Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-15-00523546- 0000 Date: December 29, 2025 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Kimberley Lam, Plaintiff And: Hussan Amash also known as Hosam Amash also known as Sam Amash, Defendant

Andrew Francis, for the Plaintiff Not present

Heard: November 4, 2025

Des Rosiers J.

Reasons for Judgment

[1] In this action, the Plaintiff, Ms. Lam, is claiming repayment of loans, monies owed pursuant to a cohabitation agreement, compensation for the care that she provided to the Defendant, Mr. Amash, interest payments that she has had to make on a line of credit she incurred at the coercive insistence of Mr. Amash, and punitive/mental distress damages.

[2] In particular, Ms. Lam is claiming $167,000.00 for outstanding loans, interest incurred at the lender's rate of interest under the applicable outstanding mortgage loans, co-habitation agreement payments of $23,000.00, compensation damages for attendant care in the amount of $156.000,00 and punitive/mental distress damages in the amount of $250,000,00.

[3] Mr. Amash did not participate in the hearing.

[4] Ms. Lam's evidence was that she was exploited by Mr. Amash, who promised to marry her and repeatedly promised to pay her back all the money that she lent him over the ten years that she was in a relationship with him.

Background

[5] When the parties met in 2004, Ms. Lam was living with her parents. She was 43 years old and had spent several years looking after her parents and her siblings. She was a substitute teacher. She had pre-purchased a condo that she owned free and clear. She intended to move into her condo in the spring of 2005.

[6] Ms. Lam's evidence was that Mr. Amash pursued her and wanted to move in with her, so they signed a cohabitation agreement. Ms. Lam's father had suggested that they should sign such an agreement to protect her from Mr. Amash, who did not have a regular job, was younger than she was and did not appear to have much financial ability to contribute to expenses.

[7] According to the cohabitation agreement, Mr. Amash was to contribute $500 per month to the expenses of the condo. Except for two payments, he never did.

[8] Early in the relationship, Mr. Amash suggested that Ms. Lam get a Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) on her condo. The access to credit was to allow him to pursue business ventures whereby he would buy a house, renovate it and sell it for a profit. Mr. Amash took Ms. Lam to the bank and she signed the HELOC (with a maximum credit of $100,000). On the day on which she signed the HELOC, Ms. Lam advanced $10,000 to Mr. Amash for the purpose of buying a property.

[9] This would be the first of many loans that Ms. Lam would make to Mr. Amash. At the time, she thought that they were in a relationship because Mr. Amash had promised to marry her.

[10] Mr. Amash signed two promissory notes for additional loans. Both were repaid when Ms. Lam sued him in 2006. They negotiated minutes of settlement and obtained an Order from Justice Spiegel on June 30, 2006. The judgment was satisfied and Ms. Lam is not claiming any amount arising from Spiegel J.'s judgement.

[11] Despite this lawsuit, Ms. Lam and Mr. Amash got engaged in December 2006. Despite promises to change and repay her what he owed her, Mr. Amash continued to pressure Ms. Lam to loan him money. He would also get her to ask her parents to give her money so that she could lend him more money. The purpose of these loans was to finance the renovation of a house on Northland Avenue that Mr. Amash bought in his name alone, despite Ms. Lam's financial contributions.

[12] Ms. Lam asked and received from her father a $60,000 advance on her inheritance and loaned the money to Mr. Amash. This time, she secured a lien on the Northland Avenue House.

[13] On June 13, 2009, Mr. Amash was involved in a serious motorcycle accident. As a result of the accident, Mr. Amash's right leg was amputated below the knee. Mr. Amash relied on Ms. Lam for care and support while at the hospital, in rehab and upon his return to the Northland property.

[14] In 2010, Mr. Amash sold the Northland property, which had stairs and proved unmanageable for him. He bought a condo in close proximity to Ms. Lam's condo. Ms. Lam was able to recuperate $65,000 from the lien on the Northland property.

[15] Again, Ms. Lam lent money to Mr. Amash to complete renovations on his condo. Mr. Amash promised to pay her back from the settlement he expected from his motor vehicle accident.

[16] On April 13, 2013, Mr. Amash received a substantial settlement for his injuries ($6.4 million dollars). He did not tell Ms. Lam about the settlement.

[17] In October 2013, Ms. Lam ended the relationship. Mr. Amash promised to repay Ms. Lam. When she continued to text him asking for her money, in February 2014, he cut off all communications with her and blocked her texts and calls.

[18] Ms. Lam filed her statement of claim on March 9, 2015. A statement of defence was served on November 4, 2015, a reply on November 25, 2015, an amended statement of claim on July 19, 2019 and an amended statement of defence on September 11, 2019. Mr. Amash's defence was struck on May 22, 2025. This matter proceeded before me as an undefended trial on November 4, 2025.

