R. v. Edward, 2026 ONSC 1207
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: R v. sHAKKIM EDWARD,
BEFORE: S.F. Dunphy J.
COUNSEL: Ana Serban, for the Crown
Lisa Bristow, for the Defendant Shakkim Edward
HEARD at Toronto: February 27, 2026
REASONS FOR DECISION – SENTENCING
Notice re publication ban: there is a publication ban regarding the name of the complainant or any information that might identify her. These reasons have been anonymized to remove any such references and may be published in any established digest of legal decisions in Ontario.
1Shakkim Edward was tried before me sitting with a jury. The jury rendered its verdict on August 29, 2025. Mr. Edward was convicted on one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and one count of trafficking heroin. He was acquitted on a single count of assault. He was also convicted on five human trafficking-related charges: human trafficking (s. 279.01(1)), material benefit from human trafficking (s. 279.02(1)), procuring (s. 286.3(1)), material benefit from procuring (s. 286.2(1), and advertising sexual services (s. 286.4).
2I revoked Shakkim Edward’s bail at the request of the Crown following the delivery of the verdict on August 29, 2025. I found that the loss of the presumption of innocence, the discovery of significant and convincing evidence of other procuring and human-trafficking related activity in the data extracted from his cell phone before trial but after his last bail hearing, his lack of any settled immigration status beyond a pending claim and his breach of prior release conditions all tilted the balance decisively towards incarceration on all three criteria.
3During the sentencing hearing, and on consent, I conditionally stayed Counts 5 (procuring) and 6 (material benefit from procuring) under the principle of Kienapple1 as the essential elements of these two charges are also essential elements of Counts 3 (human trafficking) and 4 (material benefit human trafficking) on the facts proved in this case. Shakkim Edward is before me for sentencing on the charges for which he was convicted other than those stayed.
4I issued a summary of my reasons as well as my sentencing decision after the hearing on February 27, 2025 with written reasons to be delivered subsequently. These are those reasons.
Circumstances of the Offences
5The human trafficking-related convictions and the conviction for trafficking in heroin relate to the time period May 27-29, 2021, in and around the residence of Mr. Edward in a North Toronto apartment building. The possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking conviction arises from substances found following his arrest during execution of a warrant to search his apartment by police on June 16, 2021.
6The complainant CR lived in northern Ontario at the time of the offences. She had been a heroin addict since 2019. In 2020, she met Mr. Edward on a bus coming down to Toronto. They exchanged social media handles. The Instagram name Mr. Edward gave her and the only name she knew him by throughout the relevant time frame was “Demon Time” or “Demon” for short. The two kept sporadically in touch over the following year via text messages on social media platforms. In January 2021 they met in northern Ontario when Mr. Edward travelled there with some friends.
7In May 2021 the complainant had been “clean” for several months but was experiencing significant personal difficulties. The road away from addiction is seldom straight or smooth. She visited a boyfriend in the Toronto area but hid where she was going from her mother who feared her being so close to sources of supply given her addiction – with good reason as it turned out.
8On or about May 27, 2021, CR posted a message indicating her feelings of frustration on social media. Mr. Edward responded to her post and reached out to her suggesting they get together to smoke. In the context, this referred to smoking heroin.
9From her past experiences with Mr. Edward, CR knew him as a possible supplier of heroin which she smoked and thought in responding to his message, she expected that she might obtain some from him again. She also imagined from her prior correspondence and meetings with him that he might lend a sympathetic ear to her in dealing with other issues she faced. She texted Mr. Edward that she had “cried myself to sleep” and “can you come”. She arranged to meet him late in the afternoon of May 27, 2021.
10She left her boyfriend’s house taking her bag with her and waited for Mr. Edward to pick her up at a place she had selected where her boyfriend would not see what she was really doing. To her surprise, Mr. Edward showed up as a passenger in the car picking her up. Another man was in the back seat and a woman was driving. Neither were known to her. The driver dropped the car’s three passengers - Mr. Edward, his friend Joel and CR – at Mr. Edward’s North Etobicoke apartment building and drove away.
11Shortly after entering the apartment, Mr. Edward took CR alone out on to the balcony with him. Before long, he proposed to CR that she should work for him as a sex worker, asking her to send him a suggestive photo for a “LeoList” advertisement and to receive the clients that he would arrange. He told her he would be watching over her from outside on the balcony. CR was offended at the suggestion, rejected it and went back inside the apartment. There she asked for and received some heroin from Mr. Edward. She smoked it. Not having smoked heroin in several months, she fell asleep soon thereafter.
