ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
K.W., a minor, by his Litigation Guardian, A.W.
Plaintiff
– and –
United Mennonite Educational Institute o/a UMEI Christian High School
Defendant
Jacob Benson, for the Plaintiff
Michael Nicol and Jeffrey R. Adey for the Defendant
HEARD: February 10, 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
A. NATURE OF THE MOTION
1The plaintiff, K.W., a minor, by his Litigation Guardian, A.W. (“A.W.”), brings a motion seeking an interlocutory injunction or, in the alternative, and interim injunction, restraining the defendant, United Mennonite Educational Institute o/a UMEI Christian High School (“UMEI”), from enforcing the suspension and/or expulsion of the plaintiff. For the purpose of this hearing, the plaintiff seeks to have the defendant:
(a) Permit the plaintiff to attend UMEI in person; and
(b) Permit the plaintiff to participate fully in all academic and school related activities pending trial.
2Further, the plaintiff seeks: (i) an order allowing for the plaintiff’s party name to be anonymized in the style of cause; (ii) an order sealing the complete affidavit in support of this motion, with exhibits; and (iii) an order permitting the filing of an anonymized affidavit.
3The defendant strenuously opposes the granting of any injunction.
4Two issues arise on this motion:
Issue One: Has the plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the test for an interlocutory injunction?
Issue Two: If so, should this court grant the relief sought?
5The plaintiff commenced this proceeding by issuing a Statement of Claim on February 3, 2026. In it, the plaintiff alleges breaches of contract, the provincial Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, and the federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5.
6Given the time constraints and urgency associated with both hearing this motion and delivering a prompt decision, the plaintiff agreed to limit the motion to the alleged breach of contract, rather than pursue the additional alleged breaches. The defendant, in turn, agreed to proceed with the hearing notwithstanding that the factums were filed contrary to the service requirements in r. 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
7Further, given the evidence and my findings of fact that ultimately led to the plaintiff’s application for an interlocutory injunction being dismissed, I concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, it was unnecessary to consider interim injunctive relief.
8These are my reasons.
B. THE BACKGROUND FACTS
9My review of the background evidence is limited to those facts that are admissible, that are significant to the central issues, or that provide context necessary to appreciate and determine the relevant issues.
10UMEI is a private non-profit institution which provides Christian-centered secondary education to approximately 68 full time students. UMEI relies on the support of its faith community to keep education as accessible and affordable as possible and operates with modest resources. UMEI delivers its courses on a semester-based system.
11K.W. is a 16-year-old student enrolled at the defendant school, UMEI. K.W. has been enrolled at UMEI since August 2023, beginning in Grade 9. He is now in Grade 11. He is an exceptional student with several documented disabilities, including obsessive–compulsive disorder, anxiety, and emotional‑regulation challenges.
12A.W. is K.W.’s lawful guardian.
13During a student’s enrolment at UMEI, each student is required to comply with the policies established by the Board of Directors, as set out in the Student Handbook. At the beginning of each academic year, K.W., like all students, signs the Student Handbook, acknowledging the school’s policies. These policies and agreements include the UMEI Discipline Policy, the Expectations of Students, and the Code of Learning Behaviour. In addition, students and their parents or guardians may enter into supplementary agreements with the administration during the student’s time at UMEI, which K.W. and A.W. ultimately did.
14The parties agree that these documents collectively operate as contracts between K.W., A.W., and UMEI, and that their relationship is contractual in nature.
15In November 2023, concerns arose regarding aspects of K.W.’s behaviour, including reports that he had verbally mistreated another student. A guardian–teacher meeting was held on November 28, 2023, involving A.W., then‑Principal Sonya Bedal (“S. Bedal”), and then Vice‑Principal Darcy Bults (“Bults”). As a result of that meeting, K.W. and A.W. entered into a Behaviour Contract with UMEI.
16The Behaviour Contract lists agreed upon terms K.W. was obligated to adhere to during his enrolment at UMEI. These include, inter alia, respecting all members of the school community, attending all classes regularly and punctually, following all school safety rules and regulations, and not engaging in intimidating or threatening behaviour to others.
17The Behaviour Contract establishes a progressive discipline process should K.W.’s misconduct toward others continue. The steps include a verbal warning, a teacher-student conference, a teacher-guardian meeting, and in‑school consequences such as detention or a behaviour‑improvement plan. Continued misbehaviour may then result in suspension or expulsion in accordance with the policy set out in the Student Handbook.
