SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

7755 Hurontario Street, Brampton ON L6W 4T6

RE:

SIDHU, Shinder Pal Kaur, plaintiff

AND:

JAIN, Sachindra, defendant

SONEIL LINCOLN INC., defendant

SIDHU, Norman, defendant

CITATION: Sidhu v. Jain et al 2025 ONSC 735

COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00001055-0000

DATE: 2025 06 25

BEFORE:

Justice Andre

COUNSEL:

DHALIWAL, Harinder (harry@mdlawllp.ca ), for the plaintiff

MOORE, Evan (emoore@moorelawyers.ca ), for the defendant (SIDHU, Norman)

SHARMA, Virender (saharalawyerpc@gmail.com ), for the defendants (JAIN, Sachindra & SONEIL LINCOLN INC.)

HEARD:

April 16, 2025

ENDORSEMENT

1This matter is a tale of two motions. In the first, the Plaintiff, Mrs. Sidhu, seeks to consolidate two actions before the court, one in 2016 and the other in 2024, involving a land transaction which goes back to 2004. The Defendant, Mr. Jain, opposes this motion on the ground that the two actions are entirely different. The defendant, Mr. Sidhu, takes no position in this motion. The second motion has been brought by Mr. Jain for summary judgment against Mrs. Sidhu on the ground that her 2024 action is statute-barred. Mrs. Sidhu begs to differ.

BACKGROUND FACTS

2Mrs. Sidhu and Mr. Norman Sidhu were married on August 1, 2001, and separated on September 5, 2016. A family law application was commenced by Mr. Norman Sidhu on October 6, 2016.

3Mr. Sidhu was involved with Mr. Jain in investing and managing properties.

4In 2004, Mr. Sidhu, Mrs. Sidhu and Mr. Jain purchased a property in Clinton, Ontario. The parties refer to this property as “Lot 16.” The property was purchased under title to Mr. Jain’s corporation – Soneil Lincoln Inc.

5On March 8, 2006, an agreement was signed between the Defendants Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc. on the one hand, and the Plaintiff Mrs. Sidhu on the other, acknowledging that Mrs. Sidhu has a one-third interest in Lot 16. Norman Sidhu negotiated this agreement. By virtue of that agreement Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc. were trustees of that property for her benefit.

6In 2016, Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc. sold Lot 16 without accounting for the proceeds or paying Mrs. Sidhu. To date, they have not provided any documents respecting that sale. Mrs. Sidhu believes Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc. granted a “vendor take back” mortgage to the buyer.

7Little is known about this mortgage. None of the Defendants have denied that this mortgage was granted. Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc. have refused to provide any documentation relating to this mortgage.

8When cross examined, Mr. Jain refused to provide any documentation respecting the purchase, sale, and mortgaging of Lot 16.

9Mr. Sidhu commenced the 2016 Action on October 28, 2016.

10The Plaintiff did not commence her own Action under the belief that she would receive her entitlement once the 2016 Action commenced by her ex-husband, Mr. Sidhu was resolved.

11On April 13, 2022, Mr. Sidhu, and Mr. Jain, through their respective counsel, agreed to complete an accounting respecting Lot 16, among other things.

12Mr. Sidhu and Mrs. Sidhu signed a trust agreement on May 25, 2023, resolving entitlement issues between them.

13On October 17, 2023, Mr. Jain’s lawyer emailed Mr. Sidhu’s lawyer. He said that Mr. Sidhu has no Locus Standi in the 2016 Action. This was the first time that Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc. took this position.

14On November 6, 2023, Mr. Sidhu’s lawyer, Mr. Moore, informed the Plaintiff’s family lawyer of Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc.’s new position.

15On November 22, 2023, the Plaintiff retained civil litigation counsel. On March 4, 2024, she commenced the within (2024) Action. Mrs. Sidhu claims that she was a one third beneficiary respecting Lot 16. Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc. were trustees. She claims damages flowing from breach of trust following the sale and mortgage of Lot 16. She claims that Mr.Jain and Lincoln Inc. breached their contractual and trust obligations by failing to provide an accounting and paying monies owed to Mrs. Sidhu.

