ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
SASELASRI UTHAYAKUMAR Plaintiff
– and –
UTHAYAKUMAR NADARASAH, SURESH CONSULTING SOLUTIONS INC., and 2502472 ALBERTA INC. Defendants
Vitali Luchko and Alina Saharov, for the plaintiff
Uthayakumar Nadarasah, appearing in person No one appearing for the defendants Suresh Consulting Solutions Inc. and 2502472 Alberta Inc.
HEARD: March 3, 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Honourable justice Ranjan k. agarwal
I. INTRODUCTION
1These motions are for the enforcement of an Alberta family law judgment through a claim for fraudulent conveyance.
2The parties are former spouses. In January 2023, an Alberta court ordered the defendant Uthayakumar Nadarasah to pay the plaintiff Saselasri Uthayakumar almost $200,000 in equalization and costs. In this action, Uthayakumar alleges that Nadarasah transferred a Mississauga property to two closely held corporations to defeat enforcement. Nadarasah didn’t deliver a defence, and he was noted in default. Uthayakumar now moves for default judgment. Nadarasah moves to set aside the noting in default.
3For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the motion to set aside the noting in default, grant default judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claim, and order Nadarasah to pay $25,000 in costs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
4The parties married in 2001 and separated in 2023. Nadarasah is the sole director of the defendant Suresh Consulting Inc.; the parties’ daughter is the sole director of the defendant 2502472 Alberta Inc. The property was valued at approximately $1.375m on the valuation date.
5Following trial and an unsuccessful appeal, Nadarasah owes Uthayakumar $198,140.71. In September 2023, while Nadarasah’s appeal was pending, he transferred title to the property to the corporate defendants for $499,999, and caused a $200,000 charge to be registered in favour of a relative.
B. Litigation History
6Uthayakumar started this action in May 2024. She moved, without notice, for a CPL. Mandhane J instead granted an interim preservation order, and directed Uthayakumar to serve Nadarasah with the CPL motion. Nadarasah didn’t respond to the motion. Accordingly, Mandhane J ordered issuance of a CPL. As I discuss below, Uthayakumar’s motion record included the statement of claim, and Nadarasah acknowledged receipt.
7In July 2024, Uthayakumar amended her statement of claim to plead Rules of Civil Procedure, r 17.02(a), because Nadarasah lives in Edmonton. The defendants evaded service of the amended statement of claim. In March 2025, Kumaranayake J ordered substituted service by email. She also ordered costs of $1500. Uthayakumar served the defendants that month. They didn’t defend the case.
8The defendants were noted in default in April 2025. Uthayakumar served her motion record for default judgment on Nadarasah by email and regular mail in late 2025, returnable March 3, 2026.
9In mid-December 2025, Nadarasah responded to Uthayakumar’s motion by serving a motion to set aside the notices of default and the CPL. He also sought an order removing the parties’ daughter from the action (though she’s not a party), and “addressing breaches of the public ban by the Plaintiff and her counsel”. He didn’t press these issues at the hearing, so I don’t discuss them further.
10Nadarasah made his motion also returnable on March 3, 2026. Uthayakumar agreed that the motions could be heard together.
C. Procedural Issue
11Suresh Consulting and 2502 didn’t seek leave to be represented by a non-lawyer under Rules of Civil Procedure, r 15.01(2). Nadarasah’s motion only seeks to set aside the notice of default as against him. But he also seeks to file a statement of defence on behalf of all the defendants. I’m not confident that Nadarasah would be granted leave to represent either Suresh Consulting or 2502. See GlycoBioSciences Inc. v Industria Farmaceutica Andromaco, S.A., de C.V., 2024 ONCA 481, aff’d 2024 ONCA 760, at para 6. As a result, I’m only considering whether the notice of default against him should be set aside.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION
12This case presents two issues:
(a) whether the noting of default should be set aside; and
(b) if not, whether default judgment should be granted.
A. Issue #1: whether the noting of default should be set aside
13The noting of default may be set aside by the court on such terms as are just. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 19.03(1). In deciding whether to set aside a noting of default, the court should assess the “context and factual situation” of the case, including:
the parties’ behaviour
the length of the defendant’s delay
the reasons for the delay
the complexity and value of the claim
whether setting aside the noting of default would prejudice a party relying on it
the balance of prejudice as between the parties
whether the defendant has an arguable defence on the merits.
See Intact Insurance Company v Kisel, 2015 ONCA 205, at para 13; Franchetti v Huggins, 2022 ONCA 111, at paras 6-10.
14Nadarasah argues that his claim should be decided on its merits for several reasons: (a) lack of proper notice; (b) email service issues; (c) complexity of the matter; (d) meritorious defence; and (e) language and translation needs.
