Dawn Pratt v. Anthony Korculanic

COURT FILE NO.: FS-24-00041972

DATE: 20251007

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

DAWN PRATT Applicant

– and –

ANTHONY KORCULANIC Respondent

COUNSEL: J. Cox and J.G. Cox, for the Applicant No One Appearing

HEARD: October 3, 2025

K. SAH J.

CORRECTED REASONS FOR DECISION

Overview

[1] This matter came before me, in chambers, as an uncontested trial. After reviewing the materials, I requested that the applicant and their counsel attend court, in-person, to allow the applicant to provide viva voce evidence and make additional submissions.

[2] Having reviewed the history of this case, it is appropriate for it to proceed before me on an uncontested basis. As a consequence of not serving and filing an Answer in this proceeding, the respondent is not entitled to any further notice of steps in the case, is not entitled to participate in the case in any way, and the court will deal with the case in the respondent’s absence: Rule 10(5) and 1(8.4) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (the “FLR”).

[3] The respondent is entitled to receive this endorsement and the order to be issued: Rule 25(13)(a).

[4] This court reviews the following:

• The Application issued on April 10, 2024;
• the Amended Application;
• the applicant’s Financial Statement sworn May 29, 2025;
• the applicant’s Form 23C affidavit for unconsented trial dated May 29, 2025;
• the applicant’s factum;
• the applicant’s affidavit for divorce; and
• the applicant’s affidavit dated September 26, 2025.

[5] The court also considered the viva voce evidence of the applicant and her counsel’s oral submissions.

Leave to Amend Application

[6] The applicant requested leave to amend her application to include: 1) a claim under s. 40 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the “FLA”) and 2) a request for an order not recognizing a divorce obtained by the respondent in Spain.

[7] Rule 11(3) provides that “on motion, the court shall give permission to a party to amend an application, answer or reply, unless the amendment would disadvantage another party in a way for which costs or an adjournment could not compensate.”

[8] This rule is mandatory, absent prejudice or disadvantage to another party that cannot be cured by either an award of costs or the granting of an adjournment, or both.

[9] At this uncontested trial, the respondent is not entitled to any further notice of steps in the case and is not entitled to participate in the case in any way. There is no opposition to the request for leave to amend the application.

[10] However, the lack of opposition does not justify an automatic amendment. I will consider the requested amendments in the context of what the applicant pled earlier on in this litigation, of which the respondent has notice.

[11] In her original application, the applicant requested an order restraining the respondent from depleting any family property under s. 12 of the FLA. The respondent has full knowledge of this request and is aware that an interim Mareva injunction order was made by this court.

[12] The proposed amendment to include a claim under s. 40 does not raise a new issue, but rather a new legal application.

[13] There is no unfairness or disadvantage to the respondent because he is fully aware of the nature of the request that had been previously made against him which is similar to the relief that is sought by the proposed amendment.

[14] Regarding the Spanish divorce order, the respondent is aware that the applicant was seeking a divorce in the Ontario court, and is aware that the Ontario court has jurisdiction over the divorce. This court, in assessing the appropriate as to granting the divorce, cannot ignore the existence of the Spanish divorce order.

[15] Even though the request not to recognize the Spanish divorce raises a new issue, it's relevance to an issue previously pled and its connection to the court’s determination of whether a divorce order should be granted in this court was prompted by a recent change in the case, not an afterthought.

[16] In addition, I have considered the merits of the amendment. There is a possibility that the substance of the request can be proven. It is not plain or obvious that there is no legitimate evidentiary utility to the amendment.

[17] Allowing the two amendments does not unnecessarily add to the length or expense of the uncontested trial.

[18] The proposed amendment is not requested or motivated by bad faith.

[19] The applicant’s request for leave to amend the amended application to include a claim under s. 40 of the FLA and to request an order that the Spanish divorce not be recognized as valid is permitted.

Issues

[20] The issues for the court to determine are:

1. Should this court recognize the Spanish divorce order?

2. Should the divorce be granted by this court?

3. What equalization payment is owing?

4. What, if any, income should be imputed to the respondent? What is the applicant’s income for support purposes?

5. What child support obligations flow, considering both Table and Section 7 special and extraordinary expenses?

6. Is the applicant entitled to spousal support? If so, in what quantum and for what duration? Is lump sum support appropriate to order?

7. Should this court continue the Mareva Injunction currently in place pending enforcement of the orders made by this court?

8. What terms of enforcement measures, if any, should be ordered in this case?

9. Are costs payable by the respondent to the applicant?

Brief Background

[21] The applicant, Dawn Elva Pratt, is a Canadian citizen residing in Toronto, Ontario.

[22] The respondent, Anthony Stanley Korculanic, has dual Croatian and Canadian citizenship with ties to Spain, The Bahamas, and the United States. It is believed that the respondent is currently residing in Croatia.

[23] The parties were married on June 10, 1995, in Mississauga, Ontario, and separated in or around September 12, 2022, after approximately 27 years of marriage.

[24] The parties resided in Toronto, as spouses from 1991 to 2004, in the Bahamas from 2004 to 2018, and in Mallorca, Spain from 2018 until their date of separation, September 12, 2022. The applicant has been a resident of the city of Toronto since September 12, 2022.

[25] There are two children of the marriage, Ava Korculanic born October 31, 2006, (“Ava”) and Sydnee Korculanic born May 27, 1999 (“Sydnee”). Sydnee is independent. Ava resides primarily with the applicant in Toronto and attends the University of Western Ontario.

[26] At the time of separation, the respondent was a self-employed stock promoter. According to the applicant, his income was significant, leading the parties to move to the Bahamas to avoid taxation.

[27] While in the Bahamas, the parties built their family home located at 32 Ocean Club Drive, Nassau, Bahamas (the “Bahamas home”).

[28] When the parties moved from the Bahamas to Spain in 2018, they rented out the Bahamas home was for $25,000 USD per month.

[29] During the marriage, the parties also accumulated a vacant lot in Palma de Mallorca. The proceeds of the sale of the lot were located at the Caixa Bank in Mallorca, Spain. There is approximately €400,000 held in the joint names of Ava and the respondent at the Caixa Bank in Mallorca, Spain (the “Spanish bank account”).

[30] The funds in the Spanish bank account stemmed from the sale of the vacant lot in Spain. The home was sold on January 14, 2022, for approximately €1,850,000. The proceeds were divided equally among the respondents, the applicant, and their two daughters, with each receiving approximately €400,000.

[31] The applicant was unaware that the home in Spain was sold. It is her evidence that the respondent forged her signature on the document to affect its completion.

[32] Sydnee, who was over 18 years old at the time, signed her share of the Spanish bank account over to the parties in 2023. Ava’s funds were deposited into the Spanish bank accounts to be held for distribution when she turned 18 on October 31, 2024. The respondent has signing authority over that account. The applicant is concerned that he may have depleted the Spanish account despite an interim Mareva injunction order further particularised below.

Litigation History

[33] The following is a review of the parties’ involvement in multiple jurisdictions. This review is based on the untested and undisputed evidence submitted for this uncontested trial, which this court accepts to be true as outlined below.

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

[34] The applicant commenced this proceeding on April 10, 2024.

[35] On October 4, 2024, Diamond J. granted an ex parte Mareva injunction and preservation order (“interim Mareva injunction” order) restraining the respondent and any other corporation or subsidiaries in which the respondent has an interest or control from dealing with assets, including the Bahamas Home and income from the Bahamas Home, as well as assets held directly or indirectly through the respondent’s Bahamian company, Trius Management Limited (“TML”). TML is a respondent to this proceeding.