12Meanwhile, Mr. Edward revised an advertisement for sexual services he had posted promoting the sexual services of a different woman a few days earlier on “Leo List” – a classified advertisement service commonly used to advertise sexual services. Whether this was an advertisement he himself had posted appears likely but it is only material for present purposes that he had control of the advertising account such that he was able to amend and repost it. He changed the name and address of the girl on the prior advertisement all without CR’s knowledge. As revised, the “new” advertisement indicated that “Jessica” was available to provide various sexual services offered at the address of his apartment and the rates to be charged. He posted this advertisement without CR’s knowledge or consent. He then proceeded to field inquiries from large numbers of prospective clients in “Jessica’s” name that came via text message to the number he had provided in the advertisement. The number in question was an internet telephone number he had arranged from a service provider that made such numbers available to anyone with an email address. All of this was done without CR’s consent. Indeed, prior to smoking heroin and passing out, she had quite explicitly communicated her refusal to be involved in this scheme.
13CR’s cooperation with Mr. Edward’s designs despite her voiced objections was secured by a combination of her isolation at his apartment – a slight woman alone with no money in an apartment on the edge of the city with two and then three men much larger than her – as well as the provision to her by Mr. Edward of the heroin that she craved. It was also reinforced from time to time by threats, both explicit and implicit.
14CR awoke a short while later to find that Mr. Edward had arranged for a client already who had arrived. Her objections had no effect upon his actions. Mr. Edward told her what she had to do and how much she should collect. She met the client, spoke to him for a while and ultimately the man masturbated in her presence while she kissed him on the neck. Mr. Edward was critical of the amount of time she spent with the man. He texted her from the balcony outside that she should be charging more. She collected at least $850 from the clients over this span of time.
15Approximately five clients came to the apartment over the course of that evening, the following evening and the next day. Each time, Mr. Edward told her what to do and what to charge. Her memory of the sequence of events and timing was admittedly foggy, but she was adamant that she could remember what was done to her. She knew that sometimes clients came up to the apartment, other times Mr. Edward sent her downstairs to guide the clients to the apartment door. However, she had trouble remembering which client had been greeted in which way and when. Similarly, she remembered that Mr. Edward took all of her money, but which money he took out of her hand immediately vs. the money she tried to hide and he subsequently took or from which client she could not accurately recall.
16Mr. Edward gave her heroin again the next day before she saw the clients arranged for that evening.
17The data extracted from Mr. Edward’s phone and secured from LeoList confirmed the date the original account was opened the prior week and the date and time he altered the prior ad to repost it under the name of “Jessica” at the new address less than two hours after CR first arrived at his apartment that Thursday evening. Indeed, the same extracted data from his cell phone showed the extensive correspondence in the form of text messages exchanged by Mr. Edward posing as “Jessica” with potential clients answering the ad that he posted for the sexual services of “Jessica”.
18Prior to the conversation on the balcony after her arrival, CR had no inkling what Mr. Edward’s true intentions were for her. Data from Mr. Edward’s phone indicated that he was checking the LeoList account while on his way over to pick her up that afternoon before he even arrived. CR’s social media posting about her frustrations that Mr. Edward saw was not expected by him. However, Mr. Edward saw and reacted to her post with an invitation which, in its context, was to smoke heroin. This and his phone activity en route confirms that he almost immediately put into execution a plan whose goal was to supply heroin to an addict and to exploit her for his personal gain.
19CR arrived at Mr. Edward’s apartment with little or no money and left it with none. All of the money she collected from clients she saw in his apartment was taken from her by him.
20On Friday Shakkim Edward appeared with what appeared to CR to be a handgun visibly tucked into the waistband of his sweatpants. This deliberate display was clearly intended as an implicit threat and it had its intended effect of helping to secure CR’s continued compliance. Other threats came by way of text messages reminding CR that he was watching, threatening to “flip” of she didn’t charge more money.
21In addition to arranging for CR’s transportation to the apartment, Mr. Edward maintained tight control over her movements and her opportunities to communicate with others. He examined her phone or took it from her from time to time. By confiscating all funds that came into her hands, he deprived her of the practical means to escape from the apartment on the edge of Toronto that he took her to.
22CR left the apartment in the late afternoon of Saturday May 29, 2021 and called 911 with the aid of a passer-by. Police took her statement in front of the apartment building that evening and then in more depth at the station on June 2, 2021.
