CITATION: R. v. Ahmed, 2026 ONSC 1125

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-10000026-00AP

DATE: 20260226

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT

BETWEEN:

Jakaria Ahmed Appellant

– and –

His Majesty the King Respondent

Alamgir Hussein, for the Appellant

Jason Balgopal, for the Respondent

HEARD: February 12, 2026 (by videoconference)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL

NISHIKAWA J.

Overview

1On November 30, 2022, the Appellant, Jakaria Ahmed, was convicted by Borenstein J. of the Ontario Court of Justice (the “trial judge”) for assault causing bodily harm, contrary to s. 267(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the “Code”). The trial judge found Mr. Ahmed not guilty of a second count of uttering threats. On January 18, 2024, Mr. Ahmed was sentenced to a conditional sentence of six months and a term of probation of 18 months. Mr. Ahmed appeals both conviction and sentence.

2Mr. Ahmed appeals on the following grounds:

(a) the verdict is unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence;

(b) the trial judge erred in law;¹

(c) the conviction constitutes a miscarriage of justice; and

(d) the trial judge committed errors in principle in respect of sentence, misapprehended the evidence, imposed a sentence that is demonstrably unfit, and failed to consider collateral immigration consequences.

3I dismissed the appeal at the hearing of the appeal, with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

The Trial Decision

4In his oral reasons, the trial judge found as follows. In January 2021, the appellant was living in a rooming house where the complainant, Goutam Nilay, was also a resident. There were five or six other individuals living there. The complainant believed that the appellant was taking things from his room. On January 9, 2021, the complainant told the appellant that he would tell their landlady about it. The appellant told him not to, but the complainant nonetheless did so.

5On January 11, 2021, the complainant went to a room on the second floor of the house where the appellant, another resident who was known by the names Waseem, Sam and Jaffrey (“Waseem”) and a few other residents referred to as the “international students” were present. The trial judge found that in that room, the appellant assaulted the complainant, resulting in the complainant’s broken arm.

6The complainant then called 911. He later went to the hospital and was given painkillers but left before getting X-rays. The complainant moved out of his room the next day. The trial judge found that the complainant left the house because he feared for his safety.

7The trial judge completely rejected the appellant’s evidence that he was not in the room at the time of the assault. The trial judge found that the complainant’s evidence about who was present during the assault was corroborated by the appellant’s evidence that just before the police arrived, he was in a room on the second floor with Waseem and the international students. In addition, another resident, Tarek Anam Chami, testified that he came out of his room on the second floor after hearing a noise that sounded like something falling, and saw the appellant, Waseem and the international students in a room, minutes before the police arrived. He did not see the complainant. The trial judge “completely reject[ed] Ahmed’s evidence that he was not there and that somehow [the complainant] was assaulted in another room on the second floor with an identical cast of supporting characters, namely Waseem and the international students.”

8The trial judge found that the appellant assaulted the complainant because he was angry at him for calling the landlady. The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence that the appellant told him that the call had humiliated him and that he was going to teach the complainant a lesson.

9On the second count, the trial judge further found that the threat “most likely happened” but was left with a reasonable doubt because, based on the complainant’s testimony, the nature of the words spoken was unclear.

The Parties’ Positions

10The appellant argues that the verdict is unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence because the medical evidence did not support a finding that the complainant suffered a serious injury. In addition, the appellant argues that the trial judge failed to consider evidence of a second “assailant” who was present and committed the assault.

11On sentence, the appellant argues that based on the above alleged misapprehensions of evidence, the sentence imposed is demonstrably unfit. The appellant further argues that the trial judge made an error in principle by failing to take into consideration the immigration consequences of the sentence.

12The Crown submits that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and that the verdict is reasonable. The Crown further submits that the trial judge considered all the relevant factors, including the potential immigration consequences, and that the sentence is appropriate.

Analysis

Did the Trial Judge Misapprehend the Evidence?

The Applicable Principles

13An unreasonable verdict is one that no properly instructed trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably render: R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 9.

14A misapprehension of evidence is a failure to consider evidence relevant to a material issue, a mistake concerning the substance of the evidence, or a failure to give proper effect to the evidence. A claim of misapprehension of evidence is subject to a stringent standard. The error must be “readily obvious”, “real rather than speculative”, and plain in the reasons: R. v. B.B., 2025 ONCA 318, at para. 4 (citation omitted), aff’d 2026 SCC 1.

