R. v. Chegini, 2025 ONSC 6907

Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-25-00000118-00BR Date: 2025-12-10 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King -- and -- Armin Chegini

Counsel: Thomas Surmanski, for the Crown Melina Macchia, for the Defence

Heard: November 7 & 24, 2025

Reasons for Sentence

R.F. Goldstein J.

1On November 7, 2025, Armin Chegini pleaded guilty to the following counts:

• Uttering threats against Negin Habibollahian;
• Assault with a weapon, a firearm, on Negin Habibollahian;
• Possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, a .45 handgun;
• Unlawfully confining Negin Habibollahian against her will; and,
• Disobeying an court order.

2I heard sentencing submissions on November 24, 2025. I sentenced Mr. Chegini on December 1, 2025 and gave abbreviated oral reasons for sentence. I indicated that my full reasons in writing would be published in due course. What follows are my full reasons.

Facts

3The facts are very troubling.

4Mr. Chegini and the victim were in a common law relationship and had a child together. They shared an apartment at 1 Bloor Street East. There were several occasions where Mr. Chegini threatened the victim. On March 3, 2022, at about 4:00 am, the victim asked Mr. Chegini to turn down the very loud music he was playing as their child was sleeping. Mr. Chegini had consumed cocaine. He told her to "shut the fuck up". He pointed a firearm at her head and told her to get on her knees. He then pulled the trigger, making a clicking sound. Fortunately, the firearm was unloaded. The victim was so afraid that she urinated. Mr. Chegini called her a "filthy bitch" and told her to wash herself.

5Two weeks later, on March 17, 2022, police attended the apartment of Mr. Chegini and the victim. They came in response to a call from a friend of the victim that Mr. Chegini had a gun, was being abusive, had a cocaine problem, and that their child was in the apartment. The police observed physical bruising on the victim. The victim told the police that she had taken a gun from Mr. Chegini while he was passed out after taking cocaine. She had hidden it in the laundry room. The police located a .45 handgun loaded with six rounds of ammunition. The ammunition was hollow-point ammunition. The police arrested Mr. Chegini.

6Mr. Chegini was released from custody on March 25, 2022, after about a week in custody. He was released on a house arrest bail. He was not to leave his residence except in the presence of his sureties. Other conditions included:

• He was not to communicate with the victim by any means whatsoever except pursuant to a family court order for the purpose of having contact with his child;
• He was not to be with 200 meters of anywhere he knew the victim to be, including the location of their apartment at 1 Bloor Street East, except for one occasion to retrieve belongings or see his child, and only in the presence of a uniformed police officer.

7Two days later, on March 27, 2022, at about 4:00 am, Mr. Chegini went to 1 Bloor Street East, where he was specifically prohibited from attending. At the time, their child was staying in Barrie with the family of the victim. Mr. Chegini forced the victim into a vehicle and repeatedly punched her and slapped her. He drove her to his mother's residence at 7 Fairview Avenue in Richmond Hill. He told the victim that he was going to kill her. She urinated herself in fear. Mr. Chegini then started driving towards Barrie, where their child was staying. Prior to arriving at the address of the victim's family, Mr. Chegini ripped off the victim's clothing. She managed to escape from the vehicle in her bra and underwear. She flagged down a passing motorist and obtained help. Mr. Chegini was arrested at some point later. While he was in custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre, Mr. Chegini contacted the cell phone belonging to the victim's mother. He spoke to her despite an order prohibiting communication.

Impact On The Victim

8The victim, Ms. Habibollahian, filed a victim impact statement. Photographs of her from the March 27 incident was entered into evidence. The photographs show that she suffered bruising and scratching to her face, chest, and arms. She described the fear, panic, and trauma of the night that Mr. Chegini put a gun to her head. She also described the fear and terror when Mr. Chegini kidnapped her after being released on bail. Not surprisingly, the fear and trauma remain with her even now, some three years later. She continues to experience headaches, stomach aches, and bodily pain. Financially, she has been broken by this experience. She continues to live in fear that Mr. Chegini will do what he did before, which was violate a court order and terrorize her and her children. Given the circumstances, her fears are not at all groundless.

Circumstances Of Mr. Chegini

9I turn next to Mr. Chegini's personal circumstances. Prior to this incident, Mr. Chegini had no criminal record. He was 35 or 36 at the time of the offences. Ms. Macchia informs me that before the Covid pandemic he was working as a sales manager at a car dealership. During the pandemic he was not able to work, and he fell into a cocaine addiction. Some casual drug use, apparently, escalated to debilitating drug use. He has siblings in the United States. He has an address to live in -- his mother's condominium -- and his plan is to find a job when he gets out of custody. It is difficult to see how a man in his mid-30's who has lived a pro-social life, with a responsible job and a child, could spiral into a situation where he obtains a handgun and commits horrendous crimes against an intimate partner. Drug addiction, however, is an evil that is known to stimulate anti-social behaviour that is out of character. One hopes that the absence of drugs when he is released will ease Mr. Chegini's rehabilitation. In custody, Mr. Chegini has completed courses and as far as I am aware has generated no institutional misconducts. That also bodes well for his rehabilitation.

