CITATION: R. v. J.K., 2026 ONSC 1340
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: R. v. J.K.
BEFORE: Rees J.
COUNSEL: Rebecca Edward, for the Crown Jordan Tekenos-Levy, for J.K.
HEARD at Kingston: February 24, 2026
Subject to any further order by a court of competent jurisdiction, an order has been made in this proceeding directing that the identity of the complainant and any information that could disclose such identity shall not be published in any document or broadcast in any way pursuant to section 486.4 of the Criminal Code. These reasons have been anonymized and may be published.
AMENDED Reasons for Decision1
Overview
1The accused, J.K., is charged with four counts of sexual assault against his former spouse (one of which involves choking), and one count of assault against his daughter. The counts appear on a single indictment.
2The morning the trial was set to begin, before the arraignment of the accused, I raised with the Crown and defence whether the court had territorial jurisdiction over Counts 1 and 3, which appear on their face to charge the accused with offences that are alleged to have occurred entirely in another province. Count 1 charges the accused with a sexual assault that is alleged to have occurred in Edmonton, Alberta in 2014. Count 3 charges the accused with a sexual assault that is alleged to have occurred in Montreal, Quebec in 2018.
3At that point, the defence filed, over the bench, a Notice of Application seeking an order quashing or dismissing Counts 1 and 3. I understand the defence gave notice to the Crown the Friday before trial of its intention to do so.
4Both the Crown and defence submitted that I could address the jurisdictional issue at the close of trial. The accused was arraigned, and I started to hear the evidence of the complainant.
5Shortly after the complainant started testifying, there was an objection from the defence based on s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and on the scope of Count 1. We adjourned, among other reasons, so that the Crown could consider the defence objection and the jurisdiction issue.
6When we resumed the next day, the Crown had narrowed its allegation under Count 1 from a continuing sexual assault over the period set out in that count to a single incident. I also heard submissions on the issue of whether the court had territorial jurisdiction over Counts 1 and 3.
7During the adjournment, I had reviewed the authorities regarding territorial jurisdiction and s. 478(1) of the Criminal Code. I noted the Quebec Court of Appeal’s conclusion in R. c. Ibeagha, 2019 QCCA 1534, 382 C.C.C. (3d) 295, at para. 18, that territorial jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a trial on the merits. It is “a preliminary matter that affects the authority of a court to proceed at trial and ideally should be resolved before the presentation of evidence on the general issue.” Having reviewed the authorities, the Crown and defence agreed that I should address the issue of territorial jurisdiction before continuing with the trial.
8The issue was argued based on the indictment and submissions. After hearing submissions, I concluded that the offences alleged under Counts 1 and 3 do not have any real and substantial connection with Ontario and were committed entirely within other provinces. Therefore, I stayed Counts 1 and 3 and I undertook to provide written reasons. These are my reasons.
The Indictment
9The indictment reads as follows:
J.K. stands charged that he between the 1st day of January in the year 2014 and the 31st day of December in the year 2014 at the City of Edmonton in the Province of Alberta,
Did commit a sexual assault on K.B.K., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada; AND FURTHER THAT
J.K. between the 1st day of January in the year 2017 and the 31st day of December in the year 2021 at the City of Ottawa in the said East Region did, in committing a sexual assault on K.B.K., choke, suffocate or strangle them, contrary to Section 272, subsection (1), clause (c.1) of the Criminal Code of Canada; AND FURTHER THAT
J.K. between the 13th day of August in the year 2018 and the 15th day of August in the year 2018 at the City of Montreal in the Province of Quebec did, commit a sexual assault on K.B.K., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada; AND FURTHER THAT
J.K. on or about the 11th day of November in the year 2022 at the City of Kingston in the said East Region did commit a sexual assault on K.B.K., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada; AND FURTHER THAT
J.K. between the 30th day of April in the year 2023 and the 1st day of June in the year 2023 at the City of Kingston in the said East Region did, in committing an assault on A.K., use a weapon namely a shoe, contrary to Section 267, clause (a) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
The Law
10Section 478(1) of the Criminal Code provides: “Subject to this Act, a court in a province shall not try an offence committed entirely in another province.”
11Although the location of the sexual acts alleged is not an essential element of the offences, the location of the alleged offences of sexual assault are relevant to the territorial jurisdiction of the court: R. c. G.L., 2023 ONCA 750, 433 C.C.C. (3d) 404, at para. 28.
12In R. v. Bigelow (1982), 1982 2046 (ON CA), 37 O.R. (2d) 304, the Court of Appeal interpreted the predecessor to s. 476(b), which provided, among other things, special jurisdiction for offences commenced within one territorial division and completed within another. In that case, the accused had unlawfully removed his son to Alberta when the child was ordinarily resident in Ontario with his mother.
13The Court of Appeal held that Ontario courts have no jurisdiction if an offence were wholly committed in another province. But Ontario courts have territorial jurisdiction if any element were committed in Ontario. This analysis must be approached flexibly and includes three categories: (1) a continuity of operation extending from Ontario to the other province; (2) the commission of an overt act in Ontario; and (3) the registration of effects in Ontario from acts committed in other provinces.