23A search warrant was obtained and was executed at the apartment on June 16, 2021. Upon searching the apartment, police seized five plastic bags containing what appeared to be cocaine as well as what appeared to be a pellet gun. Samples of the suspected cocaine were sent for analysis. One bag, containing 27.6g of white powder, was found to contain cocaine. Three other bags were found to contain Phenacetin, commonly used as a “cutting agent” to dilute cocaine and increase profits for traffickers. The other bag contained an unknown substance. The jury found that Mr. Edward was in possession of the seized cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
24While the offences are serious ones and the impact of these offences upon the victim, CR, has been quite severe, it bears noting that within the spectrum of what are undoubtedly serious human trafficking offences, the duration of the exploitation underlying these charges is comparatively short compared to other cases. This is not a mitigating circumstance of course but is a relevant consideration in assessing the seriousness of the offending conduct.
Circumstances of the Offender
25Mr. Edward was 23 years of age at the time of the offences for which he was convicted. He was born in St. Lucia and was raised by his grandmother until he came to Canada to join his mother at the age of nine (she having come over approximately four years earlier). He had no significant relationship with his father who denied paternity and was allegedly abusive towards his mother. He has one younger sister who has resided primarily with his father but with whom he has had a positive relationship. He had a stepfather and stepbrother for after moving to Canada but his mother’s relationship with that man ended soon afterwards.
26He described his experience as a young child integrating into a foreign country and culture in positive terms to the author of the Pre-Sentence Report. He reports having done relatively well in school but dropped out of high school to pursue employment. He suggested that his cannabis use in high school may have contributed to some of the difficulties he experienced in that era. He has subsequently completed course credits on-line to grade 11 level.
27He was briefly married but separated in 2020. For the past two years he has been in a committed relationship with another woman and enjoys the support of his family.
28He has worked sporadically since the age of 17, primarily in cash-based employment in the construction industry. His lack of legal immigration status in Canada likely contributed to his relatively sporadic and casual employment history. When employed, he contributed to his household expenses. He reported no substance abuse of alcohol or narcotics but has used cannabis for several years, a habit which he acknowledged has had adverse effects on his ability to succeed at school and in employment.
29Mr. Edward assembled a number of support letters from family and friends. Among these is a letter from his mother who also spoke to the author of the pre-sentence report whose summary of Mr. Edward’s circumstances is broadly similar with what his mother records in her letter.
30The other letters from friends and family are laudatory of Mr. Edward’s character describing his acts of kindness and consideration in glowing terms. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the authors of these letters. However, there is no indication that any of the authors have any understanding of the crimes which he committed or how they themselves might assist in his rehabilitation. The portrait they paint of Mr. Edward is in no way consistent with the actions which resulted in the jury’s verdict. Further, nothing in the evidence observed by me gives me any reason to conclude this his actions were an aberration or a “one off”. The evidence of planning and organization underlying both the trafficking and the human trafficking convictions speak quite strongly to the contrary. There is no suggestion of actual insight into his crimes or his personal responsibility for them. There is no indication of actual remorse that indicates an understanding of how harmful and morally repugnant his actions were. What remorse he has expressed appears indistinguishable from the understandable regret he has about being incarcerated and incarcerated in the conditions that have prevailed for much of his time in pre-trial detention.
31Mr. Edward came to Canada at a young age brought by his mother. He did not however have permanent resident status when he came and has remained in the country without any legal status to do so. I am advised that he has commenced a refugee claim – on what grounds I am not aware beyond the fact that he has not been to St. Lucia for many years and left as a young boy several years after his mother’s departure.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
32I find the following aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond reasonable doubt:
(a) The vulnerability of CR as a young woman and recovering heroin addict that was exploited by Mr Edward (s. 718.04): Mr. Edward knew of her family conflict and her struggles with addiction in particular smoking heroin. He knew that she was in a vulnerable state and had contacted him for support. His response was to suggest they smoke together following which they arranged to meet. The speed with which he proposed sex work to her the moment she was alone with him on the balcony and his accessing his LeoList account while driving to meet her leaves no doubt as to his ulterior motive of exploitation when offering his “help”.
(b) The use of heroin as a tool to bend CR to do his will in sex work: Mr. Edward trafficked heroin to CR to obtain her compliance knowing that she was an addict who was attempting to go clean. Feeding an addiction as a tool of control is a frequently-found feature in human trafficking cases. Given the very close connection between the trafficking of heroin and the human trafficking in this case and the fact that the sentence for the latter is certainly longer than the former, I have decided to sentence the heroin offence concurrently with the human trafficking charge and to consider the use of heroin as a tool of acquiring and maintaining control as an aggravating factor in determining a fit and proper sentence for human trafficking to avoid the risk of double-counting a single factor.