15To warrant appellate intervention, the misapprehension must be material rather than peripheral to the reasoning of the trial judge. It must play an essential role in the reasoning process: B.B., at para. 4. A mere misstatement or inaccuracy in the trial judge’s treatment of the evidence does not constitute reversible error: R. v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 732, at paras. 1-2.

16An appellate court considering misapprehension of evidence as a ground of appeal should not “dissect, parse, or microscopically examine the reasons of a trial judge”: Abella J. in R. v. C.L.Y., 2008 SCC 2, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 5, at para. 11. The reviewing court engages in the following two-step analysis: (i) did the trial judge misapprehend the evidence on a matter of substance; and (ii) if the misapprehension was substantive and material, did it play an essential or central part in the reasoning process of the trial judge leading to conviction: Lohrer, at para. 2.

The Principles Applied

17The appellant argues that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by finding that the complainant suffered a serious injury. The appellant submits that the X-ray report that was admitted in evidence states that the complainant did not suffer an acute fracture.

18At trial, the evidence before the trial judge included the complainant’s testimony and medical documentation. The complainant testified that the appellant punched him multiple times and then broke his arm by twisting it until it was broken. The complainant testified that he heard and felt a crack. The complainant went to the hospital that night. Because of the large number of people waiting in the emergency room, he left the hospital and later went to his family doctor, who made a referral for an X-ray. He later went to a fracture clinic.

19The relevant portion of the X-ray report states: “Findings support a nonacute remote nonunited avulsion fracture of the medial humeral epicondyle at the common flexor/pronator origin. No evidence of an acute fracture is detected.” At trial, the X-ray report was admitted into evidence on the parties’ consent. No expert evidence was called. At trial, the appellant’s trial counsel admitted that the complainant suffered a broken arm but argued that the appellant did not assault the complainant. The complainant was not cross-examined on the extent of his injury, nor was the statement in the X-ray report regarding the absence of an acute fracture ever put to him.

20The appellant now seizes on notation about the absence of an “acute fracture” to argue that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence. The appellant also takes issue, for the first time on appeal, with the complainant’s decision to leave the hospital before obtaining an X-ray.

21In my view, the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence. There was ample evidence before the trial judge to find that the appellant suffered a serious injury as a result of the assault. Moreover, at trial, the defence made no attempt to challenge this evidence. Having made this strategic choice at trial, it is not now open to the appellant to argue the contrary.

22At the appeal hearing, in response to questions as to why the issue about the seriousness of the injury was not raised at trial, the appellant’s counsel argued that Mr. Ahmed was not properly represented at trial. However, the notice of appeal does not raise ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground of appeal. Nor has the appellant taken other steps that would be customary when ineffective assistance of counsel is raised, such as notifying trial counsel or providing a waiver of privilege. In addition, although the appellant has included an affidavit in his appeal book, no motion to adduce fresh evidence was brought. In any event, in his affidavit, the appellant states only that he had a lawyer through Legal Aid because he could not afford a lawyer. He does not state that he was dissatisfied with his legal representation at trial or otherwise raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.

23Similarly, the appellant argues that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by disregarding evidence of a second “assailant”. In support of this argument, the appellant relies on a note regarding an unknown person in the police synopsis. There are a number of problems with this argument. First, the police synopsis was not in evidence before the trial judge. The trial judge rightly did not consider, and could not have considered, a record that was not properly admitted into evidence. The appellant now submits that all of the Crown disclosure ought to have been in evidence at trial. However, the appellant was not able to articulate a basis on which the police synopsis or other documents in the Crown disclosure should have been admitted into evidence.

24Moreover, the appellant did not bring a motion for fresh evidence on appeal. In any event, the appellant would not have satisfied the Palmer test to adduce fresh evidence. The proposed fresh evidence that the appellant seeks to have this court consider is the “disclosure package” or more specifically, the police synopsis. The police synopsis was available to the appellant and, by due diligence, the defence could have sought to adduce it at trial. It is unclear on what basis the synopsis, which is simply a summary prepared by police and contains hearsay and, potentially, prior consistent statements, would have been admissible. In any event, the police synopsis could not be expected to have affected the result.

25Second, the police synopsis makes no mention of a second “assailant” as the appellant submits. It mentions only that an unknown male was present during the assault. The trial judge clearly found that other individuals, Waseem and the international students, were present during the assault. The presence of other individuals does not undermine the trial judge’s finding that the appellant committed the assault.