14The Supreme Court of Canada later considered the issue of territorial jurisdiction in the context of transnational offences in Libman v. The Queen, 1985 51 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178. In that context, the Supreme Court held that the relevant inquiry is to determine whether there is a “real and substantial link” between the offence and Canada. To establish jurisdiction in Canada, “all that is necessary to make an offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a significant portion of the activities constituting that offence took place in Canada”: at pp. 212-13. As the Quebec Court of Appeal explained, “the same principle applies where any significant portion of the alleged activities took place in two or more territorial divisions within Canada”: Ibeagha, at para. 13.
15In G.L., the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the test adopted in Bigelow is harmonious with the real and substantial connection test: at para. 30. The Quebec Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in Ibeagha, at para. 13, as did the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Hammerbeck, 1993 613 (BC CA), 26 B.C.A.C. 1, at para. 22, (“[t]he test in Libman encompasses the test in Bigelow”).
16A single charge of sexual assault can refer to numerous acts that are all part of the same transaction: R. v. Sandhu, 2009 ONCA 102, 242 C.C.C. (3d) 262, at paras. 20-21; R. v. L.F.P., 2017 ONCA 132, at para. 3. An Ontario court will have jurisdiction over the count where the charge constitutes a single ongoing transaction, some of which occurred in Ontario: L.F.P., at para. 5. See also Bigelow; R. v. L. (D.A.) (1996), 1996 8371 (BC CA), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 178 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 19; and R. v. F.R.H., 2013 ONSC 2238, at para. 25.
17For instance, in L.F.P., the count as amended was not tied to any specific sexual act. As amended, the count in that case referred to a continuing sexual assault over a three-year time period in both Ontario and Quebec. It was therefore within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ontario courts.
18An Ontario court will also have jurisdiction over the count where the location in which the offence occurred is uncertain, but there is a real and substantial connection to Ontario. In G.L., the accused committed two sexual acts against the complainant E.J. the same night. The evidence was that the sexual acts occurred in Ontario or Quebec. Given the assaults occurred more than 30 years earlier, the complainant could not recall whether the accused took him camping as a child in Ontario or Quebec. At the conclusion of the evidence, the indictment was amended to conform with the evidence to specify that the offence occurred in Pembroke and in the province of Quebec.
19The Court of Appeal held in G.L. that there was a real and substantial link between the offence and Ontario. It held that there was a continuity of operation between Ontario and Quebec. The accused and complainant were both resident in Ontario, the relationship had developed in Ontario, and the accused brought the complainant from Ontario to Quebec. The complainant was under his care and control from Ontario while in Quebec. Further, the complainant suffered the effects of the offence in Ontario.
20The Court of Appeal went on to hold that where the location of the sexual acts is uncertain but there is a real and substantial connection between the offence and Ontario, it is appropriate for the court to conclude that it has territorial jurisdiction. Otherwise, there would be a risk that the accused could not be prosecuted in either province and this would be an unacceptable result.
Analysis
21The defence argues that Counts 1 and 3 relate to offences that are alleged to have been committed entirely in Alberta and Quebec, respectively. The defence argues that there is no real and substantial link between the alleged offences and Ontario. The offence under Count 1 is particularized as having occurred in Edmonton, Alberta in 2014. The offence under Count 3 is particularized as having occurred in Montreal, Quebec in 2018. The defence argues that the Crown has not alleged that conduct constituting an essential element of the offences occurred in Ontario, that any element of the offence was completed in Ontario, that any preparatory act occurred in Ontario, or that any harm was suffered in Ontario. The fact that the complainant resides in Ontario and that a complaint is made to police in Ontario is not sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction on Ontario courts.
22The Crown says that, as narrowed, Count 1 relates to a discrete event in Alberta. The Crown is not alleging multiple instances of sexual assault under Count 1. No element occurred in Ontario. The sexual assault occurred in Alberta and was completed in Alberta.
23Nevertheless, the Crown argued that there was a real and substantial connection with Ontario because there was an ongoing relationship between the complainant and accused; ongoing cross-count sexual assaults, including in Ontario; and the impacts of the sexual assault under Count 1 were felt by the complainant in Ontario.
24I disagree. Count 1 is distinguishable from the cases relied on by the Crown. No part of the sexual assault is alleged to have occurred in Ontario. There was no overt act in Ontario referable to or in furtherance of a criminal plan extending into Alberta. Unlike G.L., this is not a situation where the complainant was underaged and in the custody of the accused at the time or where there was any uncertainty as to the location of the sexual assault such that no provincial Crown could prosecute the offence. See R. v. Fasan, 2025 ONSC 6617, at para. 154. Count 1 is a discrete sexual assault that occurred entirely in Alberta.
25In respect of Counts 1 and 3, the Crown argued that the effects were suffered by the complainant in Ontario. The Crown argued that the complainant reported the offences here and sought counselling in Ontario as a result of the offences.
