Introduction

1The defendant, S.V. was charged with two counts of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of assault contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code.

2After a four-day trial without a jury, I found the defendant guilty of one count of sexual assault and one count of assault: R. v. S.V., 2025 ONSC 2913.

3I subsequently received a pre-sentence report. I heard submissions on sentence on January 9, 2026.

Background of the Defendant

4The pre-sentence report discloses that the defendant is a 30-year-old single Black man with no children. He was born in Canada. His parents were separated at the time of his birth. The defendant had only a limited relationship with his father, who relocated to the United States and started another family. The defendant’s mother remarried, but the defendant did not share a positive relationship with his stepfather.

5During his childhood, the defendant relocated frequently, moving between British Columbia, Montreal, and Toronto. He described his relocations as destabilizing and stated that they made it difficult for him to form lasting connections. He maintains a few close friendships, and reports that none of his current associates have a criminal record.

6The defendant’s mother has been a constant support in his life. The defendant denied any experience of sexual, emotional, or physical abuse, or any involvement with child protection services in his youth.

7The defendant is a high-school graduate. He completed one year of a culinary management program and has completed online technology courses. He aspires to enroll in a holistic nutritional program in the future.

8The defendant is self-employed as a life coach. He has not yet acquired his licence but curates individualized programs for clients.

9The defendant denies any substance abuse. He drinks alcohol socially and does not currently use recreational drugs.

10The defendant has a prior criminal record for offences that include assault causing bodily harm and simple assault, both of which occurred in the context of intimate partner violence. He has no prior convictions for sexual assault. He has reoffended while on probation.

11The defendant provided character letters from his mother, sister, and two friends. He is generally described as caring, hardworking, and disciplined. His friends describe him as having the ability, motivation, and discipline to move forward positively, and grow and make positive choices in the future.

12The defendant’s mother indicates that the defendant has expressed sincere remorse for his actions and wishes to make amends. She expresses her hope that he obtains help where needed to gain the necessary coping skills and mental health supports to be a more effective member of society.

13The defendant’s sister describes him as a “great kid, very quiet but spoiled.” According to her, the defendant is “easily misled,” and “tends to attract females that will promise to take care of him which put them in a position of power over him” … “only to hurt him because they cannot get him to care any other way.” She questions the defendant’s judgment in relying on a woman who is not mother. She states, “[h]is weakness are these females that make him think his way of thinking is ok. Girls that entertain his laziness.” She suggests that the complainant wants to ruin the defendant’s life because he does not want to be with her any longer.

Background to the Offences

14The full context of the offences in respect of which I found the defendant guilty are set out in my written reasons for decision. In summary, the convictions relate to events that occurred around the second week of April, 2022. The defendant arrived at the complainant’s home around 5p.m. or 6 p.m. They were in a dating relationship. The complainant prepared a meal, and they ate together in her bedroom. Afterwards they engaged in some consensual sexual activity.

15The complainant was not on any form of birth control. The defendant did not have a condom. He told her that she should be using pills, but she explained that she has an underlying health condition because of which she was not on any kind of birth control pill. Because neither of them had contraception, they agreed that they would have sex, but the defendant would not ejaculate in the complainant’s vagina.

16The complainant and defendant began having intercourse. The complaint was on top. She sensed from the defendant’s vocalizations and body language that he was about to ejaculate inside of her, and she protested that that was not what they had agreed to. She told him to stop and tried to remove herself from his body, but he pulled her down by her shoulders. She could not move away. He ejaculated inside her vagina. The complainant testified to feeling upset, helpless, betrayed, angry, and disappointed by what had occurred.

17Afterwards, the complainant continued to object and told the defendant that what he had done was selfish and irresponsible. The defendant said he had an idea, but did not share what it was. He left the complainant’s home. When he returned, some 20-30 minutes later, he was carrying an emergency contraceptive pill that he had purchased and asked the complainant to take it.

18They argued about whether she should take the pill. The defendant told the complainant to take it or “he will do it,” by which the defendant meant he would force her to take it.