[19] Pursuant to Rule 19.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, having not defended the proceeding because his defence was struck, a defendant is deemed to admit the truth of all allegations of fact made in the statement of claim.

[20] However, pursuant to Rule 19.06, a plaintiff is not entitled to judgment at a trial merely because the facts alleged in the statement of claim are deemed to be admitted, unless the facts entitle the plaintiff to judgment. The Plaintiff must satisfy the court that she is entitled to the damages claimed.

[21] In particular, Rule 19.05 provides that a motion for judgment which involves unliquidated damages shall be supported by evidence given by affidavit.

[22] Ms. Lam bears the burden of establishing her entitlement to the monies that she is claiming.

[23] The test on a motion for default judgement was set out in Elekta Ltd. v. Rodkin, 2012 ONSC 2062, at para. 14, as follows:

i) What deemed admissions of fact flow from the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim?

ii) Do those deemed admissions of fact entitle the plaintiff, as a matter of law, to judgment on the claim?

iii) If they do not, has the plaintiff adduced admissible evidence which, when combined with the deemed admissions, entitles it to judgment on the pleaded claim?

[24] The issues before me are:

• Is the claim statute-barred or inadmissible because of the application of the principle of res judicata?
• Is there sufficient evidence to support the existence of the various loans advanced to Mr. Amash?
• Is Ms. Lam entitled to be compensated for the interest that she is continuing to pay because she borrowed money to advance various loans to Mr. Amash?
• Is Ms. Lam entitled to compensation pursuant to the cohabitation agreement?
• Is Ms. Lam entitled to compensation for her care and companionship after Mr. Amash's accident?
• Is Ms. Lam entitled to punitive or mental distress damages?

[25] I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has established liability based upon the deemed admissions in the statement of claim, her affidavit affirmed on November 3, 2025 and her testimony in front of me on November 4, 2025. For the reasons below, I calculate her damages to be:

• $118,700 for unpaid loans from Mr. Amash;
• $19,607.94 for interest on loans to Mr. Amash;
• $19,000 for moneys owing pursuant to the cohabitation agreement;
• $40,000 as compensation for her loss of income while caring for Mr. Amash;
• $15,000 in damages for intangible harm and mental distress.

Limitation period

[26] Ms. Lam claims that she is not out of time to claim the repayment of the loans she gave to Mr. Amash because she relied on his promises that she would be paid back from the proceeds of the settlement for Mr. Amash's injuries.

[27] Ms. Lam testified that until Mr. Amash blocked her texts and calls in February 2014, she did not know that he did not intend to repay her the loans. At the time, she was not aware that he had received his settlement. She only found out through the discovery process that Mr. Amash received his settlement in the spring of 2013 and he never mentioned it to her.

[28] Ms. Lam relies on Mr. Amash's acknowledgement of the debt in his text of February 2014 to claim that the limitation period was interrupted. The text does constitute an acknowledgement of debt: 1475182 Ontario Inc. o/a Edges Contracting v. Ghotbi, 2021 ONSC 3477, 155 O.R. (3d) 272 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 35-37; 1702108 Ontario Inc. v. 3283313 Canada Inc., 2016 ONCA 420, 132 O.R. (3d) 237, at paras. 5-6; Middleton v. Aboutown Enterprises Inc., 2009 ONCA 466, at para. 1.

[29] I also agree with Ms. Lam that pursuant to s. 5(1)(a)(iv) and s. 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B, a reasonable person in her circumstances would not think that instituting proceeding against Mr. Amash was an appropriate means to seek a remedy until February 2014.

[30] I take into account the pattern of coercive control established between the parties. Ms. Lam was forbidden from discussing with her family the loans that she had given to Ms. Amash. I take into account the verbal and physical abuse that Ms. Lam described as part of the on-going relationship. She felt trapped and the longer the relationship lasted and the more indebted to her Mr. Amash became, the less able she was to extricate from the relationship, which only ended when Mr. Amash no longer needed her because he had received his insurance settlement.

[31] In assessing what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances, courts must avoid disregarding patterns of intimate partner coercion and violence that characterize a relationship such as the one between Ms. Lam and Mr. Amash. To suggest that Ms. Lam should have known much earlier that Mr. Amash was using her incorporates a myth/stereotype about intimate partner exploitation, that is, that the victim is able to leave the relationship at any time.

