Court File and Parties

Date: 2025-10-15

Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Re: Quinto Annibale, Plaintiff

And: Corriere Canadese, Corrcan Media Group Inc. and Joe Volpe, Defendants

Before: Parghi J.

Counsel:

• Amanda Pilieci, for the Plaintiff/Responding Party
• Paul Slansky, for the Defendants/Moving Parties

Heard: July 29, 2025

Endorsement

Background

[1] On January 30, 2019, the Defendant Corriere Canadese, Canada's only daily Italian/English daily newspaper, published an article entitled "The Never-ending Saga of Villa Charities Inc." (the "Article"). The Article was one of several published by Corriere Canadese about a controversial development proposal for the site known as 901 Lawrence Avenue West in Toronto. The site houses the Columbus Centre, a beloved community centre, and several programs geared toward the Italian Canadian community. The development proposal was a source of debate in the community, with some members concerned that it would result in the tearing down of the Columbus Centre to make way for a for-profit condominium development.

[2] The Article was critical of the development proposal and of the leaders, lawyers, and board members of Villa Charities Inc. and Villa Charities Foundation, the two organizations behind the proposal. Villa Charities Inc. is a registered charity with which several organizations, known as the Villa Charities, are affiliated. The Villa Charities include the Villa Charities Foundation, the Villa Colombo Seniors Centre (Vaughan) Inc. ("Villa Colombo Seniors Centre"), and the Columbus Centre.

[3] The statements in the Article included the following:

a. "There used to be some shed [sic] of decency and altruism in the foundation stones of what is now called Villa Charities."

b. "The most recent cadre of members of the respective boards... appear to be engaged in putting that reputation to rest."

c. "Their names and their games elicit comparisons to the sly, manipulative and malicious cast of characters conjured up in Ancient Greek Mythology."

d. "They remind everyone that the price of 'civility' is constant vigilance."

e. "The coven of self[-]hating Italian Canadian businessmen and women who had taken over The Villa, the Columbus Centre and their Operational arm, VCI, met with local, Community outrage and political opposition."

f. "They and their legal team of development and regulatory lawyers", who included a lawyer "who pompously introduced himself at a [May 2017] North York Community Council meeting as 'Cue Enable' - clearly not his real name – concocted a plan to transform a community asset into condominiums for private profit."

g. "The 'Reimagine Plan' was highlighted by some questionable partnerships and tactics. These included, as later revealed in documents made public, spreading disinformation and outright lying - by individuals in a position of trust and by organizations whose raison d'etre is service and honesty."

h. "The Members of the Boards of VCI, Columbus Centre and Villa, had they been in any other environment, would have done two things: dismissed their CEO and then resigned."

i. "Their reputation along with that of a once venerable institution in the Community, whatever is left of it, is in tatters."

[4] The Plaintiff, Quinto Annibale, was a member of the board of the Villa Colombo Seniors Centre and legal counsel to Villa Charities Inc. He is a lawyer and a member of the Italian Canadian business community. Mr. Annibale has sued, alleging that the Article is defamatory of him "in its entirety" and in the passages cited above. He says the Article's words and the context in which it was written make clear that the allegedly defamatory statements refer to him personally, in his capacity as a member of the board of Villa Colombo Seniors Centre, and as legal counsel for Villa Charities Inc.

[5] Corriere Canadese has been in publication since 1954. It publishes print copies five days a week and also publishes online and on a public x.com account. Its publisher, the Defendant Joe Volpe, is also the head of the Defendant Corrcan Media Group, an online digital channel that carries a digital version of some of the Corriere Canadese. The Defendants deny the claim of defamation and have counterclaimed for abuse of process and interference with their common law rights and their rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking $1.2 million in general, aggravated, and punitive damages.

[6] The Defendants move to dismiss the defamation claim pursuant to the so-called "anti-SLAPP" provisions in section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (the "Act"). The "anti-SLAPP" provisions underlying the Defendants' motion aim to "achieve a 'delicate equilibrium'" between two competing goals: protecting free speech by screening out "early stage strategic lawsuits that adversely affect debate and participation in matters of public interest" and ensuring that people can seek redress for reputational harm caused by defamatory statements (Teneycke v. McVety, 2024 ONCA 927, at para. 34). They also seek $150,000 in damages, pursuant to section 137.1(9) of the Act, on the basis that Mr. Annibale commenced this proceeding for an improper purpose.

