CITATION: R v. Nassr, 2025 ONSC 934
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Tom Mack, for the Crown /
Respondent
- and -
JASON NASSR
Jason Nassr, acting in person / Applicant
HEARD: January 27, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
1Mr. Nassr is charged with intimidating a justice system participant. His trial is scheduled to be heard by a judge and jury in London in August 2025. I am the assigned trial judge.
2In January 2023, Mr. Nassr was tried in London by a judge and jury on charges of extortion, harassment by communications and making and distributing written child pornography. He was found guilty of the charges and received a conditional sentence.
3The current charge of intimidating a justice system participant stems from statements Mr. Nassr allegedly made to James Spangenberg, the Assistant Crown Attorney who prosecuted the earlier charges, while the prosecutor was cross-examining Mr. Nassr at his trial.
4Mr. Nassr applies under section 599 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 for an order to change the venue of his trial from London to Toronto. The Crown opposes the application.
The Evidence
5The record on the application included an affidavit sworn by Mr. Nassr, in which he detailed the circumstances that precipitated the earlier charges against him, the media coverage surrounding his trial on those charges, and the current prosecution. Mr. Nassr attached various exhibits to his affidavit, including a list of media stories, their headlines, bylines, publication dates, and the first two lines of the text associated with each. However, his affidavit only attached the full text of a couple of these.
6Additionally, the Crown filed a 2021 Census Profile report from Statistics Canada, which shows that, as of that year, the metropolitan London area's population was 543,551 and that at least 422,856 people were of an age that would make them eligible for jury service.
7According to Mr. Nassr's affidavit, between 2015 and 2020, he was involved in a project entitled "CreeperHunterTV." It consisted of what Mr. Nassr describes as a "documentary series" in which he would pose as a child online and communicate with adults in that role. Eventually, Mr. Nassr would arrange a meeting with the adults, and when they attended to meet the "child," he would film these encounters. Mr. Nassr posted these videos on TheCreeperHunterTV webpage and YouTube. He reports filming as many as 30 of these videos in London.
8Mr. Nassr deposes that TheCreeperHunterTV videos he posted online garnered millions of views on its website and YouTube and attracted some attention from the mainstream media. According to Mr. Nassr, some of the individuals ensnared by TheCreeperHunterTV sting faced criminal charges because of his efforts.
9Unfortunately, one of the men exposed through the sting operation committed suicide, resulting in a criminal investigation, which culminated in Mr. Nassr's arrest, charges and the earlier prosecution. The jury found Mr. Nassr guilty of the offences charged, accepting that he extorted and harassed the victim and that some of his written communications with the targets of his sting operation met the definition of child pornography.
10The charge Mr. Nassr currently faces concerns an exchange between him and Mr. Spangenberg at his trial while the prosecutor was cross-examining him. During the cross-examination of Mr. Nassr, the court granted his defence lawyer’s application to withdraw based on a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship. The cross-examination continued thereafter, with Mr. Nassr representing himself. At one point during the questioning that followed, Mr. Spangenberg suggested that Mr. Nassr derived sexual pleasure while posing as a teenage girl during his communications with his targets and played a video of a man masturbating as he communicated with Mr. Nassr who was pretending to be a child at the time. The Crown alleges that when the prosecutor pressed Mr. Nassr on this issue, he responded by saying that he knew Mr. Spangenberg had a child and stated the child’s name. It is these comments that the Crown contends amounted to intimidating a justice system participant.
11Most of the media stories are from 2023 and concern Mr. Nassr's earlier trial and sentencing, which took place that year. By Mr. Nassr's count, at least 14 stories appeared in various publications, including The London Free Press, The Windsor Star, CTV News London, CBC.ca, Yahoo News Canada, and Ground News. Only a few of the stories reference the current prosecution. That includes the latest story published in The London Free Press on January 17, 2024. The record does not contain any information regarding the size of the readership of any of these publications.
12The various stories reference Mr. Nassr's earlier charges; most describe him as the "Creeper Hunter." Stories related to the earlier trial detail developments in that proceeding, including listing the charges he faced and reporting his convictions. Some of the stories note that the victim in that earlier case committed suicide. Mr. Nassr is described variously as a "vigilante," a "self-styled vigilante," a "child predator vigilante," a "self-styled internet child predator vigilante," and an "online provocateur." In two stories published after he was convicted, one on March 21, 2023, and another on January 17, 2024, Mr. Nassr was described as a "convicted child pornographer."
13Additionally, in his affidavit, Mr. Nassr details some of his interactions with his conditional sentence supervisor in Windsor before the Court of Appeal granted him bail pending his appeal in June 2024. At the time, Mr. Nassr was seeking permission to be outside of his home while serving his conditional sentence so that he might take walks to benefit his mental health. According to Mr. Nassr, at one point, his conditional sentence supervisor told him that a relevant consideration in deciding whether to permit the walks was that his case was "high profile."