[32] In her testimony and the victim impact statement that she shared with the court, Ms. Lam described how she was isolated from her family and was ashamed of her credulous nature. Mr. Amash knowingly took advantage of her gullibility. I make this finding despite the fact she was able to institute proceedings for repayment of the promissory notes and had put a lien on the Northland property. Such actions were instituted in 2006 and 2008, before the pattern of exploitation deepened after Mr. Amash's accident.

[33] The litigation is therefore not statute-barred.

Res judicata

[34] I have reviewed the proceedings in front of Justice Spiegel and am satisfied that the issues before me were not part of the case put forth at that time, which concerned only the two promissory notes.

[35] In the present proceedings, Ms. Lam is not claiming any moneys arising out of the promissory notes nor of the minutes of settlement entered.

[36] The present litigation arises from the non-payment of loans, of the cohabitation contract and compensation for the care and support that Ms. Lam provided Mr. Amash after his accident. It is not subject to a dismissal on the basis that it was already decided.

The unpaid loans

[37] Ms. Lam has provided the court with her HELOC statement, and the identification of the transfers that she made to Mr. Amash, who has not participated in the present proceedings.

[38] The business records produced are consistent with Ms. Lam's testimony that she loaned Mr. Amash the following amounts:

Amount	Date	Purpose
$10,000	August 15, 2005	Initial amount at the time of the signing of the HELOC for the purposes of buying a property Admitted by Mr. Amash in his cross-examination
$15,000	February 20, 2006	Promissory Note Not claimed in the present proceedings
$40,000	April 20, 2006	Promissory Note Not claimed in the present proceedings
$15,000	May 11, 2006	For renovations – Northland property
$20,000	December 21, 2006	For renovations – Northland property The parties became engaged to each other Advance on heritage from Ms. Lam's parents
$14,000	January 2, 2007	For renovations – Northland property
$6,000	January 14, 2008	For renovations – Northland property
$1,700	January 25, 2008	For renovations – Northland property
$7,500	May 13, 2008	For renovations – Northland property
$19,500	August 8, 2008	For renovations – Northland property
$15,000	September 9, 2008	For renovations – Northland property
$60,000	September 15, 2008	Advance on inheritance from Ms. Lam's father to Ms. Lam
$10,000	October 11, 2008	For renovations – Northland property
$9,000	November 29, 2008	For renovations – Northland property
$2,000	December 17, 2010	For renovations to the condo on Queen's Quay
$5,000	January 4, 2011	For renovations to the condo on Queen's Quay
$1,000	May 24, 2011	For renovations to the condo on Queen's Quay
$2,000	September 1, 2011	For renovations to the condo on Queen's Quay
$12,000	March 16, 2012	For renovations to the condo on Queen's Quay
$209,700	Total
($65,000)		Less payment from the sale of the Northland property
($26,000)		Less payment of April 1, 2017
$118,700	Total

[39] To lend the money to Mr. Amash, Ms. Lam borrowed on her HELOC line of credit that she obtained on August 15, 2005 at Mr. Amash's insistence.

[40] Ms. Lam described a relationship marked by a pattern of financial, psychological, and even occasional physical abuse. Mr. Amash would promise to change and repay her the money he owed her and then he would not follow through. When she asked for payment, he promised that he would pay when he sold the next house. He promised marriage, children and love. If she balked at lending him money, he would threaten to leave her and to pursue other women. The pattern of abuse continued for many years.

[41] Ms. Lam believed that all the money she was lending to Mr. Amash was needed so that Mr. Amash could establish himself as a developer and generate income for their future together. Mr. Amash always promised to pay her back when he would make a profit.

[42] On December 21, 2006, Ms. Lam provided a loan of $20,000 from her HELOC to Mr. Amash. Again, Mr. Amash agreed the monies would be repaid to Ms. Lam.

[43] On January 2, 2007, Mr. Amash demanded further monies from Ms. Lam for the mortgage and renovations on his Northland property. Ms. Lam was coerced into loaning an additional of $14,000 to Mr. Amash from her HELOC. The parties again agreed to repayment in full of the loaned monies.

[44] Mr. Amash placed further demands on Ms. Lam during the month of January 2008 for additional monies. Ms. Lam was coerced into providing an additional $7,700. Mr. Amash again agreed to repay the monies in full.

[45] From May 13, 2008, to June 5, 2008, further loans of $7,500 were provided to Mr. Amash with the agreement that he would repay the money after the renovations to the Northland property were completed.

[46] On August 8, 2008, Mr. Amash again demanded and coerced Ms. Lam to provide funds. The Plaintiff provided $19,500 in a bank draft again on the agreement that the funds would be repaid.

[47] On September 9, 2008, another $15,000 loan was provided to Mr. Amash. The parties again agreed that the monies would be repaid.

