Court File and Parties
2026 ONSC 132
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: KAPAHI REAL ESTATE INC., KANIKA KAPAHI, PARVEEN KUMAR DHINGRA, YUNAY INVESTMENTS INC., ARUN KOHLI, AMITA KOHLI, QURATULAIN LAKHANI, RAJ SEHJAL, DAVINDER SEHJAL, JASS SEHJAL, SUNITA RANI, PEREIRA REAL ESTATE INC., 10503380 CANADA CORPORATION, HEYINC ., VIRENDRA SHARMA, RICHA DHAWAN, VANDANA KARDAM, ISTHIA ZAMAN, LAURENCE FREDERICK ELAHI, JENNIFER E R ISAAC, KENNETH PAUL, and SUKHWINDER KAUR SEHJAL, Applicants
-and-
ELITE REAL ESTATE CLUB OF TORONTO INC., 2613702 ONTARIO INC., ASIF KHAN and HUMA AKHTAR, Respondents
BEFORE: FL Myers J
COUNSEL: Khalid Parvaiz, for the Respondents Asif Khan and Huma Akhter
Kaleigh Sonshine, for the Applicants
HEARD: January 6, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
The Motion and Outcome
1The Respondent Asif Khan moves to vary the order of Steele J. dated April 15, 2025 enforcing two arbitral awards under s. 50 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 17.
2In particular, Mr. Khan asks to revise the order made by Steele J. so that he and Ms. Akhter are not jointly and severally liable for the costs of the arbitration and the application to enforce the arbitration.
3Although the body of the Notice of Motion refers only to Mr. Khan as the moving party, it seeks relief for Ms. Akhter as well. Mr. Parvaiz appears for both Respondents as shown on the backsheet of the Notice of Motion and all other filed documents. In my view, Ms. Akhter must be taken to be a moving party. Mr. Khan can seek relief only for himself.
4The grounds for the motion are the Steele J made a slip ordering the personal Respondents to be jointly and severally liable for the costs of the arbitration and the application to enforce the arbitration awards. Alternatively, they submit that there are new facts discovered after the order was made that should lead the court to vary the order. The motion is made pursuant to Rules 59.06 (1) and (2)(a).
5For the reasons that follow, the motion is dismissed.
The Key Facts
6Broadly speaking, the Applicants claim that they were induced to invest in Elite Real Estate Club of Toronto Inc. and related investment corporations due to the misrepresentations made by the personal Respondents Ms. Khan and Ms. Akhter. They assert that after they made their investments, Mr. Khan and Ms. Akhter breached their duties to the corporation and otherwise oppressed the Applicants as investors by, among other things, mismanagement including wrongly taking money for themselves.
7Mr. Khan and Ms. Akhter are spouses. Mr. Khan is said to be an officer of Elite while Ms. Akhter was its sole director. The Applicants allege that Mr. Khan held himself out to be a director and that he was the operating mind of the corporation.
8By a Notice to Arbitrate dated August 30, 2024, the Applicants commenced arbitration proceedings against the Respondents pursuant to the arbitration provisions of numerous subscription agreements governing the terms of the Applicants’ investments.
9The Notice to Arbitrate expressly and unambiguously sought damages, tracing of corporate funds, and other relief against Mr. Khan and Ms. Akhter in their personal capacities. The relief was sought both based on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and for personal misconduct amounting to oppression.
10The Respondents moved to challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal because, among other things perhaps, they individuals were not signatories to the subscription agreements containing the arbitration agreements.
11The Respondents then abandoned the motion challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under s. 4 (1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, they likely waived the right to object thereafter. But I do not have to decide that question today.
12On October 31, 2024, the Applicants brought a motion before the Arbitrators for production by the Respondents of 15 classes of documents.
13The Arbitral Tribunal consisted of the Hon. James Turnbull, Chair, the Hon. Frank Marrocco, K.C., and Mr. Andrew Diamond.
14The Respondents did not participate in the motion. Mr. Parvaiz did not appear although he was provided with notice and the Zoom coordinates for the hearing.