(c) The use of threats to obtain compliance from CR: Text messages sent to her and the intentional display of what appeared to be a genuine firearm had the intended effect of inducing compliance from CR. It matters not the degree to which he carried any threats into execution – the fact of the threat was designed to induce cooperation and had the intended effect.
(d) The sophistication and planning demonstrated: The evidence demonstrates a degree of sophistication and planning attaching to Mr. Edward’s exploitation of CR which in turn demonstrates a concerning indifference to the impact of his actions upon others where his own self-interest is concerned. Evidence of this planning and sophistication include the operation of the Leo List account (including strategic “re-posting” of the ads to gain higher visibility), the evidence that his “help” offered to CR was actually an entrée to his true scheme of exploiting her (evidenced by his consulting the Leo List account from the car on his way to pick her up, the speed with which he pitched his proposal to her and his activity on the Leo List account after CR passed out following her consumption of the heroin he supplied).
(e) The severe impact of this crime upon its victim: This is discussed further below. The potential for long-lasting harm and trauma upon the victims of this category of crime is amply borne out by the actual harm CR recounted in her victim impact statement and in my own observations of her through her lengthy period of time testifying at trial. She has experienced significant trauma that has caused and will continue to cause very material harm to her well-being virtually on a daily basis and will do so for many years to come.
(f) The scale of the cocaine trafficking enterprise: I consider that the cumulative evidence gathered from inside the apartment are indicative of a trafficking operation of a degree of scope and scale. There were multiple cell phones present as well as a digital scale and considerable quantities of a commonly-used cutting agent found alongside the cocaine which itself was in a significant quantity.
33In light of the jury’s findings, I am not able to conclude that Mr. Edward was physically violent towards CR in the apartment hallway as an element of the offence for which he has been convicted. CR admitted that she had taken Mr. Edward’s phone – her reasons for doing so were explained but are not material here - and this circumstance appears to have played a significant role in the physical violence captured by security cameras. The circumstances of the altercation are sufficiently unclear that I can form no conclusions to the degree of certainty required to consider this as an aggravating circumstance.
34I find the following mitigating circumstances are present in this case:
(a) The status of Mr. Edward as a young offender without a prior criminal record at the time of the commission of these offences.
(b) The challenging circumstances of Mr. Edward’s youth, being raised by a single mother and separated from her for a time, as well as the obstacles these circumstances placed before him in terms of completing his education and obtaining meaningful employment and a positive start in life.
(c) Immigration status, Duncan credit and Downes credit as described below.
Immigration Status
35While Mr. Edward has been in Canada since a young age, he does not have Canadian citizenship. His affidavit confirms that he currently has no status in Canada. This means that his removal has been a potential outcome at any time apart from his involvement with the criminal justice system.
36I am aware that the crimes for which he has been convicted and the range of sentence reasonably available make him removable for serious criminality without appeal as of right under our immigration laws. At least some of the support letters filed by the defence include letters addressed to the Minister which informs me that he is taking what steps he can to mitigate that risk and counsel indicated that he has a pending refugee claim that is currently suspended pending completion of this trial at least.
37I have no basis to forecast the future as regards the application of Canada’s immigration laws to this young man. Steps may be taken to remove him when he is up for early release. Steps may be taken to remove him when he is up for statutory release. Or no steps may be taken to apprehend him at the end of sentence at all. Even removal orders are sometimes not enforced. If steps are taken to remove him, a humanitarian application may be made. That application may or may not succeed.
38There are simply too many variables to permit any intelligible application of a mitigating circumstance. Whether and when he is returned to St. Lucia will be decided by others. Whatever sentence I hand down – given that under six months is not a remote possibility – will have very little if any impact on the outcome of that process.
39In some circumstances, he could even find himself in a more advantageous situation in relation to the completion of his sentence than another who is not in that situation. Were the Minister to seek his early release, he might be released earlier than another similarly situate inmate and his deportation may be due as much to his lack of legal status in the country as to his criminal history. His lack of status means that there were numerous risks facing Mr. Edward independent of the consequences of his crimes.
40Mr. Edward’s individual circumstances are always relevant as are the individual circumstances of all offenders before the court for sentencing. His lack of status has doubtless had some impact on the sporadic nature of his employment, for example. However, for the reasons described, I find there is little concrete that I can take away from his immigration situation that amounts to a material mitigating circumstance. I can take note of his immigration circumstance, but it appears to me to add little material weight in the sentencing process in comparison to the aggravating circumstances.
41Mr. Edward has served a total of 622 days of pre-trial custody for which credit at the rate of 1.5:1 or 933 days (or 2 years and 203 days) is conceded by the Crown. This is not precisely speaking a mitigating circumstance so much as a capped statutory credit. This credit (2 years, 203 days) for pre-sentence custody shall be applied pursuant to s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.
