Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FS-25-00000031-0000 Date: 2025-10-07 Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Re: Paul Bowlby and Laura Bowlby And: Appellants/Respondents to Cross-appeal

Alex Bowlby, by his litigation guardians, Andrew Oliver and Julie Lynn Oliver Respondents/Appellants on Cross-appeal

Before: SPURGEON J.

Counsel: Deborah Ditchfield, counsel for the Appellants/Respondents to Cross-appeal Birkin Culp, counsel for the Respondent/Appellant on Cross-appeal

Heard: September 16, 2025

Endorsement

Overview of Issues on This Appeal

[1] Before the court are three things:

a. An appeal of the order of Justice G.B. Edward of the Ontario Court of Justice dated June 7, 2024;

b. A cross-appeal of that order; and

c. A motion to vacate the appeal as moot.

[2] There are two parties before the court in this appeal; they are Alex Bowlby on the one hand and his parents, Paul and Laura Bowlby, on the other.

[3] There are, however, three actual parties in play in this matter. They are:

a. Alex Bowlby ("Alex"). At the material times in this matter, Alex was an older teenager, 15½ to 18 years old. Alex is presently the respondent to the appeal and appellant by cross-appeal.

b. Paul Bowlby and Laura Bowlby (the "Bowlbys"), who are the adoptive parents of Alex are the appellants and respondents by cross-appeal.

c. Craig and Julie Oliver (the "Olivers"), the parents of Alex's girlfriend, who, for reasons set out below, subsequently took Alex into their home and are presently non-parties to this appeal. However, they were the original applicants in this proceeding and were deemed to be the litigation guardians of Alex after the original hearing of the matter on June 7, 2024.

[4] There is a further peculiarity to this appeal, as before me now is Mr. Culp who acted for the Olivers at the original application before Justice Edward, and who now professes to only act for Alex now that he is of the age of majority.

[5] This implicitly means that the Olivers had no direct representation before the court on the appeal, though Mr. Culp, instructed by Alex, made submissions on the substance of the appeal – which concerned the Olivers.

Factual and Procedural Background

[6] Alex was born on September 29, 2006. He was taken into care and was placed in the foster care of the Bowlbys. Eventually, the Bowlbys adopted Alex when he was approximately six years old. Alex lived with the Bowlbys until he was approximately 15½ years old.

[7] At that time, there was a breakdown in the relationship between Alex and his parents. There is conflicting evidence as to just what happened and how the relationship broke down. The court will not comment on that information, as it is largely immaterial as to the issues the court must address in these appeals.

[8] At the time the relationship broke down, a specific episode of conflict occurred. At that point, Alex ceased living in the Bowlbys' home and came to live with the Olivers on or about May 9, 2022.

[9] On July 5, 2022, the Olivers commenced an application in the Ontario Court of Justice seeking both decision-making authority and child support from the Bowlbys in respect of Alex.

[10] Within the proceeding, the Olivers brought an urgent motion (prior to a case conference) under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (the "CYFSA") and obtained an order – opposed by the Bowlbys – granting them decision-making authority in relation to Alex. The ostensible basis for the order is the perceived urgency of registering Alex in a competitive baseball program.

[11] The Olivers were granted that motion on August 16, 2022.

[12] The Bowlbys delivered their answer in this proceeding on September 9, 2022. Subsequently, the parties appeared before Hilliard J. on June 21, 2023 for a trial management conference, wherein she stated:

Trial Management conference not conducted …

There is also a preliminary issue as to whether or not the applicants have standing to make the claims in their application. The determination of this issue will have an impact on the trajectory of the trial in this matter. In my view, this preliminary issue should be determined by way of argument prior to the commencement of trial and prior to trial scheduling.

[13] Hilliard J. then scheduled the hearing of the issue to occur on November 15, 2023.

[14] By way of background, it is important to note that there are two different groups of people who, by the terms of s. 33(2) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 ("FLA"), may have "standing" to bring a child support application before the court. They are:

a. Dependants; or

b. Parents of dependants.

[15] A dependant, who is a child or a special party – essentially a minor or person under disability – pursuant to rule 4(2) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, may bring a claim for support through a representative who is nominated via a process set forth in rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, via incorporation by reference pursuant to rule 1(7) of the Family Law Rules. A person so nominated and qualified is called a litigation guardian.