19The complainant continued to refuse. The defendant approached her and put his whole hand around her neck. He said she had to take the pill.

20The complainant was afraid of what could happen if the situation escalated further. She agreed to take the pill, although she continued to tell him that she does not take contraceptive pills due to her medical condition. She took the pill and told the defendant she had done so. He approached her and used one hand to forcefully squeeze her cheeks open and told her to open her mouth. He said he wanted to check that she had swallowed the pill. He told her to move her tongue so he could confirm she had not hidden the pill underneath her tongue.

21Thereafter, the complainant told the defendant to leave, multiple times. He did leave.

22The complainant suffered pain on her cheeks that subsided overnight. She testified that she also had pain in her ovaries for about a week after taking the emergency contraceptive pill.

The Impact of the Offences on the Complainant

23The complainant delivered a victim impact statement in which she described the profound and lasting impact the offences have had on her life.

24She described a lasting emotional and psychological impact of the offences, including her struggles with fear, anxiety, self-doubt, and moments of overwhelming sadness. She described that her ability to trust others has become much harder and this has impacted her relationships and friendships. She no longer has the appetite to participate in activities she once enjoyed, like travelling, going out with friends, or going to the gym.

25The complainant also described that she has experienced physical impacts from the offences, including stress-related symptoms such as ongoing tension, fatigue, disrupted sleep, nightmares, headaches, changes in appetite, and her body feeling on high alert even when she is in a safe environment.

26The complainant reports that it has become harder for her to concentrate, which has affected her ability to work, study, and focus on responsibilities. When the offences occurred, she was in a master’s program. After the offences, she struggled to attend classes consistently and participate fully and to retain information as she had been able to do previously. She fell behind in her program and was unable to finish it on the timeline she had planned.

27The complainant also described the financial impact she suffered because of the offences, including the costs of therapy or medical appointments that were not covered by her insurance. She took an unpaid leave of absence from work because she felt disoriented and broken. She has incurred expenses related to transportation. In addition, because the defendant made friends with one her roommates, and because the complainant was assaulted in her home, she no longer felt comfortable or safe in that environment. She found a new place to live, and incurred costs related to moving expenses, deposits, new furnishings, and costs incident to finding new housing in Toronto quickly.

Position of the Crown

28The Crown seeks a five-year penitentiary sentence with respect to the sexual assault conviction, and a one-year concurrent jail sentence with respect to the assault conviction.

29The Crown also seeks ancillary orders, including a DNA order, a s. 109 order, and a SOIRA order for twenty years.

30The Crown argues that there are many aggravating factors that apply in this case, including the fact that the offences occurred in the context of intimate partner violence, in the complainant’s home, and the prior criminal record of the defendant. The Crown argues that denunciation and deterrence are of paramount importance in this case, and a five-year sentence for sexual assault is appropriate in view of the guidance from the Court of Appeal in R. v. A.J.K., 2002 ONCA 487.

Position of the Defence

31The defence argues that a fit and just sentence for the sexual assault conviction is a conditional sentence lasting two years less a day, or alternatively a custodial sentence of two years less a day. In the further alternative, the defence argues that a three-year custodial sentence is appropriate.

32With respect to the assault conviction, the defence argues that 18 months’ probation is appropriate, or alternatively, a six-month concurrent custodial sentence.

33The defence does not contest the DNA order, or the s. 109 order. The defence disputes that a SOIRA order is mandatory in this case.

34The defence also seeks a Downes credit, a Duncan credit and a Summers credit.

35In essence, the defence argues that more weight should be placed on the mitigating factors in this case. The defence points to family support for the defendant, some mental health and physical health concerns of the defendant, the defendant’s good character, and his lack of criminal record for the offence of sexual assault.

Legal Principles Regarding Sentencing

36 Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code sets out the fundamental principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

37The purposes of sentencing are set out in s. 718. These include denunciation, deterrence, and separation of the offender from society where necessary; rehabilitation of the offender, reparations to the victim of the crime or community; and promotion of a sense of responsibility acknowledging the harm done to victims or the community. Section 718.2(d) provides that an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances.

