CITATION: Lecker v. Lecker, 2026 ONSC 1051

COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-21517-0000

DATE: 20260219

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

RENNIE LECKER

Applicant

– and –

BRAM A. LECKER

Respondent

Barry Nussbaum / Ari Rubin, for the Applicant

Nancy Iadeluca, for the Respondent

HEARD: January 13 – 22, 27-30 and February 27, 2025

Hood J.

1The parties married in August 1984. They separated on October 21, 2020, after 36 years of marriage. At the time of separation the applicant was 63 and the respondent 62 and they had three children who were all adults aged 34, 30 and 27. At the time of trial, the applicant was 67 years old and the respondent was 66.

2The applicant asked the respondent to leave the matrimonial home on October 21, 2020 when she discovered the respondent was having an extramarital affair. While there was some argument over whether I should hear any evidence concerning why the parties separated, the reason for it has played no part in my decision making. The only relevant evidence is the date of separation.

3Both parties worked throughout their marriage. The applicant was a social worker and initially worked at the York Regional Children’s Aid Society. In 2000 she became employed as a youth and adolescent counselor at a hospital. When each of the children were born, the applicant took a six-month maternity leave. The respondent is a lawyer and initially during their marriage worked at the Better Business Bureau as an employee. Approximately two to three years after their marriage the respondent started his own practice, doing everything except family and criminal law. Eventually in the early 1990’s, he began to specialize in employment law and established his own firm. He operated as Lecker and Associates. The law firm was eventually incorporated as Leckerslaw Professional Corporation (LPC) on March 19, 2013. Other corporate entities that will be referred to in these reasons are Bram A. Lecker Professional Corporation (BALCP), which was incorporated on April 17, 2003. BALPC is now a personal services corporation through which the respondent bills LPC for services he provides to LPC. There was an issue as to whether BALPC pays the salaries and wages of the lawyers and other employees of LPC or just the staff and not the lawyers, but this issue was not relevant to what I had to decide. The other relevant corporation is Leckerslaw Holdings (2016) Ltd. (LH). It was incorporated on November 17, 2016 and is a holding company which holds real estate comprising of the office out of which Lecker and Associates operates.

4According to the applicant this was a very traditional marriage. While the respondent did do yard work and looked after the outside of their various homes, the applicant basically ran the household and had the primary care of the three children. While in the early years of their marriage she contributed to the family finances, eventually, the respondent paid for everything related to the home and the family and any salary she earned was hers alone to spend on what she wanted. The only exception was that she paid for the dog walker and the cleaning lady from her salary until two years before separation.

5While there were some differences between the parties as to the extent of the applicant’s contribution to the family’s finances, they were not material to the issues and whether the applicant was entitled to support. Clearly, the respondent earned substantially more than the applicant and he was the one in control of the family’s finances. As to the family dynamic, the respondent acknowledged that the applicant was the primary caregiver with respect to the children. As he put it, he assisted. In the early years he worked long hours, often 16 hours per day, leaving early in the morning. He tried to keep his weekends free for the children. The parties also had a nanny when the children were younger until their youngest child went to Senior Kindergarten in 1998.

6While the family had the assistance of a nanny for a number of years, this does not take away from the fact that the applicant was the primary caregiver to the children. The respondent acknowledged this to be the case.

7The applicant testified and was not challenged that the respondent made all of the financial decisions in the family and for the family. 102 Carmichael Avenue, their home at the time of separation, was what she believed to be the eighth home that the family had lived in. The respondent had made all of the financial decisions concerning this property, just like all of the other previous homes, and had handled all of the real estate issues with respect to it as he had with all of the other properties. After it was purchased, he looked after all of the payments relating to it.

8The applicant had no idea of the size of the mortgage or the amount of the mortgage payments. She had no idea of the amount or frequency of the utility payments or the insurance payments or the taxes. It was only after they had separated and she continued to live in the matrimonial home and had to start paying the bills herself that she had any idea of the expenses associated with the home.

9She testified, and again was not seriously challenged, that she discovered what the expenses were when the mail arrived. This included discovering that the home taxes and water and waste accounts with the City were in arrears and that the cottage taxes were also in arrears.

10In addition to controlling all of the family finances the respondent also paid for all of the children’s education following high school.

11The parties went on multiple vacations every year. The applicant testified that typically they took one trip to Mexico or the Caribbean every year along with a lengthy vacation elsewhere in the world, such as to the United Kingdom, Italy, Vietnam, Switzerland or Thailand. The respondent agreed that they took two to three trips every year but was of the view that they were not luxurious, rather being modest vacations. However they may be described, since separation the applicant has not taken any trips, being unable to afford them.

12While the respondent did not want to agree with the applicant that they drove luxury cars, preferring to describe them as “nice”, to most people a Jaguar SUV and a Tesla, which were the family cars at the time of separation, would be considered luxurious as opposed to nice.

13The respondent in his testimony tried to downplay the parties’ lifestyle. To him they lived modestly but comfortably. In my view the respondent’s assessment of their lifestyle as being modest was far from realistic.

14The applicant worked full-time until she turned 60 in 2017. At that time, she began to work part-time three days a week. With her pension she earned close to what she had earned on a full-time basis. She testified that the respondent was not opposed to this as it allowed her to spend more time with their first grandchild and allowed them extended weekends at the cottage in order to avoid the traffic on Fridays and Sundays.

15She retired from her part-time work when she turned 65 years old in 2022. She felt that she had to retire at 65 as the adolescent children that she mostly worked with no longer accepted her, making her job difficult. While the respondent ultimately argued that the applicant should not have retired and should have continued to work, in support of his argument that any support should be reduced, he did not seriously challenge her evidence that she had no choice and had to retire at 65.

16The issues as presented to me were equalization, which included multiple disagreements over what was included and their values along with the value of the respondent’s corporate interests, spousal support, which included determining the respondent’s income, occupation rent, and post-separation adjustments. The parties are in agreement as to what the respondent has paid in spousal support since separation to December 2024. They disagree over whether this is the correct amount.

17The matrimonial home was listed for sale in November 2024 and sold for $3,213,840 with a closing in April 2025.

18On January 17, 2022 a consent order was made providing that the respondent pay spousal support commencing on October 1, 2021 in the amount of $9,844 per month. There was no evidence as to how this figure was determined and the order was silent on it. On June 10, 2022 a further consent order was made providing that the respondent pay spousal support commencing May 1, 2022 in the amount of $17,000 per month based upon an imputed income for the respondent of $550,000 and $80,000 for the applicant. The respondent has continued to pay this amount.

Equalization Issues

19The parties had a multitude of equalization issues. The applicant argues that she is entitled to an equalization payment of $1,626,295, whereas the respondent argues that she is entitled to $438,765, which is then subject to a number of credits for a net payment of $365,593.