[36] The interim Mareva injunction order provided for exceptions, including the following:

1. The Bahamas home property owned by TML, municipally described as Lot #32, Ocean Club Estates, Paradise Island, The Bahamas which was ordered to be listed for sale and sold by an agent to be chosen by the applicant.

2. Upon the sale of The Bahamas Home, the applicant shall receive 50 percent (50%) of the net sale proceeds.

3. The rental proceeds from The Bahamas Home in the amount of $25,000.00 USD per month was ordered to be used for historical expenses of The Bahamas Home, including the pool, landscaping, property manager, upkeep, tax payments, maintenance, and repairs. Any remaining rental income after the above disposition of rental proceeds was ordered to be transferred to and used by the applicant on a monthly basis.

4. Upon the sale of The Bahamas Home, the remaining 50 percent (50%) net sale proceeds was ordered to be preserved under s. 12 of the FLA by Bahamian counsel, Sean Moree at McKinney, Bancroft, and Hughes at George Street Mareva House, PO. Box N-3937, Nassau, Bahamas, pending further order of this court.

[37] After receiving the interim Mareva injunction order dated October 10, 2024, the respondent brought a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada claiming that Spain was the more appropriate forum to hear the family law action.

[38] The respondent’s motion for want of jurisdiction was heard on January 28, 2025. Cross-examinations of the parties on the issue of jurisdiction took place on December 9, 2024.

[39] This court ordered that Ontario held jurisdiction over all issues in this family law matter, including divorce, child support, spousal support, and equalization and property matters related to the Bahamas Property. Diamond J. dismissed the Respondent’s motion on January 31, 2025, and affirmed Ontario’s jurisdiction over all issues in this case (the “jurisdiction order”).

[40] The respondent was ordered to pay cost of $65,000.00 CAD to the applicant as a result of the jurisdiction order pursuant to the cost endorsement of Diamond J. dated March 7, 2025. Costs were ordered to be paid by April 6, 2025.

[41] The jurisdiction order was not appealed. It remains in full force and effect.

[42] The respondent has not complied with various orders of this court to provide disclosure and pay costs awarded against him.

[43] The undisputed evidence before this court is as follows:

• The respondent has not complied with the interim Mareva injunction order by continuing to transfer assets subject to the Mareva injunction to his lawyers in Ontario, the Bahamas, the United States, and Spain without first seeking an exemption to the Mareva injunction from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
• The respondent transferred proceeds of rent from The Bahamas home to himself.

[44] As a result of the respondent’s non-compliance with court orders and his failure to attorn to the Ontario preceding, an urgent 14B motion was brought on April 1, 2024, requesting that the matter proceed without further delay. This court ordered that unless the Respondent attorned to Ontario’s jurisdiction, he could not participate further in the proceedings.

[45] On April 16, 2025, the Court heard the return of the October 4, 2024 Mareva injunction matter, on that date the respondent formally advised the Court that he would not be attorning to Ontario’s jurisdiction. Diamond J. confirmed that the Mareva injunction order would continue until trial and ordered that $65,000.00 CAD from the sale proceeds of the Bahamas property held in escrow by Bahamian counsel, Sean Moree, K.C. of McKinney, Bancroft & Hughes, be released to satisfy the outstanding cost endorsement.

[46] This case was ordered to proceed on an urgent basis to an uncontested trial in this court.

Questioning/Respondent’s Sworn Evidence in Ontario Proceeding

[48] The respondent attended questioning with respect to his motion on jurisdiction on December 9, 2024.

[49] The respondent provided the following sworn evidence which this court accepts to be true:

• He was indicted on multiple counts to commit conspiracy fraud, wire fraud, concealment of money laundering consequent to a pump and dump stock scheme between 2015 and 2019. It was the respondent’s evidence that he was arrested and released with some restrictions.
• His Croatian passport was seized by the Spanish authorities and that his Canadian passport expired.
• He refused to answer questions about where he lived.
• He refused to answer whether the €400,000 was still in the Spanish bank account.
• He refused to advise whether he has bank accounts in other jurisdictions, claiming it was irrelevant and a private matter.
• At the time of questioning, he was paying €3500 for accommodation.

Bahamian Civil Proceedings before the Supreme Court of The Bahamas

[50] Parallel enforcement proceedings were initiated in The Bahamas under Claim No. 2024/CLE/gen/00456.

[51] On May 31, 2024, the Honourable Justice Simone Fitzcharles, granted an order against the respondent and TML prohibiting the selling, transferring, charging, diminishing, assigning or otherwise disposing of The Bahamas Home or receiving any income in relation to the property or dealing with the property in any other way.

[52] The Bahamian court also ordered that the Bahamas Home continue to be leased in accordance with the lease rental agreement and that the respondent and TML be served via the email addresses anthony@m5m.com and islandmobile@yahoo.com. Further, $45,000.00 USD in costs was ordered against the Respondent and TML.

[53] On June 3, 2024, Justice Fitzcharles noted that the respondent is restrained from dealing with his assets until a final disposition of the Canadian proceedings. The Bahamas court recognized the Ontario family law action’s precedence under the private international law principle of comity.

[54] On August 2, 2024, Justice Fitzcharles, granted the applicant permission to bring proceedings holding the respondent in contempt of the Supreme Court of the Bahamas and for a Writ of Sequestration of the property held by TML. The order also dispensed with a requirement for personal service and deemed effected service through email.

[55] On October 8, 2024, the respondent was found in contempt of court at the Supreme Court of The Bahamas for non-compliance with the May 31, 2024, Freezing Order, leading to a committal order.

[56] On May 26, 2025, the applicant sought a sale of the Bahamas home from the Supreme Court of The Bahamas for $4,400,000 USD, with 50% of net proceeds to the applicant, and the balance in escrow pending the final disposition of the family law matter at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

[57] On October 11, 2024, the Honourable Justice Fitzcharles, granted an order against the respondent, holding him in contempt of court. Her Honour also granted the Writ of Sequestration, seizing 32 Ocean Club Estates, Paradise Island, The Bahamas. Costs of $40,000.00 USD were further ordered against the respondent.

[58] The Bahamas home has recently sold for $4.4 million USD. The transaction was completed on September 17, 2025. After the payment of government taxes, stamp duty, real estate commission, legal fees and other related expenses, there is $3,329,804.46 USD remaining. Those funds are currently being held in trust pursuant to the order of Justice Fitzcharles in the Bahamas, and the interim Mareva injunction order made by this court.

[59] This court questions the credibility and validity of the evidence presented by the respondent in the Bahamas court proceedings. As I set out in further detail below, the respondent does not have a passport.

[60] On September 22, 2025, the respondent had an affidavit apostilled based on “valid government issued identification document through an online verification biometric scan.” The notary is located in Sweden. The court questions what government identification was apostilled by the notary.

[61] Further, in his affidavit presented to the Supreme Court of Bahamas, the respondent attached copies of his residency certificate from Spain for the period of 2022 to 2024, and he deposed that the certificates were renewed annually for travel purposes. As further particularised below, the respondent was arrested and extradited to the United States in 2022. The authenticity of the certificates is questionable, as is the allegation that they have been renewed annually.

Family Law Proceedings in Spain

[62] In or around March 7, 2024, the respondent issued divorce proceedings in Spain. Effective service of these proceedings did not occur until January 15, 2025.

[63] The applicant has recently come to know that the Spanish courts granted a divorce decree dated July 10, 2025. The Spanish divorce decree specifies that the divorce shall not take place until three months after July 10, 2025, which falls on October 8, 2025.

[64] The respondent advised the Supreme Court of the Bahamas that he was seeking a default judgment in the Spanish proceeding.