[48] On October 11, 2008, Mr. Amash demanded additional monies for the renovations of the property. Ms. Lam provided $10,000 on the agreement that the funds would be repaid.

[49] A further $9,000 was loaned to Mr. Amash on November 11, 2008.

[50] By spring 2009, the renovations on the property were complete. Once the renovations were complete, Mr. Amash became distant, volatile and verbally abusive towards Ms. Lam. They did not move in together to the Northland property.

[51] Mr. Amash had his accident in June 2009.

[52] The Northland property was sold in early 2010 and Mr. Amash purchased a condo in proximity to Ms. Lam's condo. In October 2011, Mr. Amash asked Ms. Lam for monies so he could renovate his newly purchased condominium that he bought close to Ms. Lam. Mr. Amash made representations that he needed Ms. Lam in his life. Out of sympathy, Ms. Lam loaned him another $10,000 on the condition that Mr. Amash would repay this loan and all outstanding loans in full after the settlement from his motorcycle accident. Mr. Amash agreed.

[53] Mr. Amash made frequent promises during this period that all the loaned monies would be repaid from the settlement of his motorcycle accident. Ms. Lam relied on these representations.

[54] I find that the outstanding amount owed by Mr. Amash to Ms. Lam is $118,700.

Interest on the loans

[55] Ms. Lam claims that Mr. Amash should pay the mortgage that she now has on her condo. She argues that before she met Mr. Amash, she had no mortgage on the condo and that her indebtedness arises out of the loans that Mr. Amash had promised to repay.

[56] The evidence indicates that the HELOC was also used over the years to pay property taxes or credit cards, which could have been Ms. Lam's personal debts. I am not prepared to conclude that the entire debt that she now claims arose from Mr. Amash's failed promises.

[57] However, interest is due on the money borrowed. The loans were demand loans. Ms. Lam expected to be repaid out of the settlement funds which Mr. Amash received. I find it appropriate to use the date of receipt of his settlement as the date at which Ms. Lam claimed repayment of the loans, that is April 13, 2013. The interest owed is $19,607.94.

Claim pursuant to the cohabitation agreement

[58] Under the Co-habitation Agreement signed in 2005, Mr. Amash was supposed to contribute $500 per month for his share of co-habitation expenses.

[59] Ms. Lam could not produce a signed copy of the co-habitation agreement. She produced an affidavit from the law clerk who witnessed the parties' signature in 2005. This is not the best evidence. However, on a balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that Mr. Amash did sign the cohabitation agreement. He made two payments in 2005 pursuant to the agreement.

[60] Because the house on Northland Avenue was not completely renovated until the spring of 2009, I find that the parties continued to live at Ms. Lam's condo until the renovations were sufficiently advanced for Mr. Amash to reside at the Northland property.

[61] I assess that the outstanding balance is $19,000.

Compensation for services

[62] Ms. Lam claims $156,000 as compensation for her services to Mr. Amash after his accident until the relationship ended. She calculated her damages on $100 per day for the period from June 9, 2009 until October 2013.

[63] I am not prepared to make this award. Ms. Lam did not provide any evidence that she stopped working for the entire period. She did not produce her income tax returns for the years that would support her allegation that she worked substantially less than before to support and care for Mr. Amash.

[64] I also find that although Ms. Lam may have been present at the hospital and at the rehab centre for many days for Mr. Amash, this would not entitle her to compensation for attendant care. At that time, from his accident in June 2009 until he was discharged from the rehab center, on August 28, 2009, Mr. Amash was being cared for by the health care system.

[65] Based on her testimony that she attended to Mr. Amash's needs after he returned to the Northland property, and particularly when he moved to a condo close to hers, I am prepared to find that she provided services including cleaning, making meals, and driving Mr. Amash to appointments. I also find that Mr. Amash claimed that he needed attendant care in his insurance claim and that he promised that he would compensate her for the care she provided.

[66] Ms. Lam testified that she worked less as a substitute teacher during that time to look after Mr. Amash. I estimate that her care during the period from Mr. Amash's discharge from the hospital until the end of the relationship (from the fall of 2009 until fall of 2013) to amount to an amount closer to $40,000 to reflect an annual compensation of $10,000.

Punitive damages / mental distress

[67] Ms. Lam claims $250,000 in punitive damages. She argues that Mr. Amash deliberately breached his obligations in a manner that is in the utmost bad faith; that his conduct was malicious, oppressive, arbitrary and high-handed; was a marked departure from ordinary standards of decent behaviour; was harsh, vindictive, and reprehensible; offends the ordinary standards of morality or decency; was arrogant and callous, high-handed and egregious.