26Third, the complainant testified that the appellant’s friend, whom he knew as Jaffrey or Sam (Waseem) was there, but that this individual did not hit him. The appellant’s trial counsel never put to the complainant that another unknown person assaulted him. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahmed was not a credible witness and rejected his testimony. By contrast, he found the complainant credible and reliable, despite a couple of peripheral facts that he did not remember, and that his evidence that only the appellant assaulted him was consistent. The trial judge addressed, and completely rejected, the suggestion that someone else in the room committed the assault.

27Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence or that any misapprehension related to a matter of substance.

Was the Verdict Reasonable?

The Applicable Principles

28A reasonable verdict is one that a properly instructed judge or jury could reasonably have rendered: R. v. Binaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at paras. 36-37. In rare cases, a verdict can also be found unreasonable where the trial judge made a finding of fact or drew an inference essential to the verdict that is: (i) plainly contradicted by the evidence relied upon by the judge for that inference or finding, or (ii) shown to be incompatible with evidence that has not been contradicted or rejected: Sinclair, at paras. 4, 16, 19-22, 44-45.

29An appellate court must read the reasons as a whole and should not dissect, parse, or microscopically examine the reasons of a trial judge. A difference of opinion is insufficient to overturn a conviction, especially where the conviction is supported by a well-reasoned decision: R. v. C.R., 2010 ONCA 176, 260 O.A.C. 52, at para. 31.

30The question of whether a verdict is reasonable is one of law, whereas the credibility of a witness is a question of fact: R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 10. A reviewing court must afford due deference to factual findings made by the trial judge, who heard the evidence. They are reviewable on a standard of palpable and overriding error: R. v. Clark, 2005 SCC 2, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 6, at para. 9.

The Principles Applied

31Based on my findings above that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the verdict is one that no properly instructed judge or jury could have rendered. The appellant has not shown that the trial judge made a finding of fact or drew an inference essential to the verdict that is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied upon by the judge for that inference or finding or incompatible with evidence that has not been contradicted or rejected.

32The verdict is well-supported by the evidence and well within the bounds of reasonableness.

Did the Trial Judge Err in Sentencing?

The Applicable Principles

33The standard of review on a sentence appeal is highly deferential. Appellate intervention is permitted only where there is an error in principle that had an impact on sentencing, or the sentence is demonstrably unfit: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 11, 42-44.

Application

34The appellant relies on the misapprehensions of evidence addressed earlier in these reasons to argue that the sentence imposed was demonstrably unfit. Based on my finding that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, the sentence is not manifestly unfit.

35Further, I reject the appellant’s argument that in determining the appropriate sentence the trial judge erred in failing to take into consideration relevant factors such as the appellant’s remorse and lack of a criminal record. The trial judge recognized that the appellant expressed empathy toward the complainant for his injury but maintained that he did not do it. The trial judge did not err in finding that empathy was not remorse. In addition, the trial judge did not treat the complainant’s pre-existing bone condition as an aggravating factor, as the appellant argues.

36The appellant argues that the sentence is a substantial and marked departure from sentences customarily imposed for similarly situated offenders committing similar crimes but has not provided any authorities to support that the sentence is disproportionate to the offence or to sentences in similar cases. The appellant also argues that the trial judge failed to take into consideration the collateral consequences of the sentence, specifically, the immigration consequences on the appellant.

37The record belies this argument. At the sentencing hearing on December 15, 2022, the appellant’s trial counsel sought a lengthy adjournment to ensure that the appellant could take the oath of citizenship. The trial judge granted repeated adjournments over a lengthy period of time to allow the appellant to do so. The appellant was not sentenced until over a year later, on January 18, 2024.

38In his reasons for sentencing, the trial judge states that the conviction will prevent the appellant from automatically becoming a Canadian citizen and will require him to prove his entitlement to become a citizen. Not only did the trial judge consider the impact of the sentence on the appellant’s citizenship application, he went out of his way to ensure that the appellant had sufficient time to on his citizenship before being sentenced. The trial judge was not required to continue to adjourn the matter until that occurred.

Conclusion

39Based on the foregoing analysis, the trial judge did not materially misapprehend the evidence and the verdict is amply supported by the totality of the evidence. The trial judge did not impose a sentence that was demonstrably unfit or make an error in principle by failing to take into consideration the immigration consequences of the sentence.

40Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Nishikawa J.

Footnotes

1. 1The error of law was not identified.