Deng v. Liu, 2026 ONSC 1283
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Yujie Deng, Applicant
AND:
Jing Liu, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice Carolyn Leach
COUNSEL: Samuel Eng, for the Applicant
Michael Silkstone, for the Respondent
HEARD: February 5, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1This motion is brought by the applicant to increase her parenting time with the children of the marriage. For the reasons set out below, her request for a temporary order providing for increased parenting time is granted.
Background
2The applicant and respondent are a same sex couple who began to cohabit in late 2015 and were married on June 9, 2016. They have two children, G. (age 6) and K. (age 2).
3The respondent states that the parties separated in July 2024 and that the children have primarily lived with her since that time. The applicant states that the date of separation was January 1, 2025 when the respondent moved out of the matrimonial home, removing the children some weeks later. Since that time, the applicant has remained in the matrimonial home (a two bedroom condo) with her parents. The respondent lives in a home with her own parents and the children.
4The applicant’s evidence is that she was a primary caregiver and extensively involved in the children’s daily care until the respondent removed them from the matrimonial home, including managing their morning and bedtime routines, preparing and feeding them meals, bathing and soothing them, arranging and attending medical appointments, transporting them to extra curricular activities, and ensuring that they had appropriate clothing, toys, supplies and other necessities.
5The respondent does not address the applicant’s parenting role in her materials. She says simply that she, the respondent, was the primary caregiver during the relationship.
6On December 3, 2024, the parties signed a separation agreement under which the respondent was referred to as “Party A” and the applicant was referred to as “Party B”. This agreement addresses decision-making responsibility and parenting time in a section entitled CHILD SUPPORT, as follows:
- CHILD SUPPORT:
a) Both parties have joint decision-making responsibility for the two children: Child 1: G. X. Y. DENG, date of birth:[…], and Child 2: K. Z. C. LIU, date of birth: [….], including but not limited to education, international travels, major non-emergency health care, major recreational activities, religious activities, and etc.
b) Party A agrees to provide financial support to Child 2. Party A will not pay child support to Child 1 when Party B has parenting time with Child 1.
c) Party B agrees to provide financial support to Child 1. Party B will not pay child support to Child 2 when Party A has parenting time with Child 2.
d) Each party has 50% parenting time with Child 1. When that party has parenting time with Child 1, that party will provide child support to Child 1.
e) Party A has primary parenting time with Child 2. Party B has the right to visit the Child 2 with the previous consent of Party A for specific time and place.
f) When Party A goes to school to study, the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) and other government benefits of the two children will be deposited to Party A's bank account.
g) .After Party A's graduation, the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) and other government benefits of Child I will be deposited to Party B's bank account, and the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) and other government benefits of Child 2, will be deposited to Party A's bank account.
7As part of her application, the applicant seeks to set aside this separation agreement. Her evidence is that she signed the separation agreement under duress. She says that, if she refused to sign, the respondent had threatened to disclose sensitive and deeply personal information to others. The applicant states that the terms of the agreement were not consistent with terms that the parties had agreed to verbally, that no financial information was disclosed, and that she did not receive independent legal advice prior to signing. The respondent does not dispute any of this in her evidence, other than to say that the agreement was entered into voluntarily at a lawyer’s office. The agreement itself confirms that no legal advice was sought or given by the lawyer who witnessed (but did not prepare) the agreement.
8The applicant’s evidence about the post-separation parenting arrangements is as follows:
a. Between January 2025 and August 2025, she had flexible parenting time with G. that included regular overnights. Starting in approximately August 2025, she and the respondent agreed to a schedule whereby the applicant had parenting time with G. on alternate weekends from Saturday at 7 pm until Monday morning before school, as well as every Monday and Tuesday overnights. This continued until January 2026.
b. The respondent has always restricted her parenting time with K. From February to April 2025, the respondent allowed her only sporadic contact with K. of a few minutes every two weeks. From May 27 to July 22, 2025, the respondent permitted the applicant to take K. to China to visit extended family. Upon their return to Canada, the respondent again restricted parenting time to extremely limited and infrequent contact.
c. From September to December 2025, the respondent permitted her to have three hours of parenting time with K. per week, occurring exclusively at the respondent’s home and under her or her parent’s supervision.
d. At a TBST appearance in November 2025, Justice Nakonechny directed the matter to proceed to a DRO conference in December 2025. Following extensive negotiations at the DRO conference, the respondent agreed to increase K’s parenting time to five hours per week. Currently, the applicant sees K. every Sunday from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
e. On January 10, 2026, the respondent unilaterally determined that G. would no longer have overnight parenting time with the applicant on Sundays as she had enrolled him in an extracurricular activity on Sundays. The respondent currently has G. on Sundays for approximately five hours, with the start and end times determined by the Respondent. She continues to have overnight parenting time with G on Mondays and Tuesdays.
9The respondent has provided no evidence about the current parenting arrangements, other than to say that she has been the primary caregiver and residential parent since separation. She states that she is responsible for organizing the children’s routines, schooling and medical, and that they are settled and doing well in her care.