20These numbers differ from the equalization payments on the applicant’s NFP Statement and the respondent’s NFP Statement. It was never really made clear to me why this was so as the NFP Statements were both sworn just before trial. The differences between the parties were somewhat of a moving target, not only during the course of the trial but also during closing submissions and it was difficult to follow what were the real valuation issues between the parties. I have not calculated what the equalization payment from the respondent to the applicant is. I leave that to the parties to resolve based upon the decisions made by me. I have also not addressed every apparent difference between the parties. I have only addressed those that were argued before me where there was evidence provided of value.

21The same was true as to the post-separation adjustments. The evidence from both parties was minimal and the positions of the parties on each other’s positions were practically non-existent. It was never made clear to me which post-separation adjustments were in issue and which ones were agreed to. Nor was there any explanation as to how the applicant arrived at a total adjustment of $7,882 from the expenses incurred by her after separation. It was also unclear whether the parties were in agreement over the $21,000 and whether the “consent” which the applicant referred to, whereby she acknowledged that she owed an additional $21,000, was the same as the $21,000 that the respondent said he was entitled to pursuant to the October 20, 2022 order of Sharma J.

22Other than the question over the $21,000 and whether it has been in effect counted twice, I accept both parties’ claimed adjustments as neither party seemed to challenge the other in relation to them. I leave it to the parties to sort this issue out and strongly suggest that they do so through counsel. If they are unable to do so, I will have to hold a further hearing on this issue, which I likely will not be able to do for some time. The nature of and the scheduling of the hearing can be the subject of a conference call or a zoom hearing in order to discuss and make the appropriate arrangements, if the parties are unable to reach agreement.

23This also applies to the amount of the equalization payment from the respondent to the applicant. If the parties are unable to arrive upon an agreed payment, I expect that a further hearing will have to be held.

Sculpture

24The sculpture was valued at $5,000. The applicant in her evidence says that the respondent’s movers inadvertently took the sculpture from the matrimonial home and that she had an agreement with the respondent that the sculpture was to be returned to her, or the respondent was to pay her $5,000. In cross-examination she acknowledged that she was agreeable with either result. The respondent advised that he did not want the sculpture. Accordingly, the respondent is to return the sculpture to the applicant within 30 days of the release of these reasons, unless he has already done so, and the $5,000 is to form no part of the equalization between the parties.

Scarab Boat

25The respondent bought the applicant’s share of the family cottage. At the cottage was a boat. It has been valued at $25,000. The applicant argues that the boat was not part of the purchase price and since the respondent still has it in his possession it should be included as part of the respondent’s net family property. The respondent argues that it was part of the purchase price.

26The applicant’s half interest in the cottage was bought pursuant to an agreement of purchase and sale dated December 13, 2022 for $550,000. The agreement provides in paragraph 4 that “All chattels, as is condition, located at the property on the date of completion are included in the purchase price.” The completion date was set out as being December 19, 2022. The agreement further provides that the Court Order, Endorsements, and Minutes of Settlement attached as Schedule A were to form part of the Agreement.

27The applicant’s evidence was the boat was stored at a marina, and since it was a chattel, it did not come within paragraph 4 as being part of the purchase price, not being on the property at the date of completion. She thought that the respondent was disputing that it was a chattel in order to avoid paragraph 4.

28The respondent’s evidence was to the contrary. He acknowledged that it was a chattel but testified that while at one time they had stored the boat offsite, or as he put it “around the corner”, they had subsequently built an enclosure on the property, and it was stored in it along with the other watercraft.

29The third appraisal, which valued the cottage at $1.1 million and upon which the respondent’s purchase price of $550,000 was based, and which may have assisted in determining whether the boat was included in the purchase price, was not put into evidence before me.

30I find that the boat was included in the purchase price. The applicant was the one wanting to include the boat in the equalization analysis. Accordingly, the onus was on her to prove this. She called no reply evidence to challenge the respondent’s assertion that the boat was located on the cottage property and in my view did not meet her onus.

98 Lillian Street

31This is a condominium property purchased in May 2017 and sold in August 2022 by the respondent and the parties’ son Jared. When purchased, title was held 99% by Jared and 1% by the respondent.

32When sold, the net proceeds of sale, as set out on the Trust Ledger Statement, indicated that $311,691 was paid to LPC. This was acknowledged by the respondent. The applicant argues that this amount should be included in the respondent’s net family property as it was paid to his law firm. The respondent argues that only $67,000 of this amount should form part of his net family property.

33It was the respondent’s argument that 98 Lillian was bought for $367,000, that $300,000 of this was financed, with a mortgage as security and that the balance of $67,000, was a deposit paid by him. When it was sold for $620,000 in August 2022 a portion of the $311,691, which was paid to LPC, was then used to allow the parties’ son Jared to buy another property at 8 Eglinton Avenue East for $820,000. The respondent testified that from the $311,691 paid to LPC he received $67,000, being the return of the deposit paid by him, and that the balance of the funds, $244,691 was paid to Jared.

34None of this was supported by any documentation from the respondent, other than the Trust Ledger Statement that was put into evidence by the respondent, which showed that the net proceeds of sale did in fact amount to $311,691 and were paid to LPC.

35There was no documentation relating to the purchase of 98 Lillian to show that $67,000 came from the respondent. There was no documentation to show that the $67,000 was paid to the respondent or that the $244,691 somehow went to Jared. The respondent put the transfer to Jared of 8 Eglinton Avenue East into evidence, which is a document he presumably obtained from Jared, but nothing more. It should have been easy for the respondent to show that he initially put $67,000 into the purchase of 98 Lillian and that he received this back when 98 Lillian was sold. What was produced shows that $311,691 from the sale went to his law firm.

36However, the sale of 98 Lillian took place in August 2022, almost two years after the date of separation. The money that may or may not have been received by the respondent in 2022 is not, in my view, relevant to the issue of equalization. As ultimately argued by the respondent, there was no claim made by the applicant that she had an ownership interest in 98 Lillian or that the respondent’s interest in 98 Lillian amounted to more than 1% and that somehow there was a value for 98 Lillian that should have been attributed to the respondent on the date of separation.

37The respondent took the position that he was owed $67,000 with respect to 98 Lillian on the date of separation. While there was a suggestion made by the applicant that what the respondent and Jared paid for 98 Lillian was more than $367,000, which would imply that additional funds must have come from the respondent, and that he was actually owed more than $67,000, there was insufficient evidence from the applicant on this. Moreover, she never changed the amount of her claim with respect to 98 Lillian to claim this different amount and insisted that she was entitled to the entire amount paid to LPC two years after separation. I find that $67,000 is the value to be used with respect to 98 Lillian.

Respondent’s Inheritance

38This was one of the issues that has seemingly been a point of difference throughout this proceeding.

39The issue had to do with an investment property held by the respondent located at 27 Bathurst Street, Unit 1506.