18The Student Handbook sets out “Standards Concerning the Safety and Inappropriate Behaviours.” It prohibits certain behaviour, including the following:
engage in bullying, intimidating, threatening behaviours;
inflict or encourage others to inflict bodily harm on another person;
commit harassment of any kind;
be in possession of any weapon, including firearms;
use any object or weapon to threaten or intimidate or harm another person;
cause injury to any person with an object;
commit an act of vandalism that causes damage to school property or to property located on the premises of the school;
engage in academic dishonesty;
swear at a teacher or other person in authority;
fight;
engage in inappropriate use of electronic communications/media; including accessing inappropriate materials on the internet or posting or texting offensive, derogatory and/or degrading comments or images on personal or commercial websites (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, and similar sites);
have unexcused absence from school activities; and
have a conduct injurious to the moral tone of the school or to the physical or mental well-being of others.
19Specifically with respect to “Lighters, Knives, and Weapons”, the Student Handbook states the following:
Under no circumstance may students bring lighters, knives or weapons of any kind to school. Possession of any weapon will result in its confiscation, possible suspension or termination of enrolment and notification of law enforcement authorities.
20The Student Handbook also states that UMEI reserves the right to suspend a student where:
the student’s misbehaviour is of a most serious nature;
intervention has not brought about resolution, reconciliation, and restoration
the student persists in their misbehaviour;
the principal believes it is necessary.
21And further, that UMEI reserves the right to expel a student when:
the continued attendance of the student would not be in the best interests of the student or the school;
the student’s behaviour is in breach of the standards of this Policy;
the behaviour seriously jeopardizes the UMEI’s ability to guarantee the dignity and safety of its students and/or interferes with learning;
the behaviour involves conduct which is injurious to UMEI’s moral tone or to the physical or mental well-being of others;
the principal recommends to the School Board that such action be taken.
22On December 1, 2023, K.W. advised Bults that he had recorded conversations with fellow students, staff, and management earlier that day. As this conduct breached school policy, and given the school’s unsuccessful attempts to address earlier misconduct through less serious disciplinary measures – including incidents involving dishonesty about what teachers have said to him and attempts to manipulate those in authority – K.W. was suspended for three days, from December 4 to December 6, 2023, in accordance with the Student Handbook.
23On December 1, 2023, Bults also emailed A.W. outlining K.W.’s concerning behaviour over the previous “couple of months.” This included the following:
K.W. was bullying a student which caused the student to be fearful of an upcoming trip to Toronto. K.W. was also emailing the student’s mother, attempting to convince her to let the student go on the trip.
K.W. repeatedly called and texted a teacher after that teacher had given his number to K.W. at a field trip earlier in the year but only for emergency purposes.
K.W. again bullied the above student, which included threats of stuffing the student in a locker and jabbing him painfully in the ribs – which K.W. denied when confronted by Bults.
K.W. lied to Bults, saying that his math teacher gave him permission to leave a classroom when in fact he was given no such permission.
K.W. attempted to record a conversation he had with Bults on his phone when he placed his phone in A.W.’s coat pocket before she attended a meeting with Bults and S. Bedal in her office. It was ultimately determined that the phone had in fact been recording. This led to the signing of the Behavioural Contract.
K.W. confronted the above math teacher to confirm that she was lying to him when she said he could not leave the classroom.
24After the December 2023 suspension and for the remainder of grade 9 (the 2023-2024 school year), no further significant disciplinary action was taken against K.W.
25Between December 2024 and April 2025, while K.W. was enrolled in Grade 10, Bults received several emails from teachers reporting further troubling behaviour by K.W. at school. These include emails received detailing K.W.’s conduct on the following dates: December 10, 2024 (robotics teacher – challenging tasks, refusing and avoiding classwork, distracting, speaking rudely and creating tension with fellow students); January 31, 2025 (science teacher – refusing to do work; religious teacher – refusing to do work and being disrespectful); March 4, 2025 (science teacher – refused to write a test until he has an IEP), March 5, 2025 (communication technology teacher – disrespecting and disrupting teacher’s instructions); March 7, 2025 (science teacher – using condescending language to the teacher, and refusing to follow instructions); April 1, 2025 (communication technology teacher – playing video games and disrupting students); and April 2, 2025 (religious teacher – challenging instructions, refused work and to work in pairs; communication technology teacher – disruptive in class, and distracting students).
26Teachers and Bults repeatedly confronted K.W. about the above inappropriate behaviour and routinely advised his guardian, A.W., of these incidents by email or during teacher‑guardian meetings, including on the following dates:
On January 30, 2025, K.W.’s religious studies teacher emailed A.W. advising that K.W. was refusing to complete any work, declining to participate in individual or group activities, and acting disrespectfully toward the teacher.