Duncan and Downes
42I must consider in addition the degree to which the particularly harsh conditions of pre-trial detention should be considered a mitigating circumstance pursuant to R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754 and the degree to which the stringent conditions of his pre-trial release under house arrest with a monitor warrant consideration as a mitigating factor pursuant to R. v. Downes.
43As I have often written, I do not consider it helpful to reduce these two mitigating circumstances to a precise number when no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances are so quantified. However it is clear that both Duncan and Downes “credits” are mitigating circumstances that must be taken into account in arriving at a sentence which is fit and proper having regard to all of the circumstances present including these. Neither should be characterized as a credit against a fit and proper sentence but as a component of a fit and proper sentence. The Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 at para. 52-53 is entirely consistent with this approach.
44There is evidence that both mitigating circumstances ought to be applied here, although the impact of both upon this particular offender is not presented with much particularity. As shall be seen, the evidentiary value of quantity has a particular weight on its own in relation to the Duncan credit.
45There are two aspects to the Duncan mitigating circumstances counsel have brought to my attention: the provision of health care while in custody and the conditions of his detention more generally. I am disinclined to attach material credit to former but shall take the other into consideration.
46While in pre-trial custody prior to his June 4, 2024 release, Mr. Edward suffered from a pre-existing condition of soreness to his ACL arising from a motor vehicle accident at some point in the past. This was a chronic condition but I have no evidence beyond his requests for treatment to determine whether this was a condition that required treatment or was even amenable to treatment. There is no evidence about what steps he took to deal with his ACL injury prior to his detention or when he was on release in the community. There is no evidence that this condition amounted to an actual disability or if so what accommodations were sought or denied him.
47There is evidence that Mr. Edward made complaints of a lost filling that needed attention from a dentist in 2022. Over the span of a few weeks, it is apparent that the condition became more serious and eventually left him in pain unable to chew or eat properly. It appears he was initially wait-listed to see a dentist for a period and was brought to see a dentist after about a month. I have no basis to assess the reasonableness of the delay nor the urgency of the need initially as opposed to later on when it clearly got worse and he was ultimately treated. I cannot see from the record whether the situation was treated with greater urgency when it got worse. There are wait lists in the community – waiting for health care of all kinds is a not unique to the custodial setting. There is nothing in the record that suggests Mr. Edward’s requests for medical care were ignored nor am I in any position to assess the reasonableness of the reaction time of custodians who had/have an undoubted obligation to attend to the health needs of their inmates.
48This evidence of responsiveness to his health needs on these two distinct occasions is just too general and lacking in specifics to permit me to afford it any particular degree of weight. It is however fair to observe that overcrowding generally – and there is distinct evidence of this since his re-incarceration in August 2025 – can have an impact on the availability and wait times for medical care generally.
49Mr. Edward’s detention at Toronto South Detention Centre, much of which also coincided with the latter stages of the Covid pandemic (Mr. Edward was arrested in late June 2021), was certainly in sub-standard conditions whether due to overcrowding, underfunding, or both. While I lack significant evidence of the particular impact of these upon Mr. Edward, the sheer volume and frequency of lock downs and latterly of triple-bunking compensates to some degree the lack of particularity in Mr. Edward’s evidence on the impact of these conditions upon him.
50Mr. Edward was subjected to 52 days of triple bunking as of December 30, 2025 (the effective date of the Toronto South report). He was triple-bunked from the time of his detention post-conviction until December 30, 2025 and I was asked to infer that this condition persisted through January and February as a result of the adjournment of Mr. Edward’s sentencing hearing at his counsel’s request. He spent a total of 253 days on full or partial lockdown up until December 30, 2025 and I was asked to make a similar extrapolation of this data based on his having been subject to one form or lockdown or another for about 45% of this time in custody prior to December 30, 2025.
51Mr. Edward’s affidavit mentions the discomfort and degradation of having to take turns sleeping on the floor, sometimes with a blocked toilet next to the mattress. The cells were not designed for three and the impact upon the detainees of such overcrowding is not difficult to imagine.
52There is little concrete evidence of the impact of the lockdowns upon Mr. Edward beyond this statement in his affidavit: “The lockdowns and overcrowding affect my ability to speak to my lawyer and family, my ability to have fresh air and exercise, and my ability to shower and clean myself.” He also referred to fears of getting sick and dying experienced during the pandemic where days would go by without access to showers, cleaning supplies and clean laundry.