40In late 2018 the respondent’s mother passed away. In June 2019, the respondent received $283,301 from her estate. In October 2019, he received a further $436,578. The applicant in her evidence acknowledged she had no discussion with him as to what he intended to do with his inheritance.

41The respondent, during his marriage to the applicant, made numerous real estate investments in pre-construction condominiums and in March 2016 he entered into an agreement to purchase a condominium at 27 Bathurst Street.

42The closing did not take place until March 2020. The purchase price was $442,860 and in order to close the transaction, the respondent was required to make a further $394,998 payment as set out in the statement of adjustments. The respondent transferred $399,880 from the joint Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) registered on the matrimonial home on March 4, 2020 for this payment.

43The property at 27 Bathurst Street was then sold in November 2020 for $706,000. The net proceeds of sale according to the trust reconciliation amounted to $670,346. Having just separated on October 21, 2020 both parties agree that this is the amount to include in the NFP Statements as being owned by the respondent as at the date of separation. Where the parties differ is whether the respondent is entitled to exclude $603,000 from this amount as being an inheritance from his mother’s estate. The figure of $603,000 is used as being 90% of the initial purchase price for this property that came from the HELOC. The applicant does not take any issue with the calculation of the amount of exclusion. She takes issue with whether the respondent is entitled to any exclusion at all.

44When the respondent received his inheritances from his mother’s estate, he did not put them into a separate or segregated account. In July 2019 he transferred $290,000 from his estate account into the joint HELOC and on October 2019 he transferred $379,171 from his estate account into the joint HELOC.

45The opening balance of the HELOC in July 2019 was approximately $587,000. Over the month of July 2019, there were other payments towards the HELOC and other withdrawals and the HELOC had a closing balance for the month of approximately $337,000.

46The closing balance for August 2019 was approximately $352,000, for September 2019 it was approximately $380,000, and for October 2019 it was approximately $1,300 due to the large transfer from the respondent’s estate account. By March 2020 the HELOC had an opening balance of approximately $64,000 and a closing balance of approximately $539,000 due to the purchase of the 27 Bathurst Street condominium.

47The respondent argues that his excluded inheritance can be traced into the Bathurst property so that the Bathurst property itself should not form part of the NFP equalization process. The applicant argues that by paying down the HELOC the respondent was paying down debt and that by doing so the inheritance can no longer be traced, despite the fact that the HELOC was used in purchasing the Bathurst property.

48I agree with the applicant. The inheritance was used by the respondent to pay down debt. He acknowledged this in his own evidence saying that he did this to avoid the interest charges associated with the HELOC. In Booth v. Booth (2003), 40 R.F.L. (5th) 22 (Ont. S.C.) at para. 36, the court found that paying down a line of credit was the equivalent of paying a debt, and that the right to trace money was lost. In Ludmer v. Ludmer, 2013 ONSC 784, 33 R.F.L. (7th) 331 at para. 86 the court held that tracing may reach its limit when an asset is used to pay down debt such that the original trust property can no longer be discerned. That is what happened here.

49In paying debt the asset used to do so effectively disappears as it has been passed onto the creditor. The asset itself no longer exists and can no longer be traced. If the respondent’s position was to be followed then there would never be a situation where funds could not be traced. Here, when the respondent utilized the HELOC to purchase the Bathurst property the funds that were being used were coming from bank funds, not from a segregated account where the inheritance had been placed.

50Accordingly, there is no exclusion of the $603,000 by the respondent and the amount that he has to pay for equalization purposes is increased by this amount.

Applicant’s LIRA and RRSP

51For some reason these remained as issues between the parties. The applicant used a figure of $113,585 for her Locked-in Retirement Account (LIRA), whereas the respondent used a figure of $116,637. For her Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), the applicant used a figure of $225,769 and the respondent used a figure of $232,344.

52Based upon the BMO Portfolio Report for the applicant, the figures used by the respondent for the applicant’s LIRA and RRSP are the proper figures, being the values for each as at October 21, 2020 as set out in the Portfolio Report.

Respondent’s RRSP

53For this the applicant used a figure of $27,920 whereas the respondent used a figure of $21,000. The respondent produced one document, which was a compilation of two statements in relation to the valuation of his RRSP. The portion of the statement for March 31, 2020 showed a value at that date of $27,921, the portion of the year end statement for December 31, 2021 showed the market value as at January 1, 2021 as $17,586. The respondent then argued that assuming an evenly declining asset a value of $21,000 should be picked as the value as it was on October 21, 2020.

54In my view the respondent’s argument is based upon an unwarranted assumption that the RRSP declined on a straight line from March 31, 2020 to January 1, 2021. There was no need for this assumption. The respondent had the ability to provide the account statement for October 30, 2020 but did not do so. The last actual monthly statement showing a value is the same one of March 31, 2020 showing a value of $27,921. That is the value for the respondent’s RRSP with B2B Bank as it was on October 21, 2020.

Taxes Owing by Respondent to CRA

55In her closing submissions the applicant acknowledged that, in terms of the respondent’s claimed debts, the only contested figure was the respondent’s claimed tax debt.

56The applicant says this should be $93,000 according to her NFP Statement and the respondent says this should be $100,207 according to his NFP Statement.

57The respondent filed his 2020 Notice of Assessment. It showed that his 2020 tax liability amounted to $122,327. The respondent has prorated this amount to the date of separation to arrive at his figure. The applicant gave no explanation in her evidence as to how her figure was calculated and no explanation was given in argument, other than that the respondent’s figure was not owed on the date of separation and it was his onus to prove the amount claimed. The applicant never explained in argument how the respondent could calculate the exact amount of taxes owing on October 21, 2020. Prorating his 2020 assessed tax liability is a reasonable approach and no other or better approach was offered by the applicant. The respondent’s figure of $100,207 is to be used.

The Respondent’s Corporate Interests

58As mentioned previously there are three corporations which the respondent had an interest in: LPC, BALPC, and LH. All are related to the respondent’s practice as a lawyer. Mr. Paul Mandel valued the respondent’s interests in LPC and LH on behalf of the applicant in his report of October 31, 2023. Mr. Matthew Krofchick valued the respondent’s interest in LPC, BALPC, and LH on behalf of the respondent in his report of April 2, 2022. Both Mr. Mandel and Mr. Krofchick were accepted by me, on the agreement of the parties and after hearing evidence on their qualifications and expertise, as experts in the subject of business valuation.

LPC

59At the date of separation the respondent held 65% of the common shares of LPC. Mr. Krofchick valued the respondent’s 65% interest in LPC at $1,270,200 as being the midpoint between his high and low valuations. Mr. Mandel valued the respondent’s 65% interest in LPC at a high of $1,617,200 and a low of $1,573,000. The applicant used the high valuation in her NFP Statement.