On March 7, 2025, Bults had “yet another long conversation” with A.W. after school regarding K.W.’s behaviour, following an email from K.W.’s science teacher reporting that K.W. had repeatedly yelled at her in class.
On April 1, 2025, in an email to D. Bedal, Bults indicated that he had a meeting with K.W. and his family today.
On April 2, 2025, communication technology teacher D. Bedal sent an email to A.W., which was copied to Bults. The email stated the following:
On April 1, 2025:
o K.W. brought his laptop to class without permission.
o K.W. played video games in class and then, despite being redirected, did it again and then once again, clearly ignoring Bedal’s instructions.
o K.W. repeatedly disrupted students while they were still working during class, despite redirection by Bedal – although others students were disrupting class as well.
On April 2, 2025:
o K.W. was issued a detention after his 4th late for this course (Communication Technology and Building the Entrepreneurial Mindset)
o K.W. once again brought his laptop without permission.
o K.W. made comments towards peers that were inappropriate.
- On April 2, 2025, K.W.’s religious studies teacher again emailed A.W. She advised that K.W. was challenging her instructions and lessons, creating an unsettling classroom environment, and refusing to complete required work or participate in paired or independent activities.
27On March 5, 2025, a teacher-guardian meeting was held between A.W., the UMEI Learning Support Teacher, Nancy Loewen (“Loewen”) and Bults to discuss initiating an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) for K.W. to accommodate his exceptional needs. That same month, as a substitute to an IEP, Bults prepared a UMEI Student Success Plan.
28On April 1, 2025, Bults met with A.W. and K.W. and both signed the Student Success Plan. The plan sets out additional behavioural expectations and classroom accommodations for K.W., including matters relating to instruction and proximity to teachers. It was to be reviewed monthly to determine whether any adjustments were required.
29Bults later advised K.W.’s communication technology teacher, Derek Bedal (“D. Bedal”), that K.W.’s family wished to receive more frequent communication from his teachers. Bults explained that the request stemmed, in part, from A.W.’s perception that “it seems like he isn’t being corrected in class” – a perception that is contrary to the evidence.
30The above behaviour constituted repeated breaches of his Student Success Plan and policies in the Student Handbook.
31On May 29, 2025, K.W. was involved in a physical altercation with another student. As this conduct constituted an additional breach of the Student Handbook, Bults sent a letter to A.W. advising that, “[c]onsidering that multiple attempts at progressive discipline through conversation have been unsuccessful,” K.W. would be suspended for six days, from Friday, May 30, 2025, to Monday, June 9, 2025.
32At the beginning of the 2025-2026 academic year, as with every year, K.W. signed the Student Handbook. It included school policies for the coming year.
33Before the start of K.W.’s Grade 11 year in September 2025, A.W. provided UMEI with the results from K.W.’s psychological assessment which K.W. participated in over the summer months. Loewen eventually formalized an IEP that was signed by K.W. and A.W.
34The psychological assessment conducted for K.W. determined: that he struggled with non-compliance and socially appropriate standards of behaviour; that his overall intellectual functioning is in an average range; that he possesses strengths with verbal reasoning; and that he struggled with visual memory and visual motor integration skills.
35Starting in October 2025, K.W. was cast as the lead role in the annual Grade 11 Drama performance, for which he also received curricular credit. The Drama performance was scheduled for December 5, 2025.
36However, as a result of several incidents during the first week of December 2025 including failing to memorize his lines for the Drama performance, Bults and K.W.’s drama teacher, Jull Suta (“Suta”) prepared a Drama Performance Agreement. In the Drama Agreement, several expectations were outlined for K.W. to adhere to in preparing for the performance.
37On December 4 and 5, 2025, Bults met with A.W. and K.W. to discuss the Drama Agreement, which they declined to sign. After Bults advised that K.W.’s signature was required for him to participate in the Drama performance, K.W. emailed Bults a photograph of his signature on the final page of the Drama Agreement.
38K.W. participated in the Drama performance on December 5, 2025. However, he did not comply with the expectations set out in the Drama Agreement and was replaced by another student. As a result, Bults telephoned A.W. to advise that K.W. would not be permitted to attend the Drama Performance scheduled for that afternoon.
39In response to a subsequent email from A.W. concerning K.W.’s replacement, Suta explained that the decision was made because K.W. failed to assist his peers with cleanup duties after the performance, arrived an hour and a half late before the production, and instructed his understudy not to attend the performance scheduled for the following day.