[16] In this case, the Olivers presented themselves as parents of the dependant, Alex. They did not frame themselves as representatives (litigation guardians) of Alex.

[17] Though the hearing was initially scheduled for November 15, 2023, it was not held until June 7, 2024, which was just 114 days shy of Alex's 18th birthday.

[18] In that hearing, Justice Edward made two decisions:

a. First, he determined that the Olivers did not have standing to bring the application for child support pursuant to s. 33(2) of the FLA because the Olivers failed to demonstrate that they were "parents" of Alex.

b. Second, despite the Olivers specifically eschewing the role of litigation guardian, Justice Edward made the Olivers litigation guardians for Alex, effectively continuing the proceeding in that manner.

[19] Justice Edward gave oral reasons for his decisions. In them he stated:

By what mechanism can the Oliver's move forward with a claim for child support given Alex has lived under their roof for 18 months and they've received no child support from the Bowlby's.

The Family Law Act says that a parent has an obligation to support his or her child. Translation, Paul and Laura Bowlby have an obligation to pay child support for Alex. One thing I'm certain of, based on the affidavit material, is that Alex did not voluntarily withdraw from the Bowlby house. The friction present, for whatever reason, made it impossible for Alex to continue to live there. This was no rouse by Alex to orchestrate a move-in with his girlfriend. But what is problematic is the wording of s.33(2) of the Family Law Act. It says the application may be made by the dependent, Alex, or the dependent's parents. It's a huge question mark as to whether the Oliver's meet the definition of the dependent's parents.

In short, I see no avenue for the applicants to assert standing as they do not fit within the definition of who can bring an application for support.

When the applicants obtained the temporary decision-making authority and primary parenting time order of Justice Baker, dated August 16, 2022, it was ostensibly to see consent signed for Alex to continue to play baseball. Somehow with the passage of time it is argued by the applicants that it is morphed into them being capable of standing in the place of the parent. I do not see that. I do not see how they have demonstrated a settled intention like Mr. Chartier had to treat his stepdaughter as a child of his own. Rather, the proper approach to be taken is for Alex to bring his support application via a litigation guardian.

As I indicated earlier, my wish in family matters is to move things on. To that end, I am amending the application to note the applicant as Alex Bowlby, by his litigation guardians Craig Andrew Oliver and Julie Lynn Oliver. And the respondents shall remain styled the same.

[20] A third decision was made by Justice Edward in the hearing on June 7, 2024. It flowed from the prior two decisions. His Honour, despite finding the Olivers had no standing as parents to bring the proceeding under s. 33(2) of the FLA, denied the Bowlbys costs on the preliminary matter – subject to a contingent offset of $2,000, depending upon the final outcome of the case.

Outline of the Appeals and Motion

The Bowlbys' Appeal

[21] The Bowlbys assert that the first decision of Justice Edward to deny standing to the Olivers to bring the claim for support in the capacity as Alex's parents pursuant to s. 33(2) of the FLA is correct. The Bowlbys' position is that upon denying the Olivers assertion of standing, the claim they brought should have been dismissed in toto.

[22] The Bowlbys assert that Justice Edward erred in respect of his second decision. Specifically, the Bowlbys assert that Justice Edward lacked jurisdiction to appoint the Olivers as litigation guardians absent compliance by the Olivers with the requirements set out in rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[23] The Bowlbys further assert that Justice Edward erred with respect to the costs decision. Absent any jurisdiction to appoint the Olivers as litigation guardians, Justice Edward – the Bowlbys submit – was obliged to dismiss the Olivers' claim and address the matter of costs upon a final determination of the matter.

Alex's Cross-Appeal

[24] With respect to Justice Edward's first decision, Alex asserts 14 grounds of appeal. Those grounds, overlapping and repetitive, are characterized in errors of law, errors of mixed fact and law, and errors of fact alone. At their core, all grounds of appeal advanced by Alex boil down to one thing: Justice Edward erred in not embracing the following inescapable logic chain:

a. Section 1 of the FLA defines "parent" as a person who demonstrates "a settled intention to treat a child as a child of his or her family."

b. Section 33(2) of the FLA extends standing before the court of a "parent" of a dependant child to seek support for that dependant child.

c. The Olivers tendered evidence that they had a "settled intention" to treat Alex as their child.

d. The Olivers' evidence of settled intention to treat Alex as their child should be accepted and recognized.

e. In turn, this translates into standing for the Olivers to bring the proceeding pursuant to s. 1 and s. 33(2) of the FLA.