[68] In Whiten v. Pilot Insurance, 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, at para. 94, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the following principles for an award of punitive damages:

(1) Punitive damages are very much the exception rather than the rule,

(2) imposed only if there has been high-handed, malicious, arbitrary or highly reprehensible misconduct that departs to a marked degree from ordinary standards of decent behaviour.

(3) Where they are awarded, punitive damages should be assessed in an amount reasonably proportionate to such factors as the harm caused, the degree of the misconduct, the relative vulnerability of the plaintiff and any advantage or profit gained by the defendant,

(4) having regard to any other fines or penalties suffered by the defendant for the misconduct in question.

(5) Punitive damages are generally given only where the misconduct would otherwise be unpunished or where other penalties are or are likely to be inadequate to achieve the objectives of retribution, deterrence and denunciation.

(6) Their purpose is not to compensate the plaintiff, but

(7) to give a defendant his or her just desert (retribution), to deter the defendant and others from similar misconduct in the future (deterrence), and to mark the community's collective condemnation (denunciation) of what has happened.

(8) Punitive damages are awarded only where compensatory damages, which to some extent are punitive, are insufficient to accomplish these objectives, and

(9) they are given in an amount that is no greater than necessary to rationally accomplish their purpose.

(10) While normally the state would be the recipient of any fine or penalty for misconduct, the plaintiff will keep punitive damages as a "windfall" in addition to compensatory damages.

(11) Judges and juries in our system have usually found that moderate awards of punitive damages, which inevitably carry a stigma in the broader community, are generally sufficient.

See also Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2023 ONCA 476, 167 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 132, leave to appeal granted, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 529.

[69] One aspect of Mr. Amash's conduct in the present case, which has not been reviewed yet, is his disregard for an undertaking that he signed as part of this litigation to provide notice to Ms. Lam if he encumbered his condo property. Ms. Lam never received any notice of encumbrance. She recently discovered that Mr. Amash has significantly mortgaged the property over the years.

[70] I find that Mr. Amash exploited Ms. Lam. He took advantage of her for his own financial benefit. Ms. Lam was borrowing money to provide him these loans. She was not independently wealthy. She did not give the money: it was always understood and acknowledged by Mr. Amash that the loans were to be repaid.

[71] The question before me is whether the Whiten criteria are met in the present case. I must first determine whether the amount of compensatory damages awarded are insufficient to deter, denounce and condemn Mr. Amash's conduct.

[72] Punitive damages are not meant to compensate the victim. Ms. Lam testified and filed evidence that Mr. Amash's conduct has had a profound impact on her. She filed with the court her physician's assessment of her depression and of the psychological impact that the relationship with Mr. Amash has had on her. She finds herself beleaguered by debts and suffering from on-going depression as a result of the exploitative relationship with Mr. Amash

[73] I find it appropriate to award $15,000 as damages of mental distress to reflect the exploitation and Mr. Amash's disregard for the impact of his conduct on Ms. Lam.

[74] Mr. Amash chose not to defend this action. He has provided no explanation for his behaviour throughout the years.

Prejudgment interest

[75] No pre-judgment interest is due on the interest for the loan. Prejudgment runs from the date of the statement of claim (March 9, 2015) to the date of this judgment December 24, 2025 on $192,700.

[76] Prejudgement interest owed is $27,061.94.

Costs

[77] Ms. Lam is claiming $17,440.80 in costs that she paid to previous counsel. I award 40% of these costs to reflect what would have been awarded on a partial indemnity basis: $7000.

[78] She is also claiming the legal expenses that she has incurred to prepare for trial. I have reviewed the bill of costs presented by counsel. I award costs on a partial indemnity in the amount of $10,195.09. I find the expenses reasonable and within the contemplation of the Defendant.

Conclusion

[79] I rule that the Defendant, Hussam Amash, also known as Hosam Amash, also known as Sam Amash (the "Defendant"), shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $212,307.94.

• $118,700 for unpaid loans from Mr. Amash;
• $19,607.94 for interest on the loans to Mr. Amash;
• $19,000 for moneys owing pursuant to the cohabitation agreement;
• $40,000 as compensation for her loss of income while caring for Mr. Amash;
• $15,000 in damages for intangible harm and mental distress.

[80] The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff pre-judgment interest at the rate of 1.30 per cent per year from March 9, 2015 to December 24, 2025 for a total sum of $27,061.94.

[81] The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff her costs of this action in the amount of $17,195.09 on a partial indemnity basis (exclusive of the previous costs award of $4,117.26 issued against the Defendant in this action on May 22, 2025).

Des Rosiers J.

Released: December 29, 2025