15In a decision dated November 4, 2024, (at para. 20) the tribunal held that Mr. Khan was a “party” to the arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1991 and therefore he could be ordered to answer questions under oath concerning the records sought by the Applicants.
16At para. 27 of their decision, the Arbitrators ordered “the Respondents” to produce nine listed categories of documents. They also ordered Mr. Khan to attend to answer questions under oath or affirmation concerning the documents produced.
17Para. 30 of the November 4, 2024 decisions provides:
[30] The claimants are entitled to their costs on a substantial indemnity basis and the costs of the fees of the Arbitrators for this motion. Counsel for the claimants may file a costs summary with the Tribunal in the next ten days.
18By Award dated December 23, 2024, the Arbitrators particularized the costs awarded to the Applicants. The Respondents did not file costs submissions. At para. 8 of this decision, the tribunal held:
[8] It is ordered that the Respondents pay the Claimants their costs of this Motion on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $15,329.13. This order shall bear post judgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act. [Emphasis added.]
19In an Addendum dated January 27, 2025, at the request of the Applicants, the Arbitral Tribunal added to the costs awarded to the Applicants the Arbitrators’ own fees and expenses of $46,962.81. Although these costs had been awarded initially in the November 4, 2024 Award, the Arbitral Tribunal had not included them in fixing costs in the December 23, 2024 Award. On January 27, 2026, the Arbitrators held:
[4] Ms. Sonshine has requested that the Tribunal consider amending the Award of Costs to include the costs of the three Arbitrators. In our view, that is a reasonable request and appropriate in the circumstances of this case. The Respondents were given ample opportunity and notice to participate in the proceedings. They chose not to do so. The Claimants had no other alternative but to proceed to the hearing. The arbitration clause states that the Arbitration is to be conducted in accordance with the Rules under the Arbitration Act. Section 54(2) gives the Arbitral Tribunal the power to award costs which includes legal fees and disbursements and "the fees and expenses of the Arbitral Tribunal".
It is ordered that the Respondents shall pay the Claimants their costs of this motion made up of the following:
a. Legal fees and expenses: $15,329.13
b. Fees and expenses of the Arbitral
Tribunal: $46,962.81
Total Costs Payable: $62,291.94.
[Emphasis added.]
20On December 18, 2004, the court appointed a receiver over the two corporate Respondents at the request of the Applicants. The receivership order contained the usual provisions staying proceedings against the corporate Respondents as debtors. The last two costs awards then, were made while a stay was in place preventing proceedings against the corporate Respondents. But there was no stay precluding proceedings continuing against the individual Respondents Mr. Khan and Ms. Akhter.
21The Applicants decided to request the assistance of the court to enforce the arbitral Awards. By order dated March 10, 2025, in the receivership proceeding, the court lifted the stay of proceedings to allow an enforcement proceeding to be brought against the corporate Respondents. Ms. Sonshine advises that it was agreed at that time that the Applicants would not seek to enforce any costs orders from the arbitration or the enforcement application against Receiver, i.e. the corporate Respondents in the receivership.
22On March 18, 2025 the Respondents sought leave to appeal to this court from the amended costs award of January 27, 2025. At that time, Mr. Parvaiz did not act for the Receiver and had no authority to commence proceedings for the corporate Respondents in receivership.
23Justice Steele enforced all the arbitral awards by order dated April 16, 2025. At paras. 33 and 34 of her Endorsement of the same date, Steele J. described the status as follows:
[33] I agree that with respect to Elite and 261, both of which were under receivership, counsel for the respondents did not have the authority to commence legal proceedings. The receiver would have had this authority.
[34] However, Khan and Akhtar (who are not covered by the receivership) are also seeking leave to appeal. The costs awards were made jointly and severally. [Emphasis added.]
24Justice Steele held that the Respondents had no defence to the enforcement of the Awards. At para. 47 of her Endorsement she held, in part:
[47] Order to go as follows:
d. The Costs Award and the Costs Addendum of the Panel, fixing the costs of the productions motion heard on October 31, 2024, and of the arbitration, be and are hereby enforced as Orders of the Superior Court of Justice.
e. Pursuant to the Costs Award and the Costs Addendum, the Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the payment of $62,291.94 in costs to the Applicants (with the enforcement of costs as against the corporate Debtors, Elite and 261, being stayed pursuant to the Order of Justice Cavanagh dated March 10, 2025) and that interest on this amount runs from December 23, 2024 pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.C.43. [Emphasis added.]