16On April 26, 2024, Mr. Sidhu’s lawyer proposed a consolidation of the 2024 and 2016 Actions.

17On July 24, 2024, Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc.’s lawyer agreed to exchange Affidavits of Documents and conduct examinations for discovery pending the consolidation motion. Mrs. Sidhu and Mr. Sidhu both served their respective Affidavit of Documents in October 2024.

18Mr. Jain and Lincoln Inc. have not served their affidavit of documents. During cross examination, when asked to provide an affidavit of documents. Mr. Jain’s lawyer answered “No.”

19Mr. Sharma has not provided dates for examinations for discovery. On September 24, 2024, Mrs. Sidhu’s lawyer requested examination dates. Mr. Sharma asked for dates after February 28, 2025. Later, Mr. Sharma cross examined Mrs. Sidhu for a full day and a half on December 12 and December 13, 2024.

20On September 24, 2024, counsel attended triage court to schedule the consolidation motion. Justice Tzimas ordered a timetable for the consolidation motion. Mr. Sharma made no mention of scheduling a Cross Motion.

21On November 8, 2024, Mr. Sharma served Cross Motion materials seeking summary judgment and security for costs. The motion for summary judgment is grounded in Jain Lincoln’s limitation period defence. However, their affidavit provides very little evidence on when the limitation began.

22The security for costs motion provides no evidence of Mrs. Sidhu’s lack of assets in Ontario.

ANALYSIS

23These motions raise the following issues:

a) Is the Plaintiff’s action statute barred?

b) Should the 2016 and 2024 actions be consolidated?

c) Should Mr. Jain’s motion for summary judgment be granted?

d) Should the Applicant be required to pay a sum of money into the court as security for costs?

A) Is the Plaintiff’s action statute barred?

24Section 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act (RPLA) states:

4. No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrue to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 4.

25Section 23 of the RPLA states:

23. (1) No action shall be brought to recover out of any land or rent any sum of money secured by any mortgage or lien, or otherwise charged upon or payable out of the land or rent, or to recover any legacy, whether it is or is not charged upon land, but within ten years next after a present right to receive it accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for, or release of it, unless in the meantime some part of the principal money or some interest thereon has been paid, or some acknowledgment in writing of the right thereto signed by the person by whom it is payable, or the person’s agent, has been given to the person entitled thereto or that person’s agent, and in such case no action shall be brought but within ten years after the payment or acknowledgment, or the last of the payments or acknowledgments if more than one, was made or given R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 23 (1).

26The Court of Appeal in 1250140 Ontario Inc. v. Bader, 2022 ONCA 197, at para. 17, addressed an argument that the RPLA did not apply because the land was sold. The Court said that a mortgagee relying on Section 23, does not become disentitled to the limitation period under the RPLA just because the property was sold.

27In Studley v. Studley, 2022 ONCA 810, at para. 35, the Court of Appeal held that:

………an otherwise tenable trust claim in land, one that would be sheltered by s. 4 of the RPLA, cannot be defeated by the sale of that land.

28Section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, sets out a 2-year limitation from the date a claim is discovered unless where some other limitation period is prescribed. Section 1 of the Act defines “a claim” as “a claim to remedy an injury, loss or damage that occurred as a result of an act or omission.”

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS IN 2006

29In 2006, Mrs. Sidhu agreed to purchase a one-third interest in the land known by the parties as Lot 16. Mr. Jain sold Lot 16 in 2016 without Mrs. Sidhu’s knowledge and without her knowing what he did with the net proceeds of sale. When questioned during Discovery, he refused to answer questions relating to the net proceeds of sale of Lot 16. In 2024, Mrs. Sidhu filed a claim against Mr. Jain seeking damages for the unilateral sale of Lot 16.

30Is Mrs. Sidhu’s 2024 action statute barred, as claimed by Mr. Jain’s counsel because it was initiated 8 years after 2016? In my view, the applicable statute is the Real Property Limitation Act (“RPLA”) rather than the Limitations Act, 2002. The former relates to land while the latter relates to a claim to remedy an injury loss or damage that occurred as a result of an act or omission. Arguably, this latter definition is broad enough to cover the loss of an interest in land. However, section 4 of the Limitations Act specifically states that the Act applies unless some other limitation periods is prescribed.