[25] Assuming Justice Edward's first decision is upheld, with respect to the second decision, Alex would submit that Justice Edward did not err in appointing the Olivers as Alex's litigation guardians.

[26] With respect to the third decision, the Olivers are silent.

Alex's Motion

[27] Now that Alex is 18 years old, his position is that both the issues of the original matter – of the Olivers bringing the claim for support as "parents" as defined in the FLA or in the alternative as litigation guardians – are moot.

[28] Alex, now of the age of majority, simply pursues retroactive support from the time he left the Bowlbys' home, on May 9, 2022, to the day he turned 18, September 29, 2024.

Summary of Decision on Appeal

[29] Upon review, this court's conclusion in respect of the matters before it is as follows:

a. Justice Edward did not err in law or fact or mixed law or fact by concluding that the Olivers had not sufficiently demonstrated a settled intention to treat Alex as their child. Consequently, the decision that the Olivers had no standing pursuant to s. 33(2) of the FLA to bring the claim as "the dependant's parent(s)" was likewise not erroneous.

b. The court below, however, erred in law in ordering that the litigation continue with two private individuals – the Olivers – as litigation guardians of Alex, without meeting the requirements of rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

c. The motion to dismiss the appeals as moot is denied because there are implications as between the Bowlbys and the Olivers in relation to the costs of the decision that the Olivers are not parents of a dependant as per s. 33(2) of the FLA.

Analysis

The Issue of the Olivers Standing as Parents of a Dependant (FLA s. 33(2))

[30] Section 33(2) of the FLA permits two types of people to commence a claim for support, in this case child support. They are a "dependant" or a "dependant's parent(s)." In this case, it is clear that Alex, at the time the claim was issued, was a dependant. Justice Edward clearly concluded that he was a dependant of the Bowlbys.

[31] It is not clear from the record that Alex was a dependant of the Olivers and that they were Alex's parents for the purpose of that section.

[32] The application was framed by the Olivers in such a way as to suggest that they demonstrated a settled intention to treat Alex as their child and therefore could commence the claim for support. They tendered the following evidence:

a. The Olivers applied to the court and obtained an order – on an urgent basis – granting them decision-making authority over Alex approximately two months after Alex ceased living with the Bowlbys. This occurred on August 16, 2022.

b. Alex resided in the exclusive care of the Olivers from May 9, 2022 to the date of the hearing before Justice Edward.

c. In their affidavit of October 17, 2023, the Olivers indicated that Alex was treated as part of their family in that Alex:

i. complied with all directions of the Olivers as the decision-making parents;

ii. performed household chores;

iii. attended and applied himself to his full-time high school educational program;

iv. attended the Olivers' extended family functions;

v. completed his driver's education and licensing with their assistance;

vi. attended counselling, medical, optometrist, dental and orthodontic appointments with their assistance; and

vii. attended baseball games throughout Ontario and the United States, as well as regular practices, with their assistance.

[33] The Olivers also led evidence that they signed school, legal, and financial documentation on Alex's behalf prior to him reaching age of majority, as well as provided him the necessities of life including a home.

[34] Counsel for Alex before this court, and previously before Justice Edward in the hearing in first instance, pointed to s. 1 of the FLA which says:

"parent" includes a person who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat a child as a child of his or her family …"

[35] Before Justice Edward, counsel for the Olivers (now Alex) cited four cases for consideration:

a. Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 – concerns a stepfather who sought to avoid liability to pay a support obligation. The issue was not one of whether the applicant had standing to bring a support claim of support in respect of a dependant – she clearly did. She was the child's mother. The issue was whether the respondent stepfather was in loco parentis exposing him to liability to pay support. In that case, the stepfather was found to have acted in a manner treating the child as his own.

b. A.S. v. M.L., 2021 ONCJ 105 – concerns a maternal grandmother who sought and obtained an order of child support from the child's father. The child's mother had been arrested and the maternal grandmother stepped in to care for the child. The grandmother sought support from the child's father. The father did not contest the assertions of the grandmother that she had custody of the child nor that he had an obligation to provide support to the child. The grandmother's standing to seek support as a "parent of a dependant" under s. 33(2) was not seriously contested, nor even considered. The issue in dispute was the income attributed to the father for the purpose of calculating support.