25Para. 5 of the formal order of Steele J. dated April 16, 2025 provides, in part:
5 THIS COURT ORDERS that pursuant to the Costs Award and the Costs Addendum, the Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the payment of $62,291.94 in costs to the Applicants…
[Emphasis added.]
26After receiving submissions from the parties, Steele J. awarded the Applicants their costs of the enforcement application. Para. 2 of the order of Steele J. dated June 6, 2025 provides:
- THIS COURT ORDERS that the Respondents shall pay to the Applicants costs of the Application fixed in the amount of $27,000.00, inclusive of disbursements and HST. [Emphasis added.]
27Mr. Khan appealed this order to the Court of Appeal. He abandoned the appeal on July 15, 2025. There is some controversy around the terms, if any, under which he abandoned the appeal that I will deal with below.
Relevant Provisions
28Rules 59.06 (1) and (2)(a) provide:
Amending
59.06 (1) An order that contains an error arising from an accidental slip or omission or requires amendment in any particular on which the court did not adjudicate may be amended on a motion in the proceeding. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.06 (1).
Setting Aside or Varying
(2) A party who seeks to,
(a) have an order set aside or varied on the ground of fraud or of facts arising or discovered after it was made;
may make a motion in the proceeding for the relief claimed.
29In Trustees of the Millwright Regional Council of Ontario Pension Trust Fund v. Celestica Inc., 2013 ONSC 1502 Perell J. reviewed Rule 59.06 (1) rules comprehensively. He held:
[30] Rule 59.06 (1) is designed to amend judgments containing a slip or error, errors which are clerical, mathematical or due to misadventure or oversight. The rule is designed to amend judgments containing a slip, not to set aside judgments resulting from a slip in judicial reasoning: Central Canada Travel Services v. Bank of Montreal, 1986 2576 (ON SC), [1986] O.J. No. 1249 at para. 21 (H.C.J.); Dhaliwal v. Plantus, [2007] O.J. No. 5450 at para. 4 (S.C.J.). Rule 59.06 (1) is not designed to be a disguised means to review errors in the making of the Reasons for Decision; rather, it is designed to correct errors in memorializing the Reasons into a formal order or judgment.
[31] Generally speaking the court’s inherent and statutory jurisdiction to amend an order or judgment is limited to: (1) cases of fraud; (2) where there has been a slip in drawing up the order; and (3) where there has been an error in the order expressing the manifest intention of the court from its reasons for decision: Paper Machinery Limited v. J.O. Ross Engineering Corp., 1934 1 (SCC), [1934] S.C.R. 186; Re Wright, [1949] O.J. No. 3 (H.C.J.); Millard v. North George Capital Management Ltd., [1999] O.J. No. 3957 (S.C.J.). The rule is only operative in exceptional circumstances given the public interest in the principle of finality to the litigation process: Shaw Satellite G.P. v. Pieckenhagen, 2011 ONSC 5968 (S.C.J.) at para. 20.
[32] Under rule 59.06(1), the Court has the power to amend an order where there has been an error in expressing the manifest intention of the Court: Paper Machinery Limited. v. J.O. Ross Engineering Corporation, 1934 1 (SCC), [1934] S.C.R. 186; Millard v. North George Capital Management Ltd., [1999] O.J. No. 3957 (S.C.J.); Convay v. Marsulex, [2004] O.J. No. 3645 (S.C.J.).
[33] The rule permits amendments where the order obviously or indubitably does not reflect what the court intended to do, either by error or oversight: Johnston v. Johnston, [2002] O.J. No. 1570 (Div. Ct.); Saikely v. 519579 Ontario Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 2863 (S.C.J.); Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., (2005) 2005 23095 (ON SC), 76 O.R. (3d) 354 (S.C.J.).
[34] In Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd. v. 734925 Ontario Ltd., [1991] O.J. No. 3619 (Master), Master Peppiatt stated at para. 10.