Positions of the parties
10On this motion, the applicant seeks a graduated parenting schedule that ultimately result in a shared parenting, week about schedule for both children. For K, she proposes to begin with day long visits on Sundays as well as shorter visits during the week. She would like to work up to overnight visits with K before the case conference scheduled for June. The applicant works full-time, with three fixed in person days (Wednesdays, Fridays and Saturdays from 11 am to 7 pm) and a flexible schedule the rest of the week.
11The respondent proposes instead that the applicant have parenting time to both children on the following schedule:
a. Sunday: 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 pm
b. Monday: 4 pm to 7 pm
c. Tuesday 4 pm to 7 pm
d. Saturday: 8 am to 12:30 pm
12The respondent is opposed to overnight parenting time for K. as she does not believe that the applicant is able to provide appropriate sleeping conditions. Her evidence is that the applicant lives in a small 1200 square foot, two-bedroom unit which she shares with her parents. She states that the applicant’s bedroom does not have sufficient room for both children to stay overnight and also maintain K’s sleeping schedule. The respondent also believes that it is preferable for the children to have parenting time together, which is why her proposed schedule does not allow for continuation of overnights for G. There is also some indication in the correspondence attached to the applicant’s affidavit that the respondent is of the view that (1) overnight parenting time no longer meets G’s developmental needs and (2) overnight parenting time is not appropriate for either child until the applicant is able to provide them with a separate bedroom.
13The applicant’s evidence is that she and the respondent and both children resided comfortably in her two-bedroom condo, along with her parents, prior to separation. She is unable to see the children on Saturdays due to her work schedule and proposes a full day visit on Sundays instead. The respondent is opposed to a full day of parenting time on Sundays because G. attends church and swimming lessons on that day.
Statutory framework and legal principles
14As the parties are married, the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2nd supp.) is the applicable statute. In making a parenting order with respect to a child, the court shall only take into account the best interests of the child, as determined through consideration of the factors set out in subsections 16(3) through (6) of that Act. I have considered those factors that are relevant to this case, including the children’s needs given their age and stage of development, each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the children’s relationship with the other spouse, the history of care for the children, and the ability and willingness of each parent to care for and meet the children’s needs.
15A temporary motion is meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be fully canvassed at subsequent conferences or resolved at a trial. The status quo should ordinarily be maintained unless there is material evidence that the child’s best interests require an immediate change. See: Coe v. Tope, 2014 ONSC 4002.
Analysis
Status quo for G.
16Until January 10, 2026, the status quo for G. was that he spent alternate weekends from Saturday at 7 pm until Monday before school with the applicant, as well as every Monday and Tuesday overnight. The respondent unilaterally determined that G. overnight visits should not continue on alternate weekends, apparently to accommodate G.’s swimming lessons and church attendance. I am not satisfied that this change was in G’s best interests. The respondent appears to have selected these activities without consulting with the applicant, even though they impinged on her agreed-upon parenting time with G.
17In my view, while G. may indeed benefit from swimming lessons and attending church services, it is more important to sustain his relationship with the applicant. Further, it is not clear why the applicant cannot take G. to these activities on the Sundays that she has G, if she wishes. G. is accustomed to having extensive time with the applicant both during the week, on weekends, and overnights. Restoring the previous parenting schedule is the best way to promote his safety, security and well-being.
Status quo for K.
18With respect to K, in my view the current status quo is less of a consideration.
19The applicant’s evidence is that the respondent has been extremely restrictive of her contact with K, with the exception of the two-month trip that the applicant was permitted to take to China with K. At present, K is only seeing the applicant for five hours once a week. This limited contact is a de facto rather than a de jure status quo, created by the respondent unilaterally taking matters into her own hands without any consent from the applicant. If the current restrictions on the applicant’s access to K. were to serve as a starting point for determining the parenting schedule going forward, the effect would be to reward rather than discourage the respondent’s refusal to consider a parenting schedule that would better support the development of positive relationship between K. and the applicant. See Arbitman v. Lee, 2021 ONSC 315; L.M.B. v. F.J.D.¸2020 ONCJ 239
20It is an established principle of law that, with very few exceptions, all children benefit from having a loving relationship with both parents: A.(M.) v. D.(J.), 2003 52807 (ONCJ). The general rule, as set out in s. 16(6) of the Divorce Act, is that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child. In this particular case, the respondent does not seem to really disagree that it would benefit K. to have more regular contact with the applicant. She confirms that she had no difficulty with the two-month trip to China and more recently has proposed a schedule of four short day visits per week. However, she is not willing to consider overnight visits until the applicant obtains larger accommodations, she insists that K must return to her home for his 1 pm naptime, and she is only willing to move to the new schedule of four weekly visits if it applies to G. as well.
21I am not satisfied that the applicant’s current living arrangements preclude her from having overnight visits with both children. Her evidence is that she has a crib in her home for him to sleep in. The fact that she would be sharing a bedroom with both children is also not determinative. This is a very common experience for families across the country. While it might make it more challenging for her to maintain a regular sleep routine for K than if she had a separate bedroom for him to sleep in, it is by no means impossible. I am not persuaded that this is a sufficient basis for delaying the implementation of a more expansive schedule of parenting time. Further, I find that the respondent’s insistence that K return to her home for naptime unreasonably restricts the applicant’s parenting time. K. can nap at the applicant’s home.