[7] For the reasons below, I dismiss the Defendants' motion.

The Legal Test in an "Anti-SLAPP" Motion

[8] The Supreme Court of Canada established the legal framework for applying the "anti-SLAPP" provisions set forth in section 137.1 of the Act in 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 587, and its companion case Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 645. Under this framework, the defendant must first establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the proceeding "arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest" (section 137.1(3); Pointes, at para. 18). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must satisfy the court that there are "grounds to believe" that there is substantial merit to the claim and that the defendant has no valid defences (section 137.1(4)). Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the harm it has suffered, or is likely to suffer, as a result of the defendant's expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the underlying proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression and public participation (Pointes, at paras. 18 and 82).

[9] In its analysis, the court is to engage only in a limited weighing of the evidence for the purpose of considering the criteria under section 137.1 and only a preliminary assessment of the claim and defences to determine the overall prospects of success (Teneycke, at paras. 35-36).

Whether the Defendants Have Demonstrated That the Proceeding Arises From an Expression That Relates to a Matter of Public Interest

[10] Turning to the first part of this test, the Defendants must establish that the proceeding "arises from an expression made by" them "that relates to a matter of public interest."

[11] Section 137.1(2) of the Act defines "expression" for the purpose of the "anti-SLAPP" provisions as "any communication, regardless of whether it is made verbally or non-verbally, whether it is made publicly or privately, and whether or not it is directed at a person or entity."

[12] The parties do not dispute that the Article falls under this definition of an "expression". It is an online and print publication that addresses matters of interest to the Italian Canadian community in Toronto.

[13] The Supreme Court held in Pointes that when evaluating whether an expression relates to a matter of public interest, the court should adopt a "broad and liberal interpretation," in keeping with the legislative purpose of section 137.1(3) of the Act (at para. 26). It should not "scrutiniz[e]" the impugned statement "in isolation"; rather, it should undertake a contextual analysis that considers "what the expression is really about," the "subject matter of the publication as a whole," and whether some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information on the subject (Pointes, at paras. 27-30; Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, at para. 101; and Levant v. DeMelle, 2022 ONCA 79, at para. 58).

[14] The Article clearly discusses a matter of public interest. The focus of the article was a request by Villa Charities Inc. and the Villa Charities to have Toronto City Council reconsider its designation of the Columbus Centre as a heritage site. The broader context of the article was the development proposal, which was very much a topic of interest to the Italian Canadian community in Toronto and to the public generally. The issue galvanized and, to some extent, divided the community. There was extensive discussion and debate. There were public consultations, community meetings, protests, and letter writing campaigns. The Article responded to and contributed to public discourse on the issue. To use the language of Pointes, the Article addressed a subject that some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information on.

Whether the Plaintiff Has Demonstrated That There Are Grounds to Believe That There Is Substantial Merit to the Claim and That the Defendants Have No Valid Defences

[15] Under the second part of the test, the Plaintiff must satisfy me that there are grounds to believe that there is substantial merit to the claim and that the Defendants have no valid defences.

[16] The Supreme Court explained in Pointes that for the underlying defamation action "to have 'substantial merit', it must have a real prospect of success." This need not amount to a "demonstrated likelihood of success," but must "ten[d] to weigh more in favour of the plaintiff" (at para. 49). The court "needs to be satisfied that there is a basis in the record and the law — taking into account the stage of the proceeding — for drawing such a conclusion. This requires that the claim be legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief" (at para. 49).

[17] For the reasons below, I find that there are grounds to believe that there is substantial merit to the claim and that the Defendants have no valid defences.

Substantial Merit

[18] The test for defamation has three components: (1) the words complained of must have been published, i.e., communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff; (2) the words must refer to the plaintiff; and (3) the words must be defamatory, i.e. must tend to lower the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person (Bent, at para. 92).

[19] I find that there are grounds to believe that each of these branches of the test for defamation is satisfied here.

[20] It is not disputed before me that the words at issue were published.

[21] While the parties strongly dispute whether the words refer to Mr. Annibale, I am of the view that there are grounds to believe that they do.

[22] Where the impugned language does not identify the plaintiffs by name, as is the case here, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the impugned words are capable of referring to them and that reasonable people would conclude that the words did in fact refer to them (Foulidis v. Ford, 2014 ONCA 530, at para. 17).