[65] On September 23, 2025, the applicant received an e-mail from her counsel in the Bahamas which included a motion record from the respondent’s Spanish counsel. The motion record enclosed a Spanish divorce order which the respondent obtained on July 10, 2025.

[66] The Spanish divorce order places all marital property in the respondent’s name, including the €400,000 held in a Spanish bank account and the $3,329,804.46 USD net proceeds of the court ordered sale of the Bahamas home.

[67] The respondent tendered the Spanish divorce judgment as evidence in support of his motion to seek leave to appeal the order of the Honourable Justice Fitzcharles dated May 31, 2024, which placed a freezing order on all matrimonial assets in the jurisdiction of Bahamas with the exception of the sale of the home at 32 Ocean Blvd. Drive, pending final disposition of these Ontario proceedings or further order of the Bahamian court.

[68] On September 23, 2025, the respondent amended his Notice of Application before the Bahamian court to include as a ground of his appeal fresh evidence, being the Spanish divorce decree. In this document, the respondent takes the position that the Spanish divorce decree is decisive in showing that there is no longer any rationale for the Bahamian preservation/freezing order being in place pending the resolution of this Ontario court matter.

[69] I find that the respondent is trying to use the Spanish divorce decree to persuade the Bahamian court to transfer funds from the sale of the Bahamas home to himself.

[70] The Spanish divorce order provides that the applicant has no property rights and that all assets of the marriage belong to the respondent. Further, the Spanish divorce order does not provide the applicant with spousal support.

[71] The Spanish Divorce order states: “All consents and powers that either of the spouses might have granted in favour of the other are hereby revoked, as is the possibility of linking the assets of the other spouse in the exercise of domestic authority.”

[72] The Spanish divorce order further requires both parties to contribute to the children's expenses in equal part. This order was made notwithstanding the fact that the applicant has no income and that she has borne the full financial burden of Ava’s private school and university expenses.

[73] While some of the child’s expenses were being paid from the rental income from the Bahamas home, the renter vacated approximately six months ago and the home has now been sold. This leaves the applicant in a difficult position to meet the child's university expenses.

[74] The Spanish divorce order states but the applicant in this case is in procedural default, and in consequence declared the divorce of the marriage.

[75] The Ontario jurisdiction order was provided to the respondent’s Spanish counsel on June 25, 2025, and June 27, 2025. The Spanish divorce order makes no reference to the Ontario jurisdiction order confirming that Ontario has jurisdiction of this matter.

[76] The respondent and/or his Spanish counsel did not bring the Ontario jurisdictional order to the attention of the Spanish court, notwithstanding their knowledge and possession of same. This can only be interpretated to have been a deliberate concealment.

Involvement of the Hague Convention

[77] Counsel for the applicant contacted the Central Authority for Ontario under the International Recovery of Child Support and Family Maintenance Act, 2023, S.O. 2023, c. 9, Sched. 16. The Central Authority was in the process of completing and translating an Article 7 Application into Spanish under the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (the “2007 Hague Convention”).

[78] This was undertaken by the applicant to alert the Central Authority in Spain that a support order is being sought at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and that this court has assumed jurisdiction under private international law for this matter.

[79] Further, a request was made to invoke Article 7 of the 2007 Hague Convention seeking assistance to liaise with Spain's Central Authority for specific measures including provisional asset freezes of the approximate €400,000 held by the respondent, to get information on his assets and income, and to preserve them in view of the interim Mareva injunction order.

[80] Applicant’s counsel has followed up with the Ontario Central Authority with regularity to update them on the status of the Ontario matters and to highlight the urgency in this case given the respondent’s decision to not attorn to the jurisdiction in Ontario while pursuing parallel actions in Spain. Despite these attempts, as of September 24, 2025, the matter remained pending with no confirmation from Spain’s Central Authority regarding the Article 7 request’s outcome.

Proceedings in the United States of America

[81] The Department of Justice prosecuted the respondent under a 2022 Indictment in the Southern District of New York for conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and concealment of money laundering related to a “pump and dump” scheme generating approximately $35 million US between 2015 and 2019 (the “2022 indictment”).

[82] The 2022 indictment relates to the respondent’s financial activities during the parties’ marriage and includes him potentially revealing hidden assets or income relevant to the applicant’s claim for support and equalization. The applicant was unaware of the respondent’s activities until she became aware of the 2022 indictment.

[83] The respondent is wanted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI has classified the respondent as a fugitive in June 2024 after he failed to report to the Spanish authorities, following his arrest in April 2022 and an extradition order.

[84] The applicant believes the respondent is currently living in Croatia. It is the applicant’s evidence that the respondent is a dual Croatian citizen and has been residing there since leaving Spain in 2022.

[85] The evidence before the court is that the FBI is still seeking to arrest the respondent. The responded hasn’t returned to the United States, and if he does, he will be held in custody pending trial.

Analysis of Each Issue

Divorce – Spanish and Ontarian

[86] In her Application, the applicant seeks a divorce on the basis the parties have lived separate and apart since September 12, 2022, and have not lived together since that date in an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile.

[87] All of the required documents for the divorce are present for a divorce order to issue. The applicant, in her affidavit dated September 26, 2025, requests that this court order waive the 31-day appeal period and order the divorce order of this court to take effect immediately.

[88] Further, the applicant asks this court not to recognize the Spanish divorce decree issued by Judge Bromhill dated July 10, 2025, as valid.

[89] Section 22 of the Divorce Act sets out the circumstances in which a Canadian court will recognize a foreign divorce.

[90] Section 22(3) upholds the common law principles applicable to the recognition of foreign divorces: Novikova v. Lyzo, 2019 ONCA 821, 31 R.F.L. (8th) 140, at para. 14; Julien D. Payne, Payne on Divorce, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996), at p. 111.

[91] There are limited grounds upon which a court may refuse to recognize a foreign divorce that is otherwise presumptively valid: where the foreign court or other authority that granted the divorce did not have the jurisdiction to do so under the law of the foreign country, where there is evidence of fraud going to the jurisdiction of the granting court, where there has been a denial of natural justice such as the absence of notice, and/or where the foreign divorce is contrary to Canadian public policy: Sonia v. Ratan, 2024 ONCA 152, 171 O.R. (3d) 677, at para. 26.

[92] Here, there are several grounds upon which this court declines to recognize the Spanish divorce order.

[93] First, in this case there has been a denial of natural justice. Specifically, the applicant was unaware that the court in Spain issued a divorce decree until over two months after it was made, and this constitutes absence of notice: Novikova, at para. 17.

[94] The respondent initiated the Spanish family court proceeding on March 7, 2024, one month before the applicant initiated the family court proceedings in this court. The applicant obtained her interim ex parte Mareva injunction and freezing order in this court on October 4, 2024.

[95] The respondent brought his motion to challenge jurisdiction on October 10, 2024.

[96] The applicant was served with the Spanish proceedings on January 15, 2025.

[97] The jurisdictional motion was argued on January 28, 2025.

[98] The jurisdictional order confirming Ontario has jurisdiction of the divorce was issued January 31, 2025.

[99] The applicant took steps to obtain specific measures for administrative cooperation by the Central Authority, and to alert the Central Authority in Spain that support is being sought through the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, which has assumed jurisdiction.

[100] The respondent had knowledge of the jurisdictional order, proceeded to obtain the Spanish divorce decree nonetheless, and did not serve the Spanish divorce decree upon obtaining it. In fact, the applicant did not receive notice of the Spanish divorce order until it became implicated in the Bahamian litigation.