60Where the valuations differed was whether an amount should be added to represent the amount in LPC’s trust account as at the date of separation of October 21, 2020. According to Mr. Mandel the trust balance as at October 26, 2020 was $1,645,435. After determining the amount of fees in this amount, less a percentage for disbursements, less HST and taxes and applying a “timing discount” Mr. Mandel determined that the value of LPC’s undistributed trust billings was $486,104. This was basically the difference between the two valuations, as Mr. Krofchick had no figure for the trust account in his valuation.

61In his report Mr. Mandel stated that, in his view, a notional purchaser would be willing to pay something for the unbilled earnings in the trust account. While not adopted in his report, he indicated that there was also a dispute as to whether the high trust account balance was a result of business issues or was an intentional deferment of income. The applicant eventually argued that the high trust account balance was a result of a deliberate manipulation by the respondent in order to minimize the value of LPC.

62I find there to be no evidence that the firm’s trust account was manipulated by the respondent to minimize the firm’s value in order to minimize any equalization payment. Mr. Adler, the bookkeeper for LPC, gave evidence explaining that because of COVID-19, all of the trust payments were backed up and that it was not until May 2021 that much of the trust could be released to the firm’s general account and thereafter be disbursed not only to clients, but also to the firm. As Mr. Adler testified, it would have been preferable to have had the trust funds released earlier in order to pay firm expenses but it could not be done. It was the respondent’s evidence that he had no say as to when the funds could be released but that they had to wait on government clearances before they could do so. There was no contradictory evidence. I prefer this evidence over the applicant’s extremely speculative submission.

63As to the other suggestion by Mr. Mandel that some value should be attributed to the trust account in 2020 as it would have some value for any potential purchaser, I prefer the position of Mr. Krofchick that to do so would create a double dipping or double recovery issue in that when the trust funds were eventually released they would increase income in the year of release and unless these income amounts were backed out the same amount would have been counted effectively twice against the respondent. Mr. Krofchick testified that he reviewed the income reports from RSM (Mr. Mandel’s firm at the time) for 2021 and after and no amounts were backed out of income to reflect the undistributed trust funds.

64I prefer Mr. Krofchick’s approach over Mr. Mandel’s position. It seemed to me that Mr. Mandel’s argument as to there being a value for the trust fund for any potential purchaser was simply inserted as a fallback position in case the trust manipulation argument failed. This appeared to me to be a valuation where a certain result was desired and an effort was made to arrive at that result rather than approaching the valuation from an entirely independent perspective.

LH

65At trial Mr. Mandel valued the fair market value of LH as being $194,914 and Mr. Krofchick valued it at $149,344, a difference of $45,570. This is a sizeable difference considering the two valuations.

66In his report Mr. Mandel had valued LH between $6,000 and $381,000 based upon a range for the values of the underlying real estate being between $2,000,000 and $2,510,000. In his report Mr. Krofchick had valued LH at $1,000, representing the value of the 1,000 preferred shares owned by the respondent in LH. He attributed no value to the common shares owned by the respondent, as LH’s liabilities exceeded its assets. He based this upon a value of the underlying real estate at $2,000,000.

67I was advised that for the purposes of trial the parties had agreed to use a value of $2,255,000 for the underlying real estate. This resulted in both parties having different valuations at trial than as set out in their respective reports.

68The applicant acknowledged that both valuations were based upon the respondent owning 80% of the common shares of LH with the other 20% of the common shares being held by the Lecker Children Family Trust. At one point the applicant had advanced the position that the trust shares were actually owned by the respondent and that the total value of LH should be attributed to the respondent. Whether this position was tenable or not was not an issue before me because of the acknowledgement by the applicant.

69However, during argument the applicant continued to seemingly rely upon this position by submitting that I should accept the higher valuation of $194,914, not because Mr. Mandel’s valuation was preferable to Mr. Krofchick’s, but because the respondent really owned 100% of the shares, actually owned the trust, and the valuation for LH should really be much higher. This submission was made despite the aforesaid acknowledgement and despite the fact that this was not pleaded against the respondent and, secondly, that there was no evidence to suggest that the trust had been set up to avoid equalization upon separation, thirdly, that the Lecker Children Family Trust was not a party to the litigation and finally, that none of the three beneficiaries of the trust, namely the parties’ three children, were named as parties to the litigation. As the respondent put it in argument, the applicant was trying to do indirectly what she did not seek to do directly. In my view this was no reason to prefer Mr. Mandel’s valuation over Mr. Krofchick’s.

70The respondent argued that Mr. Krofchick’s valuation was preferable as it recognized the loss for the company from May to October 2020, recognized that the tax shield was not available for any purchaser for the shares of LH, which Mr. Mandel ignored, and did not add any value of a non-capital loss balance as Mr. Mandel had. However, there was no explanation by the respondent as to how these three things made a difference in the valuations and to what extent or why they made Mr. Krofchick’s valuations preferable over Mr. Mandel’s.

71Neither Mr. Mandel nor Mr. Krofchick gave much evidence in chief as to their respective valuations of LH, nor were they cross-examined to any extent on their valuations of LH. While they gave evidence as to their two approaches to valuation there was no reason given to me from either of the parties as to why I should prefer one approach over the other.

72During the trial I advised counsel that I expected detailed closing submissions on the valuation of the companies and the respondent’s income and expected to be provided with submissions, backed up with evidentiary references, as to why I should choose one expert over another. Ultimately, this was not provided to me by either party in closing.

73With these limitations, overall, I prefer the evidence of Mr. Krofchick over that of Mr. Mandel in relation to the business valuations. Mr. Mandel was far more defensive in support of his reports and was unwilling to concede any point or to admit that there were other ways to conduct a valuation other than how he had done it.

74Later in these reasons, I also address issues with respect to Mr. Mandel’s income valuations. In my view the issues with the income valuations also have an impact on whose business valuations to prefer. The issues that I have already mentioned with Mr. Mandel’s valuations of LPC, also have an impact on whose valuation of the other business interests should be accepted.

75The valuations from Mr. Mandel and RSM, simply put, did not strike me as being as impartial as those from Mr. Krofchick. Rather than being entirely independent they struck me as being directed to or trying to reach a certain result. I prefer Mr. Krofchick’s findings as to the valuation of LH, for this reason as well as the other reasons set out in these reasons.

BALPC

76Here there was a wide discrepancy in value. The applicant values this company as having a value of $857,000 to the respondent for equalization purposes, whereas the respondent values it at $1,000 for equalization purposes.

77There was, however, only one valuation of BALPC. It was done by Mr. Krofchick on behalf of the respondent. It was his opinion that as the respondent only owned preferred shares in BALPC and no common shares that its value was the redemption value of these preferred shares, namely $1,000. Mr. Mandel did not value BALPC for the applicant and in his evidence, he said that he agreed with Mr. Krofchick’s conclusions.

78As part of his valuation of the respondent’s interest in BALPC, Mr. Krofchick valued the fair market value of BALPC at $857,000. However, any value in BALPC would be attributed to the common shareholders of BALPC. The common shareholders as at separation were the Lecker Family Trust holding 80% and the parties’ son Jared Lecker holding 20%.