[23] I find that there are grounds to believe that readers of the Article would know it refers to Mr. Annibale. The Article targets Villa Charities entities including the Villa Colombo Seniors Centre and Villa Charities Inc., the "most recent cadre of members of the respective boards," "their chief administrative officials," and their "legal team of development and regulatory lawyers." When the Article was published, Mr. Annibale was legal counsel to Villa Charities Inc. He was serving on the board of the Villa Colombo Seniors Centre. His membership on the board was listed on the Villa Charities website and on his professional profile on his law firm website. Moreover, articles published by Corriere Canadese prior to the Article had referred specifically to him by name on May 31, 2017, as the secretary of the board for Villa Charities, and on June 13 and 31, 2017, as the lawyer for Villa Charities. There are therefore grounds to believe that a reader would conclude that Mr. Annibale was among the board members and lawyers referred to in the Article.

[24] The parties disagree about whether the statement in the Article about a lawyer with Villa Charities "who pompously introduced himself at a [North York Community Council] meeting as 'Cue Enable'" refers to Mr. Annibale. Mr. Annibale's evidence was that when he spoke at the meeting, he identified himself as "Q. Annibale". In my view, there are grounds to believe that someone who attended the meeting and who knew who Mr. Annibale was would know, upon reading this statement in the Article, that it was referring to him. The initial "Q" and the word "cue" are pronounced identically. The words "Enable" and "Annibale" sound fairly similar, and a reader would likely discern that "Enable" was an approximation of a similar-sounding last name. I also conclude that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a reasonable reader who did not attend the meeting could determine to whom the "Cue Enable" statement referred, by reading it in the context of the Article's other references to the organizations' board members and legal counsel.

[25] Finally, I find that there are grounds to believe that the statements at issue from the Article are defamatory – that is, that they would tend to lower Mr. Annibale's reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person. They state that Villa Charities used to have "some shed [sic] of decency and altruism" and that its current board members "appear to be engaged in putting that reputation to rest," implying that the current board members lack any shred of decency or altruism. They state that the current board members may be compared to "sly, manipulative and malicious" figures from Greek mythology, implying that the board members are sly, manipulative, and malicious. They describe the board members as a "coven of self[-]hating Italian Canadian" business people, the implication of which is obvious and particularly pronounced given that this is an Italian Canadian community publication. The impugned words further state that the organizations' legal team "concocted a plan" to turn the site into condominiums "for private profit" and have been "spreading disinformation and outright lying." As I have found, there are grounds to believe a reader would identify Mr. Annibale as one of the individuals who make up the organizations' legal team. The impugned words state that those individuals' reputations are left "in tatters." These words, even when read in the full context of the Article, would very clearly tend to lower the reputation of Mr. Annibale and everyone else to whom they refer.

[26] For these reasons, there are grounds to believe the defamation claim has substantial merit.

No Valid Defences

[27] Following the assessment of substantial merit, I must then consider whether there are grounds to believe that there are no valid defences to the defamation allegations. The Plaintiff must show that the defences put forward by the Defendants do not have a real prospect of success: that they could be found legally untenable or unsupported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief (Pointes, at paras. 55-60).

[28] The Defendants advance four defences: justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, and a limitations defence. Although there is reference in their pleading to a defence of responsible communication, that defence was not advanced in the Defendants' written materials or oral argument and I therefore do not consider it.

[29] I find that there are grounds to believe the Defendants have no valid defences.

Limitations Defence

[30] There are grounds to believe the Defendants do not have a valid limitations defence. The Article was published on January 30, 2019. Mr. Annibale served his notices of libel on March 8, 2019, before the earliest possible March 13, 2019 deadline. He commenced his action on April 23, 2019, before the earliest possible April 30, 2019 deadline (Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, ss. 5(1) and 6).

Justification

[31] There are grounds to believe the Defendants cannot invoke the defence of justification.

[32] The crux of the defence of justification is that the main thrust or the "sting" of the alleged defamation is substantially true (Bent, at para. 107).