22I agree with the respondent that it is in the best interests of both children that their parenting time schedules be aligned as much as possible. However, this does not mean that G’s parenting time must be reduced so that it matches K’s parenting time.
Impact of the separation agreement
23The respondent also relies on the term in the separation agreement that provides that K,’s parenting time with the applicant is subject to her consent as to place and time. Section 56(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 provides that in the determination of a matter respecting parenting time with respect to a child, the court may disregard any provision of a domestic contract where in the opinion of the court, to do so is in the best interests of the child. The court has jurisdiction to do so on an interim motion: Vale v. Vale, 2022 ONCA 278.
24Based on the applicant’s evidence, which is not really disputed by the respondent, I am concerned about the circumstances around the negotiation of the separation agreement and therefore give it little weight. I am also not satisfied that the term related to K is in his best interests, as it has resulted in a situation where the respondent is unreasonably restricting K’s time with the applicant and obstructing the healthy development of their relationship. Finally, I note that the respondent herself is not abiding by the term of the agreement that provides that the parties will each have 50% parenting time with G.
Step-up parenting schedule
25K is not accustomed to long stretches of parenting time with the applicant. The applicant acknowledges that a graduated schedule of parenting time is in K’s best interests.
26I find that it is in K’s best interests to implement the following step-up schedule:
a. Starting the week of March 9, K. will spend every Monday and Tuesday afternoon with the applicant;
b. K’s weekend time with the applicant will be expanded as follows:
i. Starting on March 8, K. will spend the full day with the applicant on alternate Sundays, to correspond with the weekends that G. will spend with the applicant.
ii. Starting the weekend of April 4-5, 2026, the applicant shall have K. overnight on alternate Saturdays, in addition to the afternoon visits every Monday and Tuesday.
iii. Starting the weekend of May 29-31, the applicant shall have K. overnight on alternate weekends from Saturday to Monday morning, in addition to the afternoon visits every Monday and Tuesday
27The above schedule allows for frequent contacts between K. and the applicant, with the gradual implementation of overnight visits as their relationship develops
28The applicant’s goal is to establish a 50/50 week about schedule for both children. I am not able to determine whether this is the schedule that will ultimately be in the best interests of the children. The applicant seeks an order requesting the services of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. I agree that input from this office may be very helpful to the parties in determining what the final parenting schedule should look like, and also to determine how decisions will be made about the children. The applicant’s counsel may submit a draft standard form Order requesting the involvement of the Children’s Lawyer for my signature, by emailing it to my judicial assistant kevin.wailoo@ontario.ca
Orders
29For the reasons set out above, this court orders that:
a. The applicant shall have temporary parenting time with the child G.X.Y. Deng, born […], as follows:
i. Commencing the weekend of March 7-8, 2026, on alternate weekends from Saturday at approximately 7 pm until Monday morning before school/daycare. The applicant shall pick G. up from the respondent’s home on Saturday evening after the applicant finishes work and drop him off at school/daycare or at the school bus stop on Monday morning. In the event that Monday is a statutory holiday, the applicant will have parenting time with G. from Saturday at approximately 7 pm until Tuesday morning before school/daycare.
ii. Every Monday overnight and every Tuesday overnight, with pick up at school/daycare and drop off at school/daycare or at the bus stop;
b. The applicant shall have temporary parenting time with the child K.Z.C. Liu, born […], as follows:
i. Commencing the week of March 9, 2026, every Monday and Tuesday from 4 pm until 7 pm. The applicant shall pick K up from day care and drop him off at the respondent’s home;
ii. Commencing on Sunday March 8, 2026, alternate Sundays from 8:30 a.m. until 7 pm, with pick up and drop off at the respondent’s home;
iii. Commencing on the weekend of April 4-5, 2026, overnight from Saturday at approximately 7 pm until Sunday at 7 pm, with pickup and drop off at the respondent’s home; and
iv. Commencing the weekend of May 29-31, overnight from Saturday at approximately 7 pm until Monday morning before daycare. The applicant shall pick K up from the respondent’s home on Saturday evening and drop him off at day care on Monday morning. In the event that Monday is a statutory holiday, the applicant will have parenting time with K from Saturday at approximately 7 pm until Tuesday morning before daycare.
c. The applicant shall be entitled to contact and receive communications and updates directly from the children’s schools, daycares and health care providers (including doctors and dentists) and to pick up and drop off the children at school or day care.
30The applicant was wholly successful on this motion and is presumptively entitled to her costs. The parties are encouraged to reach an agreement on costs. If they are unable to do so, the Applicant shall serve and file written submissions on or before March 24, 2026. The Respondent shall serve and file responding submissions on or before April 7, 2026. Written submissions shall comply with the requirements set out in r. 24(19) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99.
Justice Carolyn Leach
Date: March 3, 2026

