CITATION: R. v. Z.E., 2026 ONSC 1217

COURT FILE NO.: CR 22-0127

DATE: 2026/02/27

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

Z.E.

D. McCaig, for the Crown

G. Clark, for the Offender

HEARD: January 13, 2026

PUBLICATION RESTRICTION NOTICE

By court order made under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, no information that could identify the person described in this judgment as the complainant may be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any manner. These reasons have been anonymized to permit their publication.

Ellies J.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON SENTENCE

OVERVIEW

1For reasons released on September 25, 2025, I found the offender, Z.E., guilty of assaulting the complainant with a knife: R. v. Z.E., 2025 ONSC 5465.

2Mr. E. is before me now for sentencing. The Crown seeks a 90-day conditional sentence, to be followed by a period of 12 months probation. On behalf of the offender, counsel submits that only a period of probation is necessary in the circumstances of this case.

3To determine the appropriate sentence, I must consider the circumstances surrounding the offence; those of the offender and the victim; and the relevant principles of sentencing, especially that of proportionality.

THE OFFENCE

4Mr. E. and the victim were involved in an intimate relationship for a little over a year. After the relationship ended, the victim complained to the police that Mr. E. had inserted objects, including a knife, into her vagina while she was under the influence of sleeping medication and had shared a photo of one of the items with a friend without her knowledge or consent. She also alleged that Mr. E. had held a knife to her throat one day for about 30 seconds while asking her to trust him, following which they had sexual intercourse.

5The allegations about the insertion of objects and the photo resulted in charges of sexual assault with a weapon, making a surreptitious visual recording (voyeurism), and distributing an intimate image without consent. I dismissed those charges at trial. I rejected the victim's evidence about being under the influence of sleeping pills when the images were taken and about whether she consented to the distribution of the images. However, I accepted the victim's evidence about the knife being held to her throat. That is the only offence for which the offender is being sentenced.

6When discussing the offence, it must be borne in mind that it took place within the context of a relationship that, by the victim's own evidence and that of the text messages exchanged between the victim and the offender, involved sexual practices that many would find outside of the norm. While it was an offence for the offender to put a knife to the victim's throat without her express consent, it must be remembered that that act immediately preceded an act of sexual intercourse. I point this out not as an excuse for the offender's conduct, but to highlight that this was not a typical scenario in which one partner threatened another with a knife out of anger or during the course of an argument.

THE OFFENDER

7Mr. E. is 32 years old. He was an only child. He suffered through three abusive relationships between his mother and her partners. His father and mother separated when he was five. His father was a harsh man, who suffered from mental illness and whose idea of discipline included making his son sit on a wet carpet. Between the ages of 10 and 18, Mr. E. watched his mother suffer physical abuse at the hands of her second partner, who was eventually arrested and removed from the home. Between the ages of 18 and 22, Mr. E. and his mother lived with a third man who abused the mother psychologically.

8After completing high school, Mr. E. obtained diplomas in a sports program and in a police foundations program at Canadore College. At the time of the offence, he was a teacher's aid at Nipissing University. He eventually obtained a B.A. in sociology. However, he was unable to complete a master’s program due to the stress of being charged in 2021 and the death of his mother due to cancer in 2023.

9Although it is far from clear in the pre-sentence report (“PSR”), it appears that Mr. E. has maintained more-or-less steady employment since before the date of the present offence.

10Mr. E. is himself the father of two children. His first, the result of a common-law relationship, is now nine years old. Mr. E. remains in that child's life. The second, the result of his marriage in 2024, is just under one. Although Mr. E. and his wife separated for a period of time after the child was born, they are back together. They hope to move to eastern Canada once the sentencing process is over and, if necessary, once the sentence is complete.

11Mr. E. has no criminal record. The police reported that he was cooperative at the time he was arrested for the offences with which he was charged. He was released on those charges and has been complying with the terms of his release for nearly five years, which terms prevented him from participating in an international sporting competition in the United States.

12Mr. E. has suffered psychologically since being charged. Mr. E. began attending an early intervention in psychosis program in April 2022. He regularly sees a registered nurse/clinician and a psychiatrist and is being treated with injectable medication.

THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

13The parties are not far apart on the issue of sentence. As I indicated, in addition to a period of probation, the Crown seeks a 90-day conditional sentence. Ms. McCaig submits that Mr. E. should be treated as a youthful first offender. She submits that denunciation and deterrence are paramount objectives here given the seriousness of the offence, but that rehabilitation is also important.

14While counsel for Mr. E. agrees with the Crown on the approach that should be adopted with respect to sentencing, he submits that the proper approach need not result in a conditional sentence. Instead, Mr. Clark submits that a period of probation is all that is required in the circumstances of this case. In the alternative, if a conditional sentence is imposed, he submits that the terms of the sentence should permit his client to move out of North Bay with the permission of his supervisor.

THE RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Fundament Purpose of Sentencing

15Before I address these submissions, I will briefly discuss the law of sentencing.

16The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society, to contribute to respect for the law, and to maintain a just, peaceful, and safe society: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, (the "Code"), s. 718.1.

17Section 718 of the Code sets out a number of objectives to be achieved in fulfilling the fundamental purpose of sentencing. They include denunciation of the unlawful conduct and the harm caused by it, deterrence of the particular offender and others, and the rehabilitation of offenders.

Principles of Sentencing

18The fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: Code, s. 718.1.

19Parity is also an important sentencing principle. A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances: Code, s. 718.2(b). In this case, neither party is suggesting that the sentence proposed by the other would offend this important principle. Therefore, I need not canvas the caselaw.

20Finally, the Code requires that sentencing courts apply the principle of restraint. An offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances, and all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to the victim or to the community should be considered: Code, s. 718.2(d) and (e).