The Positions of the Parties
14Mr. Nassr submitted that he cannot receive a fair trial in London. He made three principal arguments in advancing that claim. However, by the end of the hearing, the foundation for one of his arguments fell away.1 Mr. Nassr's two remaining arguments can be summarized as follows.
15First, Mr. Nassr argued that extensive and prejudicial publicity surrounding the earlier and current proceedings would prevent the selection of an impartial jury in London. Mr. Nassr emphasized the nature of the media coverage, including that some of the stories refer to him as a "convicted child pornographer." In Mr. Nassr's view, there is widespread hostility towards him in London. He believes this is evidenced, in part, by his conditional sentence supervisor describing his case as "high profile," even though she supervised him hundreds of kilometres away in Windsor. Additionally, beyond the reporting in the mainstream press, Mr. Nassr expressed concerns about the potential circulation of prejudicial information about him on closed social networks to which prospective jurors could have had exposure.
16Second, Mr. Nassr submitted that prospective jurors could also be biased against him due to the complainant's status in the London community. He submitted that because Mr. Spangenberg is a long-serving prosecutor in London and, as such, a representative of the administration of justice in that locale, jurors drawn from that community would be unavoidably predisposed to hold him in high regard and incapable of discharging their duties impartially in this case.
17Ultimately, in urging the court to grant his application, Mr. Nassr, citing R. v. Bain, 1992 CanLII 111 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91, at pp. 147-148, Stevenson J., concurring, emphasized that the appearance that the jury is indifferent and that the Crown does not enjoy any advantage over the accused in its composition is an essential element of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by section 11(d) of the Charter. Mr. Nassr submitted that the combined effect of the publicity and Mr. Spangenberg’s status in the community would undermine the appearance that a jury in London could provide him with a fair trial, which he maintained justified an order to change the venue of his trial.
18On behalf of the Crown, Mr. Mack focused his submissions on Mr. Nassr's arguments concerning the publicity and his claim that because of it, a change of venue is necessary to ensure he receives a fair trial.
19First, Mr. Mack emphasized that pre-trial publicity alone does not warrant a change of venue. While he acknowledged that the previous prosecution received media attention and that the current case has also garnered some coverage, he argued that none of it has been inaccurate or unfair. Additionally, since the last article was published in January 2024, Mr. Mack pointed out that 20 months will have passed by the time Mr. Nassr's trial begins, rendering the publicity quite dated.
20Second, even though some prospective jurors may know about Mr. Nassr's earlier offences, Mr. Mack argued that wherever Mr. Nassr's trial takes place, the jury will unavoidably need to know something about the earlier prosecution because it is inextricably part of the narrative of the charge he currently faces. In that regard, Mr. Mack emphasized that pre-existing knowledge of the allegations does not furnish a basis for granting a change of venue.
21Finally, even if the court agreed with Mr. Nassr that some of the publicity was prejudicial, Mr. Mack argued that alone would not justify a change of venue. To succeed, Mr. Mack submitted that Mr. Nassr must satisfy the court that he is unlikely to receive a fair trial in London despite the ameliorative effects of established trial safeguards. In that regard, Mr. Mack noted that the Crown is in favour of the court summoning a larger-than-usual panel of prospective jurors and agreeable to a challenge for cause based on the potential exposure of prospective jurors to pre-trial publicity.
22In all the circumstances, Mr. Mack argued that Mr. Nassr had failed to displace the presumption in favour of a trial where the crime allegedly occurred because he had not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that he could not receive a fair trial in London.
The Law
23There is a strong and well-established presumption that an accused person's trial should take place in the jurisdiction where the alleged crime occurred: see R. v. O'Gorman (1909), 1909 CanLII 198 (ON CA), 15 C.C.C. 173 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 178; R. v. Yarema, [1990] O.J. No. 2785 (H.C.J.), at para. 23, aff'd (1991), 1991 CanLII 7098 (ON CA), 53 O.A.C. 387 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1992] S.C.C.A. No. 49.
24Nevertheless, Parliament has acknowledged that circumstances may necessitate changing the venue of a trial. Section 599(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code empowers the court, on an application by the Crown or the accused, to order a change of venue if "it appears expedient to the ends of justice, including to promote a fair and efficient trial."
25The Court of Appeal has recognized that the decision whether to order a change of venue is discretionary: see R. v. Collins (1989), 1989 CanLII 264 (ON CA), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 343 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 350; R. v. Suzack (2000), 2000 CanLII 5630 (ON CA), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 31, leave to appeal refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 583. There are no hard-and-fast rules governing such applications. Instead, the judge who considers it must assess the evidence led and weigh the circumstances in favour and against making such an order: see Suzack, at para. 31. The fundamental consideration, the Court of Appeal has explained, "is whether the change of venue is necessary" to "ensure that an accused has a fair trial with an impartial jury": Collins, at pp. 350-351.