c. Mahood v. Ducharme, 2004 ONCJ 337 – an aunt of the children, who had custody of the small children via consent order, sought child support from the children's father. The father did not contest the matter and did not appear in the proceeding. The court made a final order of custody in favour of the aunt in relation to the child – deeming her effectively a parent – yet refrained from making a final order of support due to the difficulties in establishing quantum. A temporary order of support payable by the father to the aunt with custody of the children was made. Given that the father did not contest the aunt's custody, the issue of settled intention was not seriously in play.

d. Michaud v. Younghusband, 2010 ONCJ 480 – wherein a neighbour took in a 17-year-old child of the respondent father. The child came from a high-conflict environment which was intolerable. The neighbour sought support from the child's father. At the time of the application, Ontario Works paid the child $60 per month for her personal needs and paid the applicant/neighbour $400 per month to assist in meeting the child's needs. The applicant disclaimed she was a custodial parent in relation to OW and therefore it was not support. In this case, there was no serious analysis of the issue of the applicant's position – whether she had a settled intention to treat the child as her own. Rather, the dispositive paragraph in the case (paragraph 38) states:

"The home she has found with Ms. Michaud and her family is clearly in her best interests at this time."

The issue of standing of the applicant to bring a support claim as a "parent of a dependant" and the test for "settled intention" was not squarely addressed in Michaud. The outcome seems to have been driven by exigent circumstances.

[36] Each of these cases were presented by counsel for the Olivers to Justice Edward who considered and distinguished each of them from the case at hand.

[37] None of these cases squarely address the issue before the court, specifically the issue of the standing of someone to step in as a parent via professed settled intention and when that assertion is sufficiently proven to claim child support from the child's actual parents.

[38] At the hearing of the appeal, I asked both counsel whether there is a case they could draw to the court's attention that squarely addressed and considered the issue of settled intention or in loco parentis as it relates to standing to bring a claim as a "parent of a dependant" as set out in s. 33(2) of the FLA. Both counsel replied in the negative.

[39] During the course of argument in the appeal, the court asked counsel for Alex – Mr. Culp, formerly counsel for the Olivers – a question about the temporal durability of settled intention. The court posed the hypothetical – what happens to the Olivers' professed settled intention to treat Alex as their child if there is a breakdown in their relationship with Alex in the future?

[40] Mr. Culp's response – couched in the position he advances – that he no longer acts for the Olivers, but Alex alone – was that if a breakdown in the relationship between Alex and the Olivers were to come to pass, the Olivers' settled intention to treat Alex as their own child would cease.

[41] This raises a serious question in the court's mind. If a court were to accept that the Olivers in fact had a settled intention to treat Alex as their own child two outcomes would flow:

a. First, the Olivers would have standing as "parents" to bring a support application in relation to Alex against the Bowlbys pursuant to s. 33(2) of the FLA; and

b. Second, the Olivers, as "parents" of Alex, could in theory be subject to a claim for support from Alex himself pursuant to s. 31(b)(c) of the FLA.

[42] Mr. Culp's response to the court's hypothetical query of what would happen to the "settled intention" of the Olivers to treat Alex as their child, if there were to be a breakdown in the relationship between Alex and the Olivers, is problematic.

[43] The implications of a determination that one person has a settled intention to treat another person as their child can be profound. It cannot be transactional, transitory, nor conditional.

[44] It was not clear on the record before Justice Edward that the Olivers had fully demonstrated a settled intention to treat Alex as their child. As Justice Edward noted in his oral reasons:

When the applicants obtained the temporary decision-making authority and primary parenting time order of Justice Baker, dated August 16, 2022, it was ostensibly to see consent signed for Alex to continue to play baseball. Somehow with the passage of time it is argued by the applicants that it is morphed into them being capable of standing in the place of the parent. I do not see that. I do not see how they have demonstrated a settled intention like Mr. Chartier had to treat his stepdaughter as a child of his own.

[45] The Olivers clearly care about and want to help Alex. It is laudable that they have taken Alex into their home and did so at a point in Alex's life when he needed one.

[46] However, the love, kindness, or charity extended by the Olivers to Alex does not necessarily translate into them assuming the mantle of and being recognized as parents as it is defined and used in the FLA.

[47] Justice Edward did not err in concluding that the Olivers had failed to demonstrate a settled intention to treat Alex as their own child.

