’s counsel to advise that Ms. LaPrade was working a 12-hour shift on December 17 and was unavailable to attend at 10 a.m. I do not accept Robert and Linden’s submission that Ms. LaPrade provided “no explanation, excuse, or legitimate justification” for not attending the cross-examination as scheduled. Given the short notice, the fact that Robert and Linden had had Ms. LaPrade’s affidavit for a year, and the fact that Ms. LaPrade is a non-party witness, counsel’s advice that Ms. LaPrade was working a 12-hour shift and would not be available to attend constituted a reasonable explanation for her non-attendance.

32When pressed at the hearing why Robert and Linden did not express an intention to cross-examine Ms. LaPrade until the last minute, despite having her affidavit for many months, counsel stated that it was only after “what transpired” during Muriel’s cross-examination that Ms. LaPrade’s cross-examination was determined to be necessary. Counsel went further, stating they “couldn’t trust what was being said” on Muriel’s cross-examination, and endeavoured to link Muriel and Ms. LaPrade’s affidavits on the basis that they were prepared by the same lawyer.

33Charitably interpreted, neither excuses nor explains the delay. It does not justify a last-minute request to cross-examine Ms. LaPrade, a non-party witness, on less than two days’ notice. Robert and Linden had had Ms. LaPrade’s affidavit for months. The affidavit itself is very brief and in it, Ms. LaPrade speaks to the execution of the will and her preparation of a copy of the will in accordance with the law firm’s usual practice. In Sinnathamby v. The Chesterfield Shop Limited, 2016 ONSC 6966, Charney J. found that the plaintiff had failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising the right to cross-examine in circumstances where the plaintiff waited until three weeks before the hearing and provided eight days’ notice. I reach the same conclusion in this case: having regard to all the circumstances, I find Robert and Linden did not exercise reasonable diligence in exercising the right to cross-examine Ms. LaPrade.

(c) Conclusion

34Robert and Linden were not entitled to compel Muriel’s re-attendance for further cross-examination. In any event, they failed to exercise reasonable diligence in unilaterally seeking Muriel’s re-attendance. Nor did Robert and Linden exercise reasonable diligence in unilaterally scheduling the cross-examination of Ms. LaPrade on less than two days’ notice. The certificates of non-attendance are set aside. Muriel is not required to attend for re-examination and Ms. LaPrade is not required to attend for cross-examination in connection with this application.

Robert and Linden have not satisfied the test for a Mareva injunction

35As set out by Strathy J., as he then was, in Sibley & Associates LP v. Ross, 2011 ONSC 2951, at para. 11, there are five requirements for a Mareva injunction:

i. the plaintiff must make full and frank disclosure of all material matters within his or her knowledge;

ii. the plaintiff must give particulars of the claim against the defendant, stating the grounds of the claim and the amount thereof, and the points that could be fairly made against it by the defendant;

iii. the plaintiff must give grounds for believing that the defendant has assets in the jurisdiction;

iv. the plaintiff must give grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the assets being removed out of the jurisdiction, or disposed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt with so that the plaintiff will be unable to satisfy a judgment awarded to him or her; and

v. the plaintiff must give an undertaking as to damages.²

36It is a condition precedent to the order that the plaintiff demonstrate a strong prima facie case: Sibley, at para. 12; Aetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman, 1985 55 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 2, at p. 27.

37Robert and Linden have not met the test for a Mareva injunction, either in relation to the Estate assets or in relation to Muriel’s personal assets. They have not demonstrated that there is a real risk of the assets being removed from Ontario, or disposed of, or otherwise dealt with such that they would be unavailable to satisfy a judgment.

38As set out in Muriel’s Productions, the Estate assets include a farm property in Martintown, Ontario, valued at $762,000 for tax purposes, a TMX Trust investment account in the amount of approximately $98,815, and the funds in Catherine’s TD account. The fact that no certificate of appointment has been issued in the Estate effectively freezes these assets. The farm property cannot be removed from the jurisdiction, nor could it be sold or disposed of without a certificate of appointment of estate trustee having been issued. The financial institutions will not release funds in accounts (these accounts or others) to beneficiaries without a certificate of appointment having been issued. Robert and Linden have not provided any evidence that there is a real risk of the Estate assets being removed from Ontario or of the Estate assets being disposed of such that they would be unavailable to satisfy a judgment.