Aggravating And Mitigating Factors

10There are many aggravating factors in this case. The most important is the nature of the case. This is a case of intimate partner violence with a gun and a kidnapping. It is aggravating that Mr. Chegini kept a gun in his apartment with a small child. One can only imagine the potential tragic consequences if his daughter found the gun and started to play with it, not knowing what it was. It is an aggravating factor that Mr. Chegini pointed the gun at the victim and pressed the trigger, causing the firearm to make a clicking sound. Fortunately, the gun was unloaded. I have no evidence that Mr. Chegini actually intended to shoot the victim in the head, but I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to conduct a mock execution. What else could it have been? One can only imagine the terror the victim felt. It must have been agonizing for her, believing that she might be shot in the head while her small child was left alone in the apartment with the man who shot her.

11I also find it aggravating that Mr. Chegini had hollow-point ammunition. Although not prohibited, hollow point ammunition is designed to cause a maximum amount of injury.

12It is, of course, a statutory aggravating factor that this case involved an intimate partner: Criminal Code, s. 718.2(a)(ii).

13There are some mitigating factors. The most important mitigating factor is the guilty plea. By pleading guilty, Mr. Chegini took responsibility for his actions. That is important and I accept that after more than three years in custody, and after hearing his apology, that he is remorseful. What is more important, however, is that by pleading guilty Mr. Chegini spared the victim from having to testify. That is always important in a case of intimate partner violence, but I think in this case it takes on some extra importance. These were events that anyone would have found absolutely terrifying. Forcing the victim to relive them through testimony would undoubtedly have been traumatizing in and of itself.

14I also find that it is mitigating that Mr. Chegini has taken steps towards rehabilitation while in custody, such as taking courses to deal with substance abuse and anger management.

Positions Of The Parties

15The Crown and the defence are ad idem on the amount of time Mr. Chegini should be credited for time in custody. They are not, however, ad idem on the bottom line sentence. The Crown's position is that I should impose a sentence of 8 years. The defence position is that a sentence of 6 years is appropriate, and that when Mr. Chegini receives credit for pre-sentence custody he is in a time-served position. The Crown's position is that Mr. Chegini should serve another 19.5 months in custody plus three years probation.

16As of today's date, Mr. Chegini will have spent 1355 days real in custody. That breaks down as follows: from March 27, 2022 to December 1, 2025, 1346 real days; and 9 days from March 17, 2022 to March 25, 2022. At the rate of 1.5:1 that works out to enhanced credit of 2032.5 days. Counsel have agreed that I should grant a further 286 days credit for harsh conditions of custody: R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754. Ordinarily I would prefer to treat harsh conditions of custody as a mitigating factor rather than as a mathematical value: R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344. Under the circumstances, however, I have experienced Crown and defence counsel who have negotiated and presented me with a joint position on that aspect of sentence. I have reviewed the lockdown records provided by Ms. Macchia. I have also reviewed the programming courses taken by Mr. Chegini while in custody. After reviewing those documents, I agree that counsel are proposing a reasonable amount of credit that is within the range open to a sentencing court: R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43. Accordingly, I will implement the joint position on that aspect of sentence. Mr. Chegini will be credited with 2318.5 days (which I will round down to 2318 days for ease of calculation), or about 6.35 years (or approximately 6 years and 4 months).

Principles of Sentencing

17The appropriate sentence is informed by the aggravating and mitigating factors, the facts read in by the Crown and accepted by the defence, and the principles of sentencing. The fundamental principle is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. This was a remarkably serious set of offences. It involved a man not only pointing a gun at the head of his intimate partner while she was on her knees, it also involved a mock execution. This took place while their very young child was in the apartment. It also involved kidnapping his intimate partner shortly after release from custody in violation of court orders and threatening, again, to kill her. The degree of responsibility here is, as a result, very high.

18Also of importance in this case are specific deterrence, general deterrence, and protection of the public. Although no one principle is more important than any other, in the circumstances of this case specific deterrence demands that Mr. Chegini understand that any repetition of this behaviour, in any way, will result in more charges, that he will not get bail, and he will face an even stiffer penalty than he does now. Moreover, Mr. Chegini must understand that the possession of an illegal firearm again will land him a sentence of at least 6-7 years just for a gun alone -- given that it would be his second gun conviction -- on top of any other illegal behaviour. Naturally general deterrence and denunciation also require a stiff sentence. Handguns, as our courts have stated over and over again, are a plague in this city. They have shortened many lives and brought fear and terror. When used to threaten an intimate partner they may not result in the physical shortening of a life, but they surely cause extreme emotional damage -- as the victim has described. The fact that this occurred in a setting of intimate partner violence is critical: R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36.