[101] In Novikova, a Russian divorce was not recognized because "although Ms. Novikova knew that Mr. Lyzo was obtaining a divorce in Russia, she did not see any of the documents, and she did not have the opportunity to seek legal advice about them, which would have told her that she could not obtain spousal support in Canada once a divorce in Russia had been granted": Novikova, at para. 11. The Court of Appeal affirmed that the motion judge could decide to not recognize the divorce based on the denial of natural justice.

[102] Second, I take the view the Spanish divorce order was the result of "unfair forum shopping": Vyazemskaya v. Safin, 2024 ONCA 156, 493 D.L.R. (4th) 354, at paras. 14 and 37.

[103] Unfair forum shopping occurs when a party's driving reason for pursuing a divorce order in a foreign jurisdiction is to avoid court-imposed obligations under Ontario law.

[104] Here, the respondent was aware that Ontario was found to have jurisdiction over the divorce. The respondent attended questioning of the issue of jurisdiction, applied to the Ontario court suggesting that Spain was the correct jurisdiction, and, upon being unsuccessful and receiving a final order from this court clearly citing that Ontario has jurisdiction, the respondent decided to pursue the Spanish order.

[105] The respondent’s conduct can only be construed as him attempting to deceitfully pursue the divorce in another forum for his own benefit, in other words, he engaged in unfair forum-shopping tactics.

[106] Third and finally, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that there is fraud going to the jurisdiction of the Spanish court’s authority to grant the divorce. In Powell v. Cockburn, 1976 29 (SCC), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 218, at p. 228, the Supreme Court of Canada held that “[i]f the foreign court is fraudulently misled into believing the jurisdictional facts are such as to give it jurisdiction, when in truth they are not, this will be a ground for refusal of the domestic court to recognize the [divorce order].”

[107] In Ahmed v. Ahmed, 2024 ONSC 7261, 14 R.F.L. (9th) 493, the court declined to recognize a Pakistani divorce order because "none of the information provided by the Respondent in the Pakistan divorce application was true”: at para. 9. The court found that the divorce was granted based on material misrepresentations by the respondent, including omissions going to divorce proceedings underway in Canada: at paras. 6-9. The court concluded that the Pakistani divorce was granted on the basis of fraud.

[108] In the present case, the respondent did not provide the Spanish court with the jurisdiction order confirming Ontarian jurisdiction. There is no evidence that the Spanish court had the Ontario jurisdiction order or was aware that the issue of jurisdiction over the divorce had been unsuccessfully raised and argued by the respondent. On the record before me, it is clear that there were material misrepresentations and/or omissions relating to facts and evidence going to jurisdiction before the Spanish court. There is sufficient evidence, looking at the Spanish order alone, to conclude that the divorce was granted on the basis of fraud.

[109] The applicant has met her burden to establish that the divorce was not properly obtained. The applicant has satisfied several of the grounds for the court to decline to recognize a foreign divorce as set out above.

[110] Accordingly, the Spanish divorce shall not be recognized as valid.

[111] That court has before it all of the requisite documents for a divorce order to issue. As confirmed in the jurisdiction order, this court has jurisdiction to make the divorce order. A divorce order shall issue.

[112] Turning now to the request that the 31-day appeal period be waived.

[113] This court has the discretion to waive the 31-day period after which a divorce becomes effective.

[114] This court relies on the following: s. 12(1) and s.12(2) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), and r. 19.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.

Section 12 of the Divorce Act reads:

12(1) Subject to this section, a divorce takes effect on the thirty-first day after the day on which the judgment granting the divorce is rendered.

Special circumstances

(2) Where, on or after rendering a judgment granting a divorce,

(a) the court is of the opinion that by reason of special circumstances the divorce should take effect earlier than the thirty-first day after the day on which the judgment is rendered, and

(b) the spouses agree and undertake that no appeal from the judgment will be taken, or any appeal from the judgment that was taken has been abandoned, the court may order that the divorce takes effect at such earlier time as it considers appropriate.

[115] “Special circumstances” has been interpreted include demonstrating that waiting out the 31-day period will result in an injustice: Kaur v. Virk, 2022 BCSC 173, at para. 73.

[116] Further, while in this case there is no spousal agreement to waive the 31 days, this is the result of the respondent’s failure to participate in these proceedings, his failure to attorn to this jurisdiction, and his failure to put his case before the court, all while ignoring this court’s orders.

[117] Based on the facts of this case, spousal agreement to altering the effective date is not required because

• the divorce is uncontested;
• The combination of rule 10(5) and 1(8.4) of the FLR provides that the respondent is not entitled to participate in the case in any way;
• Rule 1(8) of the FLR allows this court to make any order it considers necessary for a just determination of the case when a party as failed to comply with an order, as is the case here;
• the FLR does not address situations where a divorce is uncontested and consent of the absent party is required;
• Rule 1(7) of the FLR states that if it does not cover a matter adequately, the court may give direction by reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
• Rule 19.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure says that where a defendant has been noted in default, any step in the action that requires the consent of a defendant may be taken without the consent of the defendant in default.

[118] Allowing the 31-day appeal period to remain in place would mean that the Spanish divorce order, notwithstanding it invalidity, would take affect prior to the Ontario divorce order.

[119] This, in my view, would result in an injustice. Even though this court does not recognize the Spanish divorce as valid, the Bahamian court and various other jurisdictions involved with this family may well view it as valid, may not know of the implications of this recognition, and may act on the Spanish order.

[120] Ordering that the divorce take effect immediately is in the interest of justice. To do otherwise has the potential to reward the respondent for his conduct.

[121] This court’s divorce order shall take effect immediately.

Equalization of Net Family Property

[122] Section 5(1) of the FLA sets out the presumptive formula for the determination of equalization of net family property (NFP) It provides that when the spouses are separated and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation, the spouse whose net family property is the lesser of the two net family properties is entitled to one-half the difference between them. The purpose of equalizing net family property is to equally divide between the parties the net wealth accumulated from the date of marriage to the date of separation/valuation date. The NFP equalization payment requires fairness to both spouses.

[123] To undertake this analysis, in the ordinary course, a net family property statement is prepared based on the financial information of the parties as disclosed in their Form 13.1 Financial Statements.

[124] In this case, the respondent has not produced a Financial Statement. He has made no financial disclosure.

[125] An individual must make full and complete financial disclosure to ensure that the information required to decide on the issue is before the court. The respondent’s failure to do this may result in an adverse inference being drawn against him.

[126] At the uncontested trial, the applicant submitted two simplified net family property statements. The second one, entered as an exhibit at trial, indicates a payment by the respondent to the applicant in the sum of $6,525,368.14.

[127] I accept the applicant’s sworn financial statement wherein she attests to the value of her assets and debts on date of marriage and valuation date. Those figures were appropriately imported into the net family property statement.

[128] Based on the documents filed and submissions of the applicant’s counsel, the court is required to decide the appropriate value/inclusion of the following assets of the respondent.

The Croatian Home

[129] The applicant asked that this court accept a value of $400,000 CAD, attributable to the respondent, for the value of this property as of valuation date and $250,000 CAD as of date of marriage.

[130] It was the applicant's evidence that the Croatian home was a family home initially owned by the respondent’s father. It was her evidence that during the parties’ relationship, they would spend each summer at this property.

[131] In or around 2013 or 2014, the parties completely renovated the Croatian home. They spent approximately $150,000 to $200,000 on the renovation which she described as completely gutting and rebuilding the home, including changing all windows and doors, purchasing all new appliances, and putting in new heating and electrical work.

[132] The home was described to be on an island which can only be reached by boat. The applicant was there for the last time in 2021. The value of the home was never discussed between the parties.