31In my view, section 4 of the RPLA applies given that it relates to the issue of land. Section 42 of the RPLA states that a party can make a claim under there when property is sold: see Khan v. Taji, 2020 ONSC 6704, at paras. 57-77.

B) SHOULD THE ACTIONS BE CONSOLIDATED?

THE LAW

32Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Where Order May Be Made

6.01 (1) Where two or more proceedings are pending in the court and it appears to the court that,

a) they have a question of law or fact in common;

b) the relief claimed in them arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences;

or

c) for any other reason an order outght to be made under this rule, the court may order that,

d) the proceedings be consolidated, or heard at the same time or one immediately after the other;

or

e) any of the proceedings be,

(i) stayed until after the determination of any other of them,

or

(ii)asserted by way of counterclaim in any other of them. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r.6.01 (1).

(2) In the order, the court may give such directions as are just to avoid unnecessary costs or delay and, for that purpose, the court may dispense with service of a notice of listing for trial and abridge the time for placing an action on the trial list. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 6.01 (2).

Discretion of presiding judge

6.02 Where the court has made an order that proceedings be heard either at the same time or one immediately after the other, the judge presiding at the hearing nevertheless has discretion to order otherwise. R.R.O 1990, Reg. 194, r. 6.02.

33Perell and Morden, in The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario, First Edition, notes that:

In exercising its discretion whether to order the consolidation of proceedings or that they be heard simultaneously or consecutively, the court will consider the general rule, mandated by the Courts of Justice Act, that, as far as possible, multiplicity of proceedings shall be avoided, and a variety of factors including: (1) the extent of the difference of commonality of the factual or issues in the proceedings; (2) the status of the progress of the several proceedings; and (3) the convenience or inconvenience, in terms of time, money, due process and administration, of bringing the proceedings together. To this I would add the comments made by Quinn J. in Wood V. Farr Ford Ltd.:

The customarily expressed purpose of rule 6 is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, thereby preventing inconsistent dispositions, protecting the scarce resources of the court, and saving expense to the parties. However, it also safeguards against a tactical decision to subject a party or parties to more that one action and, therefore, it promotes fairness.

APPLICATION OF THE RULES TO THE FACTS

34The Applicant seeks to consolidate the actions commenced in 2016 and 2024. He maintains that both matters involve Lot 16. The 2016 action was initiated by Mr. Sidhu while Mrs. Sidhu initiated the 2024 action to claim her interest in Lot 16, which was sold without her knowledge in 2016. A hearing of both matters together would streamline the proceedings, enable counsel for Mr. and Mrs. Sidhu to jointly hold Discoveries, and would result in one trial therefore saving a considerable amount of court time.

35Mr. Sharma, on behalf of Mr. Jain, suggests otherwise. He raises a number of objections to the proposed plan of having the two matters dealt together. These are:

a) Mr. Sidhu has no standing in Mrs. Sidhu’s 2016 action because he was not a party to the 2006 agreement between Mrs. Sidhu and Mr. Jain;

b) He opposes consolidation of the two actions because they involve different proceedings and different parties, and would merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily.

36However, the evidence appears to contradict Mr. Sharma’s submission that Mr. Sidhu has no standing in the 2016 action. Mr. Sidhu filed an email from Mr. Jain in which the Respondent stated that Mr. Sidhu paid him $100,000 for property of which $33,000 was for Lot 16. Mr. Sidhu further referred in his materials at Master Bundle B-2-10, the extent of his financial contribution to Lot 16 and other properties owned by the Defendant Mr. Jain.

37Second, contrary to Mr. Jain’s, submission, the two actions involve the same parties and the same property, and ultimately involve questions surrounding Mr. Jain’s sale of Lot 16 and what happened to the net proceeds of sale. Having a joint hearing would therefore enhance court efficiency without prejudice to any of the parties. Having both actions heard together, in my view, would be in the interests of justice.