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

21Section 718.2 of the Code requires that a sentence be increased or decreased to account for any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. The section lists a number of circumstances that are presumptively aggravating. Under the Code, the burden of proving the existence of an aggravating circumstance rests with the Crown, who must prove the existence of such a circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt: Code, s. s. 724(3)(e).

22I will deal with the aggravating factors first.

Aggravating Factors

23The Crown submits that two of the circumstances listed in s. 718.2 are relevant in this case: (1) evidence that the offender abused his intimate partner, and (2) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering her age and other personal characteristics: Code, s. 718.2(a)(ii) and (iii.1). There is no dispute that the victim was the offender's intimate partner. However, I am not persuaded that the offence for which the offender is being sentenced is responsible for all of the psychological harm for which the victim is blaming him. My concerns relate to both the sources of the evidence relied upon by the Crown, and its substance.

24I have two sources of evidence about the effect of the offence on the victim. One of them is the victim herself. She alleges that she is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of this offence. However, there is no indication in the evidence as to whether this is the hearsay expression of some professional's opinion, or just that of the victim. As I explained in my reasons following the trial, I did not find the victim to be either credible or reliable about the majority of the allegations: E., at para. 21.

25The other source is the victim's sister. She alleges that, “[a]s a result of the trauma she endured, my sister faced serious mental health and addiction challenges”, which required the victim to attend a 30-day inpatient treatment program at a cost of approximately $25,000. I do not doubt that the victim attended such a program. However, I do doubt that it was entirely, or even substantially, as a result of this offence. As I also explained in my reasons, the victim's sister was instrumental in getting the victim to conclude that she had been abused by the defendant, even though, according to the victim, she herself was not sure at the time: E., at para. 12.

26In any event, the victim seems to blame her present condition on the delay in getting to trial as much or more than she blames the offence itself. In her victim impact statement, she writes:

The criminal court process lasted five years and involved multiple delays. This prolonged timeline had a significant impact on my ability to heal and move forward with my life. Having the case unresolved for so long meant that I remained emotionally tied to the offence and the offender, which intensified my anxiety and stress.

The uncertainty and repeated delays made it difficult to find closure and prolonged the emotional harm I was experiencing. Instead of being able to focus on recovery, I was repeatedly forced to revisit the trauma. This has delayed my healing and affected my ability to move forward with a sense of stability and safety.

27For these reasons, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim is suffering PTSD from this offence, although I do accept that it caused her distress, based on the evidence I accepted at trial. As I indicated earlier, I also accept that the offence took place in the context of an intimate relationship. However, given my doubts about the effect that this one offence had on the victim, I would not make an order for restitution under s. 738 of the Code with respect to the costs of treatment to which I referred earlier.

28I turn now to the mitigating factors.

Mitigating Factors

29There are a number of mitigating factors in this case, some of which I have already mentioned.

30At age 32, the offender is relatively young. He has no criminal record. He has no history of involvement with the police and was cooperative throughout their investigation into the charges he faced.

31Mr. E. has been the subject of a bail order since his arrest for this offence in 2021 and there have been no issues surrounding his compliance with the terms of that order. Because of the order, he was unable to travel outside of the country to compete in a strongman competition, a sport he enjoys, and in which appears to be successful.

32Until he was charged, Mr. E. was on course to complete a master’s degree in sociology. I accept that he was unable to do so in part because he was charged with four offences, with respect to three of which he was found not guilty.

33Throughout his studies and since being charged, Mr. E.e has maintained steady employment. He has also maintained contact with his first child and reintegrated with the mother of his second.

34Being charged had an effect on Mr. E. that went beyond his studies and his hobbies. In combination with the stress caused by his mother's illness, the stress of being charged resulted in Mr. E's hospitalization due to the onset of a psychosis. Unlike the evidence relating to the effect of the offence on the victim's mental health, the effect of being charged on the offender's mental health is supported by information obtained from his registered nurse/clinician.

35Finally, Mr. E. is remorseful of the effect his conduct had on the victim, even though he has a different version of events; one which he did not advance at trial and that I therefore do not accept.

APPROPRIATE SENTENCE

36In my view, given the circumstances to which I have referred, it is not necessary to impose any sort of custodial sentence, even one served in the community, to satisfy the sentencing goals of deterrence and denunciation in this case. The offence, while serious, is not serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence for the purpose of denunciation or general deterrence. Nor is incarceration necessary to deter the offender himself. The consequences of being charged have served well enough in that respect. So, too, will the effect of having a criminal record.

37Instead, I agree that a suspended sentence and probation is sufficient to serve all of the goals and principles of sentencing, including rehabilitation. In my view, based on all of the factors to which I have referred, I believe that the appropriate length of the probation order should be 18 months.

38In addition to the statutory terms requiring the offender to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, to appear before the court when required to do so, and to notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly after any change of employment or occupation, the probation order will require the offender:

(a) to abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with the victim or from going to any place or geographic area where he knows the victim to be, except with the written permission of his probation officer;

(b) to remain within the jurisdiction of the court (meaning Ontario) unless written permission to go outside of that jurisdiction is obtained in advance from the court or the probation officer; and

(c) to continue to seek and obtain such counselling as is recommended by his probation officer and by his treating health professionals.

ANCILLARY ORDERS

39In addition to the probation order, I make the following ancillary orders:

(a) the offender shall provide a sample of his DNA under s. 487.051 of the Code; and

(b) he shall be prohibited from possessing any firearm, ammunition, or other thing mentioned in s. 109 of the Code for a period of 10 years.

M.G. Ellies J.

Released: February 27, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Z.E., 2026 ONSC 1217