Court File and Parties
Court File No.: FS-24-00041194-0000 Date: 2025-09-19 Superior Court of Justice – Ontario
Re: Laura Lynn Colligan, Applicant And: Grant Corwin Anthony, Respondent
Before: Mathen J.
Counsel: Kelly Jordan / Emma Katz, for the Applicant Danielle DeBartolo, for the Respondent
Heard: September 16, 2025
Endorsement
Overview
[1] In this family law motion, the Respondent, Grant, seeks the partition and sale of a property located at 25 Whitehall Road, Toronto. Grant co-owns the property with the Applicant, Laura.
[2] Grant and Laura never married. They lived together for a number of years. They disagree about the length of cohabitation and date of separation.
[3] Laura has a 12-year-old daughter, B. Grant says he never assumed a parental role for B. and, therefore, has no obligations to her.
[4] Before they separated, the parties and B. lived in Grant's home at 61 Binscarth Road, Toronto.
[5] Whitehall is a triplex. Laura purchased it on November 18, 2022, in her name alone but with significant financing from Grant. On December 30, 2022, Laura changed the ownership to a 50-50 tenancy in common between the parties' respective corporations: Borealis Real Estate Inc. (Laura) and 1864238 Ontario Inc. (Grant). The parties dispute the reason for this change. Grant says that the parties always intended for Laura to purchase the home in trust for both companies. Laura says that Grant initially offered Whitehall to her as a gift but his feelings for her changed after she fell ill. She says he coerced her to make the change while she was recovering from cancer treatment.
[6] Currently, Whitehall has a mortgage of over two million dollars.
[7] There is no dispute that parties purchased Whitehall as an investment property and never lived there as a couple. However, in April or May 2023, Laura and B. moved into the main floor unit. The two moved to the upper floor unit in May 2025.
[8] Pursuant to an April 2025 interim order, Grant pays monthly support of $9,057.00 for B. and $31,240.00 for Laura.
[9] Grant wants to sell Whitehall because he has lost trust in Laura and no longer to co-invest with her. Grant says Laura has mismanaged 25 Whitehall and improperly diverted rental income to her own use.
[10] Laura denies Grant's allegations. She says that Grant wants the sale out of malice. She says that: in the current market the property will sell at a loss and cause her financial hardship; Grant does not need the funds; the proceeds of sale are likely to be held in trust to satisfy separate claims; and a forced move is not in B.'s best interests.
[11] Grant's family has launched a civil claim for a beneficial interest in Whitehall. I understand that the claim is currently under appeal. Grant advised the family of this motion. The individuals have taken no position on the issue but indicated that they may take additional steps depending on the remedy.
Issues and Brief Conclusion
[12] The issues to be decided are:
a. Is Grant entitled to an order that Whitehall be sold? In particular: i. Does Grant have a prima facie right to the order? ii. Is Grant's request malicious, vexatious or oppressive? iii. How would such an order affect B.'s best interests?
b. If a sale is ordered, on what terms should it proceed?
c. Is Grant entitled to other procedural relief including disclosure and leave to amend his pleadings?
[13] I have decided that Grant has a prima facie right to sell the property, and Laura has not established on a balance of probabilities that I should decline to make an order. However, out of concern for B.'s well-being, I will order that no sale can be pursued for three months. Grant's requests for additional relief are granted in part.
Analysis
[14] The following analysis contains my findings of fact.
[15] The motion record contains numerous documents and exhibits about the parties' relationship. Both parties rely on sworn but highly disputed allegations that are untested. Questioning has not occurred.
[16] On this motion, I cannot make findings about the parties' relationship, including the date of separation or how Laura left 61 Binscarth Road. Nor can I assess Grant's relationship with, and obligations to, B.
Issue One: Is Grant Entitled to the Order?
The Law
[17] Joint tenants and tenants in common, among others, have the right to seek an order for sale of their property: Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4, s. 2.
[18] Because joint tenants have a statutory, prima facie right to sell their property, the court has a narrow discretion to decline to grant them an order. The court may, however, decline if the requesting party's conduct is "malicious, vexatious or oppressive": Latcham v. Latcham.
[19] 'Oppression' can include 'hardship': Greenbanktree Power Corp. v. Coinamatic Canada Inc. (2004), 75 O.R. (3d) 478 (C.A.), at para. 2. Hardship, however, requires more than financial inconvenience or adverse consequences: Walker v. Walker, 2024 ONSC 1508 at para. 18.
[20] The court must consider whether the proposed sale would negatively affect any involved child. Courts have declined or modified a requested partition and sale to protect a child's best interests: R.L. v M.F., 2022 ONSC 1677; Carmichael v. Carmichael, 2019 ONSC 6313.