[33] The underlying factual claim in the Article is that the organizations, and their counsel and board members, were proposing to demolish the Columbus Centre, turn it into for-profit condominiums, and lie to the community about it. The Defendants provide a detailed chronology of events as they see them, which I will not summarize in detail here. In broad strokes, the Defendants state the following:

a. Initially, there was a proposal whereby the Toronto Catholic District School Board ("TCDSB") would buy the Columbus Centre on the condition that Villa Charities Inc. would tear it down and have the site cleared and construction ready. TCDSB would build a school, part of which would function as a community centre after hours. A contract was signed to that effect in June 2016, the details of which "were kept secret" until 2018.

b. In late 2016, plans were submitted to Toronto City Council for approval "without any public consultations." Toronto City Council directed them to North York City Council and initiated a process for review of the site by the Toronto Heritage Board.

c. Public consultations were then held at which "[t]he public was overwhelmingly opposed."

d. Villa Charities Inc. and TCDSB sought permission from the Ontario Management Board to go ahead with the project, "widely perceived as a means to circumvent the rest of the consultation process." Public demonstrations were held.

e. In September 2017, TDCSB voted that they would not proceed with the partnership unless an outside agency conducted a public consultation whose report showed "overwhelming support" for the project.

f. The ensuing report, entitled "Villa Charities/Columbus Centre & TCDSB/Dante Alighieri Catholic Academy International Community Hub Consultation" (the "Report"), was "less than enthusiastic". The TDCSB's staff nonetheless said it was prepared to recommend proceeding.

g. In February 2018, the Minister of Education withdrew funding for the project.

h. In June 2018, the Chair of Villa Charities Inc. announced that it had accepted the resignation of its Chair.

[34] The Defendants submit that through the process, the boards of Villa Charities Foundation and Villa Charities Inc. "engaged in a complete ignoring of … legitimate complaints, requests, and opposition" and "attempts at intimidating and silencing that opposition."

[35] Mr. Annibale's evidence is that while there was, at an earlier point in time, a proposal for a new joint facility to be shared between the Toronto Catholic District School Board and the Columbus Centre, "there was no plan to build condominiums at the location of the Columbus Centre and there certainly was no plan to deceive the community about any redevelopment of the Columbus Centre, nor was I ever involved in same." Mr. Annibale points to the Report, which contains an appendix entitled "12 Common Questions". One of questions posed is, "Is the future of the site also going to include condo development?" Villa Charities Inc.'s response to the question is:

No, there is no plan to build market condominiums or additional private housing. The mission of Villa Charities has been to celebrate and promote Italian culture and support seniors. Villa Colombo, our Long Term Care home was the first critical piece of this mission. Our mission has not changed and if the need arises, it is our intention to continue to contribute to both senior needs and the Italian cultural landscape in the best ways possible.

[36] The question before me on this motion is not whether, based on a full weighing of the record, the defence of justification is made out. Rather, the question is whether there are grounds to believe that the Defendants will not succeed in advancing their defence of justification.

[37] I answer that question in the affirmative. The Report, a public document that was released well before the Article was published and to which the Defendants themselves refer to in their motion materials, expressly provides that there was "no plan" to build condominiums. The Defendants provide no evidence of a redevelopment proposal that was going to involve building condominiums. The only evidence they can point me to consists of Corriere Canadese articles, many of them by Mr. Volpe himself, that assert that the Columbus Centre stood to be demolished under the organizations' redevelopment plan. But repeated expressions of this claim, coming from the Defendants themselves, are not evidence of the accuracy of the claim itself.

[38] Even if I were to accept that there is evidence of a plan to build a condominium, there is no evidence to show that Mr. Annibale was involved in formulating that plan. In his evidence, he denies that there is any such plan or that he was involved in any such plan. I am presented with no evidence of his direct involvement in any such plan.

[39] There are grounds to believe that the Defendants will be unable to show that the "sting" of the alleged defamation is substantially true. The "sting" of the words at issue is that Mr. Annibale and other board members and lawyers for the two organizations are sly, manipulative, malicious liars, abusing their positions of trust to deceive community members into thinking that the Columbus Centre will not be demolished to build condominiums. Yet the record contains evidence from an outside consultant that squarely rebuts the claim that the Columbus Centre was to be demolished. The record contains no evidence to support the claim; it only contains dozens of Corriere Canadese articles that reiterate the claim. There is no support for the claim that Mr. Annibale or any other leaders, board members, or lawyers for the organizations were lying when they suggested the opposite. There is certainly no support for the significant allegations that they were being sly, manipulative, or malicious. I find that there are grounds to believe that the Defendants will not be able to show that there are sufficient facts to take away the "sting" of the alleged defamation.