[133] In Lyttleton v. Lyttleton, 2022 ONSC 5120, Nakonechny J., at para. 63, summarized the “best evidence” approach as follows,

The court has a broad discretion to find value, even in the absence of solid valuation evidence. In Felte v. Felte, the Court of Appeal stated that where the evidence is unsatisfactory and incomplete, a trial judge must use the evidence he or she does have, in attempting to come to a reasonable and fair result. [Footnotes omitted.]

[134] Here, the court is left with no option but to rely on the limited available evidence to achieve a just and fair result.

[135] This court accepts the applicant’s evidence that the Croatian home was an asset of the respondent as of date of marriage and valuation date.

[136] The applicant’s estimated values are based on her knowledge of the property, including the extent of the repair and renovations to the property, having spent time there every summer prior to separation.

[137] The applicant has some direct knowledge of the respondent’s assets, and the values proposed represent the best evidence, and only evidence before the court. The values are accepted by the court.

Caixa Bank in Spain

[138] On the respondent’s side of the ledger, the applicant seeks to include the value of $524,732.00 CAD, representing the approximate amount of €400,000 converted to Canadian funds using the valuation date conversion rate.

[139] This court accepts that the respondent has signing authority over this account despite it being a joint account with the child, Ava.

[140] When the lot in Spain sold, the proceeds of sale were required to go into the names of the parties and their two daughters, as all four of them held title. The funds that were in Sydnee’s name were provided to the parties by Sydnee as she was over 18 years old at the time.

[141] The funds held by Ava were in a joint account with the respondent. It was always intended that the funds were to be distributed to both the parties upon Ava's 18th birthday on October 30, 2024.

[142] This distribution did not occur. The applicant has refused to answer questions under oath about whether she has accessed the funds or if they still exist. The applicant suspects the respondent has dissipated his assets despite the freezing order in the Bahamas court and the Mareva injunction in this court.

[143] There is no dispute that as of valuation date the respondent had complete control of the account and complete access to the funds in that account.

[144] The amounted requested to be inserted on the respondent’s side of the ledger is accepted.

Portfolios and Accounts held in various Swiss and Asian bank subject to the 2022 Indictment

[145] The applicant asks this court to include, on the respondent’s side of the ledger as of valuation date, funds that may be held in various Swiss and Asian bank accounts that are subject to the 2022 Indictment against the Respondent.

[146] The applicant requests this court attribute $12,478,512.50 to the respondent.

[147] It is a figure that was determined by reverse calculation. The applicant submits, based on the US Indictment, that there were four co-conspirators who purportedly generated at least $35,000,000.00 USD. These assets are not currently traceable. The applicant converted the $35,000,000.00 USD to CAD and divided the amount by four, the number of co-conspirators.

[148] The court cannot accept the evidence presented in support of the applicant’s proposition for the following reasons:

• An indictment is not a finding of guilt of conviction.
• The amount of $35,000,000 USD is an estimate.
• There is no link between the charges and the assets held by the respondent as of valuation date.
• There were no bank statements tendered to support that there were accounts held in the respondent’s name at valuation date.
• The applicant did not testify as to any direct knowledge she has about funds in an account in Asia or Switzerland.

[149] There is an inadequate factual basis to assess this proposed asset at the value suggested. Absent the information necessary to assess these assets, the value suggested ought not be inserted into the calculation.

[150] I acknowledge that the respondent’s failure to provide disclosure can permit the court to draw an adverse inference. However, in my view, the adverse inference cannot extend to the court accepting evidence, even if uncontested, that allows the court to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that the respondent had $12,478,512.50 in an account or accounts on valuation date.

[151] The applicant could have and ought to have tendered evidence about the accounts held by the respondent during the marriage. If possible, the applicant ought to have tendered evidence about the amount in those accounts and the typical balances held in those accounts, or provided any evidence of direct knowledge of the respondent’s assets.

[152] The applicant did not tender evidence regrading TML and the value of same. The respondent is the sole shareholder, sole controller and decision maker of this corporation.

[153] There was no evidence tendered regarding any other assets of the respondent.

[154] Accordingly, pursuant to s. 5 of the FLA, the respondent owes to the applicant an equalization of NFP in the amount of $286,111.89. If any errors are identified with my arithmetic, counsel for the applicant may arrange for a time to appear before me through the trial coordinator.

Income for Support

[155] The applicant asks this court to input the respondent’s income to $1,360,000.00 and to set her income at zero for support purposes.

[156] Section 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, (SOR/97-175), permits the court to impute income to a party as it considers appropriate.

[157] Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children: Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 41868 (ON CA), [2002] 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 32.

[158] The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, 65 R.F.L. (6th) 17, at para. 28.

[159] Once a party seeking the imputation of income presents the evidentiary basis suggesting a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the individual seeking to defend the income position they are taking. See: Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663, at para. 57; Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719, at para. 66.

[160] Where a party fails to provide full financial disclosure relating to their income, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference and to impute income to them: Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548, at para. 57; Woofenden v. Woofenden, 2018 ONSC 4583, at para. 38.

[161] A person’s lifestyle can provide the basis for imputing income: Aitken v. Aitken, 2003 2050 (ON SC), 42 R.F.L. (5th) 1 (Ont. S.C.) at para. 38; Jonas v. Jonas, [2002] O.J. No. 2117 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 58; Price v. Reid, 2013 ONCJ 373, at para. 36.

[162] This court accepts the undisputed evidence summarized as follows:

• At the time of separation, the respondent was employed as a stock promoter working to market companies that were going public.
• Though the applicant never really understood the full extent of the respondent’s employment duties, she testified that he was primarily responsible for paying all of the family’s expenses which were extensive.
• Another source of the respondent's income was passive income from an investment portfolio comprising worldwide securities, debt instruments, investments, bank accounts, and corporations which accumulated during the marriage.
• The respondent has a history of complex financial dealings, and information revealed in the 2022 indictment may suggest additional income sources from hidden assets or other business activities undisclosed to the applicant.
• The respondent’s ability to evade the authorities in the United States and his complete control over TML suggests he might have access to income from sources beyond rental income and investment portfolio income. The applicant lacks details due to the respondent’s tactics, nondisclosure, and non-participation in this process.
• Since the date of separation, the respondent has had the ability to retain at least five lawyers across multiple jurisdictions, including lawyers to assist him with his 2022 indictment in New York, lawyers in Spain, the Bahamas, and Ontario. The respondent, more likely than not, paid these lawyers retainers, and the money for his legal fees was derived from his direct breach of the interim Mareva injunction.
• While in the Bahamas, the parties lived in a luxury home in a gated community within the Ocean Club Estates on Paradise Island, in Nassau, Bahamas.
• The parties regularly travelled internationally and had access to significant financial resources.
• The parties’ lifestyle was funded solely by the respondent’s income from his investment portfolio and self-employment as a stock promoter.
• The Bahamas home is a six-bedroom, six-bathroom home which was purchased for cash.
• Following its purchase, the applicant went to Florida with a designer who took her shopping to buy furniture for the home. The parties paid 50% duty on all items brought in from Florida for their home.
• The parties lived in this home from 2004 to 2018, during which they had a live in property manager the housekeeper.
• The children attended private school in the Bahamas, and at times various different boarding schools.
• The parties never budgeted for anything.
• The respondent used a Black Amex card frequently.
• The applicant described their lifestyle to be amazing. They traveled multiple times a year, skied often, vacationed in Europe every summer, and visited the Maldives. They traveled to Croatia yearly and every time they went to Croatia, the respondent would rent a catamaran at a cost of $70,000, inclusive of the captain’s services.
• When they traveled, the parties flew first class and always stayed at the Ritz or Four Seasons hotels.
• The respondent drove a Tesla and a Porsche. He owned a 60-foot luxury boat which was sold during the parties’ marriage.
• After moving to Spain, the parties rented a villa for €12,000 per month. The respondent bought the applicant a Mercedes and a mini-Cooper and an Audi for himself.
• In Spain, the parties purchased a plot of land which was later sold for $1.8 million.
• Following the parties’ separation, the respondent purchased a Ferrari and on one occasion bought one of the daughters €150,000 ring.
• The applicant estimates that the respondent paid approximately $4,000 USD per month for the electricity bill in the Bahamas, private school at a cost of $25,000 per child or $50,000 yearly, plus $15,000 for busing. The respondent paid the live-in property manager in the amount of approximately $2000 per month, the landscaper approximately $1,500 per month, and the housekeeper in the approximate amount of $500 per month.
• The Ocean Club dues were approximately $10,000 per year.
• The respondent paid off a $500,000 USD debt incurred by the applicant as a result of a failed business venture.
• The respondent once told the applicant that he required $1 million per year just to cover the bills.
• The applicant deposes she is aware that the respondent’s income was upwards of $1 million US since 2015 based on her knowledge of their family’s finances.