79The applicant argued that the fair market value of $857,000 for BALPC should be attributed to the respondent for equalization purposes despite the fact that the respondent had no equity interest in BALPC.

80The applicant argued that since, on the evidence, the respondent controls this company, all of its value should be attributed to him despite the shareholding structure.

81There was no evidence to suggest that the Lecker Family Trust was anything but legitimate. It was created in December 2013 with the parties’ three children as beneficiaries. The respondent is not and never has been a trustee of the trust. It was set up for tax planning and estate planning purposes and was done through the respondent’s then accountants. BALPC has paid, from time-to-time, dividends to the trust, which in turn has distributed money to the beneficiaries. In 2019 BALPC paid a dividend of $42,500 to the trust. According to Mr. Adler, BALPC has never paid dividends to the respondent.

82BALPC was initially incorporated in 2003 to operate the respondent’s law firm. When LPC was incorporated and it began to operate the law firm, the respondent began to operate BALPC as his management company.

83When distributions were made to the beneficiary children, they would typically return the money to the respondent and he would then expend it on their behalf. When the last distribution was made in 2019 all of the children were adults. There was no evidence to convince me that any of this was improper or that they were forced to hand over the distributions or that the expenditures were not on their behalf.

84Just as with the valuation of LH, I am not prepared to go behind the long-standing corporate structure and question the family trust when this was not pleaded, when the trust was not a party to the litigation, there was no evidence to suggest that the trust was a sham and had been set up to avoid equalization upon separation, and it was not pleaded that the respondent beneficially owned BALPCs common shares.

85Finally, and perhaps more importantly, if the value of $857,000 was included as part of the respondent’s net family property then, as Mr. Krofchick testified, the debt and the contingent disposition costs of BALPC would actually create a negative number for the purposes of equalization.

Spousal Support

The Respondent’s Income

86The applicant’s experts, Mr. Mandel and Mr. Cape, who both worked at RSM, gave evidence as to the respondent’s income from 2018 to 2023 with Mr. Mandel opining on the respondent’s income from 2018 to 2021. Because Mr. Mandel could no longer continue with his retainer, Mr. Cape, had to do the income valuations for 2022 and 2023. The respondent’s expert Mr. Krofchick gave evidence as to the respondent’s income from 2018 to 2023. All experts were agreed by the parties and were accepted by me as being experts in income valuation.

87Each respective expert initially presented a number of scenarios as to income depending on various assumptions. During argument the applicant advised that one of her scenarios was no longer being relied upon. This still left a range of income valuations for the respondent. For the applicant for 2021 for example, Mr. Mandel opined that the respondent’s income could be either $1,040,000 or $870,000. Mr. Krofchick initially had four different valuations for the respondent’s 2021 income in his first report of April 2022. However, in his second report of December 2024, which updated and replaced the April 2022 report, he opined that the respondent’s income was either $889,875 or $904,875. The difference in these two incomes was whether certain life insurance provisions were personal or not.

88For the years in question, being the years post-separation, the various valuations were as follows:

	2021	2022	2023
RSM A	$1,040,000	$1,180,000	$1,120,000
RSM B	$870,000	$1,100,000	$930,000
Krofchick 1	$889,875	$1,134,085	$784,216
Krofchick 2	$904,875	$1,149,085	$799,216

In argument the respondent stated that Mr. Krofchick had changed his income figure for 2021 to $789,527 due to a computation error. I have reviewed Mr. Krofchick’s evidence and was unable to locate any such admissions by him and will use the numbers from his December 2024 income report.

89As best as I could determine, the main issues between the opinions were firstly whether the life insurance expense for the respondent should have been included as a personal expense or whether it was a proper deduction and secondly whether the respondent had the ability to access the corporate income from the three corporations, LPC, BALPC, and LH. While Mr. Krofchick’s initial report had the accessing of corporate income as an arguable scenario, in his December 2024 report he carried out his valuation based upon income from all three corporations being payable to the respondent subject to their ability to do so, leaving the issue of the life insurance as the only meaningful valuation issue for him.

90As Mr. Krofchick explained in his report and his evidence, there were two different aspects to the life insurance payments. There was some life insurance that had LPC as the beneficiary and there was some life insurance that had other beneficiaries. The payments for the insurance with LPC as the beneficiary were not added back to the respondent’s income by him whereas the cost for the other insurance was as it was personal to the respondent.

91In my view the attribution of the life insurance payments depends upon the beneficiary. Under paragraph 14 of the shareholders’ agreement for LPC, there was a requirement to maintain life insurance on each of the company’s shareholders, so that upon the death of a shareholder, the remaining shareholders could purchase the shares of the deceased shareholder from his estate.

92The life insurance payments attributable to the insurance with LPC as the beneficiary are not, in my view, attributable to the respondent’s income. As a result, Mr. Krofchick’s valuation of the respondent’s income for 2021 to 2023 would be $889,875, $1,134,085 and $784, 216 respectively.

93As mentioned previously, during the trial I had indicated to counsel that I had expected detailed closing submissions and that they were not forthcoming.

94There were three differences between RSM’s scenario A and B. These differences were not the same as between Mr. Krofchick’s scenario 1 and 2. Nor did Mr. Cape in his evidence advise as to the impact of each of the three differences between RSM’s scenario A and B. Nor were these differences addressed in argument. Rather, I was simply asked by the applicant to accept the scenario A assumptions as being correct. As well, the assumptions used by Mr. Mandel in his scenario B seemed to differ from the assumptions used by Mr. Cape in his scenario B. All in all, I was asked to choose between income valuations which had different assumptions throughout including between the same party’s experts. There was also no analysis of the effect of how the various assumptions from the experts would have actually impacted the final income numbers if I was to find that the assumptions were appropriate or not.

95As to the income valuations, I prefer the evidence of Mr. Krofchick over that of Mr. Mandel and Mr. Cape. Mr. Mandel was far more defensive in support of his reports and was unwilling to concede any point or to admit that there were other ways to conduct a valuation other than what he had done. On the other hand, Mr. Krofchick acknowledged errors and corrected them. For example, he acknowledged an error in the valuation of the income of LH, with respect to adding back bank amortization in his April 2022 report. He corrected it in the December 2024 report. Mr. Mandel had included scenario C in his income report. It was unclear whether this was done on his own or at the behest of the applicant but ultimately it was not relied upon by the applicant as being a viable scenario. It was premised upon the trust account at LPC being improperly manipulated by the respondent. Also, as pointed out by Mr. Krofchick, Mr. Mandel and Mr. Cape merged years in valuing income, which was something Mr. Krofchick had never seen done before in all his experience and which, in his view, could lead to erroneous results.

96Again, the corporate valuations by RSM struck me as not being as impartial as Mr. Krofchick’s. Rather than being entirely independent they seemed to be more directed to a certain result. This applies equally to the income valuations.