40On December 6, 2025, Bults discovered that K.W. had altered the original Drama Agreement by changing the p.m. to a.m. regarding the time during which he would agree to not be on his phone and changing the word from “below” to “above” in a sentence which was drafted to state that he would have to comply with the below listed behavioural expectations. He made these alterations before signing the agreement and sending the photograph of his signature.
41Bults then learned later that this conversation had been recorded and then circulated by K.W. among his classmates through a chat account associated with him.
42Following this incident, and in light of K.W.’s disciplinary history, Bults sought approval from the Board of Directors to impose an indefinite suspension. After receiving unanimous approval, Bults emailed A.W. enclosing a letter advising that, as a result of K.W. sharing the recorded telephone conversation between A.W. and Bults, and “[c]onsidering that multiple attempts at progressive discipline through conversation have been unsuccessful,” K.W. would be suspended indefinitely from UMEI and would not be permitted on school property or to attend any UMEI events while the suspension remained in effect.
43Later that afternoon, A.W. responded by email, advising that she had recorded the telephone conversation – which she noted was legally permitted – and that she, not K.W., had privately shared the recording with several Grade 11 students who had asked what had occurred. She requested clarification regarding which UMEI policy K.W. was alleged to have breached, and how her conduct could justify the suspension imposed on him.
44The following day, on December 7, 2025, Bults replied by email, stating that the suspension had been explained in his earlier letter. Additional email exchanges occurred over the next several days. In an email dated December 9, 2025, A.W. reiterated that she had recorded and disseminated the conversation and again asked which policy the school believed K.W. had violated, whether he was continued to be held responsible, and how long the suspension would remain in effect.
45On December 18, 2025, a teacher-guardian meeting was held between A.W., Loewen, and Bults to discuss three options for K.W. moving forward in relation to his education. K.W. was not permitted by Bults to attend the meeting. The options presented were as follows:
a. Option #1: K.W. finishes Semester 1 on Schoology with his UMEI teachers, but after that, he continues his journey to obtain his Ontario Secondary School Diploma (“OSSD”) through TVO ILC, which they would facilitate by registering and recording his grades. They would use his personal email address to register in these courses.
b. Option #2: K.W. finishes Semester 1 on Schoology with his UMEI teachers, but registers at a different high school for Semester 2.
c. Option #3: K.W. is removed from UMEI effective immediately and will not obtain his Semester 1 credits.
46On January 5, 2026, K.W. sent an email to Bults advising that he was choosing Option #1. A.W. also confirmed with Bults that she wished to proceed with Option #1.
47For Fall Semester 1, K.W. had one remaining exam – his Grade 11 Math exam – which he completed, thereby obtaining all of his credits for that semester.
C. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Position of the Plaintiff
48Counsel for the plaintiff argues that they have satisfied each step of the three-part test in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, (“RJR-MacDonald”) for an interlocutory injunction restraining UMEI from enforcing K.W.’s suspension and/or expulsion.
49First, there is a serious issue to be tried as K.W. was denied natural justice because neither him or his guardian A.W., were provided any opportunity to be heard from, respond to, or otherwise given any advance notice of, the suspension/expulsion.
50Further, K.W. remains suspended or expelled to date. This, the plaintiff submits, has caused K.W. significant distress and irreparable harm. The harm and distress continue as he has been unable to secure an equivalent private educational placement elsewhere. This inability is due to his IEP needs and the various supports and benefits previously provided to him by the defendant school.
51Finally, the plaintiff asserts that on a balance of convenience, the harm to the plaintiff in granting the injunction exceeds any harm to the defendant in not granting it.
Position of the Defendant
52Counsel for the defendant submits that UMEI acted with procedural fairness in imposing an indefinite suspension on K.W. Following multiple verbal discussions, teacher‑guardian meetings, and progressive disciplinary measures, UMEI was entitled to exercise its contractual discretion in accordance with Board‑approved policies. Accordingly, there is not only no serious issue to be tried, but the moving party has also failed to establish a strong prima facie case for success at trial as required by R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 196 (“CBC”).
53The defendant further submits that K.W. will suffer little to no irreparable harm, as alternative avenues remain available for him to complete his OSSD. In any event, any harm to K.W. if the injunction is refused is outweighed by the prejudice to UMEI that would result from the anticipated continuation of his behavioural misconduct should the plaintiff’s motion succeed, and he returns to the school.
54Accordingly, the defendant argues the plaintiff has not met the test for an interlocutory injunction, and the motion should be dismissed.
D. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND ANALYSIS
Statutory framework for injunctive relief
55The court has jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction as the relationship between the parties is governed by contract law.