[21] Therefore, the analysis proceeds as follows. First, I will consider whether Grant has a prima facie right to the sale. If he does, I will consider whether to exercise my discretion to refuse to order the sale because Laura has established on a balance of probabilities that (a) Grant's conduct is "malicious, vexatious or oppressive" and/or (b) B.'s best interests warrant it. If I decide that an order is warranted, I will consider whether the sale should have any additional conditions.
i. Does Grant have a prima facie right to sell 25 Whitehall Road?
[22] There is no dispute that Whitehall is a tenancy in common between Laura and Grant's respective corporations.
[23] Laura concedes that Grant has a prima facie right to seek an order that Whitehall be sold.
[24] Therefore, Grant has established his right to seek relief under the Partition Act and his entitlement to an order for sale unless Laura can persuade the court to exercise its discretion.
ii. Has Grant behaved in a malicious, vexatious or oppressive manner?
[25] I am not persuaded that Grant's conduct meets the standard articulated in the Latcham case for exercising discretion to decline to order a sale.
[26] Laura makes several arguments for why Grant's conduct does meet the standard.
Malice
[27] Laura acknowledges that Whitehall eventually will have to be sold. It is Grant's desire to sell it now, Laura argues, that is malicious.
[28] Laura says that Grant has been malicious throughout the parties' separation. Among other things, on May 5, 2023, he changed the locks to 61 Binscarth, kicking Laura and B. out of their home. Grant flatly rejects this narrative. He adds that Laura was using him for money for years, which caused their break-up in 2022, not 2023.
[29] Laura says that Grant has no need to sell Whitehall. Grant's equity in Whitehall is likely around $300,000. Grant has millions of dollars in other assets and earns at least a million dollars a year. Grant says that a $40,000 monthly support order is a heavy burden for anyone. He is entitled to convert his asset into liquid funds.
[30] Grant says that Laura reneged on her promises to (a) contribute $3600 a month to Whitehall when she moved in and (b) competently manage the property. He notes that the property's mortgage fell into default in the spring of 2024, which was not corrected until the parties executed a consent order in July 2024. Laura does not dispute the problems in 2024 but says that Grant had: stopped contributing to the mortgage; fired her; and refused to pay her any support. She says the property's expenses are now fully paid including property taxes. She recently moved to a smaller unit to increase Whitehall's rental income.
[31] Laura says that selling the property now will incur a loss. The real estate market is weaker than it was in 2022. Laura adds that if the parties sell before November 2027, they will face a $28,000 mortgage penalty.
[32] Grant makes additional allegations about Laura's supposed diversion of funds from Whitehall to her Borealis account for her own personal use. Laura strongly disputes this, pointing to a letter from her chartered accountant issued in July or August 2025. The accountant states that: all funds deposited and withdrawn from the Borealis account "have been recorded accurately and fully traceable"; "[a]ll bank and credit card balances have been reconciled to the company accounting records"; and "[a]ny funds withdrawn…for personal use were accounted using [Laura's] shareholder account"; and that as of December 31, 2024, Borealis owed Laura money, which suggests that she has not wrongly diverted funds.
[33] There is no dispute that Whitehall currently operates at a deficit because its rental revenue does not cover its expenses. Laura is covering the shortfall which is just under $8800 per month.
Findings
[34] It is not possible to determine the truth of Grant's allegations regarding Laura's diversion of funds to Borealis. While Laura bears the overall burden of proof because she is asking the court to exercise its discretion, with respect to the diversion issue I cannot find that Laura has acted improperly.
[35] Nevertheless, for the following reasons, Laura has not persuaded me that Grant's request to sell Whitehall is malicious:
a. I cannot determine exactly how Laura and B. came to leave 61 Binscarth Road. Therefore, Laura's narrative of being "kicked out" cannot factor into alleged malice.
b. Given that Whitehall has never been profitable, it is unsurprising that Grant might want to sell it.
c. The parties' relationship is over. It is understandable that Grant would no longer want to be Laura's co-investor.
d. Laura is only able to cover Whitehall's monthly shortfall because of Grant's interim support payments.
e. Grant's desire to sell Whitehall as soon as possible does not necessarily imply malice. It could also stem from Grant's desire to disentangle his and Laura's affairs, even at some cost.
Vexatiousness
[36] Laura relies heavily on Grant's failed attempt to force a sale in civil court. While a judge of this court did admonish Grant, I do not find that fact sufficient to make out vexatiousness in this proceeding.
[37] On June 4, 2024, this court stayed Grant's civil petition for partition and sale of Whitehall as an abuse of process. Justice Centa chided Grant for failing to disclose the existing family law proceeding. The parties had already attended a case conference canvassing the status of Whitehall. They discussed the possibility of a motion for its sale. Given those circumstances, Justice Centa found, the civil application was "abusive" and "duplicative".
