Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 25-100694-ES Date: October 30, 2025

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Karen Sabarros, Plaintiff

- and -

Nally Catala Morell, Defendant

Before: Associate Justice Kamal

Counsel:

• Karen Sabarros, self-represented Plaintiff
• Jenny Bogod and Diana Simonetti, for the Defendant

Endorsement

[1]

On August 26, 2025, a case conference occurred before me. At the conference, Ms. Morell requested a summary dismissal under Rule 2.1.01. I dispensed with the requirement of Form 2.1B outlined in rule 2.1.01(6) and set out timelines for submissions to be served and filed.

[2]

I have now received and reviewed all submissions, and this is my decision with respect to Ms. Morell's request for a summary dismissal under Rule 2.1.01.

[3]

For the reasons that follow, the request pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 is dismissed. I do not find that this is a clear case where the frivolous or abusive nature of the claim is apparent on its face. Ms. Sabarros raises arguments under the broad dependant's relief provision of the SLRA that might warrant consideration by the Court.

Background

[4]

Karen Sabarros has commenced two proceedings with respect to her late father's estate. In this action, Ms. Sabarros is pursuing a claim for dependant's relief. Ms. Sabarros has also issued an Application in which she is seeking to challenge the Will of the Deceased based on her entitlement as a dependant under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act ("SLRA").

[5]

This request for a summary dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 is only with respect to the action dependant's relief.

[6]

According to the Statement of Claim, Ms. Sabarros is seeking support from her late father's estate, pursuant to section 58 of the SLRA, based on her father's failure to provide financial assistance from the time he left their household when she was three years old, through to the completion of her post-secondary education.

[7]

Ms. Sabarros is now 37 years old. She acknowledges throughout the Statement of Claim that since her parents' separation in 1991, when she was about three, her father provided no child or financial support to her or her mother, and that she never received support from him, including before his death.

[8]

Ms. Sabarros is seeking to hold her father accountable for his failure to support her financially (as well as emotionally) and for his neglect, which she is asking the Court to "correct".

Analysis

General Principle under Rule 2.1.01

[9]

Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a summary procedure that allows the court to dismiss a proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the process of the court.

[10]

Rule 2.1 must be "interpreted and applied robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise their gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process". See: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8.

[11]

It is not for close calls; it may only be used in "the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process". See Mohammad v. McMaster University, 2023 ONCA 598, at para. 6, citing Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8; Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320, at para. 6.

[12]

The Court of Appeal has also said that Rule 2.1 is an extremely blunt instrument. It is reserved for the clearest of cases, where the hallmarks of frivolous, vexatious, or abusive litigation are plainly evident on the face of the pleading. Rule 2.1 is not meant to be an easily accessible alternative to a pleadings motion, a motion for summary judgment, or a trial. See Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625 at para. 12.

[13]

The Court may consider whether the allegations are entirely implausible. The Court may ask itself, "What if the plaintiff's allegations are true"? See Husain v. Craig, [2015] O.J. No. 1300, 2015 ONSC 1754 (S.C.J.), at para. 10 and Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625 at para. 11.

[14]

The statement of claim must be read generously, and I must assume that the assertions of fact are true unless they are obviously implausible or ridiculous. See: Sumner v. Ottawa (Police Services), 2023 ONCA 140 at para. 9.

Positions of the Parties

[15]

Ms. Morrell's position is that Ms. Sabarros does not meet the statutory threshold for two reasons. First, she was not receiving support from her father at the time of his death. Second, she was not legally entitled to support, having long since reached adulthood. Accordingly, Ms. Morrell submits that this action is frivolous.

[16]

Furthermore, Ms. Morrell submits that Ms. Sabarros is improperly using her dependant's relief claim, as set out in this action, to gain a tactical advantage in support of her parallel Application to challenge the validity of the Will. Ms. Morrell submits that this conflation of proceedings is inappropriate and an abuse of process.

[17]

Ms. Sabarros submits that this action is not frivolous or without merit. Ms. Sabarros relies on section 57(1) of the SLRA, which defines a dependant to include a child of the deceased "to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death."

[18]

Ms. Sabarros submits that this action and the Application are two distinct proceedings that engage different legal issues. This action concerns her entitlement under Part V of the SLRA, while the Application concerns the fundamental validity of the Deceased's Will. Ms. Sabarros submits that both proceedings were brought appropriately and in good faith.

Frivolous

[19]

A "frivolous" action is a proceeding that lacks a legal basis or legal merit: Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, at para. 14.