1. Lack of Proper Notice
15Nadarasah claims that he didn’t receive sufficient notice of the statement of claim. Under Rules of Civil Procedure, r 18.01(b), Nadarasah had 40 days to deliver a statement of defence because he was served outside Ontario. The statement of claim was issued on May 15, 2024. It was served on him on June 17, 2024, as part of the motion record for the preservation order. Upon being served, he emailed Uthayakumar’s lawyer’s office. They answered his questions, but he took no steps to defend the claim. The statement of claim was then amended in July 2024 to add the language of rule 17.02. It was served on Nadarasah on March 13, 2025. He was noted in default on April 7, 2025—25 days later. Nadarasah argues that Uthayakumar’s failure to wait 40 days to note in him default justifies setting aside the notice.
16Nadarasah’s argument might have had more merit if he tried to file a defence in the 40 days after he was served with the amended statement of claim but couldn’t do so. But the totality of the evidence is that he took no steps to respond until Uthayakumar moved for default judgment, almost 16 months after he learned about the action and 9 months after he was served with the amended claim. Arguably, Uthayakumar could have required the registrar to note Nadarasah in default as early as July 27, 2024.
17Nadarasah also says he didn’t receive proper notice of Uthayakumar’s preservation order motion. That’s irrelevant—the motion was without notice.
2. Email Service Issues
18Nadarasah says that he didn’t receive the statement of claim because his “prior email account had over 90,000 emails” and he doesn’t “regularly monitor email due to physician advice regarding stress.”
19I don’t accept this explanation. To begin, he acknowledges receiving Uthayakumar’s motion record, which contained the statement of claim. He emailed her lawyer’s office about the motion. Further, he hasn’t adduced any evidence of his doctor’s advice. Finally, I don’t find his explanation credible—email overload is a problem for many people, but it can’t be an excuse to avoid legal obligations. Once Nadarasah received Uthayakumar’s motion record, Mandhane J’s order, and the statement of claim, he was on notice that he was party to a lawsuit in Ontario. He ought to have been monitoring his email for any other legal documents related to this case.
3. Complexity of the Matter
20Nadarasah asserts that this matter is complex because it involves “multiple parties”, including banks, lawyers, corporations, insurers, and the City of Mississauga. His affidavit suggests that he was relying on “multiple professionals” to ensure this matter was being “properly handled”.
21First, as I discuss below, the issue in dispute is whether Nadarasah transferred the property to the corporate defendants to judgment-proof himself. These “multiple parties” have nothing to do with this claim or his defence.
22Second, there’s no evidence that Nadarasah engaged any professionals to defend his interests in this action.
4. Meritorious Defence
23Nadarasah has filed a draft statement of defence. It baldly denies Uthayakumar’s allegations. There’s no statement of material facts. No points of law. No affirmative defences. Other than asserting that he has a meritorious defence, Nadarasah hasn’t shown any defence.
5. Language and Translation Needs
24Nadarasah says he needs a Tamil translator because of his “limited English proficiency”. I don’t understand how this fact justifies his delay. He defended the family law proceedings in Alberta, including appealing the judgment.
25More importantly, I don’t believe him. Uthayakumar says Nadarasah is fluent in English. His motion materials here, including his affidavit, were in English. His emails with Uthayakumar’s lawyer were in English. He gave some of his submissions in English. Most importantly, he ran for mayor of Edmonton in 2026, and made public statements in English. In one statement, he described himself as an “IELTS specialist”. The International English Language Testing System exam assesses English language proficiency. That role is inconsistent with someone who doesn’t speak English.
6. Conclusion
26The trial judge in the parties’ divorce case found that Nadarasah was more focused on punishing Uthayakumar than “moving the matter forward to resolution”. She gave several examples:
…his unsuccessful appeal of three interim orders, refusing to provide the name of his Ontario counsel, refusing to allow amendments to pleadings without an application, and failing to abide by several court orders including the order to vacate the home, the order prohibiting him from disposing of property, and the order for production of undertakings, as well as his emergency application for Christmas travel which was dismissed when no actual travel plans had been made, and his voluminous, improperly labelled and duplicative affidavit of records.
See Nadarasah v Uthayakumar, 2024 ABCA 22, at para 3.
27I would add Nadarasah’s defence of this proceeding to that lengthy list. Nadarasah has shown little or no interest in abiding by the rules. He says Ontario law favours a decision on the merits. That’s true, but Nadarasah doesn’t seem interested in a meritorious adjudication of this claim. If he were, he would have filed a defence long ago. Instead, his actions suggest that he’s seeking to delay the enforcement of the divorce judgment as long as he can.
28Nadarasah’s motion to set aside the noting of default is dismissed.
B. Issue #2: whether default judgment should be granted
29When a defendant has been noted in default, the plaintiff may move before a judge for judgment against the defendant on the statement of claim in respect of any claim for which default judgment has not been signed. A motion for default judgment shall be supported by evidence given by affidavit if the claim is for unliquidated damages. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 19.05(1), (2).