26Prior cases where change of venue applications have been successful provide helpful examples of the types of prejudicial circumstances that can warrant such an order. They typically include some combination of extensive media coverage both leading up to and shortly before the trial; the publication or broadcast of highly prejudicial inadmissible information; a victim who is a beloved or prominent member of the community; inflammatory comments made by elected officials or other public figures; law reform efforts inspired by the crime; fundraising for the victim's family or to memorialize the victim in some way; and, quite often, comparatively smaller communities: see R. v. Papadopoulos, [2006] O.J. No. 5403 (S.C.); R. v. Henoche, 2018 NLSC 166; R. v. Bridson (1994), 1994 CanLII 16661 (MB QB), 99 Man. R. (2d) 6 (Q.B.); R. v. MacNeil (1993), 1993 CanLII 4442 (NS SC), 125 N.S.R. (2d) 346 (S.C.); R. v. Frederick (1978), 1978 CanLII 2373 (ON HCJ), 41 C.C.C. (2d) 532 (Ont. H.C.J.); R. v. Talbot (1977), 1977 CanLII 2121 (ON HCJ), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 555 (Ont. H.C.J.); R. v. Kully (1973), 1973 CanLII 833 (ON HCJ), 2 O.R. (2d) 463 (H.C.J.).
27The cases demonstrate that there "must be very strong evidence of a general prejudicial attitude in the community as a whole to justify a change of venue.": R. v. Alward (1976), 1976 CanLII 1214 (NB CA), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 416 (N.B.C.A.), at p. 427, aff'd on other grounds, 1977 CanLII 166 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 559; see also R. v. Proulx (1992), 1992 CanLII 3362 (QC CA), 76 C.C.C. (3d) 316 (Que. C.A.), at pp. 335-336.
28Pre-trial publicity alone will not suffice to justify a change of venue: see Yarema, at para. 24. The law does not require jurors to be a blank slate. To quote Justice Cory: "The objective of finding 12 jurors who know nothing of the facts of a highly‑publicized case is, today, patently unrealistic." Instead, as he observed, a fair trial requires "jurors who, although familiar with the case," can discard "any previously formed opinions" and "embark upon their duties armed with both an assumption that the accused is innocent until proven otherwise" and who are willing "to determine liability based solely on the evidence presented at trial": Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), 1995 CanLII 86 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97, at para. 132.
29The courts have recognized that where the publicity involves little more than reporting the allegations, no matter how disturbing, that alone will not justify a change of venue, given that no matter where the trial takes place, the jury will ultimately be required to hear the evidence: see Suzack, at paras. 37-38. The courts have also distinguished between hostility toward a particular crime and prejudice toward the accused—only the latter militates in favour of changing the venue: see Yarema, at para. 25; R. v. Turvey, 1970 CanLII 1056 (NS SC), [1970] 1 C.C.C. (2d) 90 (N.S.S.C.T.D.).
30Ultimately, for the application to succeed, the applicant must demonstrate that despite the available trial safeguards—such as jury screening procedures, challenges for cause, the oath taken by jurors, the rules of evidence, and the jury instructions—there is a reasonable likelihood that they will not receive a fair trial in the local venue: see Suzack, at paras. 42-44; Yarema, at para. 23, 28.
Analysis
31Having carefully considered the materials filed, the parties' submissions, and the governing principles, I have concluded that Mr. Nassr has failed to demonstrate that, despite the protections afforded by existing trial safeguards, there is a reasonable likelihood that he will not receive a fair trial in London. I have come to that conclusion for the following reasons.
32First, Mr. Nassr's claim that Mr. Spangenberg's status as an Assistant Crown Attorney in London would result in jurors drawn from that community being unduly sympathetic toward him and hostile toward Mr. Nassr has no basis in evidence. Unlike in some cases where courts have granted a change of venue, the record does not suggest there has been a groundswell of community support for Mr. Spangenberg or his family because of the crime allegedly committed against him.
33The fact that Mr. Spangenberg is an Assistant Crown Attorney and, as such, a representative of the administration of justice in London does not logically support the claim that jurors from the London area are unlikely to judge the Crown's case against Mr. Nassr based only on the evidence and the law. The court will excuse any prospective juror who knows Mr. Spangenberg during the preliminary screening phase of the jury selection process. Further, the standard jury instructions, which remind jurors of their obligation to approach the evidence with an open mind and without prejudice or bias and to decide the case based only on the evidence and the law, should prove more than sufficient to ensure that they do just that, even though the alleged victim is a senior prosecutor in London: see R. v. Find, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863, at paras. 41-42.