- The purpose of…[the] procedure [under Rule 59] is to ensure, so far as humanly possible, that the formal order upon which an appellate court, and other members of the same court, sheriff, accountant, etc., will act accurately sets out the intention of the court which pronounced the order as reflected in the endorsement or reasons. It is important that this should be done so that all concerned may know their rights, obligations and duties. It is far more than a mere formality.
30In essence, Rule 59.06 (1) is available to correct technical slips that prevent that Court’s order from properly reflecting its intention. It is a very narrow rule with a very specific application. Perell J. uses words like “obviously or indubitably,” and “an error in expressing the manifest intention” to reflect the exceptionality of the rule.
31A motion under Rule 59.06 (1) is not the time to say that the judge made an error in her reasoning or outcome. Legal and factual errors are the province of an appellate court.
32I do not deal with the law governing variation of orders under Rule 59.06 (2)(a) based on new facts “discovered” after an order is made. As discussed below, there are none.
The Issues
33Mr. Khan and Ms. Akhter submit that Steele J. made a slip in para. 47 (e) of her Endorsement and in para. 5 of her order, by finding the Respondents, (plural), jointly and severally liable for the costs of the arbitration and of the application to enforce the arbitral Awards.
34They make two arguments in essence. First, they submit that the individual corporate actors cannot be held liable for costs in relation to the arbitration in the absence of express findings of wrongdoing that are needed to pierce the corporate veil.
35Second, they submit that they did not know that the Applicants were seeking to hold them liable personally for costs and Mr. Sachdeva, one of the Applicants’ counsel, represented that they would not do so in order to induce the individual Respondents to abandon their appeal from Justice Steele’s order. They rely on a form of estoppel. They submit that the Notice of Examination in Aid of Execution delivered by the Applicants to enforce the costs liability is a new fact that post-dates Justice Steele’s order and undermines the order under Ruled 59.06 (2)(a).
Analysis
36As will become apparent below, neither ground advanced by the individual Respondents is properly the subject of a motion under Rule 59.06. There is no issue of the judge making a “slip” that prevented her from expressing her intention correctly. Nor are any allegedly “discovered” facts new. Rather the individual Respondents are continuing efforts to avoid their liability for costs as found by the Arbitral Tribunal and by Steele J. The place for those arguments was on appeal rather than by efforts to re-argue the case under the guise of correcting a slip or due to new facts.
Issue 1: Piercing the Corporate Veil is a Red Herring
37I agree with Mr. Parvaiz that neither the Arbitral Tribunal nor Steele J. made findings needed to hold the individual Respondents liable for corporate obligations under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
38I agree with him as well that in FNF Enterprises Inc. v. Wag and Train Inc., 2023 ONCA 92 the Court of Appeal reasserted the types of findings and allegations required to invoke the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. There were no such findings made by either the Arbitral Tribunal or Steele J.
39Mr. Parvaiz then submits that Steele J. erroneously expanded the arbitration jurisdiction by granting costs against all the Respondents on a joint and several basis, to include the individual Respondents, when (a) the Arbitral Tribunal did not do so; and (b) without making the findings required to pierce the corporate veil.
40This submission cannot succeed. First, the Arbitral Tribunal plainly and unambiguously held “the Respondents” liable for costs. Steele J. found that they did so on a joint and several basis. This is correct in law. See: Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation v. the Town of South Bruce Peninsula et al., 2024 ONSC 2827 at para. 9.
41There is no basis to conclude that the Arbitral Tribunal held only the corporate Respondents liable in costs. Doing so would have made no sense particularly in light of their criticism of the conduct of Mr. Khan by failing to produce relevant documentation to the Applicant investors.
42Mr. Parvaiz submits that the law that allows parties to a legal proceeding to be held liable in costs is subject to the requirement that before a corporate officer or representative can be held liable in costs, the court or tribunal must find explicit grounds to pierce the corporate veil.
43Not surprisingly, Mr. Parvaiz provided no legal support in precedents or statutory material to support this submission. It has no basis in law, policy, or logic.
44Neither of the individual Respondents has been held liable to pay the obligations of the corporate Respondents. Rather, they are all parties to the proceedings and each has been held liable for costs as such.