[163] The applicant has established an evidentiary basis for a prima facie case for the imputation of the respondent’s income of at least $1,000,000 USD. When converted to Canadian dollars, this is at least $1,360,000 CAD. This position has not been defended. The applicant has met her onus.

[164] The respondent’s income shall be imputed to $1,360,000 CAD for each year, commencing in 2022.

[165] I also accept that, for support purposes, the applicant's income should be set at zero.

[166] The applicant is currently 60 years old. When the parties were first married, she worked as a real estate agent. When they moved to the Bahamas in 2004 the applicant ceased employment and has not worked since.

[167] The children were born in 1999 and 2006. The applicant worked until the eldest child was born and for a period of time after. However, once the parties moved to the Bahamas, she no longer was permitted to work given the country’s policies.

[168] While in the Bahamas, the applicant was primarily responsible for caring for the children and attending to all their needs while the respondent worked long hours.

[169] The children were involved in various activities which she was responsible for arranging and organizing.

[170] Between 2013 and 2015, the applicant attempted to open a restaurant with a friend in the Bahamas, but the venture was not successful. It was the applicant’s evidence that she took out a loan of $500,000 for this business venture. The respondent paid off the $500,000 loan.

[171] The applicant was not employed in any capacity while the parties lived in Spain.

[172] The applicant recently obtained her yoga certification and is qualified as a wellness coach and nutritionist. She has tried to assist various clients but never earned more than $2000 per year.

[173] After her return to Toronto in 2022, the applicant attempted to work as a holistic nutritionist, but she only has two to three clients.

[174] There is no claim before the court to impute income to the applicant. Her income will be zero for support purposes.

Child Support

[175] The respondent has not paid any Table child support since the parties separated. The applicant did acknowledge some payments made by the respondent towards private schooling.

[176] The applicant seeks retroactive support dating back to the date of separation. This request was set out in the amended application.

[177] In Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para, 114, the court set out the framework that should be applied for applications to retroactively increase support. Courts have found that this framework should also be applied, with necessary modifications, for an original request for retroactive support: L.S. v. M.A.F., 2021 ONCJ 554, at para. 111; M.A. v. M.E., 2021 ONCJ 555, at para. 80. Paragraph 114 of Colucci sets out the following:

The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.

a. Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.

b. Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.

c. The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct, and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.

d. Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

[178] In this original application, there is no need to meet the threshold requirement of establishing a material change in circumstances, as required in Colucci.

[179] The court must first determine the presumptive date of retroactivity as described in Colucci. Second, the court must determine if it should depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair, having considered the factors described in Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, [2020] S.C.R. 763, at para. 62. Third, the court will quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the guidelines.

[180] On the record before me, it is reasonable and fair that the retroactive claims for both child and spousal support to start on date of separation.

[181] The claim for retroactive support was set out in the amended application. The respondent is aware, by virtue of being served, that the claim is for support retroactive to the date of separation. The respondent’s failure to pay support immediately after separation caused the applicant to spend money she saved.

[182] Having determine that retroactive support to the date of separation is appropriate in this case, I must quantify the proper amount owing for each year since the date of retroactivity.

Table Child Support

[183] Various DivorceMate calculations were produced during submissions. Those submissions took into account evidence, which this court accepts, regarding when Ava resided with the applicant, in boarding school, and in university.

[184] Ava was residing with the applicant from September 2021 until September 2023. Ava attended boarding school in the Bahamas during the 2023-2024 academic school year. Ava began attending and studying kinesiology at the University of Western Ontario in September 2024. She is currently in her second year of studies.

[185] The applicant concedes that the respondent paid for Ava’s private school education during the 2022-2023 academic school year. She does not seek his contribution towards that Section 7 expense.

[186] It is evident that requests were made for the respondent to contribute to the child's post secondary education but that he has refused to do so.

[187] Based on his imputed income and the number of months Ava was residing with the application, the respondent owes table support as follows:

YEAR	TABLE SUPPORT AMT	NO. OF MONTHS WITH APPLICANT	TOTAL
2022	$10,011	4 months (September to December)	$40,044
2023	$6,674 using summer formula	12 months	$80,088
2024	$3,337 using summer formula	12 months	$40,044
2025- to date	$3,508 using summer formula	9 months (January to September)	$31,572

[188] For the period of September 1, 2022, up to and including September 30, 2025, the respondent owes to the applicant retroactive table support in the total amount of $191,748.

[189] On an on-going basis the respondent is required to pay the applicant, child support for the benefit of Ava, based on the summer formula, in the monthly amount of $3,508, commencing October 1, 2025, and payable on the first day of each month thereafter, based on his imputed income of $1,360,000.

[190] The applicant requests that the court order the respondent to pay s. 7 expenses on a retroactive and on-going monthly basis.

[191] Attached to her sworn financial statement, as Schedule “B”, is a list of all of the child's special and extraordinary expenses for 2004. The list is extensive and includes such things as university tuition, transportation, residency room charges, residence meal plans etc. These amounts total $56,269.61 annually or $4698.13 monthly.

[192] Included in the $56,269.61 are costs of international travel ($9,000) as well as costs for clothing, food, phone, transportation, and entertainment (totalling $19,992). These expenses do not properly constitute s. 7 expenses and are to be omitted.

[193] The balance of the expenses listed in Schedule B are accepted by the court. The child is a second-year university student and the expenses sought are reasonable and necessary.

[194] The balance of the s. 7 expenses therefore is $27,277.61. This amount is properly owing by the respondent for the period of September 1, 2022, up to and including August 31, 2025. Given the income of the parties as outlined above, the respondent shall be 100% responsible for these costs.

[195] On a go forward basis, the respondent shall be responsible for paying s.7 expenses in the amount of $2,273.13 per month commencing September 1, 2025, and payable on the first day of each month thereafter.

Spousal Support

[196] The applicant seeks retroactive spousal support to the date of separation and on-going spousal support based on the respondent’s imputed income $1,360,000 and her income of zero. The asking this court to order lump sum support.

[197] Under s. 15.2(1) of the Divorce Act, the court can make an order for spousal support. In making an award of spousal support, the factors identified in s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, must be considered:

… the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

[198] The objectives of an award for spousal support can be found at s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act:

An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should:

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage;

(d) and insofar as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

[199] All four objectives must be considered. “No single objective is paramount”: Moge v. Moge, 1992 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at p. 852; Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 35.