53While this evidence is perhaps some distance from the quality of evidence of the adverse effect upon Mr. Edward flowing from the “particularly harsh” treatment due to locked down conditions that the Court of Appeal in Duncan required to be presented in evidence, the volume of these lockdowns and triple bunking is to a degree persuasive on its own. When almost 1 day in 2 contains some form of lockdown, a very large percentage of which is recorded as due to “staff shortages” over multiple years, at some point the reader has to ask whether this is by accident or by design.
54The volume of partial and full lockdowns as well as the more recent experience of triple bunking satisfy the Duncan requirement of particularly harsh pre-sentence detention conditions that must be considered and taken into account as mitigating circumstances pursuant to Duncan.
55Mr Edward was released from pre-trial custody on June 4, 2024 and remained at large until his conviction on August 29, 2025 for a total of 451 days. During this time, his release conditions required him to live in the apartment he was in at the time of his arrest and not to leave it except for medical emergencies or in the continuous company of his sureties (his mother and his girlfriend). He was also required to have an ankle monitor applied at all times. Such conditions are near the severe end of the release-conditions continuum and must be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. I shall do so.
Position of the parties
56As noted, both parties concurred that Counts 5 and 6 have been stayed conditionally pursuant to Kienapple.
57The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 8 years broken down as follows:
(a) Possession of cocaine for trafficking (s. 5(2) CDSA): 1 year consecutive;
(b) Trafficking heroin (CDSA s. 5(1)): 1 year consecutive;
(c) Human trafficking (s. 279.01): 6 years consecutive;
(d) Material benefit human trafficking (s. 279.02(1)): 4 years concurrent; and
(e) Advertising sexual services (s. 286.4): 2 years concurrent to HT.
58In addition the Crown sought the following ancillary orders:
(a) Obtain DNA sample (s. 481.051); primary designated offence of human trafficking;
(b) Weapons prohibition for life (s. 109);
(c) SOIRA order (s. 490.012 and .013): 20 years
(d) Non-communication with CR (s. 743.21(1); and
(e) Restitution order in favour of CR (s. 738): $900.
59The Defence proposed the following sentence:
(a) Possession of cocaine for trafficking (s. 5(2) CDSA): 1 year;
(b) Trafficking heroin (CDSA s. 5(1)): 1 year concurrent;
(c) Human trafficking (s. 279.01): 4 years consecutive;
(d) Material benefit human trafficking (s. 279.02(1)): 1.5 years years concurrent; and
(e) Advertising sexual services (s. 286.4): 1.5 years concurrent.
60As regards the proposed ancillary orders, the defence takes no objection to the Crown’s suggested orders with the exception of the restitution order which the defence suggests should either not be made or if made should not exceed $500 given the inconsistency of the complainant’s evidence on this subject.
Impact upon the victim
61I had the opportunity to gain some insights into the impact of these crimes upon their victim, CR, during the course of her examination in chief and cross-examination spanning four sitting days. As well, I have her Victim Impact Statement.
62Her statement outlined the dramatic impact these crimes have had upon her young life. These events weigh upon her and significantly impact her sense of security and well-being on a daily basis. Her plans for the future have been replaced by a pervasive sense of fear and anxiety. She described being prey to panic attacks and flashbacks to the events.
63She has spent periods of time unable to leave home and her social life has contracted. She has experienced severe strains in her relationships with friends and family both. Her emotional turmoil and difficulty in focusing has impacted her career and work life. She continues to struggle with shame, guilt and fear. She has periods of hopelessness and depression. She described her healing process as a “long and painful process. I am working every day to rebuild my life, retain my sense of identity and find stability. But the emotional scars remain. This experience changed me permanently”.
64Unfortunately, similar sentiments are all too frequently the outcome of the human exploitation that victims of human trafficking undergo. The sentence of the victims can confidently be predicted to exceed any sentence that may reasonably be handed down to the perpetrators of this crime in many cases including this one. This category of predatory crime inflicts harm on the core of the being of its victims in such pervasive and long-lasting ways.
Analysis and discussion of applicable sentencing principles
65The nature of these offences and the aggravating circumstances I have found present require that I give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence – both specific and general. While these are primary sentencing objectives, they are by no means the sole applicable principles to be considered. The public needs to be protected from such callous infliction of harm. The gravity of this offence is great and the moral culpability of the offenders is as undoubted as it is significant. Rehabilitation is by no means an irrelevant sentencing consideration, but its weight is significantly diminished relative to the primary factors listed.