45Whether under s. 54 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, or s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, unsuccessful parties to a legal proceeding are presumptively liable to pay a portion of the costs of the successful party. This is a personal liability. It is also a matter of discretion for the presiding judge or tribunal in each case. The liability is presumptively ordered on a joint and several basis where there are multiple defendants as noted in Chippewas of Saugeen First Nations above.
46Mr. Parvaiz submits that this ruling will “open the floodgates” for plaintiffs to name people as parties to a proceeding frivolously to try to make them liable for costs of a corporate defendant. He submits this will create a significant loophole in the corporate veil that is inconsistent with the separate personalities of corporations and their owners.
47I do not agree.
48Costs awards against unsuccessful parties to a legal proceeding have nothing to do with corporate personality and do not depend on findings required to pierce the corporate veil.
49If someone is added to a lawsuit for no valid reason, they can move to strike the claim under a variety of rules in the Rules of Civil Procedure. If successful, they will also be entitled to recovery of some of their costs as well.
50In this case, if the individual Respondents believed that the Arbitral Tribunal had no jurisdiction over them (because they were not parties to the subscription agreements that contained the arbitration agreements invoked by the Applicants), they had every opportunity to make that submission to the Arbitrators. Subsection 17 (3) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 recognizes parties’ entitlement to challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal as a preliminary matter.
51As noted above, the Respondents brought a jurisdictional challenge in the arbitration and then they abandoned it. Whether the individual Respondents ultimately may be held liable for the obligations, if any, of the corporate Respondents on the merits has not been determined as yet. But that has nothing to do with their liability for costs as parties who have taken steps in the arbitration and then in this court and been ordered to pay costs as a result.
52There is no hint that Justice Steele somehow slipped by holding the individual Respondents liable in costs. The corporate Respondents were not before Steele J. because they are in receivership. The only parties who were before her and who were unsuccessful were the individual Respondents. There is no basis to find that Steele J. made a slip holding the individual Respondents liable for the costs of this application to enforce the arbitration Awards therefore.
53As to the costs of the arbitration, as quoted above, in para. 34 of her Endorsement, Steele J. found expressly that costs had been awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal against the Respondents jointly and severally. Para. 47 of her Endorsement and para 5 of her order carry out explicitly the findings she made.
54The individual Respondents are claiming that the Arbitral Tribunal and Steele J. erred in holding them liable in costs without finding them liable under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. That is an issue of law for an appeal. If they assert that Steele J. made an error of fact or mixed fact and law by finding that the Arbitral Tribunal ordered costs against all Respondents on a joint and several basis, that too is an issue for an appeal.
55The subscription agreements that governed the arbitration provided that there were to be no appeals. The individual Respondents have already sought and abandoned a motion for leave to appeal from the Award amending the initial costs Award of the Arbitral Tribunal and an appeal from the order of Steele J. They have exhausted their remedies. This motion is not a proper basis to assert the same alleged errors again.
Issue 2: No New Facts Discovered
56The individual Respondents allege that Mr. Sachdeva represented that if they abandoned their appeal from the order of Steele J., the Applicants would not enforce costs orders against the personally.
57One can be forgiven for thinking that as worded, this would be the basis for a settlement agreement rather than just a representation feeding an estoppel. But no agreement is claimed.
58Moreover, under cross-examination, Mr. Khan could not remember anything about the alleged representation despite alluding to it in his sworn affidavits.
59By email dated July 6, 2025, Mr. Sachdeva made clear that his clients were not interested in waiving their rights to recover costs from the individual Respondents in return for abandonment of their appeal(s). He expressed his clients’ views that the appeals had no merit.
60With no supporting evidence, Mr. Parvaiz included in his reply factum cherry-picked screenshots of emails in which it appears that Mr. Sachdeva agreed that the abandonment on a without costs basis of the individual Respondents’ motion for leave to appeal to this court from the amended costs award made by the Arbitral Tribunal. These emails are dated the day after the individual Respondents had already abandoned their appeal to the Court of Appeal from the order Steele J. of April 16, 2025.