[200] I find the applicant entitled to support on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis based on the following uncontroverted evidence:

• The applicant was 57 years old on date of separation and is currently 60 years old.
• The parties’ period of cohabitation was 27.5 years.
• The applicant has not been employed in any meaningful way since 2004, when the parties decided to move to the Bahamas in support of the respondent’s business/employment pursuits.
• The decision to move to the Bahamas impaired the applicant’s earning potential.
• The applicant was the children's primary caregiver throughout the marriage while the respondent worked long hours.
• The respondent was the primary and sole income earner throughout the parties’ cohabitation.
• There has always been a significant income differential between the parties.
• The applicant has suffered an economic loss and or disadvantage as a result of the roles adopted during the parties’ marriage and following separation. The applicant no longer enjoys the same standard of living.
• Ava has resided primarily with the applicant after separation.
• The Applicant has been funding all of Ava’s expenses, educational and otherwise, without contribution from the respondent, requiring her to use money she would otherwise have saved. This has resulted in a decrease in funds available to her for her own support.
• The applicant has not received the benefit of the economic interdependence that developed as a result of the parties' shared life during marriage since separation.
• The applicant has suffered an economic consequence as a result of her contribution to the relationship. According to her financial statement her current expenses far exceed her income and, on the record before me, her current needs can be interpreted to cover a significant decline in the standard of living from the marital standard.

[201] Having determined that the entitlement to spousal support exists, the court then considers the quantum and duration of support and whether ordering a lump sum of spousal support is appropriate on the facts of this case.

[202] The Court has discretion to fix a lump sum payment where there is a real risk that periodic payments will not be made and it is necessary to affect a clean break between the parties: Davis v. Crawford, 2011 ONCA 294, 106 O.R. (3d) 221, at para. 29.

[203] Based on the incomes of the parties as determined above and the child’s present living arrangement, periodic spousal support would be owing in the monthly range of $39,669 to $48,783.

[204] The applicant asks the court to order a lump sum payment of $5,922,902 representing the mid-range support, net present value mid-point (of the respondent’s after-tax cost and the applicant’s after-tax benefit), based on indefinite support discounted for the applicant’s life expectancy.

[205] The facts of this case militate in favour of a lump sum spousal support because:

• The respondent’s attitude and failure to pay support, despite requests for same, make it highly unlikely that he would pay periodic support: Willemze-Davidson v. Davidson, 1997 1440 (ON CA), 98 O.A.C. 335, at para. 33.
• The respondent has breached court orders, particularly the Ontario Mareva injunction order, and the Bahamas injunction order resulting in a contempt finding, and there is a real risk that periodic payments would not be made in the future: Hartmann v. Hartmann, [2004] O.J. No. 6166 (Ont. S.C), at para. 46.
• A lump sum payment would create finality between the parties, would place the applicant in a financially secure position which might not occur given the low likelihood that the respondent, based on his historical record, would pay periodic support: Stevens v. Stevens, 2012 ONSC 706, 109 O.R. (3d) 421, at para. 252, aff’d 2013 ONCA 267.
• The respondent has failed to make full and complete financial disclosure in this case and will likely not in the future.
• The respondent has ignored the applicant’s request for contribution to Ava’s expenses.
• The respondent has demonstrated a history of not following court orders, including cost orders.
• A lump sum of support will include significant retroactive arrears.
• There is currently a liquid asset (funds held in the Bahamas) available to, at least partially, satisfy a lump sum award.
• The respondent obtained a divorce order in Spain, knowing it was not the proper jurisdiction, to try and gain access to funds frozen by two courts (Ontario and Bahamas) pending completion of this matter in Ontario. This type of deceitful and self-serving act leaves the court with no confidence that he has the capacity to act honourably.

[206] This court orders the respondent to pay to the applicant the sum of $5,922,902. The payment is in full satisfaction of spousal support owing by the respondent commencing September 1, 2022.

Mareva Injunction and Other Orders

[207] The applicant asks that the final order include the Mareva injunction pending the enforcement of the order.

[208] This is not an unreasonable request. The existing Mareva injunction order shall continue post-judgement because there is a real risk the applicant might suffer irreparable harm if it was to terminate prior to enforcement of this order.

[209] Keeping the Mareva injunction in place is required because of the respondent’s clear and concerted efforts to defeat the applicant’s claims before this court, and will aid in the execution of this order.

[210] Therefore, this court will continue Diamond J.’s worldwide Mareva injunction until the equalization, retroactive Table child support and s. 7. expenses, and lump sum spousal support orders are paid in full.

[211] Further, at the applicant’s request and as an added precaution, orders will be made pursuant to ss. 12 and 40 of the FLA, freezing assets belonging to the respondent.

[212] In Fraser v. Fraser, 2021 ONSC 1900, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 463, the court held that the onus lies on the party asserting that a preservation order is necessary, on a balance of probabilities, to protect his or her interests under Part I of the FLA, and to prove that his or her claim for support under Part III of the Act would be impaired or defeated unless a preservation order was made.

[213] This court has determined and ordered an equalization payment in this case. This court has also determined the extent of the respondent’s retroactive child support and lump sum spousal support payments.

[214] As described above, there is a real risk that the applicant’s equalization award and support awards could be defeated if preservation/non-depletion orders are not made.

[215] The applicant has met her onus of demonstrating that a preservation order is necessary to protect her interest, and that she would suffer irreparable harm if the relief is not granted. That harm involves non-payment and a potential inability to locate the respondent in the future. This is not only contrary to the child’s best interest, but also contrary to the interests of justice.

[216] There shall be orders restraining the respondent from disposing of or depleting any assets in Ontario or worldwide and requiring him to preserve those assets under ss. 12 and 40 of the FLA.

[217] The applicant also requests that this court order that the respondent provide a sworn affidavit listing assets and providing specific details of the same. This request is made to aid in the enforcement of this court order. The request is reasonable, fair, permissible under the FLR pursuant to r. 1(8) and r. 2(2)-2(5), and shall be so ordered.

[218] Finally, the applicant requests that this court make a declaration that the corporate veil of TML is pierced, imposing any liability of the respondent on the corporation. Again, the request on the facts of this case is reasonable, fair, permissible under the FLRs pursuant to r. 1(8) and r. 2(2)-2(5), and shall be so ordered.

Costs

[219] The applicant seeks her costs of this action in the amount of $251,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, on a full indemnity basis. This amount excludes previous costs orders of this court.

[220] Rule 24(3) of the FLR creates a presumption of costs in favour of the successful party. The applicant has substantially, but not entirely, prevailed in the relief that she sought from this court.

[221] Rule 24(9) establishes that the court shall award costs against an absent party. The respondent chose not to participate in this proceeding, except in relation to the jurisdictional issue.

[222] I have considered the reasonableness and proportionality of each party’s behaviour, the time spent by each party, and the legal fees incurred by the applicant, as they relate to the importance and complexity of the issues.

[223] In assessing the reasonableness of the respondent’s conduct, I have considered his failure to comply with court orders and the rules, and his failure to participate, forcing the applicant to present this case on limited evidence. Counsel for the applicant has had to repeatedly confer with counsel in several jurisdictions as well as with the Central Authority.

[224] Rule 1(8) provides that if a person fails to obey a court order or the rules, the court may deal with the failure by making an order for costs: M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2023 ONSC 3748, at para. 45.

[225] This court order is intended to sanction the unreasonableness of the respondent’s conduct and behaviour thought this proceeding. The unreasonableness of the respondent’s behaviour combined with the complexity of the issues and the extent of costs incurred in this matter lead me to a conclusion that costs should be awarded on a close to full recovery basis.

[226] There was some duplication of time between senior and junior counsel and as such, a slight downward reduction to follow.

[227] The respondent shall pay $200,000 in costs to the applicant.