[20]

Section 57(1) of the SLRA defines a dependant to include a child of the deceased "to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death."

[21]

Ms. Sabarros' claim is based on this second branch, as she takes the position that her father remained under a legal obligation to support her by virtue of a court order requiring her father to pay child support for her benefit. The order is dated June 15, 1998. That order was enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office and expressly provided that any arrears would accrue interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

[22]

Ms. Morrell relies on Ms. Sabarros' admission that she never received support from her late father. However, this is not a material issue.

[23]

Ms. Morrell further submits that Ms. Sabarros' claim is, at its core, an effort to enforce the 1998 Order against the Estate. Ms. Morrell is of the view that this distinction between enforcing arrears and entitlement to ongoing support is critical. While arrears may continue as a debt claimable against an estate, that does not satisfy the statutory requirement that the deceased was providing or legally obligated to provide support immediately before death.

[24]

I do not agree with Ms. Morrell's submission that the distinction described above is determinative of this proceeding being frivolous. The definition of child in sections 57(1) or 1(1) of the SLRA does not limit the term "child" to mean only a minor child. The fact that Ms. Sabarros had reached adulthood at the time of her father's death does not automatically remove her from the statutory definition of "child" or clearly disentitle her to claim relief under Part V of the SLRA. This is an issue more appropriately addressed through full legal argument.

[25]

Ms. Morrell also relies heavily on the Family Responsibility Office's (FRO) exclusive authority to enforce an Order, unless the Order is no longer filed with the FRO's office. Section 8(3) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act ("FRSAEA") also precludes FRO from taking steps to enforce against an estate, and this Court has held that FRO "continues to retain exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of the support Order, even if such enforcement is prohibited as against the estate." See Dagg v. Cameron Estate, 2016 ONSC 1125 at para. 24 (aff'd at 2016 ONSC 1892 (Ont Div Ct) and varied on other grounds at 2017 ONCA 366 (Ont CA)).

[26]

I do not agree that section 8(3) assists in determining whether this action is frivolous. Section 8(3) precludes the Director (FRO) from taking steps to enforce against an estate; it does not preclude the claimant from taking steps to enforce or seek relief under the SLRA.

[27]

Ms. Morrell also submits that Ms. Sabarros does not have standing to enforce a support Order to which she is not a party. Ms. Sabarros is not the recipient of the support Order; the recipient is her mother. Any arrears are owed to the mother and not the claimant.

[28]

However, child support is the right of the child and cannot be bargained away by the recipient parent. See Gray v. Rizzi, 2016 ONCA 152 at para 58. Accordingly, Ms. Sabarros raises an interesting legal issue worthy of consideration.

[29]

The fact that Ms. Sabarros did not have a relationship with her father at the time of his death is not an important consideration for this motion.

[30]

The SLRA is remedial in nature and was enacted to prevent dependants from being left unsupported, whether a person dies intestate or with a will. Section 58(1) gives the Court broad discretion to make provision for a dependant as it considers adequate. See Cummings v. Cummings at para. 43. As Justice McLachlin remarked in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, the SLRA must be interpreted through the prism of modern values, and the generosity of the language suggests that the legislature was attempting to craft a formula that would permit the courts to make orders that are just in the specific circumstances and in light of contemporary standards.

[31]

As Rule 2.1.01 is to be used only for the clearest of cases, I am not persuaded that this is a clear-cut case that can be determined to be frivolous, based on my reading of the pleadings and the submissions. The arguments and allegations of Ms. Sabarros are not completely implausible. Ms. Sabarros raises issues that are worthy of consideration by this Court.

Abuse of Process

[32]

A proceeding is an abuse of process when it is inconsistent with the objectives of public policy. See Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, at paras. 16, relying on Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000).

[33]

The Supreme Court of Canada recently discussed the doctrine of abuse of process and multiple proceedings in Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4 at paras. 33 to 44.

[34]

The doctrine of abuse of process is concerned with the administration of justice and fairness. The doctrine engages the power of the court to prevent misuse of its proceedings in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party or would in some way bring the administration of justice into disrepute. See Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para. 37; Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, at para. 39; Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, at para. 33.

[35]

A multiplicity of proceedings that engage the same issues can amount to an abuse of process. However, the abuse of process analysis does not end when multiple or similar proceedings exist. Rather, the analysis needs to focus on whether allowing the litigation to proceed would violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice. Where, for example, having duplicative proceedings would waste the resources of the parties, courts, and witnesses, or risk inconsistent results and therefore undermine the credibility of the judicial process, this can amount to an abuse of process. See Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4.