30Every conveyance of real property or personal property made with intent to defeat, hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties, or forfeitures are void as against such persons and their assigns. See Fraudulent Conveyances Act, RSO 1990, c F.29, s 2. A creditor is entitled to invoke the Fraudulent Conveyances Act to recover the proceeds of a conveyance void under the statute from a fraudulent transferee. The fraudulent transferee is, and bears all the liability of, a trustee of the property or its proceeds for the benefit of creditors. See Allen v Hennessey (1997), 1997 1182 (ON CA), 107 OAC 69 (CA), at para 5.
31The elements of a fraudulent conveyance claim are (a) the plaintiff is a creditor (i.e., a person to whom a debt is owed); (b) the debtor is an insolvent person or can’t pay their debts in full; and (c) the debtor conveyed their property to another person with intent to defeat, hinder, delay, or prejudice creditors. See EnerWorks Inc. v Glenbarra Energy Solutions Inc., 2012 ONSC 414, at para 51. The types of facts that can support an inference of such an intention to convey property away from creditors—present or future—are often described as “badges of fraud”. See Ontario Securities Commission v Camerlengo Holdings Inc., 2023 ONCA 93, at para 12.
32A defendant who has been noted in default is deemed to admit the truth of all allegations of fact made in the statement of claim. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 19.02(1)(a). Conclusions of law, and of mixed law and fact, are not to be deemed admitted. If the facts pleaded do not support the conclusion of law pleaded, the motion judge may decline to grant judgment despite the failure of the defendant to defend the action. See Paul’s Transport Inc. v Immediate Logistics Limited, 2022 ONCA 573, at para 77.
33There’s no dispute that Nadarasah owes a debt to Uthayakumar. There’s also no dispute that Nadarasah hasn’t paid this debt and can’t pay this debt. Leaving aside the deemed admissions on these points, his evidence on this motion concedes the issue: “I am not denying the obligation to pay; however, I require additional time to do so due to my current financial hardship.”
34Thus, the only issue is whether Nadarasah conveyed the property to the corporate defendants with intent to defeat, hinder, delay, or prejudice Uthayakumar. I find that he did so given the numerous badges of fraud:
on the valuation date, the property represented almost 85 percent of Nadarasah’s total assets
he is the sole officer and director of Suresh Consulting
his daughter, who lives with him, is the sole officer and director of 2502
the transfer divested Nadarasah of a substantial portion of his exigible assets
Nadarasah has no other assets to enforce the judgment against
the transaction occurred after the trial judgment was made
the property was transferred for only $499,000 but its value in 2022 was $1.375m
Nadarasah has adduced no evidence about the purpose of the transaction
35As a result, I endorse an order that the conveyance of the property is fraudulent and void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act. I order the Land Registrar to delete the transfer from title and restore Nadarasah as the registered owner.
IV. COSTS
36Subject to the provisions of a statute or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid. See Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 131(1).
37In exercising its discretion under section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs, the court may consider, together with the result in the proceeding and any offer to settle or to contribute made in writing, the factors listed in Rules of Civil Procedure, r 57.01(1).
38In the usual case, costs are awarded to the prevailing party after judgment has been given. The traditional purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful party in respect of the expenses sustained either defending a claim that in the end proved unfounded (if the successful party was the defendant), or in pursuing a valid legal right (if the plaintiff prevailed). Costs awards are “in the nature of damages awarded to the successful litigant against the unsuccessful, and by way of compensation for the expense to which he has been put by the suit improperly brought”. See British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71 at paras 20-1.
39The main objective is to fix an amount of costs that is objectively reasonable, fair, and proportionate for the unsuccessful party to pay in the circumstances of the case, rather than to fix an amount based on the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant. See Boucher v Public Accountants Council (Ontario) (2004), 2004 14579 (ON CA), 188 OAC 201 (CA), at para 26.
40Uthayakumar asks for $10,000 in costs for these motions, and $16,000 in costs for the action, both on a partial indemnity basis. Given that she was the successful party, she’s presumptively entitled to her costs. Nadarasah responds that a reasonable amount of costs is $2000-$3000. He pleads financial hardship but, given my findings above, this claim is baseless.
41I endorse an order that Nadarasah shall pay the costs of this action and motions on a partial indemnity basis, fixed in the amount of $25,000. This amount is fair, reasonable, and proportionate. Though Nadarasah is self-represented, he was aware, from his divorce case, that unsuccessful litigation can lead to an adverse costs award. These costs include these contested motions, along with the pleading, and the CPL motion. Uthayakumar’s lawyer’s time and fees are proportionate to the work that these tasks entail.
V. CONCLUSION
42Nadarasah, in his motion materials and orally, said that he’s prepared to pay the judgment to Uthayakumar, but he doesn’t have the funds. That’s untrue—he has a significant asset that he’s been trying to hide from Uthayakumar. No longer—the time has come to pay his debts.
Agarwal J
Released: March 10, 2026