[40] As such, I find that there are grounds to believe that there is no valid defence of justification.

Fair Comment

[41] I further find that there are grounds to believe that the Defendants have no defence of fair comment.

[42] The defence of fair comment has five elements: (a) the statements were on a matter of public interest, (b) the statements were "based on fact", (c) the statements are recognizable as comment, (d) any person could honestly express the opinion at issue on the proved facts, and (e) the defendants were not actuated by express malice (Hansman v. Neufeld, 2023 SCC 14, at para. 96).

[43] The first element is satisfied. For the reasons above, I accept that the statements in the Article were on a matter of public interest.

[44] I find, however, that there are grounds to believe that the statements were not based on fact. The Article does not provide any factual basis for the statements at issue. As discussed above, there is no factual foundation for the claim that the organizations' board members, lawyers, or administrative leadership devised a plan to demolish the Columbus Centre to build condominiums. Nor is there any evidence before me to suggest that the factual basis for the statements was so notorious as to already be understood by the Article's reading audience. As such, the statements cannot be "tethered to an adequate factual basis to allow the reader to be an informed judge" (Hansman, at para. 102).

[45] There are also grounds to believe that the statements would not be understood by a reasonable reader as a comment rather than a statement of fact. The content of the statements in the Article is to be assessed from the perspective of a reasonably thoughtful and informed reader with "a degree of common sense", who is "likely to read" the Article "casually or uncritically and not give it concentrated attention or read it a second time" (Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia CMR inc., 2011 SCC 9, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 214, at paras. 36 and 37, quoting Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Color your world Corp., 38 O.R. (3d) 97 and Raymond Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Scarborough: Carswell, 1999) (loose-leaf 2010-Rel. 2). In my view, some of the statements will be perceived by a reasonable reader as factual assertions, and not as statements of opinion. These include the statements that Mr. Annibale and others "concocted" the alleged plan to demolish the Columbus Centre to construct for-profit condominiums and engaged in "outright lying" and "spreading" of "disinformation". These are framed in the Article as factual assertions. They will be understood by a reasonably thoughtful reader as such.

[46] The fair comment defence is defeated by malice, and in my view there are grounds to believe that the statements were made with malice. Malice can be proven by showing that a statement was made with the defendant's knowledge that it was false, reckless indifference to the truth, or intention to injure the plaintiff out of spite or animosity. A purportedly honestly held belief "arrived at without reasonable grounds" may still be spoken recklessly and ground a finding of malice (Bent, at para. 136). Malice may be evidenced intrinsically, "based on the mode and style, tenor, tone and spirit of the publication, if the language is more abusive, extreme, exaggerated, inflammatory, sensationalized, offensive, excessive or extravagant than required" (Canadian Standards Association v. P.S. Knight Co. Ltd., 2019 ONSC 1730, at para. 105). Malice may also be evidenced through extrinsic factors that include "statements made in reckless disregard for the truth" or "without taking steps to check or verify the facts" and publishing subsequent articles that attack the plaintiff and allude to the libel action (Canadian Standards Association, at paras. 105-106). The more serious the allegation, the more weight a court will assign to the failure to the defendant to verify the allegation as evidence of malice (Bent, at para. 136).

[47] Intrinsic evidence of malice may be found in statements in the Article such as, "There used to be some shed [sic] of decency and altruism in the foundation stones of what is now called Villa Charities" and the organizations' board members', leaders', and lawyers' "names and their games elicit comparisons to the sly, manipulative and malicious cast of characters conjured up in Ancient Greek Mythology." This language is more extreme and excessive than is required.

[48] Extrinsic evidence of malice is found in the facts, uncontroverted before me, that:

a. Mr. Volpe had no contact with Mr. Annibale after the May 2017 meeting that is discussed in the Article;

b. the Defendants did not ask Mr. Annibale for comment before publishing the articles that pre-dated the Article and which identify Mr. Annibale by name;

c. the Defendants did not identify anyone affiliated with Villa Charities whom they interviewed for the Article for its publication; and

d. Mr. Volpe says he read the materials in the record which, as I read them, indicate that the allegations of a secret plan to demolish the Columbus Centre so that condominiums may be built are incorrect.