Findings
[38] While Grant should not have brought the civil motion, I cannot infer from the stay of that proceeding that the current one is vexatious. Justice Centa made no finding about the substance of the application to sell – only that Grant should not have been brought it as a civil matter. Any vexatiousness related to the choice of venue and to Grant's failure to disclose pertinent facts. A different judge of this court granted leave for this motion, and the issue before me is suitable for a determination of whether to grant pre-trial relief under the family law process. Accordingly, on a balance of probabilities, I decline to find Grant's conduct vexatious.
Hardship
[39] I will now consider Laura's claim of financial hardship. Laura argues that Whitehall is her main source of savings, because she drew down on other finances to purchase it. Therefore, if Grant's motion is successful, and the property sells now for less than what it could sell for later, the loss will be difficult for Laura to absorb.
Findings
[40] For the following reasons, I am not persuaded that Laura's situation rises to the level of 'hardship' contemplated in Latcham and other cases:
a. Laura's most recent sworn financial statement shows her with a negative net worth of $2.3 million. However, that includes over $2 million owing on the Whitehall mortgage. It also includes mortgages on two other properties Laura owns in her own name. Further, the negative net worth is based on monthly income of $1600, which is far lower than Laura's 2024 net self-employment income of $455,117.86. Laura says that her business suffered after Grant terminated her employment. But there is no information to support such a drastic diminution in her income on a permanent basis.
b. Laura has alternative, immediately available accommodations, namely, an 1100-square foot apartment that she owns at 304-1A Dale Avenue. Laura says that the apartment is unsuitable for her and B. I address that argument in my analysis of B.'s best interests. Nevertheless, when considering financial hardship, I find it relevant that Laura has the option to move to a different apartment with no increase in expenses. It is possible that such move would decrease her overall expenses.
c. I am not persuaded that being forced to sell Whitehall now as opposed to after trial will cause Laura financial hardship. It is true that, since 2022, the real estate market has weakened. At the same time, the country is facing significant financial uncertainty, which makes the consequences of an immediate versus delayed sale unknowable. I am therefore unable to find on a balance of probabilities that listing the home for sale now will result in consequences that rise to the required level of hardship, as opposed to the risks that a person assumes in any real estate investment.
d. It appears to be undisputed that if the parties sell before November 2027, they will incur a financial penalty of approximately $28,000. However, given that Laura believes that Whitehall is worth over two million dollars, with hundreds of thousands of dollars in equity, I am not persuaded that paying a penalty of $14,000 (Laura's share) constitutes financial hardship.
[41] In conclusion, I find that Grant's request to sell Whitehall is not malicious, because it can be explained by other financial motivations stemming from the parties' break-up and the property's current unprofitability; is not vexatious, as the matter has been contemplated for over a year; and will not work a financial hardship on Laura sufficient to override Grant's right to dispose of the property.
[42] Therefore, I will not exercise my discretion under the Latcham standard to decline to order the sale.
iii. How will a sale affect B.'s best interests?
[43] I now turn to a separate question, which is whether a sale will detrimentally affect Laura's daughter, B.
[44] This is a sensitive issue. B. has been diagnosed with ADHD and anxiety. Laura has adduced third party evidence detailing B.'s current emotional difficulties. Laura deposes that B. has told her that she misses Grant. B.'s psychotherapist makes similar comments in a letter dated July 21, 2025.
[45] I am unable to make any findings about Grant and B.'s relationship, and his legal obligations to her. There appear to be many stressors on B., including her mother's cancer diagnosis and treatment, her move out of 61 Binscarth Road in 2023, her perception of the effects on B. of those stressors compared to the effects on her of a forced move from Whitehall.
[46] B.'s doctor has expressed concerns about B. being forced to leave Whitehall. The doctor writes that "the stability of [B.'s] current home environment has become a critical anchor in helping her cope with these stressful events" and "[i]t is in [B.'s] best interests to remain in her current home where she has established a sense of safety, routine and support."
[47] B.'s stability and mental well-being is of concern to the court. I find those considerations to be the strongest factor weighing against a sale of Whitehall pre-trial.