The Issue of Jurisdiction to Appointment of the Olivers as Litigation Guardians

[48] During the course of argument before Justice Edward, it was clear that Justice Edward, having reviewed the material, had the following thoughts and concerns:

a. First, that the Olivers had failed to demonstrate a settled intention to treat Alex as their own child and therefore lacked standing as "parents of a dependant" under s. 33(2) of the FLA.

b. Alex was indeed a minor child pursuant to s. 31(a) of the FLA and the Bowlbys, as Alex's parents, had an obligation to support Alex pursuant to that section.

c. The only alternative to ensure Alex would be able to pursue relief in the proceeding would be to have Alex proceed as a dependant himself privately represented pursuant to rule 4(2) of the Family Law Rules.

d. Rule 4(2) permits private representation but does not specify how private representation of a minor is to come about. The solution to this issue comes from rule 1(7) of the Family Law Rules which says:

If these rules do not cover a matter adequately, the court may give directions, and the practice shall be decided by analogy to these rules by reference to the Courts of Justice Act and the Act governing the case, and if the court considers it appropriate, by reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

e. The manner by which a minor or infant (a person under the age of 18) is represented in a civil proceeding is governed by rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure wherein a litigation guardian may be appointed.

[49] During the course of argument, counsel for the Bowlbys took the position that the proper way the Olivers could have commenced the proceeding as representatives of Alex would have been by taking the steps to make themselves Alex's litigation guardians.

[50] Confronted with this during the course of argument, the Olivers demurred from the prospect of embracing the role of litigation guardians and their counsel asserted the correctness of the Olivers' position that they were "parents" of Alex for the purpose of s. 33(2) of the FLA.

[51] Ultimately, Justice Edward disagreed, and in wishing to preserve Alex's course to a remedy – support from the Bowlbys – Justice Edward imposed the role of litigation guardians upon the Olivers.

[52] A careful reading of rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reveals, however, that Justice Edward's approach was erroneous as he was without jurisdiction to make such an order.

[53] Rule 7.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure says:

Court Appointment Unnecessary

7.02 (1) Any person who is not under disability may act, without being appointed by the court, as litigation guardian for a plaintiff or applicant who is under disability, subject to subrule (1.1). O. Reg. 69/95, s. 3 (1).

Affidavit to be Filed

(2) No person except the Children's Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee shall act as litigation guardian for a plaintiff or applicant who is under disability until the person has filed an affidavit in which the person,

(a) consents to act as litigation guardian in the proceeding;

(b) confirms that he or she has given written authority to a named lawyer to act in the proceeding;

(c) provides evidence concerning the nature and extent of the disability;

(d) in the case of a minor, states the minor's birth date;

(e) states whether he or she and the person under disability are ordinarily resident in Ontario;

(f) sets out his or her relationship, if any, to the person under disability;

(g) states that he or she has no interest in the proceeding adverse to that of the person under disability; and

(h) acknowledges that he or she has been informed of his or her liability to pay personally any costs awarded against him or her or against the person under disability.

[54] Rule 7.04(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure says:

7.04(1) Litigation guardian for party – Unless there is some other proper person willing and able to act as litigation guardian for a party under disability, the court shall appoint,

(a) The Children's Lawyer, if the party is a minor.

[55] Rule 1.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure says:

"disability", where used in respect of a person, means that the person is,

(a) a minor …

[56] Once Justice Edward determined that the Olivers had no standing as parents, he was confronted with the Olivers who had not complied with rule 7.02. There was no proper person willing and able to act as litigation guardian. At that point, Justice Edward's only jurisdictional option was to appoint the Children's Lawyer to assume the role of litigation guardian pursuant to rule 7.04. He did not do that.

[57] This error is jurisdictional.

[58] The court's jurisdiction to appoint a litigation guardian who does not comply with the requirements of rule 7.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to only the Children's Lawyer in respect of a minor.

[59] No private individual is eligible to be a litigation guardian unless they meet the requirements of rule 7.02(2) (a) through (h).

[60] Mr. Culp, counsel for Alex, in argument before the court on appeal, pointed out that the Bowlbys' counsel, when arguing before Justice Edward, stated that the proper way for the Olivers to have advanced a support claim for Alex was by assuming the role of litigation guardian.

[61] Mr. Culp went further in asserting that counsel for the Bowlbys effectively invited Justice Edward to appoint the Olivers as litigation guardians.