34Tellingly, even in cases involving the murder of police officers, who are arguably equally respected representatives of the administration of justice in the local community, that alone has not proven a sufficient basis for ordering a change of venue: see Suzack; Collins; and R. v. Fitzgerald and Schoenberger (1981), 1981 CanLII 3272 (ON HCJ), 61 C.C.C. (2d) 504 (Ont. H.C.).
35Second, Mr. Nassr's belief that there is widespread hostility toward him in London and his claim that his conditional sentence supervisor views his case as "high profile" cannot be considered in the analysis. Opinion evidence is not admissible, and the inadmissibility of the statement attributed to Mr. Nassr's conditional sentence supervisor is compounded because it constitutes hearsay. Notably, Mr. Nassr did not point to any evidence beyond the publicity to substantiate the existence of widespread hostility towards him in London.
36Third, while Mr. Nassr's earlier trial and resulting sentencing received a fair amount of publicity, and the current charge has received at least some, that, on its own, as the case law recognizes, hardly calls into question Mr. Nassr's ability to have a fair trial in London. Mr. Nassr's case is not one of those exceptional cases where the publicity has been so persistent and inflammatory that it alone could reasonably support an inference of widespread prejudice toward him in the local venue: see Yarema, at para. 25.
37Fourth, the time that will have passed between the last story, in January 2024, and Mr. Nassr's trial in August 2025, is significant. With the proliferation of news media in the Internet and cable news era, consumers have an infinite choice of news sources. As a result, the news cycle has accelerated considerably compared to earlier times. In a large community like London, many potential jurors will likely have had little exposure to the publicity. Of those who did, even those who, one might speculate, exchanged information about the earlier prosecution on closed social networks are unlikely to have anything more than a vague recollection of the case after 20 months. With the passage of so much time, it is highly improbable that anyone will remember that two of the stories described Mr. Nassr as a "convicted child pornographer."
38Fifth, although the media coverage of Mr. Nassr's earlier trial and sentencing raises at least some basis for concern about the potential for prejudice—after all, jurors ordinarily should not know whether an accused has previously been before the court or the nature of their prior charges or convictions—the circumstances of this case are somewhat unusual.
39The jury will unavoidably know about the earlier prosecution since the alleged offence occurred while Mr. Nassr testified at his previous trial. Furthermore, the context in which Mr. Nassr allegedly made the statements in question will necessarily reveal at least something about what the earlier trial concerned. There is no way to avoid this, regardless of whether the trial is in London or Toronto.
40In any event, there is no reason to believe that limiting instructions cannot effectively redress the risk of prejudice such narrative evidence might occasion. Juries can be assumed to follow instructions on the use they can and cannot make of the evidence they hear: see R. v. Corbett, 1988 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, pp. 692-696; R. v. Khan, 2001 SCC 86, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 823, at para. 82.
41Finally, London is a large city, and the court will summon a larger-than-normal panel of prospective jurors. Additionally, the Crown has agreed that the pre-trial publicity justifies a challenge for cause. Any remote risk that some prospective jurors might harbour prejudice against Mr. Nassr because of their exposure to some of the very dated media coverage will more than adequately be addressed through the challenge for cause process.
42For these reasons, Mr. Nassr has failed to demonstrate that despite the available trial safeguards, there is a reasonable likelihood that he will not receive a fair trial in London. Neither Mr. Spangenberg’s status as an Assistant Crown Attorney in London nor the publicity, nor the combination of both, convinces me otherwise.
Conclusion
43For all these reasons, Mr. Nassr's application for a change of venue is dismissed.
Signed: “Justice J. Stribopoulos”
Released: February 14, 2025
CITATION: R v. Nassr, 2025 ONSC 934
COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-52
DATE: 20250214
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and -
JASON NASSR
REASONS FOR DECISION
Stribopoulos J.
Released: February 14, 2025
After the hearing commenced, with the parties' permission, the court contacted LAO and shared Mr. Nassr's affidavit filed on the application. By the end of the hearing, LAO had agreed to fund the travel expenses of any lawyer who accepted Mr. Nassr's legal aid certificate.
As a result, Mr. Nassr's inability to retain a lawyer to represent him if his trial proceeded in London no longer grounds his change of venue application. As an alternative remedy for his inability to retain counsel Mr. Nassr had sought a stay of proceedings. However, the basis for that claim has also become moot with LAO’s decision to fund the travel expenses of any lawyer that Mr. Nassr might choose to retain.
Footnotes
- Mr. Nassr, who has a legal aid certificate, deposed that despite making a concerted effort to do so, he could not retain a defence lawyer from the London area to represent him because members of the local defence bar were too closely acquainted with Mr. Spangenberg or had heard that the lawyer at his first trial withdrew. Unfortunately, lawyers outside London were unwilling to take his case because Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) does not ordinarily fund a lawyer's travel expenses. Mr. Nassr has identified a lawyer in Toronto who would take his case if the court ordered his trial moved there.