[48] For the following reasons, however, I decline to find that B.'s best interests warrant refusing Grant's order outright:
a. B. has only lived in her current surroundings since May 2025, when Laura decided to move from one unit in Whitehall to another. While it is less disruptive to move within a house than to move to a different house, it still counts as a "disruption". Laura decided to switch units for financial reasons. Since Laura would have considered B.'s interests before making that decision, this suggests that, in Laura's view, B. can tolerate at least some changes in her living environment.
b. Laura's apartment on Dale Avenue is located 2 kilometers from Whitehall. This means that Laura could continue to keep B. in the same neighborhood: Rosedale. Laura says that, at 1100 square feet, the Dale apartment is too small to house her, B. and their two dogs. However, there is no information about the size of the unit in which B. currently lives. There is no basis to find that living in an 1100 square foot apartment would be detrimental to B.'s best interests.
c. There is no evidence that B. would have to change schools.
d. Laura acknowledges that Whitehall will have to be sold. This is not a case of keeping B. in a home for the long term. Rather, it is about determining the conditions under which B. eventually will have to move. Therefore, while the evidence of B.'s mental health team is relevant and important, it is not determinative in whether Grant is entitled to an order for partition and sale. As I will discuss in the next section, B.'s well-being is more relevant to conditions that might be attached to such a sale.
e. In this case, the effect on B. of having to move must be weighed against a number of other facts. Whitehall was not a matrimonial home, and B. has not lived in her current unit for very long. Whitehall is an investment property where Laura decided to move after she left 61 Binscarth Road. Whitehall is operating at a loss that is being funded by Grant's interim support. No party suggests that B. will be able to reside at Whitehall indefinitely.
f. I find that B.'s best interests can be safeguarded by ordering a delay before Whitehall is listed for sale. That will ensure that B. is not forced to move during the fall school term. It will allow for B. to be prepared for a move and, perhaps, to participate in the selection of a new home that will meet her needs.
[49] Therefore, while I find that a move from Whitehall will create some disruption for B., in view of all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that that factor overrides Grant's right to sell.
Issue Two: If the sale is ordered, on what terms should it proceed?
[50] While I will grant Grant's request, I will add the following conditions.
[51] First, as alluded to above, I find it appropriate to require some delay before Whitehall is sold. The sale may not commence for three months. That will permit Laura to prepare B. for the move. It will ensure that B. does not have to move this fall.
[52] The delay will also allow the parties to settle on terms, like identifying an appropriate realtor. The parties are both real estate professionals who can craft such terms. They shall retain a single realtor.
[53] In his submissions, Grant indicated he was open to holding some or all of the proceeds of the sale in trust. Given the uncertainty around what Whitehall will sell for, and the separate civil claim by Grant's family, all the proceeds shall be held in trust, subject to further court order.
Issue Three: Grant's additional requests
[54] Grant seeks the following additional orders:
a. An Order that Laura produce within 15 days, any disclosure listed at SCHEDULE "A" attached to the Notice of Motion that has not already been produced;
b. An Order the Laura provide an accounting of all funds diverted from the RBC Borealis Real Estate Inc. Account 05722 100-994-3;
c. An Order that the Respondent, Grant Anthony, be permitted to amend his answer to include a claim for any property that can be traced to the rental income generated by 25 Whitehall Road, Toronto, Ontario and for any of the rent related to the Applicant, Laura Colligan's, personal occupancy of 25 Whitehall Road, Toronto, Ontario.
[55] The order for disclosure within 15 days is granted.
[56] The order for an accounting of all funds "diverted" from the RBC account is dismissed as improvidently framed. Based on the record, it is not appropriate for this court to implicitly endorse that Laura has wrongly removed funds.
[57] Grant may amend his Answer as requested. Given the parties' upcoming trial management conference, he shall have 7 days to do so, after which the issue may be discussed at the conference.
Costs
[58] Grant prevailed, though not entirely, on this motion. I award costs in the amount of $6,648.92 payable in 60 days.
Order
[59] In conclusion, I make the following order:
a. Pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Partition Act, RSO 1990, c P.4, as amended, Grant Anthony's request for an order compelling the sale of the real property municipally known as 25 Whitehall Road, Toronto, Ontario, is granted on the following terms:
i. The property shall not be listed for sale before December 18, 2025;
ii. The net proceeds of sale shall be held in trust by the real estate solicitor, subject to further court order or otherwise as agreed to by the parties;
iii. The parties shall cooperate on terms for listing the property through a single realtor; and
iv. Laura Colligan shall cooperate in making the property available for viewings as recommended by the realtor.
b. Within 15 days, Laura shall provide a response for anything that remains outstanding in the request for information listed at SCHEDULE "A" attached to the Notice of Motion dated August 20, 2025. Laura's response shall include a sworn affidavit.
c. Grant's request for "an accounting of all funds diverted from the RBC Borealis Real Estate Inc. Account 05722 100-994-3" is dismissed without prejudice for him to reframe the request.
d. Within 7 days, Grant may serve and file an Amended Answer to include a claim for any property that can be traced to the rental income generated by 25 Whitehall Road, Toronto, Ontario and for any of the rent related to the Applicant, Laura Colligan's, personal occupancy of 25 Whitehall Road, Toronto, Ontario.
e. Laura shall pay costs to Grant in the amount of $6,648.92, inclusive of disbursements and HST, within 60 days.
Mathen J.
Date: September 19, 2025