38For these reasons, I conclude that it is in the interests of justice to have both actions heard together.

C) Should Mrs. Sidhu be required to pay security for costs if the matters are heard together?

THE LAW

39Rule 56.01 (1) (a) provides that:

The court, on motion by the defendant or respondent in a proceeding, may make such order for security for costs as is just where it appears that, the plaintiff or applicant is ordinarily resident outside Ontario.

40On a motion for security for costs, a defendant must show that the plaintiff’s circumstances fall within one of the enumerated categories set out in the week. Once this is done, then the court has the discretion to grant or refuse an order for security: Chachula v. Bailee et al. (2004), 2004 CanLII 27934 (ON SC), 69 OR (3d) 175 (ONSC), at para. 10. In exercising its discretion, the court may make any order as to security for costs “as is just.” See Chachula, at para. 13; Hallum v. Canadian Memorial Chiropractic College (1989), 1989 CanLII 4354 (ON HCJ), 70 O.R. (2d) 119 (H.C.J.), at p. 123.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS

41In my view, it would be inappropriate for the court to make an order for security for costs for the following reasons:

i) Mrs. Sidhu’s claim against Mr. Jain is not frivolous or meritless;

ii) She is ordinarily resident in Ontario and owns property in the province; and

iii) She has approximately $400,000 equity in her residence.

42Lastly, Mrs. Sidhu is seeking to recover monies which may be due to her arising from the sale of Lot 16. It would simply not be in the interests of justice to require her to posts security for costs, while trying to recover what may be due to her. Accordingly, this order sought by Mr. Jain is denied.

COSTS

43Mrs. Sidhu seeks costs of $21,000 for both motions.

a) Mr. Jain seeks costs of $45,000 for both motions.

b) Mr. Sidhu seeks costs of $4,426.83, for having to respond to Mr. Jain’s cross-motion.

c) All three lawyers were called to the Bar in 2008.

44In assessing the amount of costs that can be considered fair and reasonable in this matter, I note the following:

1. Mrs. Sidhu has been substantially successful in these matters;

2. The matter required a considerable amount of research and the preparation of facta;

3. Mr. Jain adamantly refused to disclose the sale price of Lot 16 and what happened to the net proceeds of sale;

4. The matter required the scheduling of a long motion.

45BASED ON THESE FACTORS, I ORDER THAT:

1. The Defendant, Sachindra Jain, must pay costs, fixed in the amount of $20,000 inclusive, to the Applicant, Shinder Pal Kaur Sidhu, within ninety (90) days of this order;

2. The Defendant, Sachindra Jain, must pay costs, fixed in the amount of $4,000 inclusive, to the Defendant, Norman Sidhu, within ninety (90) days of this order.

ORDER

46ON READING the Notice of Motion and Affidavits filed and on hearing the submissions of the lawyers for the Plaintiff and the Defendants, in attendance,

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Actions bearing Cour File Nos. CV-24-00001055-0000 and CV-16-00004750-0000 shall be heard and tried together.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that the parties shall adhere to the following timetable:

(a) The Defendants, Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc. shall deliver their Affidavits of Documents within 21 days.

(b) Examinations for Discoveries shall be completed by May 31, 2025. Any further examination for discovery in the Action in Court File No. CV-16-00004750 shall be conducted jointly with the within Action.

(c) Undertakings shall be answered by June 30, 2025.

(d) The Plaintiff shall set the matter down by filing the trial record by July 31, 2025.

(e) Upon this matter being set down for trial, the parties shall attend assignment court to schedule a trial in both matters.

3. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Defendants, Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc.’s motion seeking summary judgment and security for costs is dismissed.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Defendants, Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc. shall pay costs to the Plaintiff fixed at $20.000 inclusive within ninety (90) days of todays date.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT THE Defendants, Sachindra Jain and Soneil Lincoln Inc. shall pay costs to Norman Sidhu, at $4,000 inclusive, within ninety (90) days of today’s date.

6. THIS ORDER BEARS INTEREST at the rate of 3.3% per cent per year commencing on April 14, 2025.