[49] Extrinsic evidence of malice is further found in the Defendants' subsequent publication, in October 2023, of an article in which Mr. Annibale was referred to by name as "Quinto Annibale, Board Member of the Augustinian Fathers," and reference was made to this litigation:

In full disclosure, and in the interests of transparency, the newspaper and its publisher were litigated several years ago by Mr. Annibale. He has since drawn other (not from us) media attention to himself for a number of reasons – all on the public record.

The October 2023 article printed Mr. Annibale's photograph, even though the article also referred to other individuals, both public figures, whose pictures did not appear. The article was also posted on Corriere Canadese's X account in Italian and English, with the hashtag #QuintoAnnibale.

[50] In these circumstances, I find that there are grounds to believe that the fair comment defence will fail at trial.

Qualified Privilege

[51] Finally, there are grounds to believe that qualified privilege is not a valid defence.

[52] Qualified privilege will arise on an occasion in which a person making a communication has "an interest or duty, legal, social, moral or personal, to publish the information in issue to the person to whom it is published" and the recipients have "a corresponding interest or duty to receive it." (Bent, at para. 121, citing Peter A. Downard, The Law of Libel in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018), at §9.6). Qualified privilege does not apply where the dominant motive behind the words is malice or where the scope of the occasion of privilege is exceeded (Bent, at para. 121).

[53] To evaluate a claim of qualified privilege, the "occasion" to which the privilege is claimed to apply must be characterized with some precision. Only then can the court assess whether the occasion was exceeded or abused (Bent, at para. 122). The Defendants have defined the "occasion" somewhat broadly, stating that the "occasion" of the asserted privilege is in ensuring "that the public, and members of the public specifically interested, were well informed of what was happening, in the exercise of responsible publication."

[54] Qualified privilege requires a reciprocity between the speaker and the audience: the speaker must have a duty to publish the statement to the audience, and the audience must have a corresponding duty to receive the statement. In light of this requirement, the Supreme Court of Canada has observed that "[i]t remains uncertain when, if ever, a media outlet can avail itself of the defence of qualified privilege" (Grant, at para. 37). On this basis alone, I find that there are grounds to believe that the Article does not meet the reciprocity requirement at the heart of qualified privilege.

[55] In addition, as discussed above, I find that there are grounds to believe that the information communicated was uncorroborated factually and sensationalized in nature. This constitutes "inappropriate content" that exceeds the scope of the privilege claimed by the Defendants, even if an occasion of qualified privilege did exist (Canadian Standards Association, at paras. 57-58).

[56] Finally, as also discussed above, there are grounds to believe that the statement was made with malice, and that on this basis qualified privilege does not apply.

[57] I therefore find that there are grounds to believe that the defence of qualified privilege is not valid.

Whether the Plaintiff Has Demonstrated That the Public Interest in Permitting the Action to Continue Outweighs the Public Interest in Protecting the Defendants' Expression

[58] Finally, Mr. Annibale must satisfy me that the harm he has suffered or is likely to suffer as a result of the Defendants' expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting this action to continue outweighs the defamation action's "deleterious effects on expression and public participation" (Pointes, at para. 82).

[59] In Pointes, at para. 82, the Supreme Court identified this weighing exercise as the "crux or core" of the section 137.1 analysis. At this stage, the court is to consider "what is really going on" (at para. 81):

[T]he open-ended nature of s. 137.1(4)(b) provides courts with the ability to scrutinize what is really going on in the particular case before them: s. 137.1(4)(b) effectively allows motion judges to assess how allowing individuals or organizations to vindicate their rights through a lawsuit — a fundamental value in its own right in a democracy — affects, in turn, freedom of expression and its corresponding influence on public discourse and participation in a pluralistic democracy.

[60] As the Court of Appeal for Ontario put it in Burjoski v. Waterloo Region District School Board, 2024 ONCA 811, at para. 47 (d):

It is at this stage that the intention behind the legislation is given expression and force. It is here that the court determines whether the public interest in the impugned speech is such that it should not be silenced or chilled by the threat of litigation. It is here that the strategy in allegedly strategic litigation is potentially identified and exposed.

[61] In the first stage of this balancing exercise, I am to consider the harm suffered as a consequence of the alleged defamation. Mr. Annibale must be able to demonstrate the existence of harm and must also demonstrate that the harm was caused by the impugned expression. He need not tender a damages brief or quantify or particularize the harm, but must provide evidence from which I may infer the likelihood of harm and causation. "Presumed harm or bald assertions of harm will not, in themselves, be sufficiently serious such that the public interest in permitting a respondent's proceeding to continue would outweigh the public interest in protecting the moving party's expression on a matter of public interest" (Burjoski, at para. 47 (f)).