38Section 718.2(b) enshrines the parity principle. Parity is an expression of the proportionality principle. The principles of parity and individualization mandate that a sentence must both be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences and highly individualized. See also R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 12.

39Section 718.2(d) and (e) direct that the court should exercise restraint in imposing imprisonment.

40 Section 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code directs judges to increase or reduce a sentence to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender.

41Denunciation and deterrence, both general and specific, are the primary considerations in sentencing in cases of offences occurring in the context of serious sexual assault: A.J.K., at para. 83. In a domestic context, they gain added significance and require heightened attention to the moral blameworthiness of the offender. “The sentence must reflect the individual harm to the victim and the court’s response to the heinous effects of domestic violence”: R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36, at para. 26.

42In R. v. Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38, at para. 37, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that sexual assault is still among the most highly gendered and underreported crimes. Sentences for sexual assault must reflect the harm that sexual offences have done to the complainant and to society at large.

43In A.J.K., the Court of Appeal held that forced penetration of another person, absent some highly mitigating factors, will typically attract a sentence of at least three years, and that the starting point for the range of sentence in such cases is three to five years: at para. 77.

44The Court of Appeal also noted that ranges are starting points, not straitjackets, and are not meant to handcuff the court from fashioning an appropriate sentence: A.J.K. at para. 71.

Aggravating Factors

45In this case, there are several aggravating factors.

46First, under s. 718.2(a)(ii), it is aggravating that the defendant, in committing the offences, abused his intimate partner. In a case involving intimate partner abuse, s. 718.201 directs the court to consider the increased vulnerability of female persons who are victims.

47Second, the Court of Appeal noted that victims of intimate partner violence are in a position of trust and vulnerability with the perpetrator: R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36, at para. 27. Under s. 718.2(a)(iii) it is aggravating that the defendant abused his position of trust in relation to the complainant.

48Third, it is aggravating that when the defendant sexually assaulted the complainant, he ejaculated inside of her vagina. It is aggravating that he did so when they had specifically agreed that he would not do that.

49Fourth, it is aggravating that the defendant sexually assaulted the complainant in the face of her express withdrawal of consent, and that he continued to do so despite her pleas that he stop.

50Fifth, the degree of physical interference with the complainant’s bodily integrity, involving the defendant’s use of force during the penetrative sexual assault is an aggravating factor.

51Sixth, the fact that the sexual assault and assault occurred in the complainant’s home, where she should feel safe, is an aggravating factor.

52Seventh, it is an aggravating factor that the defendant forced the complainant to take an emergency contraceptive pill, despite being aware that she had an underlying medical condition and did not want to take anything not prescribed by her physician. In doing so, the defendant continued to exercise control over the complainant after the sexual assault and disregarded her bodily autonomy and integrity.

53Eighth, the sexual assault and assault had a significant emotional, physical, and financial impact on the complainant, and continues to impact her. The serious harm done to the complainant is an aggravating factor under s. 718.2(a)(iii.1).

54Finally, the defendant’s criminal record is an aggravating factor. The defendant has previous convictions for: (i) failure to attend court; (ii) fraud under $5,000; (iii) possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000; (iv) assault causing bodily harm; (v) assault; (vi) failure to comply with a court order; (vii) failure to comply with a release order; (viii) failure to comply with a probation order; and (ix) driving while suspended.

55Of these convictions, the assault causing bodily harm occurred in the context of intimate partner violence. The complainant in that case was the defendant’s dating partner.

56The conviction for simple assault also occurred in the context of intimate partner violence. In that case, the defendant’s dating partner and the defendant each telephoned the police during an altercation. The charge of assault related to the defendant’s assault on a police officer who responded to the calls.