56Section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, gives the court the discretion to grant an injunction where it is just and convenient to do so. The procedure for seeking an interlocutory injunction is established under r. 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; see also H.Z., v. Upper Canada College, 2022 ONSC 4622, at para. 26 (“Upper Canada College”).
57The broad issue before this court is whether the plaintiff has met the requirements to obtain an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the defendant from enforcing its indefinite suspension of K.W. from UMEI.
58The test for an interlocutory injunction was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R.J.R.-MacDonald. Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the onus of establishing:
a. There is a serious issue to be tried;
b. It will suffer irreparable harm or harm not compensable by an award of damages, if the injunction is not granted; and
c. The balance of convenience favors the moving party, in the sense that the harm to the moving party if the injunction is not granted must exceed the harm to the responding if the injunction is granted.
59This three-part test is conjunctive. If I rule that the plaintiff fails to satisfy even one of the above-mentioned criteria, then their motion for interlocutory relief must be dismissed.
Issue One: Has the plaintiff satisfied the test in RJR-MacDonald?
i. Serious Issue to be Tried/Strong Prima Facie Case
60The plaintiff argues that for the purpose of this hearing for injunctive relief in respect to a private school’s decision to “expel” a student, the issues to be determined for trial are as follows:
a. Whether it was an implied term of the contract between the parties that procedural fairness or principles of natural justice would be used? If so,
b. Whether UMEI failed to use procedural fairness in the events leading up to the indefinite suspension?
61The defendant submits that in CBC, the Supreme Court refined the interlocutory injunction framework by modifying the first stage of the analysis. Rather than asking whether there is a “serious issue to be tried,” the Court held that the proper inquiry is whether the moving party has demonstrated a strong prima facie case that it will succeed at trial on the underlying claim.
62In Upper Canada College, Centa J. explained that where an injunction is sought to preserve the status quo and restrain the defendant from doing something – here, UMIE maintaining K.W.’s indefinite suspension or expulsion – then, as the plaintiff argues, the lower threshold of whether there is a serious issue to be tried applies. Conversely, where the injunction would require the defendant to take a positive step, such as re‑registering the student, then the higher standard applies, requiring the plaintiff to establish a strong prima facie case for success at trial: Upper Canada College, at paras. 28-35.
63Although I am inclined to find that, if it were determined that UMEI failed to comply with the principles of fairness, the purpose of an injunction would be to restrain the defendant from enforcing the indefinite suspension – thereby engaging the lower threshold of a serious issue to be tried, rather than the higher standard of a strong prima facie case – given my ultimate finding on this point, it is unnecessary for me to resolve this issue.
64In Gianfrancesco v. Junior Academy Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 2730, at para. 39 (“Junior Academy”), MacDonald J. held that the rules of procedural fairness can be imported into the realm of disciplinary matters involving private schools by virtue of the contract of instruction that exists between the school and the pupil’s parents: see also D.(C.)(Litigation Guardian of) v. Ridley College, [1996], 140 D.L.R. (4th) 696, at para. 47 (“Ridley College”). However, as noted in Upper Canada College, at para. 97, these rules operate subject to the express terms of the contract – an issue to which I will return below.
65I agree with the plaintiff that the decision to suspend K.W. indefinitely had, by the time of the teacher‑guardian meeting on December 18, 2025 – at the very latest – effectively become a decision to expel him. Expulsion is the most serious consequence for a breach of UMEI’s policies set out in the Student Handbook. Resort to such a measure therefore requires adherence to at least the basic principles of procedural fairness.
66The Supreme Court of Canada in Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165, at para. 79, stated that the principles of natural justice are flexible and depend on circumstances, but necessitate, at minimum, three basic requirements:
i. Notice
ii. Opportunity to make representations, and
iii. An unbiased tribunal.
67The apparent reason for expelling K.W. was that he had shared a recording of a telephone conversation between Bults and his guardian, A.W., with other students. In a letter attached to an email sent that same day, Bults notified K.W. and A.W. of details regarding the incident, the policy breach, and the resulting consequence – an indefinite suspension. In the accompanying email, he informed K.W. and A.W. that he would notify them of the next steps in the process “when necessary”. Bults also explained in the letter that the disciplinary action was based not only on this incident but following multiple unsuccessful prior attempts at progressive discipline.
68Within approximately one hour after receiving the suspension letter, A.W. emailed Bults and advised him on that and other subsequent occasions that K.W. had nothing to do with the incident. In an email dated December 9, 2025, A.W. stated the following:
I want to restate something from our last communication: I was the one who made the recording, and I was the one who sent it. I only used [K.W.]’s phone because I am the owner of that device and pay for its service. With that in mind, I’m having trouble understanding what, if anything, [K.W.] is being held responsible for. I want to be sure there isn’t a misunderstanding about who took and shared the recording, and whether he is still being blamed for an action that was mine.