66Human trafficking is a crime of exploitation that all too often leaves battered and broken souls in its wake. Our courts have consistently described this crime as “a form of slavery” and its perpetrators as little more than greedy parasites: R. v. Lopez, 2018 ONSC 4749 at para. 52. In R. v. Augustin, 2022 ONSC 5901 at para. 85-89 the court reviewed the applicable jurisprudence and concluded that the appropriate sentencing range for this category of offence is in the 4-8 year range. The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the gravity of these offences in R. v. S.M., 2020 ONCA 427 which, although considering interim release and not sentencing as such nevertheless confirmed the very significant gravity of these offences committed by an offender with a demonstrated “readiness to exploit, diminish and harm a vulnerable human being in their own self-interest on an on-going basis” (at para. 14).
67More recent jurisprudence confirms that the sentencing range for this type of offence is tending higher as the devastating long-term impact of these crimes upon their victims becomes better understood. I described and commented upon this trend in R. v. Bedi, 2024 ONSC 5320.
68The aggravating features noted here clearly require a sentence closer to the upper than to the lower end of the range. The youth and vulnerability of the victim, the degree of control over and isolation of the victim, the sophistication of the enterprise involving the use of cryptocurrency, internet phone services, experienced “refreshing” of classified advertisements, the use of heroin and implied threats to control the victim, the extensive harm done to the victim all speak to the need for an exemplary sentence tending towards the upper end of the range. Prior to consideration of the mitigating features of this case, the facts of this case could easily warrant a sentence into the low double digits.
69Strand-alone sentences for trafficking heroin, apart entirely from its close connection to the human trafficking offence present here, would range in the three year range. As noted, I have decided to sentence this offence concurrently with the human trafficking sentence as the latter is the more serious and the two are, on the facts of this case, very closely connected. However, this aggravating feature of the human trafficking offence is another ground for a higher-range sentence.
70Recent cases have made it clear that features such as the relatively short duration of the exploitation or the youth and lack of prior convictions of the offender do not necessarily carry as much weight in mitigation as might otherwise be the case given the degree of harm this kind of exploitation inflicts.
71I cannot find that Mr. Edward has displayed any genuine sense of remorse or insight into his criminal behaviour or even recognition of the moral repugnance of his callous, self-centred behaviour. The pre-sentence report appears to underscore this assessment with the comments attributed to Mr. Edward regarding the circumstances of these crimes.
72I have no doubt he regrets having been caught. However, I cannot find these circumstances suggest that Mr. Edward’s prospects for rehabilitation are anything better than quite guarded. He has some support in the community – should he ever be in that community to access that support – but there is no indication that this support network has any real idea what he has done or how they might contribute to his rehabilitation. Overall, I must assess the prospects of re-offending post-release as relatively significant.
73Mr. Edward is young and will still be relatively young after serving his sentence. As the remainder of the sentence to be served will be in a Federal penitentiary, Mr. Edward will have access to a range of programming that is not available in provincial remand centres where his pre-trial detention has taken place. While I have a guarded view of Mr. Edward’s rehabilitation prospects, insight and empathy are qualities that can be nurtured over time. While his offences betray calculation and indifference to the suffering of others, I am guardedly optimistic that he can make progress in this direction.
74Section s. 718(d) requires me to consider the goal of assisting in the rehabilitation of offenders in sentencing, a mandatory direction of Parliament that is not conditioned by any consideration of the offender’s immigration status. I have not discounted the importance of rehabilitation as a sentence criterion by any consideration of whether Mr. Edward may be permanently removed from Canada.
75The pre-sentence report also contains indications of substance abuse issues that may have contributed to Mr. Edward’s criminal behaviour which Mr. Edward has not fully recognized. Once again, these are issues that are amenable to treatment in custody, and I am guardedly optimistic that time and treatment will improve Mr. Edward’s insight into the contributions of substance abuse to his behaviour and the means of controlling this. However, as with my assessment of rehabilitation more generally, the outlook must be guarded.
76Having regard to the foregoing considerations, I find that the defence suggestion of a net sentence of four years is entirely out of keeping with the trends in the jurisprudence and fails to account adequately for the very significant aggravating features present in this case. My assessment lies closer to the Crown’s position, but I also find that the Crown has underweighted the mitigating circumstances in particular the youth of Mr. Edward, his albeit guarded prospects of rehabilitation as well as Duncan and Downes.
77On balance, I find that a sentence of six years for human trafficking (Count 3) strikes an appropriate balance of the human trafficking sentencing principles applicable here. This sentence is actually near the lower end of the middle range of sentences that might be considered generally applicable here. This is a function of my recognition of the mitigating circumstances present as noted. It is also a reflection of the totality principle due to the consecutive sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking which I have also reduced in recognition of the same principle.