97As a result, I prefer Mr. Krofchick’s findings as to the respondent’s income between 2021 and 2023 inclusive, being $889,875, $1,134,085 and $784,216 respectively and I find those to be the respondent’s incomes for the years in question.

98The applicant in her closing argument averaged the highest RSM incomes to arrive at a 3-year average from 2021 to 2023 of $1,113,333. She argued that the “anomalous” 2020 income should not be used due to the Covid-19 pandemic. She then used the average income figure in a DivorceMate calculation to arrive at a support payment of $42,868 per month, which was the high figure based upon a 50/50 split of net disposable income (NDI), with her income of $81,355, starting from separation in October 2020.

99In his closing argument, the respondent submitted that his income should be $550,000 for 2020 and $700,000 for every year thereafter. How he arrived at these incomes from the evidence of the experts, including his own, was not made entirely clear. He then argued that each year should be considered with support being at the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, July 2008) (the “SSAGs”), due to the non-compensatory nature of the applicant’s entitlement to support, and that a monthly spousal support payment of $18,300 going forward would be appropriate, subject to any review order.

Determining Spousal Support

100The jurisdiction to order the payment of spousal support is found in the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), as set out in s. 15.2.

101The respondent acknowledged that the applicant was entitled to spousal support. He argued that her entitlement was based primarily upon non-compensatory grounds, in that she was in need of support. As he put it the applicant had an entitlement to support so that she could have a “decent and secure lifestyle.”

102However, he argued that as she did not sacrifice her career for the marriage and that she did not assist in establishing his law practice or in supporting his career by socializing with colleagues or attending work events, this impacted her support claim. He argued that she had a very weak compensatory claim for support because of this and that any support should be on a non-compensatory basis and for a shorter duration and for a lesser amount.

103In my view the respondent has taken a too limited and narrow approach to spousal support, taking into account the length of the marriage of over 36 years, the fact that the applicant took on far more of the family, household, and child rearing responsibilities in order to allow the respondent to build his law practice and to increase his income, and the fact of the parties’ total economic merger through their long term marriage of 36 years.

104No one factor from s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act is paramount. Spousal support is driven by both compensatory and needs-based considerations: see Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 33. To focus on one alone, as the respondent has attempted to do, is misguided. This is especially so where there has been a very long-term partnership between the parties. Because of this long-term partnership, the applicant is entitled to a continued share of the fruits of that partnership. The Divorce Act requires a recognition of not only any economic disadvantage from the marriage but also any economic advantage from the marriage: see Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at pp. 861-862. The doctrine of equitable sharing based upon the economic merger of the parties should be the focus in the situation here.

105As stated in Moge, at p. 849 “marriage is among other things, an economic unit which generates financial benefits” and that “partners should expect and are entitled to share those financial benefits”, and at p. 870 that “as marriage should be regarded as a joint endeavour, the longer the relationship endures, the closer the economic union, the greater will be the presumptive claim to equal standards of living upon its dissolution”. Even without there being any career or economic disadvantage to the applicant in this case, she is entitled to support due to the length of the marriage, the financial interdependence that arose during the marriage, and the fact that she has been disadvantaged by the marriage breakdown, having lost the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and the lifestyle that they maintained.

106The applicant’s claim for spousal support is accordingly both needs-based and compensatory.

107The respondent also strongly argued that any spousal support award should contain a review order that provides for an automatic reduction in support based upon a decline in income or his partial or full retirement, relying upon Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 920.

108While Leskun affirms that there is judicial discretion to grant a review order, the court indicates that they are not to be routinely granted: paras. 36-40. They are only appropriate if the evidence establishes that specified uncertainties will become certain within an identifiable time frame. However, on the evidence presented, I am not certain that the respondent will be retiring or when.

109While there was some evidence about the respondent’s law firm and succession plans, I am far from satisfied that the respondent was intent on giving up control of the firm and that he had a definite succession plan whereby he was going to lose control of his firm and was prepared to incur a sizeable reduction in income. Evidence as to possible health issues for the respondent which could lead to his retirement was extremely limited and there was no medical evidence in support from, at a minimum, the respondent’s health care provider, let alone a litigation expert.

110Rather than being prepared to pass on his law firm in the near future, the respondent, from his own evidence and from the evidence of the others in his firm, struck me as someone who liked being in control, liked making the law firm’s decisions, and lived for his work. He also clearly liked the income that his law firm generated, allowing him to own various properties, make real estate investments, take numerous vacations to exotic locations – even if he described them as being modest vacations – and to drive expensive cars. He did not strike me as someone who had any intention of giving up control of his law firm or his lifestyle. It was his firm. He had built it into a successful enterprise. He was prepared to litigate with his own son-in-law over what he felt were defamatory comments made by him concerning his law firm and him. As he put it in his statement of claim against his son-in-law, his public personality was fundamental to the successful operation of the law firm.

111This view was supported by the evidence of both Mr. Fisher and Mr. Hurley, both lawyers and shareholders in LPC. Mr. Fisher testified that the respondent assigned files, financed the firm, marketed the firm and made management decisions for the firm and basically managed the firm. Mr. Hurley testified that while the respondent did not practice as a lawyer, he was still the face of the firm and was still in control of the firm. He further testified that there had been nothing specific discussed about the respondent’s retirement and that he was unaware of any plan for the respondent to give up his shares in LPC and to not receive dividends. In his view, even if the respondent did step back, he was still entitled to be paid.

112The respondent admitted in cross-examination that the last case he had worked on as a lawyer was in 2019 and that he had not had any case load since 2022. However, he was very reluctant in cross-examination to admit that despite not being an “active” lawyer he still was receiving a sizeable income from Lecker and Associates. He was also very reluctant to answer simple questions as to how he maintained this high income or how others in the firm assisted him in maintaining his high income without him practising as a lawyer. I do not see there being a decline in his income in the near future or a partial or full retirement that will impact his income.

113If the respondent believes that there has been a material change then he can bring a motion to change and seek to satisfy the applicant, and if necessary the court, that there has been an appropriate change in circumstances that warrants a change in the support being ordered. To decide this now through a review order, as the respondent is asking, is not warranted.

114The respondent’s income, even accepting Mr. Krofchick’s valuation rather than those by RSM, is well above the income “ceiling” of $350,000 set out in the SSAGs. Where a payor’s income is above $350,000, the SSAGs should not be applied mechanically or automatically: R.L. v. M.F., 2025 ONCA 595, 19 R.F.L. (9th) 39, at para. 54. This does not mean that a $350,000 income creates a hard cap. The SSAGs should be used as a tool to assist in undertaking the necessary individualized, fact specific analysis required: see Carrubba-Gomes v. Gomes, 2025 ONSC 6377 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 54-54.