19Rehabilitation plays a role in this case, but under the circumstances it plays a lesser role than specific and general deterrence and denunciation. Mr. Chegini can be rehabilitated. He lived a pro-social life with a responsible job for many years. I accept Ms. Macchia's assertion that the loss of employment and an addiction to cocaine drove him to commit these terrible crimes -- after all, they happened when he was a mature man, in his 30's with no criminal record, and no prior indication that he would obtain a gun and use it in such a horrific and dehumanizing manner. Under the circumstances, if Mr. Chegini can get his life back together he does have rehabilitative prospects.

The Appropriate Range Of Sentence

20I have been referred to several cases by Crown and defence. I need only mention a few.

21In R. v. Freedland, 2019 ONSC 4324, the offender counselled another person, James, to extort and kidnap some lawyers with whom he had had "trouble" in the past. They purchased a firearm and ammunition together. They stored the weapons and ammunition at James's apartment. Through unrelated means the police discovered the weapons and uncovered the plan. Justice Akhtar, acknowledging that it was an unusual case, imposed a three years sentence less pre-sentence custody. With respect, I simply do not think that case is applicable to these facts.

22In R. v. Levy, 2024 ONSC 1454, Stephanie Wiseman pleaded guilty to one count of kidnapping. She was dating Martin Levy. Levy, with others, had kidnapped an international student and held him for ransom for 13 days. Wiseman admitted to aiding and abetting by attending the house and shopping for supplies for the house where the student was being held. Levy was acquitted at his trial. Wiseman was 32 with two children. She had a history of being sexually abused. At paragraph 26 and following of her reasons my colleague Justice Forestell analyzed the range of sentence for kidnapping. She stated at para. 26:

There is a wide range of sentence for kidnapping. The range is generally said to be from 6 years to life imprisonment. Sentences in the 6 to 10-year range are considered to be at the low end of the range and are reserved for cases that do not have aggravating features like gratuitous violence and for offenders who played a lesser role. A minimal role in the offence and mitigating personal circumstances may, exceptionally, bring the sentence below the 6 to 10-year range.

23Justice Forestell found that exceptional circumstances existed and sentenced Wiseman to 22 months. Although obviously I agree with the range of sentence set out by Justice Forestell, Ms. Wiseman's role in the kidnapping is obviously quite distinguishable from Mr. Chegini's role.

24Ms. Macchia also cited R. v. Jazei, 2024 ONCJ 338. Mr. Jazei and three accomplices, including one who identified him, lured the victim into a vehicle where they put an imitation firearm to his head, assaulted him, drove him a short distance, kicked him out of the vehicle, and assaulted him some more. the victim suffered no serious injuries. Justice MacKay recognized the 6-10 year range for violent kidnappings. Mr. Jazei was, however, a very young first offender and the kidnapping was of only a short duration. He imposed a one-year sentence. Although Jazei has some features in common with this case, I find that it is ultimately distinguishable. Unlike in this case, the duration was short. It was not committed in the face of a non-communication order. Most importantly, it did not involve an intimate partner.

25In R. v. Crawford, 2014 BCCA 175, the B.C. Court of Appeal at para. 23 summarized some of the criteria a court might consider during a sentencing for kidnapping:

Kidnappings do not fall into distinct categories. However, the jurisprudence identifies multiple criteria that are indicative of the gravity of the offence on a spectrum, including:

a) the purpose of the kidnapping, specifically whether it is carried out for ransom or as a means of extorting a payment or repayment from the victim;

b) the extent to which there is planning and premeditation;

c) the length and conditions of the confinement;

d) the extent to which there is violence, torture or significant physical injuries;

e) whether third parties are threatened;

f) whether guns are used;

g) whether there is gang involvement;

h) whether the kidnapping occurs in the course of the commission of another offence; and

i) the circumstances in which the kidnapping ends.

26Other cases cited to me are generally accordance the ranges set out in the cases. In R. v. Millan and Celaj, 2017 ONSC 2514, for example, Dunphy J. sentenced a youthful female offender who had lesser involvement in a violent kidnapping to four years and three months. He sentenced an offender who was also convicted of robbery and aggravated assault to four years and nine months. I note that this case did not involve an intimate partner or a firearm.