39As for Muriel’s personal assets, Kimberly Pelletier’s affidavit, on which Robert and Linden rely, does not assist them. In her affidavit, Ms. Pelletier describes herself as an “agent” employed by counsel for Robert and Linden. She is not a lawyer, an accountant, or a forensic investigator. Based on her review of bank records (Muriel’s Productions) and Muriel’s cross-examination transcript, Ms. Pelletier concludes that “there were transactions from the joint accounts of the Deceased totalling approximately $356,369.78 CDN from on or about 2018 to about 2023.”

40On cross-examination, Ms. Pelletier acknowledged:

she has no independent personal knowledge of any ATM withdrawal or cheque being improper;
she has no independent personal knowledge of any withdrawal being made without consent;
she has no independent personal knowledge of any intent by Muriel to misappropriate funds;
based on the five-year sample of bank records, William and Catherine gave regularly to Muriel and John, but she saw no cheques payable to Robert or Linden;
Muriel was appointed Catherine’s attorney for property;
the bank records relied on were contained in Muriel’s Productions.

41Ms. Pelletier’s affidavit amounts to little more than speculation and simply serves to put counsel’s opinion before the court. Evidence from a lawyer adduced by way of information and belief through a staff member (or, in this case, an agent), limits the weight of the evidence and should be discouraged: Ferreira v. Cardenas, 2014 ONSC 7119, at para. 16, citing Essa (Township) v. Guergis; Membery v. Hill, 1993 8756 (ON SCDC). As Myers J. observed in Ferreira, at para. 18, “lawyers’ affidavits that recite background gleaned from “the file” are especially problematic.” All the more so where the affidavit, sworn by an agent, goes far beyond background matters.

42There is simply no evidence that there is a real risk of dissipation of assets by Muriel. I agree with Muriel that even if some transactions pre-dating Catherine’s death are ultimately found to have been unauthorized or inadequately accounted for, that would not establish the real risk of dissipation of assets required for Robert and Linden to obtain a Mareva injunction.

Robert and Linden have not satisfied the test for Norwich orders

43Nor has the test for a Norwich order been satisfied by Robert and Linden.

44A Norwich order is an equitable remedy, available on a discretionary basis to assist with pre-trial discovery in certain circumstances: Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] A.C. 133 (H.L.).

45To obtain a Norwich order, the applicant must establish:

(i) a bona fide or reasonable claim against the unknown alleged wrongdoer;

(ii) the person from whom discovery is sought must be in some way involved in the matter under dispute;

(iii) the person from whom discovery is sought must be the only practical source of information available to the applicant;

(iv) the applicant is willing to indemnify the person from whom discovery is sought for their expenses arising out of compliance with the discovery order in addition to their legal costs; and

(v) the public interests in favour of disclosure must outweigh the legitimate privacy concerns: Rogers Communications Inc. v. Voltage Pictures, LLC, 2018 SCC 38, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 643, at para. 18.

46Norwich orders are a pre-trial remedy: Rogers Communications, at para. 18. The remedy is a “type of pre-trial discovery which, inter alia, allows a rights holder to identify wrongdoers”: Seismotech IP Holdings Inc. v. Ecobee Technologies ULC, 2024 FCA 205, at para. 5; see also Akagi v. Synergy Group (2000) Inc., 2015 ONCA 771.

47I am not persuaded that the relief sought is appropriate at this stage of the proceeding, months after the application was commenced, Muriel’s Productions delivered, a timetable set, not once, but twice, and cross-examinations conducted. Robert and Linden did not avail themselves of the procedural tools available to them to obtain the information they now seek by way of extraordinary, equitable relief. Norwich relief should not be granted in these circumstances.

48In any event, I am not prepared to grant Norwich orders against the financial institutions and/or the law firms identified by Robert and Linden because they have not demonstrated a valid, bona fide or reasonable claim of wrongdoing. I will not repeat my observations about Ms. Pelletier’s affidavit. There is no evidence (as opposed to speculation) of wrongdoing before the court that would justify such extraordinary relief, particularly at this stage of the proceeding.

49In light of my determination that Norwich orders are not appropriate for these reasons, it is not necessary for me to address Muriel’s submissions that Robert and Linden ought to be denied equitable relief because they do not come to court with clean hands.

50I am prepared to grant limited relief to Robert and Linden under r. 30.10 in relation to Grenkie & Reynolds LLP. While I am of the view that this relief should have been requested in Robert and Linden’s initial motion for directions following the attendance before Carey J., given Mr. Castle’s involvement in the preparation of Catherine and William’s testamentary documents, I am prepared to order the disclosure of all records relating to wills and powers of attorney prepared by Mr. Castle in or around August 20, 1997 and any other testamentary documents, estate planning correspondence, or client files relating to Catherine and/or William. Any privilege attaching to such documents and with respect to the lawyer-client relationship is waived. The application will proceed on March 16, 2026, notwithstanding the documents produced from Grenkie & Reynolds LLP.