[36]

In Toronto (City) v. CUPE, Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, the Supreme Court decision described abuse of process as a "flexible doctrine" that prevents proceedings from being used in a way that would be "manifestly unfair to a party to litigation or in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute".

[37]

Ms. Morrell submits that Ms. Sabarros's action is an abuse of process because she is improperly using her dependant's relief claim in this action to gain a tactical advantage in support of her parallel Application to challenge the validity of the Deceased's Will.

[38]

The materials before me do not demonstrate that Ms. Sabarros' claim is being used to gain a tactical advantage in support of her Application or for any other improper purpose.

[39]

Ms. Morrell also takes issue with the fact that Ms. Sabarros states that her mother will be swearing an affidavit in support of her Application to challenge the Will, attesting to the hardship she endured as a result of the Deceased's failure to pay support. Ms. Morrell submits that this demonstrates an improper overlap and duplication.

[40]

I do not agree with Ms. Morrell. While there may be evidence that is common to both proceedings, this does not violate principles such as judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice. Having these separate proceedings would not waste the resources of the parties, courts, and witnesses, or risk inconsistent results and therefore undermine the credibility of the judicial process. These claims in each proceeding are distinct, and I do not view this as an abuse of process.

Moral and Equitable Considerations

[41]

Ms. Sabarros relies on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, and submits that the Court must consider both the legal and moral obligations of a deceased when determining whether adequate provision has been made for dependants.

[42]

Ms. Morrell's position is that moral considerations inform the quantum of support once a dependant is established; they do not create dependant status in the absence of statutory entitlement. The Court of Appeal in Verch Estate v. Weckwerth, 2014 ONCA 338 at para. 5, rejected the proposition that moral considerations can override the statutory threshold. Ms. Morrell submits that Ms. Sabarros does not have standing to bring this action, and a moral obligation cannot create standing.

[43]

It is not appropriate for me to determine the issue of Ms. Sabarros' standing on this motion. The relevant consideration for me is that it is not plain and obvious that Ms. Sabarros does not have standing, nor is it clear-cut that Ms. Sabarros's reliance on moral obligation is devoid of merit.

Submissions as Evidence

[44]

Ms. Morrell's submissions dedicate a section that Ms. Sabarros' submissions attempt to introduce evidence.

[45]

Ironically, Ms. Morrell's submissions specifically state "if one were to delve into the evidence, it would demonstrate…"

[46]

Both parties have attempted to rely on unsworn evidence in their submissions.

[47]

The case law is clear that no evidence is to be submitted on a Rule 2.1 motion. However, the Court may review reasons and pleadings from other proceedings to determine whether the case is abusive. See Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320 at para. 9; Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690 at para. 8; Mukwa v. Farm Credit of Canada, 2022 ONCA 320 at para. 13.

[48]

As the Court of Appeal has stated numerous times, Rule 2.1 is not meant to be an easily accessible alternative to a pleadings motion, a motion for summary judgment, or a trial. There are many other mechanisms and remedies provided for in the Rules of Civil Procedure by which parties can deal with cases that are not clear on the face of the pleading. See Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320, at para. 15 and Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625 at para. 12.

[49]

The Rules specifically create different avenues to deal with cases before a trial. For example:

a. Rule 21, rather than Rule 2.1, may be appropriate if a case reveals no cause of action or defense, but legal submissions are necessary to resolve a legal question.

b. Rule 20, not Rule 2.1, may be appropriate if a matter requires evidence to indicate its lack of merit.

c. Rule 25.11, rather than Rule 2.1, may be appropriate if a pleading is frivolous, abusive, scandalous, or vexatious and this is not evident on the document's face.

[50]

The key consideration for a Rule 2.1 request is whether the proceeding appears to be frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court on the face of the pleadings.

[51]

Accordingly, I have not considered the unsworn evidence. I have only considered the pleadings on their face and the parties' submissions as appropriate in the context of a Rule 2.1 motion.

Conclusion

[52]

In my view, this is not a clear case where the frivolous or abusive nature of the claim is apparent on its face. Ms. Sabarros raises arguments under the broad dependant's relief provision of the SLRA that ought to be considered by the Court.

[53]

The request pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 is, therefore, dismissed.

Associate Justice Kamal

Date: October 30, 2025