Orders

[228] Pursuant to the Divorce Act, final order to issue including the following:

1. The Spanish divorce judgement dated July 10, 2025, shall not be recognized as valid.

2. A divorce order of this court shall issue and shall take effect immediately.

Pursuant to the Family Law Act, final order to issue including the following (all currencies are in CAD unless otherwise indicated):

3. The respondent shall pay to the applicant an equalization payment of $286,111.89.

4. The respondent shall pay to the applicant retroactive Table support in the total amount of $191,748 for the period of September 1, 2022, up to and including September 30, 2025.

5. Commencing October 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month thereafter, the respondent shall pay to the applicant child support for the benefit of Ava Korculanic born October 31, 2006, using the summer formula, in the monthly amount of $3,508, based on his imputed income of $1,360,000.

6. Commencing September 1, 2025, and payable on the first day of each month thereafter, the respondent shall pay to the applicant for the benefit of the child, Ava Korculanic born October 31, 2006, section 7 expenses fixed in the monthly amount of $2,273.13.

7. The respondent shall pay to the applicant retroactive section 7 expenses in the total amount of $27,277.61 for the period of September 1, 2022, up to and including August 31, 2025.

8. The respondent shall pay to the applicant lump sum spousal support in the total sum of the sum of $5,922,902.

9. The respondent is hereby restrained from disposing of or depleting any assets in Ontario or worldwide and he shall preserve those assets pending further order of this court.

This court further orders:

10. The respondent, whether by himself, his agents, services, or any other person acting on his behalf or with notice of this order, shall be subject to a Mareva injunction including, but not limited to, restraining the respondent from removing from, disposing of, transferring, dissipating, encumbering, or otherwise dealing with any of his assets, whether located within Ontario or elsewhere in the world, including but not limited to:

(a) The amount of $3,329,806.46USD being held in Trust by McKinney Bancroft & Hughes lawyers in Nassau, Bahamas from proceeds of sale from the home municipally described as Lot 32, Ocean Club Estates, Paradise Island, The Bahamas (the “Bahamas Home”);

(b) Trius Management Limited, a company incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas;

(c) The 400,000.00 EUR being held in the joint names of the respondent and child of the marriage, Ava Korculanic, born October 31, 2006, at the CAIXA BANK in Mallorca Spain; and

(d) Any other assets, whether held by the respondent solely, jointly, or indirectly through a corporation or any other entity.

11. In respect of any of the respondent’s assets located outside Ontario, the applicant may seek the assistance of foreign courts to register, recognize, or enforce this Final Order in any jurisdiction, in accordance with the laws of that jurisdiction.

12. Notwithstanding paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Final Order, and as exceptions to the Mareva Injunction:

a. The amount of $3,329,806.46 USD being held in Trust by McKinney Bancroft & Hughes lawyers in Nassau, Bahamas;

b. The respondent’s signature, either on his own behalf, or on behalf of any corporation including, but not limited to, Trius Management Limited, shall not be required on any documentation for the proceeds of sale of the Bahamas home, or anything to do with the sale of the home;

c. From the proceeds of sale of the Bahamas Home:

i. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Order of Diamond J. dated October 4, 2024, the Applicant shall receive 50 percent (50%) of the net sale proceeds;

ii. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Order of Diamond J. dated October 4, 2024, the remaining 50 percent (50%) of the net sale proceeds shall be preserved by Bahamian counsel, Sean Moree KC at McKinney, Bancroft, and Hughes for George Street Mareva House, P.O. Box N-3937, Nassau, Bahamas on trust on behalf of the respondent and shall be distributed in accordance with this Final Order;

d. The remaining 50 percent (50%) of the net sale proceeds of the Bahamas Home held in trust for the respondent shall be subject to the following deductions and released from trust in accordance with and in the following priority:

i. Satisfaction of the respondent’s retroactive Table child support obligations in the amount of $191,748 CAD payable to the applicant;

ii. Satisfaction of the respondent’s retroactive special and extraordinary expenses obligations in the amount of $27,277.61 CAD payable to the applicant;

iii. Satisfaction of the respondent’s equalization payment owed to the applicant, in the amount of $286,111.89.00 CAD;

iv. Satisfaction of the respondent’s lump sum spousal support obligations in the amount of $5,922,902 CAD payable to the Applicant;

v. The $65,000.00 CAD in costs owed by the respondent to the applicant pursuant to the Endorsement of Diamond J. dated April 16, 2025; and

vi. Costs as may be ordered by The Supreme Court of The Bahamas or any other Bahamian Court to the Applicant’s counsel in the Bahamas proceedings.

13. The respondent shall, within 7 days of service of this Final Order, provide to the applicant’s counsel a sworn Affidavit listing all of his assets worldwide, whether held solely, jointly, directly, or indirectly, including but not limited to:

(a) The location and value of the home located in Croatia;

(b) The nature, value, and location of each asset;

(c) Details of any accounts, properties, or interests held by the respondent or through nominees, agents, or third parties, including the identity of any nominees, agents, or third parties through whom such assets are held, and the nature of their relationship to the respondent, including in Switzerland, Asia, and anywhere else in the world;

(d) Any assets disposed of or transferred within the past 6 months, including the date, nature, and value of each disposal or transfer; and

(e) Tracing and accounting of source of payments to any lawyers retained by the respondent in the Bahamas, United States in relation to his fraud charges, in Spain in relation to the family law matter and the extradition proceedings, and in Canada.

14. The respondent shall provide the applicant’s counsel copies of any documents necessary to verify the information in the Affidavit, including bank statements, property deeds, and share certificates.

15. This Mareva Injunction, including paragraph’s 10 to 14 of this Final Order, shall continue until the respondent has fulfilled his equalization payment, retroactive child support and spousal support obligations under this Final Order entirely.

16. If the respondent’s 50 percent (50%) of the net sale proceeds of the Bahamas Home do not cover the applicant’s full lump sum spousal support under this Final Order, any outstanding lump sum spousal support shall continue to be owed by the respondent.

17. If the respondent’s 50 percent (50%) of the net sale proceeds of the Bahamas Home do not cover the applicant’s equalization payment under this Final Order, any outstanding equalization payment shall continue to be owed by the respondent.

18. The 400,000.00 EUR being held at the Caixa Bank in Spain shall be immediately released to the applicant as a credit toward lump sum spousal support.

19. The corporate veil of Trius Management Limited is hereby pierced. Trius Management Limited shares the respondent’s liability to pay all costs orders and any monetary amounts provided for in this Final Order.

20. The respondent shall pay to the applicant her costs fixed in the sum of $200,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

21. Of the costs ordered payable in paragraph 20, $100,000 is related to support and is enforceable as support by the Director, Family Responsibility Office.

22. The applicant and the Family Responsibility Office may seek the enforcement of this Final Order as it relates to child and spousal support through the procedures of the Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance.

23. For as long as child support is to be paid, the payor must provide updated income disclosure to the other party each year, within 30 days of the anniversary of this Final Order, in accordance with section 24.1 of the Child Support Guidelines.

24. Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director, and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall then pay them to the person to whom they are owed.

25. A support deduction order shall be issued.

26. The respondent’s approval of this order as to form and content is hereby dispensed with.

27. This Order bears interest at the post-judgment interest rate of 7% per annum effective from the date of this Order. Where there is a default in any payment, the payment in default shall bear interest only from the date of the default.

JUSTICE K. SAH

RELEASED: October 7, 2025

CORRECTION NOTICE

Corrected Decision: The text of the original judgment was corrected on October 15, 2025, and the description of the correction is appended.

October 15, 2025:

The citizenship in paragraph 22 was replaced with has dual Croatian and Canadian citizenship.

The date and place of marriage were replaced with June 10, 1995, in Mississauga, Ontario.