115Where there are high income payors and recipients with good incomes and career prospects, this tends to drive the support to be the lower end of the SSAGs. This is not the case here, at least for the recipient. She is retired, with no career prospects, with an income based primarily upon CPP and pension income other than support.

116Under the SSAGs Revised User’s Guide April 2016, at chapter 11(b) a list of principles are set out, which includes the above principles: Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, April 2016). As well, the Guide states that where the payor’s income is “not too far above the ceiling”, the formula range will be used to determine the amount of spousal support, with support falling in the low to mid ranges. As the authors say, how far is “not to far above” is still not clear. Somewhere between $500,000 to $700,000 they suggest. Once the payor’s income is “far” above the ceiling, then the amount of support ordered will usually be below the low end of the SSAG range, but SSAG ranges are still calculated and sometimes the outcome will fall within the SSAG range.

117As set out in the User’s Guide, it is suggested that counsel calculate the ranges for alternative income levels using the $350,000 ceiling as a minimum and the full income as a maximum, as well as a range of intermediate incomes.

118I was not provided with alternative SSAGs calculations by the applicant. As already mentioned, in her calculation she used the highest RSM incomes from 2021 to 2023 to arrive at an average income for the respondent of $1,113,333 and then picked a 50/50 NDI which resulted in a high payment of $42,868 per month.

119While the respondent provided alternative SSAG calculations, they were all premised on incomes for the respondent being lower than what I have found, using $550,000 in 2020 and $700,000 for the following years. If the incomes from 2020 to 2023 in Mr. Krofchick’s report as found by me are used the respondent’s income averages $788,768 for these years and if the incomes from 2021 to 2023 are used the respondent’s income averages $936,058 for these years.

120The applicant argues that the lower 2020 income figure should not be used as this was an anomaly due to Covid. This was, however, the reality of the world at the time, with some professional incomes being lower, and it should be considered, while also recognizing that there was often a large rebound in subsequent years, which clearly happened with the respondent.

121The applicant also argues that since she has experienced a drop in her standard of living creating a need and the respondent’s income is greater than $350,000 that there should be an automatic 50/50 NDI. I do not accept this argument and no caselaw in support was provided for this proposition. Unless the party paying support is extremely wealthy and is ordered to pay a huge amount of support or there are extensive and large assets to equalize, which can be used to generate a large income, there almost always will be a drop in the standard of living for the recipient party when compared to the lifestyle pre-separation. A drop in the standard of living does not necessarily equate to need and need does not automatically create a 50/50 NDI: see e.g. Fielding v. Fielding, 2015 ONCA 901, 129 O.R. (3d) 65, at para. 50.

122In assessing the applicant’s needs and means her first financial statement of February 3, 2021 had monthly expenses of $16,293, with reduced housing costs and a large expense for vacations. Her next statement of February 1, 2022 had monthly expenses of $16,567, with higher housing costs and lower vacation costs. Her statements of November 28, 2024 had monthly expenses of $25,355 with much higher housing costs, including utilities of $19,250, and continued low vacation costs. In her proposed budget she had monthly expenses of $24,765 with housing costs, including utilities of $8,324, and vacation costs of $2,083 or $25,000 annually.

123The applicant gave minimal evidence in chief concerning her expenses. She acknowledged that she did not spend her budget amount on vacations, as she could not afford it, but she wanted to. She testified that as at the time of the trial she had not been on a vacation for three years. She did not know what she was going to do when the matrimonial home was sold. She did not know whether she would try to buy a house or a condominium or would rent a property, although she acknowledged that the housing costs associated with the matrimonial home would be saved.

124As mentioned earlier, in argument, the respondent submitted that using an income of $700,000 for him, an income of $114,500 for the applicant, and a low SSAG range resulted in a spousal support payment of $18,300, properly reflecting the non-compensatory nature of her claim, meeting her customary expenses, and with an NDI respectively of 57% for him and 43% for the applicant.

125However, as already found, the applicant has a strong compensatory claim and support should not be simply limited to her needs. The applicant is entitled to a degree of comfort beyond her basic needs. As well, budgets are inherently unreliable predictions of future expenses. As the respondent’s income is above the $350,000 ceiling, his income inputs can go up to the full income amount here of the average of $788,768 or if the individual years are considered, up to $1,134,085 for 2022. The respondent’s standard of living does not seem to have suffered following separation and with a strong compensatory claim, neither should the applicant’s.

126In considering what is an appropriate amount for support I have considered that the applicant will receive an equalization payment. Although not calculated by me to the dollar, I recognize that the applicant will have a sizeable amount to invest to provide some income, in conjunction with her net proceeds form the sale of the matrimonial home. However, she will require new housing and these proceeds and the equalization payment may have to go towards a new property.

127As to retroactive support the parties are agreed that the respondent has paid $612,908 in support from the date of separation to and including December 2024.

128The respondent has argued that there should have been some obligation upon the applicant to bring another motion for support after she was in receipt of Mr. Krofchick’s report in 2022, which set out the respondent’s income, and that by failing to do so she somehow disentitled herself to retroactive support above what he was currently paying.

129At the same time, he argues that the applicant depleted her capital to pay legal fees and disbursements and that a retroactive support order would be unfair as it would allow her to pay for past legal fees and recover capital. To me this argument is nonsensical, especially considering the other argument that if she thought she could have been receiving more in support that she should have brought a motion and incurred additional fees.

130In my view it is more appropriate to look to the respondent, who should have realized that he was underpaying support when he received Mr. Krofchick’s report. The applicant required lawyers and experts to advance her claim, who were entitled to be paid. As well, the support is not just about need. Here it is primarily compensatory in nature. While perhaps there could be something to this argument if the applicant had frittered away her support in a frivolous manner, certainly no complaint can be reasonably made that she used support monies to pay lawyers and experts in order to advance her claim.

131As to the respondent’s argument that the applicant made bad investments following separation, again I am of the view that she was entitled to use her funds as she saw fit, if reasonable. She invested in some pre-construction condominiums, which was the same sort of item that the respondent had invested in for years. It was not as if she was profligate in the use of her money post-separation. This also runs contrary to the respondent’s clear admissions that the applicant was entitled to support and it was just a question of how much.

132The applicant has suggested that any support that is owed should be ordered to be paid in the most tax-effective way possible, that a “net of tax amount” be calculated. Similarly, the respondent asks that any retroactive or retrospective support has to recognize that the Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) only provides for tax deductibility for a period no longer than one year preceding the date of the order. Any tax deductibility is between the CRA and the respondent and is not for the court to maximize. If he had paid the correct amount from the beginning then this would not be an issue.

133If the parties can come to some arrangement on the advice of their experts, in the most tax effective way possible, they certainly are free to do so. It would certainly be sensible to do so, but that is not for the court to order.