27See also: R. v. Delchev, 2014 ONCA 448 with regard to the possession of a firearm (although that case also considered guns and drugs together); R. v. Oppong, 2017 ONSC 6684 (upheld by the Court of Appeal at R. v. Oppong, 2021 ONCA 352), a case that considered ranges for kidnapping in a gang (but not intimate partner) context.

28After reviewing the cases, and considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, I must say that the only reason Mr. Chegini is not facing a sentence close to or in the range of double digits is because he has pleaded guilty and spared the victim from testifying. Testimony from the victim no doubt would have resulted in her having to face Mr. Chegini, generating more fear, terror, and trauma. Under those circumstances I find that the guilty plea is very mitigating.

29In my respectful view, however, a six-year global sentence is at the low end of the range and does not go far enough to properly denounce this series of crimes especially when I consider the cases summarized above. That is because it is not only the kidnapping that is at issue here. During the first incident, the possession of the gun alone would ordinarily attract a sentence of 2-3 years. When combined with the highly aggravating factor of pointing the gun at the victim and pressing the trigger -- with their daughter in the apartment -- I find that a combined sentence involving the offences on March 17, 2022, alone could very easily attract a sentence in excess of 6 years.

30The second incident, the kidnapping, could easily attract a consecutive sentence in the range of 6-9 years. That would then leave the sentence for disobeying an order of the court, which could also attract a consecutive sentence under these circumstances of a year or more.

31The total sentence for all these offences, if consecutive, after trial, and before the principles of totality and restraint are taken into account, could attract a combined sentence of between 13 to 16 years. Even with the mitigating factor of the guilty plea and the application of the principle of totality, and despite the very fine submissions made by Ms. Macchia, I find that a sentence of 6 years does not properly denounce this crime.

32That said, I do accept that the guilty plea, which meant that the victim did not have to testify, and as I keep repeating, is very important. Although I considered putting the parties on notice that I thought a higher sentence than the one sought be the Crown was in order (and inviting submissions), I decided not to do so given that this is a range of sentence proposed by experienced Crown and experienced defence counsel who are obviously in possession of more facts about the case that I am.

33I also accept that totality and restraint are important concepts for a first offender in his 30's who has rehabilitative prospects. Accordingly, when I consider all of the circumstances, I find that a global sentence of 7 1/2 years, or 2737.5 days (which I will round down to 2737 days) should be imposed. When pre-sentence custody is taken into account, I find that Mr. Chegini should serve a further 419 days (approximately 14 months) in custody. There will also be a period of three years probation.

34Let me clarify one thing: I would have given a higher sentence on Count 9, kidnapping, but for the principle of totality.

35The sentence will be broken down as follows:

• Count 2: Uttering threats against Negin Habibollahian: Time served, with credit for 365 days (1 year).
• Count 5: Assault with a weapon, a firearm: Time served, with credit for 1460 days (4 years) concurrent to Count 2.
• Count 8: Possession of a loaded prohibited firearm: Time served, with credit for 1460 days (4 years) concurrent to Count 2.
• Count 9: Kidnapping: Time served, with credit for 858 days (approximately 29 months), consecutive to Counts 5 and 8.
• Count 11: disobeying a lawful order: 419 days (approximately 14 months), consecutive to Count 9.

36Thus, Mr. Chegini will have another 419 days to serve.

37While he is in custody there will be a no-contact order with Negin Habibollahian.

38At the conclusion of his sentence Mr. Chegini will be placed on probation for three years. The terms of his probation will be as follows:

• He is to report to a probation officer within 48 hours of release and thereafter as required, but at intervals of no less than once per month, with the means of contact to be within the absolute discretion of the probation officer.
• He is to have no contact, directly or indirectly, with the Negin Habibollahian, except through counsel for the purposes of family law proceedings or pursuant to a family law order made after today's date.
• He is to provide a report to his probation officer every time he deals with Negin Habibollahian through counsel and provide the results of any family law proceedings or negotiations to his probation officer.
• He is not to be within 200 meters of any place he knows Negin Habibollahian to live, work, or go to school.
• He is to take substance abuse counselling as required by his probation officer and sign all necessary releases to allow his probation officer to monitor his progress.
• He is to take anger management counselling as required by his probation officer and sign all necessary releases to allow his probation officer to monitor his progress.
• He is to take any other counselling required by his probation officer probation officer and sign all necessary releases to allow his probation officer to monitor his progress.
• He is to possess no weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.
• He is to inform his probation officer of any change of address within 48 hours.

39These conditions are in addition to the statutory conditions, including keeping the peace and being of good behaviour.

40Mr. Chegini will be placed on two separate s. 109 orders. The first order, which will apply to Counts 2, 5, and 8 will be for ten years. The second order, which will apply to Count 9, will be for life.

41Mr. Chegini will also be required to give a sample of his DNA.

R.F. Goldstein J.