51I am not prepared to make a similar order in relation to Dubé Law given that Eric Dubé’s involvement appears to have been limited to the preparation of powers of attorney. The underlying application is not about powers of attorney.

52As for the financial institutions, the parties entered into a consent order for the productions that make up Muriel’s Productions. It is simply too late for Robert and Linden to request further productions at this stage of the proceeding.

No accounting will be ordered

53I am not prepared to make any order for an accounting. The underlying application is to prove a lost will. If Robert and Linden wish to have Muriel pass her accounts as power of attorney, they may make application (seeking leave if required) under s. 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30. The procedure to be followed on the passing of accounts of an estate trustee is set out in r. 74.16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. No certificate of appointment of estate trustee has been issued. Robert and Linden’s request is premature.

Conclusion

54For these reasons, with the exception of the r. 30.10 relief granted in relation to Grenkie & Reynolds LLP, Robert and Linden’s motion is dismissed. In relation to Muriel’s motion, the certificates of non-attendance dated December 19, 2025 are set aside. No further motions in the application may be brought, except with leave of the court. The application will proceed on March 16, 2026, with the timetable amended to provide that the applicant’s materials are to be served and filed by March 2, and Robert and Linden’s materials are to be served and filed by March 12, 2026.

Costs

55Muriel is the successful party on both motions and is entitled to her costs. The parties have provided me with their costs outlines and made brief submissions at the conclusion of the hearing. I also invited the parties to provide me with brief written submissions on the impact of any offers to settle on the costs award. I received submissions from Muriel by the March 2, 2026 deadline. No further submissions were received from Robert and Linden.

56Muriel requests her costs on a full indemnity basis in the amount of $50,816, inclusive of HST and disbursements. In the alternative, she requests her costs on a substantial indemnity basis. For their part, Robert and Linden maintain that the billing of Muriel’s counsel is excessive. Their position is that each side should bear their own costs or, that costs of the motions should be for the application judge to determine.

57On the hearing of a contested motion, unless the court is satisfied that a different order would be more just, the court shall fix the costs of the motion and order them to be paid within 30 days: r. 57.03(1)(a), Rules of Civil Procedure. Muriel is the successful party on the motions and is entitled to her costs. In my view, the appropriate time to determine and fix the costs of these motions is now, by the motions judge.

58In my view, Robert and Linden have not engaged in litigation behaviour worthy of the court’s sanction such that substantial indemnity costs are warranted.³ However, their failure to accept Muriel’s December 19, 2025 offer to settle in respect of the notices of cross-examination and certificates of non-attendance attracts costs on a substantial indemnity basis in respect of the costs attributable to Muriel’s motion.

59Of the total time spent by Muriel’s counsel on both motions, I would attribute 20 per cent to Muriel’s motion (with costs on a substantial indemnity basis), and 80 per cent to responding to Robert and Linden’s motion (with costs on a partial indemnity basis). Robert and Linden’s motion was wide-ranging, and sought equitable and extraordinary relief. It necessitated counsel’s review of a motion record in excess of 700 pages, legal research, preparation of a responding motion record, and preparation for and attendance on a lengthy cross-examination of Ms. Pelletier. The hourly rates charged by Muriel’s counsel are reasonable, having regard to his level of experience. Robert and Linden’s motion was complex. Both motions were important to the parties: Robert and Linden’s based on the nature of the motion, including their request that Muriel’s personal assets be frozen, and Muriel’s because, if unsuccessful, the result would no doubt have been an adjournment of the application. In all these circumstances, I do not agree with Robert and Linden’s submission that the total time billed in respect of both motions by Muriel’s counsel was excessive.

60Having regard to all the above, I award Muriel costs of both motions in the total amount of $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST. In my view, this amount is fair and reasonable for Robert and Linden to pay to Muriel in the circumstances. This amount is to be paid by Robert and Linden to Muriel within 30 days as provided for in r. 57.03(1)(a). As set out in s. 129(1) of the

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, the costs award will bear interest at the postjudgment interest rate. While Muriel requested that I allow interest at a rate higher than that provided is s. 130(2), after taking into account the relevant factors listed in s. 130(2), I decline to do so.

Justice R. Ryan Bell

Released: March 9, 2026

CITATION: Aitken v. Aitken, 2026 ONSC 1382

COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00000445-00ES

DATE: 20260309

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CATHERINE ELIZABETH AITKEN, deceased

B E T W E E N:

MURIEL ELIZABETH AITKEN