[62] Mr. Annibale has satisfied me that he has experienced harm.

[63] The harm is in part professional. Mr. Annibale provides evidence that he has been a practising lawyer for 30 years and is the national head of a practice group in his law firm. His business success "depends in a very large measure on [his] reputation." He notes that the Supreme Court of Canada has described "a reputation for integrity" as "the cornerstone of a lawyer's professional life" (Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at para. 118). The Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Professional Conduct impose specific obligations on lawyers to act with civility and honesty. For example, the Rules describe integrity as "the fundamental quality of any person who seeks to practice as a member of the legal profession" (Rule 2.1-1, commentary 1). Mr. Annibale states that the allegation that he lacks those traits "is extremely damaging to [him] professionally and calls into question [his] integrity."

[64] On cross-examination, Mr. Annibale described the professional harm this way:

[I]t's caused my reputation as a lawyer to be called into question and as a lawyer I have, apart from my competence, I have one key characteristic and that's my integrity and the trust of my clients, and the articles I feel go to questioning my integrity as a lawyer. I make my -- as you know, I make my livelihood as a lawyer and so when someone calls into question my character it calls into question my abilities as a lawyer and that causes me significant distress to the point where I'm not sleeping nights. There have been occasions when I wake up in the middle of the night thinking about this.

[65] Mr. Annibale also provides evidence as to the harm the Article has caused him outside of the professional sphere, stating that, "[a]s a consequence of the Article," he "suffered and continue[s] to suffer distress and embarrassment." His evidence is worth quoting in full:

… I am a lawyer and prominent figure in the Italian-Canadian community in the Greater Toronto area. The Newspaper [Corriere Canadese] is identified as being the only daily Italian language newspaper and has been in publication since 1954. Given its long-standing tenure, the Newspaper undoubtedly has thousands of readers, including individuals in the Italian-Canadian community whom I have or could have interactions with either personally, socially, or professionally. The thought that these individuals may believe the false statements written about me in the Article is distressing and embarrassing to me as a person who has acted with civility, honestly and decency throughout my life, including my involvement with Villa Charities and my tenure on VCV's board of directors.

Moreover, as the Article was published in the Newspaper both in print and online, it is impossible to determine the number of people that read the Article and possibly agreed with its contents, including the false and defamatory statements made about me. As the Defendants have refused to issue an apology and retraction in relation to the Article, I am still embarrassed by its contents.

[66] On cross-examination, he gave the following evidence:

It's led to an interruption frequently in my normal activities. It's caused me distress, it's caused my family distress … .

There are occasions where my normal daily activities are distracted by my thinking about these allegations in the publication and it's interfered with my everyday life, my family life, my social circles. I have friends and family who have referenced the articles and asked me about it and asked me how something like this could be put into print, and I find myself explaining to them the truth because what's in print I don't believe to be the truth. So it's affected my personal life, my social life and my professional life

[67] I am satisfied that this evidence demonstrates harm to Mr. Annibale as a consequence of the alleged defamation.

[68] The Defendants contest Mr. Annibale's claim of harm, noting that in cross-examination, he gave evidence that he was not aware of any drop in his reported income after the Article was published, that no client had fired him as a result of the Article, that he was not aware of any client refusing to hire him as a result of the Article, and that he was not aware of any concrete pecuniary damage that he could quantify and trace to the Article.

[69] I reject the suggestion that, for the purposes of this motion, a plaintiff must be able to quantify alleged financial loss flowing from alleged professional harm. It is not easy to prove a loss of this nature. I do not see how Mr. Annibale could readily tender evidence from clients who are willing to say they fired him because of the Article, or prospective clients who are willing to say they refused to engage him because of the Article. Nor am I of the view that he needs to for the purposes of this motion. What he needs to do is persuade me that there is evidence from which harm can be inferred. Viewing the evidence as a whole, including his evidence on the importance of reputation in his chosen profession and on the harm he has experienced in various aspects of his life, including personally and professionally, I am so persuaded.