57The transcripts of the sentencing hearings in the assault causing bodily harm and assault convictions are before me. I note that in both, the defendant stated that he took full responsibility for his actions. He did so again before me. Unfortunately, having taken responsibility for previous incidents of intimate partner violence has not discouraged him from continuing to engage in intimate partner violence. I am concerned that his prospects of rehabilitation are diminished because he has failed to adjust his behaviour notwithstanding two previous assault convictions that arose in the context of intimate partner violence.

58I am also troubled by the fact that the defendant has re-offended while on probation, and that his criminal record includes a failure to abide by court orders.

Mitigating Factors

59There is no doubt that the defendant enjoys the support of his mother. Family support is a mitigating factor.

60However, while the defendant’s sister supports him, I am concerned by the tenor of her letter in support. It appears that her support is unquestioning and uncritical. She appears to blame the complainant for the defendant’s conduct. While her loyalty to the defendant may be a reflection of her affection for him, her apparent excusing of his behaviour does him no favours.

61While the defendant stated that he takes full responsibility for his actions, I also note that the pre-sentence report indicates that the defendant denied culpability for the offences. To be clear, I do not treat this as an aggravating factor in sentencing. Rather, I note this to highlight that at least some of the family support that the defendant enjoys is more likely to excuse his behaviour rather than support him in confronting it, which is particularly problematic in view of the inconsistency of his acceptance of responsibility for these offences.

62The letters provided by the defendant attest to his caring nature, and his sense of discipline. His general good character is a mitigating factor, although as both counsel agreed, it is not unusual for individuals who commit sexual assault and assault against an intimate partner to be of apparent good character.

63The defendant also raised his mental and physical health issues as factors that would, in his submission, mitigate his sentence. The evidence about his health issues is not sufficient to allow me to conclude that he has any health issues that would have an impact on his ability to serve a carceral sentence: R. v. Hugh, 2024 ONSC 6135 at para. 55.

64Although I adjourned this sentencing hearing once to allow the defendant to obtain a report into his mental health, no such report was obtained. The medical records and other documents provided are inconsistent as to his mental health status. For example, while the defendant’s mother stated her hope that he will get mental health supports, she does not describe any mental health challenges on the part of the defendant, other than to say he has reported “some mental breakdown.” However, the pre-sentence report records that the defendant denied any mental health related concerns. Some medical records produced from the Toronto South Detention Centre indicate that the defendant reported a history of severe depression, while others report that he denied mental health issues. Medical records from his physician from 2022 record the defendant’s report that he was undergoing psychotherapy and had some ongoing mental health issues from a motor vehicle accident in 2019. I asked defence counsel how these conflicting reports ought to be reconciled, and he advised me that the documentary evidence as to the defendant’s mental health history and status was inconclusive.

65With respect to the defendant’s physical health, the medical records document some unremarkable issues, like neck pain, and a reported injury to the fifth digit on the defendant’s left hand. I asked counsel what current and ongoing or chronic medical issues the defendant has that could impact his ability to serve a carceral sentence. Counsel submitted that there are none.

66I thus find that the defendant’s physical and mental health do not impact his ability to serve a carceral sentence.

67Defence counsel did not seek an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report which could have elucidated the aspects of the defendant’s life experiences that can be directly linked to systemic anti-Black racism, and which could be relevant to the defendant’s degree of moral responsibility for the offences: R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, at paras. 75-77. As the Court of Appeal recognized in Morris, at para. 102, “social context evidence can provide valuable insight, both with respect to the need to deter the offender from future conduct, and the rehabilitative prospects of the offender.”

68Although no such report was filed in this case, the court in Morris noted, at para. 42, that much of the contents of the report filed in Morris are properly the subject of judicial notice. The report filed in Morris drew connections between the long history in Canada of overtly racist attitudes and social practices, and present-day institutional and systemic discrimination against Black people. Many Black people live in communities marked by poverty, diminished economic and employment opportunities, and a strong and aggressive police presence. The Court of Appeal cited the authors of the report filed in Morris:

It is our opinion that the social circumstances of Black Canadians in general, and of Black male Torontonians in particular, should be viewed as criminogenic. Elevated levels of offending in the types of crimes that typically come to the attention of the police (street crimes as opposed to white-collar and corporate crimes), combined with discrimination in the justice system itself have resulted in the gross over-representation of Black Canadians in our provincial and federal correctional systems. Whereas no one individual should be completely absolved of their own responsibility when it comes to offending behaviour, the social realities that have produced or contributed to such behaviour can be acknowledged, and serve to guide judicial decision making.