61Moreover, when the Applicants immediately indicated they were moving forward with enforcement efforts against the individual Respondents, Mr. Parvaiz wrote two lengthy emails containing numerous purported reasons why they should not do so. Conspicuously absent from Mr. Parvaiz’s arguments was any mention of an alleged agreement or representation made just days before by Mr. Sachdeva promising not to take those very steps.
62Had the individual Respondents been relying on a promise made to them before they abandoned the appeal from the order of Steele J. that the Applicants would not enforce the costs orders against the individual Respondents, that would have been the first and perhaps only thing that Mr. Parvaiz would have needed and wanted to say.
63This all happened in a matter of about 10 days. It would have been top of mind. But Mr. Parvaiz did not mention it at all.
64Mr. Khan swears that he did not know that the Applicants were seeking to enforce costs against them personally. The Applicants list numerous pieces of correspondence which made that point clear throughout. Mr. Khan either was not told about the Applicants’ position, had a very poor memory (that was not jogged by his counsel before he swore the affidavit), or he was not being truthful.
65I do not need to make a credibility finding. There is no evidence of any representation being made by Mr. Sachdeva prior to the individual Respondents abandoning their appeal from the order of Steele J. to the effect that in return for the abandonment, the Applicants would forgo enforcement of the costs liability of the individual Respondents. There are bald statements to that effect in each of Mr. Khan’s affidavits. But those statements were wholly undermined by his evidence under cross-examination. The contemporaneous written record does not support the making of any such statement by Mr. Sachdeva, nor reliance upon it by the individual Respondents. Moreover, Mr. Parvaiz’s emails sent just a few days later are also inconsistent with the assertions now being made.
66The Applicants’ efforts to obtain costs awards and enforce them are also not new or newly discovered. It has been their position throughout. The delivery of a Notice of Examination was not a discovery of anything new. It was a continuation of ongoing enforcement efforts.
67Finally, even if there was some kind of settlement agreement or estoppel, that is not a basis for an order to vary the order of Steele J. under Rule 59.06 (2)(a). It would be a subsequent settlement agreement that perhaps could be the subject of a motion under Rule 49. But it would not undermine the findings made by Steele J. or require any variation in her order. However given my finding of fact that no such representation was made, I do not need to continue along this line.
Abuse of Process and Costs
68Both sides accuse the other of abusing the court’s process.
69Mr. Parvaiz went on at some length alleging that the Applicants were abusing the individual Respondents by naming them in proceedings, obtaining costs awards when successful against them, and then enforcing those costs awards. He submitted that the Applicants were misusing the legal process to make money from the individual Respondents. He accused counsel opposite of “sharp practice” by seeking costs against the individual Respondents successfully.
70I admit to not understanding the logic of the argument. The Applicants brought an arbitration. They sought money from the Respondents based on allegations that all the Respondents committed wrongful, illegal misconduct that caused the Applicants to suffer compensable losses. Of course they seek money from the Respondents. That is what civil litigation is about.
71The Respondents abandoned their challenge to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal and then chose not to participate in the production motion that led to an order for production, examination of Mr. Khan, and a costs award in consequence of the successful motion.
72The Applicants engaged the civil justice apparatus appropriately throughout. The Respondents, by contrast, have delayed resolution of the merits by repeatedly bringing proceedings only to then abandon them before hearing. Moreover, this motion had no basis in fact or law.
73There is no basis to find any abusive conduct by the Applicants. There was certainly no “sharp practice” by the Applicants’ counsel. There was no basis in evidence for Mr. Parvaiz to make such a scurrilous allegation against his colleagues opposite.
74The Applicants may deliver costs submissions by January 16, 2026. The individual Respondents may deliver costs submissions by January 30, 2026.
75Costs submissions shall be no longer than 750 words. Pages shall have normal margins. Typing shall be double-spaced and in a font of no less than 12-points. This applies to footnotes as well as the body of the text.
76The parties may also deliver with their submissions any offers to settle on which they rely for costs purposes, if any.
77Any party that delivers a costs submission shall also include their Costs Outline.
78The motion is dismissed subject to costs being determined later as set out above.
FL Myers J
Date: January 7, 2026