69However, at no time did Bults provide either A.W. or K.W. with an opportunity to make representations regarding the incident or to offer input on the final decision concerning the potential consequences of his alleged behaviour. Instead, they were excluded from this process before the three options were presented to them at the meeting on December 18, 2025. In fact, it was only through A.W.’s unilateral efforts that Bults even became aware of their version of events – information which, if accepted, would have exonerated K.W.
70This is significant because, despite the multiple previous but unsuccessful attempts at progressive discipline, the recording incident appears to have been the precipitating factor leading to K.W.’s indefinite suspension. Put differently, if K.W. were found to have done nothing wrong in relation to the recording and then sharing of the telephone conversation between Bults and A.W. to other students, then there would presumably have been no basis to suspend him indefinitely at that time.
71An argument could be made that A.W. had ample opportunity to make submissions regarding both the circumstances of the incident and the appropriate disciplinary response, which she did through her emails before the final decision was made, assuming that occurred on December 18, 2025. However, even if it is ultimately determined that Bults had sufficient justification to expel K.W. based on his other prior misconduct – particularly given the extent of the unsuccessful attempts at progressive discipline to that point – some form of hearing should nevertheless have been held to clarify, for example, the nature and scope of the investigation that led Bults to conclude, apparently, that K.W. was responsible for recording and/or sharing the recording with other students.
72In these circumstances, the decision in W.(W.) v. Lakefield College School, 2012 ONSC 577, is instructive. Here, Lauwers J. stated the following at paras. 78-82:
78While the evidence is clear on when Ms. McMahon communicated with the parents and the content of the communication, she did not say whether she actually made the decision to apply the policy and expel the students before or after she heard from the parents.
79In my view it does not matter. No hearing was necessary in the circumstances because there were no facts about the misconduct in dispute. This is unlike Ridley College and Gianfrancesco [Junior College] where those facts were in dispute and where a range of penalties was available. Where there are serious facts in dispute or a range of penalties is available, some form of hearing would be required but that was not true in this instance.
82This is not an issue on which more evidence is necessary and it does not constitute a serious issue to be tried.
73A hearing, for example, could have clarified the basis, among other things, for Bults’ belief that the recording was shared by K.W. through a chat account linked to him, how the drama teacher concluded that this constituted an attempt by K.W. to dissuade classmates from attending the performance, and why none of this information was disclosed to A.W. or K.W. It could also have addressed whether Bults even considered A.W.’s account of the incident before reaching his final decision to expel K.W.
74Unlike the cases of Lakefield and Upper Canada, the present case aligns more closely with the circumstances in Ridley College and Junior Academy, as it involves disputed facts concerning the incident – namely, whether K.W. recorded and/or shared the recording, or whether it was A.W. – and a range of disciplinary options short of expulsion.
75On this latter point, unlike Lakefield and Upper Canada, Bults retained significant discretion in determining the appropriate discipline for K.W., even after considering his prior misconduct. Although the Student Handbook states that UMEI “reserves” the right to expel students in certain circumstances – including under the broadly worded provision relied upon here, namely that “[t]he behaviour involves conduct which is injurious to UMEI’s moral tone… or mental well‑being of others” – the policy framework provides no mandatory or clearly defined consequences for policy breaches and instead emphasizes a model of progressive discipline. By contrast, in Lakefield, Lauwers J. declined to interfere with the summary expulsion of two students who were caught smoking marijuana on campus, noting that the governing drug‑possession policy was mandatory and expressly provided that students who violated it “will be expelled.”
76I find that, as in Lakefield, although UMEI’s Student Handbook outlines an escalating disciplinary regime, the remaining broad discretion it affords the school in imposing sanctions for policy violations gives rise, in the absence of an articulated procedure, to an implied contractual obligation to adhere to basic principles of procedural fairness. Consequently, some form of hearing was required before any final decision was made.
77It appears to me that, given their history, Bults may have taken the incident personally and acted on the sudden by indefinitely suspending – or, more accurately, expelling – K.W. from UMEI, the most severe form of discipline, after learning that his private telephone conversation with A.W. had been recorded and shared without his consent, a practice K.W. had engaged in previously. This decision was made arbitrarily, by someone who was not entirely impartial, and without providing K.W. or A.W. with a proper hearing or meaningful opportunity to be heard, as required by the principles of procedural fairness.