[70] The Defendants' conception of harm is unduly narrow. Reputational harm may be intangible. But that does not mean that it is any less real or invidious. In an era of online communications, innuendo and false information can take root and spread rapidly, inviting the court of public opinion to weigh in long before the court of law and in a much more emphatic and unforgiving fashion. The suggestion that Mr. Annibale must tender, at this stage of the litigation, concrete and empirical proof of economic harm in order to be able to pursue his defamation action ignores these realities and imposes an unduly high burden on him.

[71] The Defendants further suggest that Mr. Annibale has not demonstrate that the harm he experienced was a result of the Article. Although their submission on this point is somewhat unclear, the argument appears to be that the widespread public protests of the development proposal damaged Mr. Annibale's reputation. I do not agree. It was the Defendants' obligation to articulate and advance this argument, whether at cross-examination or otherwise, and they have not done so. There is nothing before me that would support drawing any causal link between public protests and the harm alleged. Mr. Annibale's evidence, meanwhile, is clear that he believes it is the Article itself that caused him the harm, and his evidence supports drawing that causal inference.

[72] As such, viewing the evidence as a whole, including Mr. Annibale's evidence on the importance of reputation in his chosen profession and on the harm he has experienced in various aspects of his life, including personally and professionally, I am satisfied that he has demonstrated harm.

[73] In the second stage of the balancing exercise, I must consider the public interest in protecting the expression in issue – that is, whether the quality and nature of the expression and the motivation behind it justify protecting the expression from the defamation action. As van Rensburg J.A. explained in Marcellin v. London (Police Services Board), 2024 ONCA 468, at para. 102, citing Hansman, at para. 79: "not all expression is created equal, and the level of protection to be afforded to any particular expression can vary according to the quality of the expression, its subject matter, the motivation behind it and the form through which it was expressed."

[74] The topic of the Article is worthy of free speech protection. It is important that the reading public be able to know about goings on in non-profit organizations and about site plan redevelopment initiatives in their communities. Further, the fact that the Article was published in an Italian language newspaper that serves an ethnic community underscores the worthiness of protecting its speech. Such publications play an important role in the communities they serve.

[75] Nonetheless, several of the statements in the Article stray from the core values underlying freedom of expression because they are personalized attacks on Mr. Annibale and other members of the organizations' leadership, boards, and legal teams. They use language that is gratuitous and vitriolic. They advance the factually unfounded claim that Mr. Annibale and others are abusing their positions of trust to deceive the community into thinking that the Columbus Centre will not be demolished to build condominiums. Nurturing thoughtful public discourse is a value that lies at the heart of freedom of expression. So too is facilitating the search for truth. Many of the statements in the Article do not foster those core values. The public interest in protecting such statements is therefore diminished (Pointes, at paras. 74-77).

[76] In the final stage of this analysis, I must consider whether the harm suffered or likely to be suffered by Mr. Annibale is "sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression." I find that the harm to Mr. Annibale is sufficiently serious to warrant allowing his defamation action to proceed. The evidence before me discloses real and serious harm to Mr. Annibale, including significant distress and embarrassment, harm to his professional reputation in a reputation-conscious profession, sleeplessness, and interference with his day-to-day activities and life. I am satisfied that that harm is sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the Defendants' expression, much of the nature and quality of which, as discussed above, strays from the core values underlying freedom of expression and public participation.

[77] I further observe that there is no suggestion before me that Mr. Annibale has ever used actual or threatened litigation to silence his critics or that he is motivated by retribution or some punitive purpose. In my view, Mr. Annibale is genuinely pursuing this action to remedy what he perceives as a legal wrong.

Conclusion

[78] For the reasons above, I dismiss the Defendants' motion to dismiss the defamation action. I also dismiss their claim for damages under section 137.1(9) of the Act.

[79] The Act provides that if a judge does not dismiss a defamation proceeding in response to an anti-SLAPP motion, as is the case here, then the respondent is not entitled to costs on the motion unless the judge determines that such an award is appropriate in the circumstances. Mr. Annibale's motion materials before me indicate that he is seeking costs. He has already provided a costs outline, as have the Defendants. If Mr. Annibale is seeking costs, notwithstanding the wording of the rule, he is instructed to provide a two-page, double spaced submission as to why he considers it appropriate to award him costs, within two weeks of the date of this Endorsement. The Defendants are to provide a responding two-page, double spaced submission, within two weeks of receiving Mr. Annibale's submission. I will then provide a separate endorsement on costs. If Mr. Annibale is not in fact seeking costs, he is asked to so advise.

Parghi J.

Date: October 15, 2025