78I have reduced the sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking to one year consecutive in recognition of the totality principle. This is a sentence which I consider to be significantly below what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence for that offence considered in isolation having regard to the aggravating circumstances mentioned including the volume of cocaine seized and the presence of a significant amount of a cutting agent. There shall be a sentence of one year for Count 1 to be served consecutively to Count 3.
79The sentence for trafficking in heroin will be fixed at three years but this shall be served concurrently reflecting the weight this aggravating circumstance has already borne in the consideration of the human trafficking sentence.
80Since my sentence for Count 3 (human trafficking) reflects the aggravating circumstances applicable to this the most serious of the related group of offences and necessarily considers to some degree the contributing circumstances of the other related offences (Counts 2 and 7), I find the following sentences to be appropriate for the reasons already discussed:
(a) Count 2 (trafficking heroin): 3 years concurrent to Count 3; and
(b) Count 7 (advertise sexual services): 2 years concurrent to Count 3.
81As with the sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose, the sentence I am imposing for trafficking in heroin is milder that the conduct would warrant viewed in the abstract. However, the gravity of this offence is to some degree reflected in the human trafficking sentence. As well the totality principle requires me to step back and consider the overall sentence.
82I find that the ancillary orders sought by the Crown ought to be made. Human trafficking is a primary designated offence. The use of a weapon as a “threat enhancer” in committing these offences – even an imitation firearm as was the case here – is an aggravating circumstance that warrants a lifetime prohibition under s. 109. While the provisionally stayed charges of procuring and obtaining sexual services for consideration are designated offences under s. 489.011(a), the jury’s verdict on those two stayed charges establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Edward possessed the necessary intention when committing the offences of human trafficking and material benefit from human trafficking requiring a SOIRA order under s. 489.012(2). The circumstances of this case also fully justify the requested s. 743.21 non-communication order.
83The jury found that Mr. Edward obtained a material benefit from human trafficking in the charge that I have provisionally stayed. I find that the jury accepted CR’s evidence that Mr. Edward confiscated the totality of the amounts collected by her from the performance of the sex work involving the five clients Mr, Edward brought to the apartment over the relevant time frame. I find the amount involved was at least $850 none of which she managed to retain and all of which was seized by Mr. Edward over the course of her stay in that apartment. I am satisfied that an order under s. 738(1) requiring Mr. Edward to make restitution to CR in the amount of $850 is entirely appropriate here. I have taken no account of the money given to her by Delroy Edward given the ambiguity of the purpose associated with those funds and the way they were to be used.
Disposition
84In conclusion, for these reasons, I sentenced Mr. Edward to a penitentiary term as follows:
(a) Count 1 Possession for purpose (cocaine; CDSA s. 5(2): 1 year consecutive to Count 3;
(b) Count 2 Trafficking (heroin, CDSA s. 5(1)): 3 years concurrent to Count 3;
(c) Count 3 Human trafficking (s. 279.01(1): 6 years;
(d) Count 4 Financial benefit human trafficking (s. 279.02(1)): 4 years concurrent to Count 3;
(e) Count 5: Procuring (s. 286.3(1)): provisionally stayed, R. v. Kienapple;
(f) Count 6: Financial benefit procuring (s. 286.2(1)): provisionally stayed, R. v. Kienapple;
(g) Count 7: Advertise sexual services (s. 286.4): 2 years concurrent to Count 3.
85The combined global sentence is thus seven years. Against this combined sentence, Mr. Edward is entitled to Summers credit pursuant to s. 719(3.1) of the Code of 570 actual days of pre-sentence custody credit against the sentence imposed, which credit is to be increased by a factor of 1.5:1 for a total credit of 855 days or 2 years, 125 days.
86The net sentence, after the above credits is thus 4 years and 240 days.
87The above custodial sentence is net of all mitigating circumstances including Duncan and Downes as well as s. 719(3.1) of the Code.
88The following ancillary orders shall also be made:
(a) An order to obtain a sample of bodily substances (s. 481.051) arising from the primary designated offence of human trafficking;
(b) An order under s. 109 for a weapons prohibition for life (s. 109);
(c) An order under the Sex Offenders Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for a period of 20 years: (s. 490.012 and .013);
(d) An order prohibiting communication with CR (s. 743.21(1); and
(e) A restitution order in favour of CR in the amount of $850 (s. 738).
89I read only a summary of these reasons in court at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing with written reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
___________________________
S.F. Dunphy J.
Date: March 6, 2026
Footnotes
- Kienapple v. R., 1974 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 SCR 729