78Again, referring to the Junior Academy case, MacDonald J. stated the following, at para. 43:
A principal must have a large degree of discretion but he/she cannot act arbitrarily, maliciously, unfairly or for some improper purpose. This statement, when combined with the concept that “expulsion must be regarded as the last desperate choice, both for the school and for the child” means that parents must be notified so that they can attend a hearing and “so that the principles of natural justice can be properly applied.” Ms. Johnson's decision was arbitrary. She saw it as a final decision. It is the inherent arbitrariness of the manner in which the decision was made which constitutes a breach of the implied term for procedural fairness in the contract of instruction.
79The fact that Bults sought and obtained unanimous approval from the Board of Directors to institute K.W.’s indefinite suspension – which, under the Student Handbook, indicates an expulsion rather than a suspension – does not render the decision any less arbitrary. This is particularly so given that the sanction remained in place, without a hearing until K.W. was ultimately expelled, notwithstanding the representations A.W. provided through her emails.
80In my view, I am satisfied that the plaintiff established both a serious issue to be tried and, if such a standard is required, a strong prima facie case that the defendant breached an implied term of the contract.
ii. Irreparable Harm
81In RJR-MacDonald, the Supreme Court ruled that “irreparable” refers to the nature of the harm rather than its magnitude. Irreparable harm is harm that cannot be monetarily quantified or that cannot be cured. In other words, the plaintiff must establish that refusing an interlocutory injunction would so adversely affect its interest that the harm cannot be remedied if it is ultimately successful in the trial of the action. To establish irreparable harm, the plaintiff must produce clear, and not speculative evidence, that irreparable harm will follow if an injunction is not granted: Upper Canada College, at para. 106.
82The defendant notes that although Lauwers J. in Lakefield, found that the application in that case satisfied the second stage of the RJR-MacDonald test, he nevertheless dismissed the applicants’ motion on the basis that they had failed to satisfy the first part of the modified test for mandatory injunctions – namely, demonstrating a prima facie case for success at trial. The defendant further relies on the fact that Lauwers J. found irreparable harm largely because the students were in Grade 12 and had been expelled mid‑year from full‑year, rather than semestered, courses, creating uncertainty as to what academic credits, if any, could be salvaged for their university applications.
83The instant case is materially different from Lakefield. K.W. is currently enrolled in Grade 11 and is approximately 15 or 16 months away from graduation. He is also enrolled in semestered courses. UMEI permitted K.W. to complete his first semester, which ended on January 31, 2026, and he apparently received all corresponding credits. He is now only a little over a few weeks into the second semester.
84In addition, K.W. is currently attending school online and has the option of exploring enrollment at several other schools in the area. If he is unable to either enroll elsewhere this semester or continue with his current course load online, he will lose one academic semester in his Grade 11 year. At worst, this may delay his graduation if those courses cannot otherwise be completed prior to the end of Grade 12.
85In Ridley College, Quinn J. emphasized that enforcing natural justice in response to what was, in that case, a single act of misconduct, would not harm the school’s reputation. By contrast, unlike the circumstances in Ridley College and the similarly isolated incidents in Lakefield and Junior Academy, K.W.’s misconduct extends well beyond a single transgression. It consists of repeated acts of troubling and, at times, seriously inappropriate behaviour over a period of approximately two years.
86Reinstating K.W. on the basis that UMEI failed to follow procedural fairness in relation to one relatively minor incident – and then explaining that particular outcome to the student body – would overlook the greater reputational harm that would arise if he were returned, particularly when the cumulative impact of K.W.’s misconduct, also referenced by Bults in the suspension letter, is taken into account. In my view, that history alone may justify his expulsion and should not, when considered in its entirety, negatively affect K.W.’s perception of whether he was treated unfairly or unjustly by UMEI: Upper Canada College, at para. 130. Nor should it undermine the perception of other students, parents, or teachers regarding the fairness of his treatment.
87The plaintiff again relies heavily on Ridley College, in which Quinn J. found that a student’s loss of the opportunity to continue their education at a unique and longstanding independent school – selected specifically for its distinctive academic environment and experiences – constituted irreparable harm, as those benefits could not be replicated elsewhere or compensated by monetary damages. However, I have no direct evidence from K.W. in this area, as he did not swear an affidavit: Upper Canada College, at para. 107. Nor do I have comparable evidence from his guardian A.W. regarding any distinct or irreplaceable benefits that K.W. could obtain only by remaining enrolled at UMEI: Upper Canada College, at para. 115.