69The pre-sentence report records aspects of the defendant’s life that can be rationally linked to anti-Black racism, including his reported difficulties in completing his education, the absence of a relationship with his father, and the absence of a positive relationship with his stepfather. His self-employment as an unaccredited life coach raises the possibility that the defendant has had difficulty obtaining stable employment, although he did not self-report any such difficulty.

70I consider these aspects of the defendant’s history and experiences in the context of anti-Black racism when I consider his moral blameworthiness for the offences at issue.

Other Mitigating Factors: Appropriate Credits

71The defendant submits that he is entitled to a Summers credit, Duncan credit, and Downes credit that total eight months up to the date of sentencing submissions, plus further Summers credit thereafter.

72The defendant seeks credit for the time he spent in pre-sentence custody, including enhanced credit based on difficult conditions he has endured, consisting of being triple-bunked and locked down.

73As of the day of sentencing submissions, the defendant has spent a total of 113 days in pre-sentence custody. To the day of sentencing pronouncement, he has spent a further 56 days in pre-sentence custody.

74A straight application of the 1:1.5 Summers credit provides the defendant with pre-sentence credit of 254 days.

75The record indicates that to the date of sentencing submissions, the defendant spent 14 days in partial lockdown, four days triple-bunked, and a further four days both triple-bunked and in partial lockdown.

76In R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, the Court of Appeal found that “particularly harsh presentence incarceration conditions can provide mitigation apart from and beyond the 1.5 credit referred to in s. 719(3.1) (the Summers credit). The court held that in considering whether enhanced credit should be given, the court will consider both the conditions of the presentence incarceration and the impact of those conditions on the accused.

77In this case, there is no evidence of any impact of the days spent triple-bunked, in lockdown, or both, on the defendant. I would not grant the defendant any Duncan credit in these circumstances.

78The defendant also seeks a Downes credit for what he describes as stringent bail conditions.

79In R. v. Downes, 2006 3957, the Court of Appeal considered when credit may be given for time spent on bail. It noted, at paras. 26-28, that the rationales that apply to pre-sentence credit do not apply to time spent on bail. Among other reasons, even the most stringent bail conditions tend to allow the defendant the opportunity to work, attend school, attend medical appointments, conduct religious worship, and address personal needs. The rehabilitative and treatment options that a defendant in pre-trial custody is often denied are usually available to a defendant on house arrest. Moreover, unlike pre-trial custody, the court noted that the impact of the bail conditions on the defendant cannot be assumed.

80However, the court also found that some of the same considerations that justify credit for presentence custody apply to a defendant who has spent a long time under house arrest. Stringent bail conditions, and particularly house arrest, are an infringement on liberty and are, to that extent, inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence. House arrest is recognized as a form of punishment in the context of conditional sentences: Downes, at para. 20.

81The amount of credit for pre-trial bail conditions is a matter in the discretion of the judge. It will depend upon factors including the length of time spent on bail under house arrest, the stringency of the conditions, the impact on the defendant’s liberty, and the ability of the defendant to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity. A defendant who asks the judge to take pre-sentence bail conditions into account should provide information as to the impact of the conditions: Downes, at para. 37.

82In this case, the defendant was subject to a series of release orders that provided for increasingly stringent bail conditions, prompted by the defendant’s failure to comply with existing release orders, or alleged failure to do so (in the case of certain fail to comply charges that are still pending.)