26I do not agree that this is sufficient to give the Ontario courts territorial jurisdiction. The effects-based connection referenced in Bigelow refers to where the act of an accused in one province generates effects in another, such as where the president of a company in Ontario made a fraudulent statement in a prospectus in Ontario and sent it to a person in Quebec, or where one spouse withholding a child in Alberta had the effect of depriving the other spouse of their access rights in Ontario.
27By contrast, here, the sexual assault is alleged to have occurred entirely in Alberta. The immediate effect of the alleged sexual assault—the violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity—was also experienced entirely in Alberta. In my view, it is too remote to say there is a real and substantial connection with Ontario because the complainant is undergoing ongoing psychological effects of the assault here. Accepting such an analysis would broaden the jurisdiction of Ontario courts beyond what the words of ss. 478(1) and 476(b) can reasonably bear.
28Considered individually and collectively, the factors asserted by the Crown under Count 1 do not establish a real and substantial connection with Ontario.
29I now turn to Count 3.
30At the time of Count 3, the accused and complainant were living together in Ontario. They are alleged to have gone to Montreal for the weekend. The sexual assault is alleged to have taken place in Montreal. It is alleged to be a specific incident. The Crown acknowledges that no elements of the offence occurred in Ontario.
31The Crown argues that the offence alleged under Count 3 has a real and substantial connection with Ontario because the complainant and accused were resident in Ontario; they were having ongoing relationship issues about the accused pressuring the complainant to have sex; they started arguing about that during the drive between Ontario and Montreal; and the complainant suffered the effects of the sexual assault in Ontario because this is where she is receiving counselling.
32In my view, there is no real and substantial connection between the offence and Ontario. If the accused were pressuring the complainant in the car on the way between Ontario and Montreal to have sex later that evening or more generally, that is not an instance of the offence having started in Ontario and continued in Quebec. No element of the offence is alleged to have occurred in Ontario. Arguing about whether they would have sex later is not an element of the offence. The absence of consent must be contemporaneous with the sexual touching. Nor can this be said to be an overt act in Ontario referable to or in furtherance of a criminal plan to sexually assault the complainant in Quebec.
33I have already addressed why I conclude that the effects-based analysis does not apply in these circumstances. The effects of the sexual assault—the violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity—would have occurred entirely in Quebec.
34Taken individually and collectively, the factors asserted by the Crown under Count 3 do not establish a real and substantial connection with Ontario.
35Finally, the Crown argues that I should look at the entire indictment in considering the Court’s territorial jurisdiction over Counts 1 and 3. The Crown argues that what is presented is a continuing sexual assault over the course of the accused and complainant’s relationship in several provinces.
36I do not accept this submission. The focus of the territorial jurisdiction analysis is properly on the offence alleged under each count and whether the offence under the count has a real and substantial connection to Ontario. In none of the authorities before me did the courts engage in a cross-count analysis of jurisdiction.
37While I understand that a “single charge of sexual assault can refer to numerous acts which are all part of the same transaction” (L.F.P., at para. 3, citing Sandhu at p. 262), the indictment as a whole cannot properly be characterized as referring to numerous acts which are all part of the same transaction. Under Count 1, the Crown narrowed its position to a single incident in Edmonton, Alberta in 2014. There is then a two-year gap between Count 1 and Count 2. Count 2 covers a four-year period (2017-21) in Ottawa, Ontario, but this too was narrowed to a single incident. Count 3 relates to a specific instance of sexual assault in Montreal, Quebec in 2018. Similarly, Count 4 relates to a specific instance of sexual assault in Kingston, Ontario on November 11, 2022.
38I acknowledge that there are good practical and policy reasons why it would be preferable for a single prosecution to take place in Ontario where the complainant reported the offences to the police and where she and the accused now reside. For example, it would avoid the need for trials in separate provinces.
39But there are countervailing constitutional considerations given that Canada is “federal state […] where the Constitution gives jurisdiction over the administration of criminal law to the provinces”: Bigelow, at p. 307. In my view, the practical and policy considerations raised by the Crown are best left to Parliament to address, as it did in permitting an accused to enter a plea in a province other than the province where the offence was committed, with the consent of the Attorney General of the jurisdiction in which the offence occurred: Criminal Code, s. 478(3).
40Ultimately, without a real and substantial connection between the offences in Count 1 and 3 and Ontario, this court does not have jurisdiction over them.
41In closing, I observe that the way the territorial jurisdiction issue was raised was far from ideal. The defence should have raised this issue as a pretrial motion, rather than raising it on the morning the trial was scheduled to begin. For its part, the Crown should have anticipated this issue and brought a motion for directions. The Crown should also have brought a Seaboyer application in advance of trial, as the complainant’s evidence almost immediately touched on other sexual activity evidence given the circumstances of the alleged offences: R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19. As the Supreme Court reminded us in R. v. Jordan, the Crown and defence “should focus on making reasonable admissions, streamlining the evidence, and anticipating issues that need to be resolved in advance”: 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 138.
Disposition
42For these reasons, Counts 1 and 3 are stayed. This is without prejudice to the counts being brought before courts of competent jurisdiction in Alberta and Quebec, respectively.
Justice Owen Rees
Date: March 5, 2026