[62] Given this, Mr. Culp argues that the Bowlbys are now prevented from appealing the order of Justice Edward appointing the Olivers as litigation guardians. He submits for the court's consideration two doctrines of law familiar to commercial lawyers; they are the doctrine of estoppel and the doctrine of approbation and reprobation.

[63] These doctrines, at their core, stand for the simple proposition that you cannot say one thing and do another. In other words, an estoppel keeps a party from alleging a fact is true for one purpose and then later saying it is not true to suit a different purpose in a different circumstance.

[64] The court respectfully disagrees with the applicability of these doctrines to the circumstances at hand for two reasons.

[65] The first reason is that counsel for the Bowlbys during the course of argument pointed out the proper process by which the Olivers could have commenced a claim – litigation guardian – but they chose not to pursue that path. When Justice Edward probed the issue further during argument, the Olivers persisted in their position that they were "parents" of Alex for the purpose of s. 33(2) of the FLA and therefore had standing. They did not volunteer to switch the modality of the litigation by taking the steps to become litigation guardians.

[66] If the Olivers had in fact switched their litigation modality premised upon some sort of promise or inducement – like an agreement on costs – from the Bowlbys, and voluntarily became litigation guardians, and then the Bowlbys went back on their word, the Olivers would have a point and could legitimately assert an estoppel. That, however, is not what happened.

[67] The second reason the doctrines of estoppel and approbation and reprobation do not apply is that what Justice Edward did was erroneous from a jurisdictional perspective.

[68] Justice Edward appointed the Olivers as Alex's litigation guardians without them taking the voluntary steps necessary – outlined in rule 7.02 – to qualify themselves as litigation guardians. These include two important facts to be sworn in an affidavit by the litigation guardians:

a. That the litigation guardian consents to acting as a litigation guardian; and

b. That the litigation guardian acknowledges that he or she has been informed of his or her liability to pay personally any costs awarded against him or her or against the person under disability.

[69] Justice Edward did not have the jurisdiction to do as he did. In the circumstances, as they were before Justice Edward at the hearing on June 7, 2024, his jurisdiction afforded him only one option if he wished to preserve the claim for support on Alex's behalf. That was to appoint the Children's Lawyer as Alex's representative under rule 7.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[70] The doctrines of law that counsel cites, estoppel and approbation and reprobation, cannot not apply to improvise a jurisdiction for the court to make an order that did not exist in the first place.

The Motion to Dismiss the Appeals as Moot

[71] On its face, the issue may be moot in that time has lapsed and Alex is now of the age of majority, and he seeks to simply pursue his claim for retroactive support from his parents, the Bowlbys.

[72] The Olivers, however, brought an application that should have, given the facts found by the judge at first instance, been dismissed with the issues of costs of that application being considered in the ordinary and normal course.

[73] The Bowlbys have an ostensible interest in pursuing those costs and the Olivers have an exposure to an award of costs against them.

[74] Yet, the Olivers did not have counsel represent them on this issue before this court on this appeal. Mr. Culp declared clearly that that he stood before the court on the appeal on behalf of Alex only and no longer represented the Olivers.

[75] Unfortunately, Mr. Culp has not recognized the conflicting interests that have arisen as a result of taking the position he has as he has shifted from representing one client (the Olivers) to another (Alex).

Conclusion and Disposition

[76] Given the foregoing, the following order will go:

a. The application of the Olivers pursuant to s. 33(2) of the FLA is dismissed for lack of standing.

b. The order that the Olivers are the litigation guardians of Alex is set aside as there was no jurisdiction on the part of the court to appoint the Olivers without them qualifying as such under rule 7.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

c. Alex's motion to dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal as moot is dismissed.

d. The foregoing orders are without prejudice to Alex commencing a claim for retroactive support against the Bowlbys.

e. The matter may be returned before me on the following issues within 14 days:

i. the issue of quantum of costs payable to the Bowlbys from the Olivers arising from the original motion before Justice Edward; and

ii. costs as between Alex and the Bowlbys before this court on the appeal, including the dismissal of Alex's motion for mootness,

if these matters cannot be resolved by the parties.

[77] A word of advice to all in this proceeding: Everyone would be well advised before taking another step in this proceeding to take a step back and carefully consider the path forward. Taking a long-term perspective with a view to reconciliation would be advisable for all involved.

A. Spurgeon, J.

Date Released: October 7, 2025