83The record indicates that the defendant spent 347 days on the initial release order. On August 6, 2023, he was charged with fail to comply. On August 8, 2023 a more restrictive release order required to reside at a certain address nightly, and to submit to GPS monitoring. The defendant spent 255 days on that release order.

84On April 19, 2024, the defendant was arrested on another charge of fail to comply. On May 7, 2024, he was released on terms that were again more stringent, requiring him to remain in a certain residence other than for medical emergencies, attending court, meeting with his lawyer, or attending work or school. He was subject to this order for 51 days.

85After 51 days, the order was varied to permit the defendant to move to a different address. Otherwise, the conditions remained largely the same, except the exceptions to house arrest were expanded to permit the defendant to attend at two specific locations between 12 and 2 pm on Sundays to purchase supplies. The defendant remained subject to this order for 323 days.

86A further release order on June 30, 2025 required the defendant to remain at an address with his mother, who was his surety, subject to the same exceptions. This order allowed him to leave the home in the presence of his surety. He was subject to this order for 89 days.

87In total, the defendant has been on release orders for 1,101 days. Of those 1,101 days, he was required to live with a surety for 436 days, he was under conditions of house arrest with exceptions for 499 days, and he underwent GPS monitoring for 754 days.

88There is no evidence of the impact that the terms of the release orders had on the defendant.

89I agree that the defendant has been under stringent release terms. Those terms became more stringent as the defendant violated his less stringent conditions of release (and in this context, I consider only those charges for which he has been convicted, and not those that are pending.)

90However, the fact that the defendant was, to a great extent, the author of his own misfortune in terms of his escalating bail conditions does not diminish the fact that he was entitled to the presumption of innocence, and the stringent bail conditions amounted to a deprivation of his liberty. At the same time, the deprivation of liberty is attenuated by the fact that the defendant was able to attend work and school during his period of house arrest.

91In these circumstances, I grant the defendant a Downes credit of 75 days.

92In total, I grant the defendant 329 days of Summers and Downes credits.

Parity

93Counsel have provided me with cases to assist me in applying the parity principle in sentencing in this case. I find the following cases offered by counsel to be particularly helpful.

94In A.J.K., a sexual assault including penetration took place when the complainant and defendant were on a date. The defendant took the complainant to a secluded area, choked her, penetrated her, pinned her down, punched and beat her, and then left her alone in the dark. She had a concussion, bruising, swelling, and a difficult and lengthy journey of mental recovery. The Court of Appeal upheld the five-year sentence pronounced by the trial judge. Aggravating factors in this case included that the assault occurred in the context of intimate partner violence and caused physical and psychological harm to the complainant. The defendant had a prior criminal record.

95In R. v. Silveira, 2024 ONSC 757, the defendant penetrated the complainant without a condom while the two were on a date. The complainant cried and protested numerous times during the assault. There was evidence the complainant had suffered significant psychological harm. Unlike this case, the defendant had no prior criminal record. The defendant was young, had the support of his family, and the evidence demonstrated he had the potential for rehabilitation. The court imposed a sentence of 3.5 years.

96In R. v. Henry, 2022 ONCA 191, the complainant and defendant met online. They made plans to meet up. The defendant picked up the complainant and, after dropping off a friend who he had with him, took her to his place where he showered. Sexual activity, including fellatio and vaginal intercourse, took place on his bed thereafter. The central issue at trial was whether the sexual activity was consensual. The defendant was convicted. During sentencing, the trial judge noted the circumstances and found that the defendant had treated the complainant in a demeaning manner. The Court of Appeal upheld the 3.5-year sentence imposed by the trial judge.

97In R. v. A.H., 2024 ONSC 2831, the court pronounced a sentence below the range set out in A.J.K., finding that the defendant’s youth (18 at the time of the offence) and that fact that he was a first-time adult offender were highly mitigating factors. The defendant had a stable and supportive household, and had found a trade he was happy to be working in. The sexual assault in question was violent, involving two men penetrating the 16-year-old complainant digitally, and the defendant also penetrating her with his penis. It also included forcing the complainant to give the defendant oral sex. The complainant suffered profound and devastating harm. The court pronounced a sentence of 30 months’ incarceration.