88Indeed, the opposite appears to be true. As I explain further below, given K.W.’s considerable needs, he may in fact be better served at a larger school with greater resources and student support, or possibly at an alternative school. It is therefore not at all self-evident that K.W. will suffer irreparable harm if he is not permitted to return to UMEI this semester – and in fact I find that he will not.
iii. Balance of Convenience
89This branch of the test in RJR-MacDonald involves a comparison of the harm to the defendant from granting the injunction and the harm to the plaintiff from refusing to grant the injunction, pending a decision on the merits.
90In RJR-Macdonald, at p. 342, the court stated that the third stage of the test requires an assessment of the balance of convenience, in order to identify the party which would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on the merits.
91I agree with the defendant that granting the injunction would cause greater harm to the teachers and students at UMEI than the harm the plaintiff would experience if the relief were refused. In reaching this conclusion, I reject the plaintiff’s submission that the only burden on UMEI would be to merely permit a long‑standing, fee‑paying student to continue his studies pending a fair determination of the allegations.
92Based on K.W.’s pattern of troubling behaviour over the past two years – conduct that repeatedly contravened UMEI’s Student Handbook, including defiance of teachers, disrespect toward classmates, and disruptions during class time – I am satisfied that his continued presence is not conducive to a healthy or safe learning or teaching environment at that school.
93I accept Bults’ evidence that, as a small private school, UMEI does not have the resources or student supports necessary to manage K.W.’s behavioural issues, which I find to be ongoing and serious, with no indication that they will be effectively managed or mitigated in the foreseeable future. According to Bults, K.W. may require the assistance of a full‑time learning support teacher, and because UMEI lacks the resources to provide one, it may be unable to accommodate his considerable needs.
94I again agree with the defendant that given K.W.’s history, permitting him to return to UMEI would reinforce the belief that his actions carry no consequences, and that the expectations applicable to him – including those set out in the Behaviour Contract, the Student Success and Behaviour Support Plan, the Drama Agreement, the Student Handbook, and the UMEI Discipline Policy – do not, in fact, apply to him. In my view, this would only embolden him to continue the pattern of misconduct he has exhibited over the past two years, albeit with intermittent periods of appropriate behaviour.
95Over a two‑year period, K.W. was suspended on two occasions and was the subject of several teacher‑guardian meetings involving A.W. as well as additional contact with Bults and various teachers, all of which proved unsuccessful in addressing his behaviour. In the week or so preceding the alleged distribution of the telephone recording, K.W. engaged in multiple acts of misconduct, including: (1) being in unauthorized possession of a robotics zone key; (2) defying his drama teacher by refusing to assist fellow students with rehearsals and failing to memorize his lines; (3) directing profanities toward his robotics teacher; (4) pulling a knife from his pocket in front of fellow students and a teacher; (5) arriving one and one‑half hours late for the Drama Production; (6) failing to assist with cleanup after the performance, contrary to the Drama Agreement; (7) instructing his understudy not to attend the next day’s Drama Performance; and (8) secretly and deceptively altering the Drama Agreement before signing same.
96I find that, notwithstanding the insufficient evidence before me regarding K.W.’s culpability in relation to the recording incident, the overwhelming evidence of his involvement in other misconduct – combined with repeated, unsuccessful attempts at progressive discipline – supports, in my view, the conclusion that the harm to UMEI’s learning environment if K.W. were reinstated pursuant to an injunction outweighs any harm he would experience if the expulsion remains in effect pending a decision on the merits.
E. CONCLUSION
97I have concluded that, although the plaintiff has demonstrated a serious issue to be tried –or, alternatively, a strong prima facie case at trial – with respect to the alleged breach of contract, K.W. has not established that he will suffer irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.
98Accordingly, in light of these findings, I conclude that the interests of justice do not require an interlocutory injunction in the circumstances.
99The plaintiff’s motion is therefore dismissed.
F. ORDER
100After considering the balance of the plaintiff’s requested relief, I have determined – given the plaintiff’s youthful age and disabilities – to grant the following orders in accordance with the authority set out in Ridley College, at para. 50 and Lakefield, at para. 32:
a. The title of the within proceedings shall be amended so as to identify the plaintiffs by their initials.
b. In these proceedings all further written reference to the plaintiffs shall be by means of their initials.
c. A publication ban remains in effect and access to the court file shall be restricted to the solicitors of record and their agents.
101The remainder of the plaintiff’s relief, including the interlocutory injunction, is hereby dismissed.
G. COSTS
102I find that, although the plaintiff’s motion is ultimately dismissed, the plaintiff succeeded in demonstrating a breach of the principles of procedural fairness. The result is therefore mixed, and no costs order will issue.
Brian D. Dubé
Justice
Released: February 24, 2026