134Taking all of the above into consideration and recognizing that the overarching consideration in determining the amount of support is fairness, I fix the spousal support for November and December 2020 when the respondent’s income was lower, in the amount of $16,000 per month. As acknowledged by the respondent in cross-examination, the applicant was entitled to support from the date of separation. I fix spousal support from January 1, 2021 in the amount of $25,000 per month. I leave it to the parties to calculate what amount is owing in relation to spousal support considering the agreement that $612,908 has been paid in support to and including December 2024. As previously indicated, I order no review so that support is for an indefinite period subject to a material change in circumstances. Any amount of support owing may be netted down with the assistance of the parties’ respective experts if the parties agree.

Occupation Rent

135The respondent claims occupation rent from the applicant in relation to the matrimonial home from the date of separation until April 2024. The parties agreed that any claim for occupation rent would not extend past that date. This agreement was put into the order of Diamond J. of August 16, 2024, which dealt with the listing and sale of the matrimonial home, among other things.

136The parties agreed that the respondent could submit the affidavit of Mr. Scarfe, dated September 25, 2024, without there being any need to have him give his evidence in person or for there to be any cross-examination by the applicant.

137In his affidavit, Mr. Scarfe stated that the monthly rent for the property in 2021 would have been approximately $7,500, for 2022 would have been between $7,000 and $7,500, for 2023 would have been between $7,000 and $7,800, and for 2024 would have been between $7,000 and $7,250. He also stated that it is normal for the tenant to pay utilities and for the owner to pay taxes, insurance and regular maintenance.

138In argument, the respondent submitted that the average monthly market rent from 2020 to 2024 was $7,240. How this was calculated was not made clear but the applicant made no argument otherwise. The respondent, in his December 12, 2024 Financial Statement, calculates the amount owing to be half of the average market rent or $3,620 per month from November 1, 2020 (being the first month after separation) to March 30, 2024 (as provided for in the order of Diamond J.), for 41 months of occupation rent totalling $148,420.

139An order for occupation rent must be reasonable. It need not be limited to exceptional cases. The factors to consider are the timing of the claim, the duration of the occupancy, the inability of the non-resident spouse to realize on their equity in the property, any reasonable credits to be set off against occupation rent, and any other competing claims in the litigation: Non Chhom v. Green, 2023 ONCA 692, 97 R.F.L. (8th) 83, at paras. 8-9. An order for occupation rent is a discretionary remedy that can be used to ensure financial fairness between the parties and as a tool to balance the competing equities.

140One of the main considerations in considering the payment of occupation rent is the payment of support. Here the respondent only started paying support pursuant to the order of Monahan J. (as he then was) of January 17, 2022, effective October 1, 2021 and in the amount of $9,844, which is far less than the support that I have found to be properly due per month. The support was increased to $17,000 per month effective May 1, 2022 pursuant to the order of Faieta J. of June 10, 2022 but this too was less than what I have found to be the appropriate support.

141I am not prepared to order occupation rent. The respondent paid no support for practically a year from separation, with the order being nearly 15 months from separation. In his own evidence he acknowledged that she had an entitlement to support. He also acknowledged that she was in need of support. Yet, he did not pay any support until much later and when he did it was much less than what he should have paid. While he may have provided some indication that he intended to claim occupation rent he did nothing about it until his notice of motion dated December 13, 2022 for a motion returnable January 26, 2023 to sell the matrimonial home and for occupation rent from the date of separation to the date of sale. There was no evidence as to why the motion did not proceed or why he waited until 2024 to amend his pleadings or why it took to August 2024 to agree to sell the home. There was no evidence from the respondent to support an argument that he wanted or needed to sell the matrimonial home in order to access his equity in it or that his attempts to have the home sold were thwarted by the applicant. These might have been factors in support of his claim.

142In all of the circumstances of this case, I do not believe it appropriate to order the applicant to pay any occupation rent and any order to do so would be unfair to her.

Pre-judgment interest

143The applicant asks for pre-judgment interest on any retrospective spousal support and for pre-judgment interest on any equalization payment from the separation date of October 21, 2020.

144The applicant in her proposed order asks for an equalization payment of $1,626,295. According to the applicant, the pre-judgment interest on this amount equals $1,052,224.

145The respondent takes issue with the applicant’s calculation of the pre-judgment interest amount and with her entitlement to it.

146As to the calculation, and assuming that the applicant is correct as to her equalization amount, it is clearly incorrect. At the time of separation in October 2020 the pre-judgment interest amount was .5%. This would result in an annual interest amount of $8,131 and, for approximately five years between the date of separation and any award of equalization, would equal approximately $41,000, not the over $1 million claimed.

147As to the entitlement, the courts have recognised that family law cases are not the same as commercial ones and that different considerations apply. Moreover, the granting of pre-judgment interest is discretionary.

148Pre-judgment interest will not be awarded on an equalization payment where the payor spouse, here the respondent, cannot realize on the asset giving rise to the equalization payment until after trial, does not have the use of the asset prior to trial, the asset generates no income, and the payor spouse has not delayed the case being brought to trial.

149Here there was no evidence of delay and the major asset between the parties was the matrimonial home. It was not listed until November 1, 2024 and it sold with a closing of April 2025. It is from his share of the home that the respondent will pay the equalization. This is not denied by the applicant. In these circumstances it would be inappropriate to award pre-judgment interest, even a correctly calculated amount, on any equalization payment.

150As to support, the applicant is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the difference between the spousal support paid and as ordered. The method of calculation as set out in the applicant’s written closing submissions is reasonable and I leave it to the parties to work out the pre-judgment interest owing on the support.

Security for Support

151Monahan J., in his initial support order of January 17, 2022, ordered that the respondent was to maintain life insurance policies of at least $1.5 million as security with the applicant being the irrevocable beneficiary. I assume that those policies are still in place. None of the SSAGs calculations provided by the parties contained the Life Insurance (to secure support) numbers. Paragraph 2 of Monahan J.’s order is to continue.

Costs

152I have received both parties’ respective Bills of Costs. Both are rather breathtaking, not only as to the legal fees being asked for but also the disbursement costs for the experts.

153At first blush success to me seems somewhat divided, so that neither party is entitled to costs. Of course, I do not know whether any offers were made which could have an impact not only on the possible quantum of costs but also their award.

154While I would hope that the parties could work out the issue of costs, based upon their history and the seeming inability to compromise on much of anything, that may not be possible.

155If either party believes that they are entitled to costs they are to provide cost submissions consisting of a maximum of 10 typed double-spaced pages with any necessary attachments such as offers to settle on or before March 20, 2026. No caselaw is required. Each party is to provide responding submissions of a maximum of five typed double-spaced pages with any necessary attachments on or before April 10, 2026. There are to be no reply submissions. All submissions are to be uploaded to Case Center to the Trial Documents bundle and are to be provided to my assistant at maria.kolliopoulos@ontario.ca to my attention. If the parties reach an agreement on costs they are to advise of the fact of an agreement to the email address provided above.

Justice K. Hood

Released: February 19, 2026