98In R. v. G.W., 2024 ONSC 4001, the court sentenced the defendant to 2.5 years of imprisonment for a sexual assault that occurred in the context of intimate partner violence. Although cognizant of the aggravating factors, the court found highly mitigating factors including the court’s conclusion that the defendant was unlikely to reoffend. The defendant had reflected deeply on the seriousness of the matter. His therapist attested to his commitment to personal growth and mental health. He was a nurturing father to his children, gainfully employed, and a contributing member of his community. He had considerable support in the community. He had persistent health issues from a stroke, and the court had concerns about his ability to access health care in custody.

99The defendant also offered up cases that pre-dated A.J.K. which I do not find helpful. A.J.K. set a new sentencing range for penetrative sexual assault; cases that pre-date it are of limited utility in evaluating parity of sentences.

Appropriate Sentence

100A conditional sentence, sought by the defendant, is demonstrably unfit. As the court held in Silvera, applying R. v. R.S., 2023 ONCA 608, and A.J.K, a conditional sentence is only available if a sentence of less than two years is appropriate, but absent some highly mitigating factor, the forced penetration of another person will typically attract a sentence of at least three years in the penitentiary: Silvera, at para. 35. There are no highly mitigating factors in this case that take it below the range established by the Court of Appeal in A.J.K. A conditional sentence is thus not available.

101Nor is this a case where the prospect of rehabilitation plays a significant role. As the Court of Appeal found in R. v. K.E., 2014 ONCA 186, at paras. 14-15, in a case where the defendant had not expressed any remorse, did not take responsibility for his actions, and had a prior conviction for a sexual offence, rehabilitation could not have played a significant role at the defendant’s sentencing hearing.

102I recognize that in this case the defendant did express remorse, and at his sentencing hearing he took responsibility for his actions. However, I do not place any weight on these words. The defendant denied responsibility when speaking to the author of the pre-sentence report. He has twice previously taken responsibility for his criminal behaviour in the context of intimate partner violence and has twice gone on to reoffend. I conclude, in view of his criminal record and his inconsistent expressions of responsibility or lack thereof for his actions, that rehabilitation cannot play a significant role in the defendant’s sentencing.

103In my view, the defendant’s level of moral blameworthiness is high. He deliberately broke his agreement with the complainant and forced penetrative intercourse after she had withdrawn her consent. He did so using force. He did so without a condom, knowing she was concerned about pregnancy. He then forced her to take an emergency contraceptive pill when he was aware she had medical reasons for not wanting to do so. He physically assaulted and demeaned her in order to get her to take the emergency contraceptive pill and to ensure that she had taken it. He did all of this in her home, where she should have felt safe. She suffered lasting emotional, physical, and financial harm. And he did this having already twice been convicted of assault arising in the context of intimate partner violence.

104I find that a penitentiary sentence of 4.5 years in respect of the sexual assault conviction is fit and just, and appropriate in view of the defendant’s moral blameworthiness, less 329 days to reflect the combined Summers and Downes credit I have granted.

105I find that a sentence of nine months in respect of the assault conviction is fit and just, and appropriate in view of the defendant’s moral blameworthiness. This sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence for sexual assault.

106In addition, I make the following ancillary orders:

a. An order that the defendant shall provide such samples of bodily substances as may be required for forensic DNA analysis and inclusion in the national databank in accordance with s. 487.051(2) of the Criminal Code.

b. A mandatory order under s. 109(1)(a.1)(i) of the Criminal Code prohibiting the defendant from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, firearm part, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance for life.

c. An order that the defendant shall comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for a period of 20 years, under ss. 490.12(3) and 490.013(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

J.T. Akbarali J.

Released: March 6, 2026

R. v. S.V., 2026 ONSC 1357

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-40000620

DATE: 20260306

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

His Majesty the King

– and –

S.V.

REASONS FOR SENTENCE