COURT FILE AND PARTIES

Court File No.: CR-507-23

Date: August 22, 2025

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

His Majesty the King – and – Antony Centeno-So, Defendant

Counsel:

Stephen Monaghan, for the Crown

James Zegers and Nicola Circelli, for the Offender

Heard: March 27 and April 10, 2025

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Justice I.F. Leach (Orally)

Introduction

[1] Before me, for sentencing in relation to the crime of manslaughter contrary to subsection 236(b) of the Criminal Code (or "the Code"), is Mr Antony Centeno-So.

[2] By way of summary of the procedural history that led to today's sentencing hearing:

a. Pursuant to the original indictment herein, Mr Centeno-So was formally charged with the offence of second-degree murder, contrary to section 235(1) of the Code, in relation to the death of Devon Cherrey-Rooke, which occurred on August 7, 2022, here in the city of London.

b. Mr Centeno-So elected to be tried by judge and jury in this court, and the matter proceeded to a preliminary inquiry (which took place on October 5, November 8 and November 10, 2023), and a judicial pretrial which took place before Justice Moore on January 8, 2024. At the time, the Crown confirmed its intention to proceed with a pretrial application to address the admissibility of evidence from a number of witnesses attributing dying declarations to Mr Cherrey-Rooke (i.e., alleged statements that inherently were hearsay in nature), including statements allegedly made by Mr Cherrey-Rooke arguably including indications that would assist in identifying the assailant who inflicted Mr Cherrey-Rooke's mortal wounds. However, counsel also indicated a desire to engage in further discussion regarding potential resolution of the matter prior to the matter being spoken to in Assignment Court for the scheduling a hearing dates for the Crown's intended application, and the contemplated three-week trial of this matter by judge and jury. That in turn led to a number of adjournments on consent, as counsel continued to engage in ongoing resolution discussions over a number of months before the setting of further dates in Assignment Court.

c. On March 5, 2024, however, the matter moved forward in Assignment court, with the scheduling of dates for the hearing of the Crown's application to confirm the admissibility of the hearsay evidence concerning Mr Cherrey-Rooke's alleged dying declarations (which was scheduled for hearing on October 18, 2024), and three weeks of trial by judge and jury scheduled to commence on January 6, 2025.

d. However, when the matter initially came on before me on October 18, 2024, for scheduled hearing of the Crown's pretrial application concerning Mr Cherrey-Rooke's alleged dying declarations, there were complications that prevented the hearing from proceeding that day. In particular, the Crown had encountered difficulties in securing the court attendance of a witness considered central to the Crown's application. Crown counsel also indicated that further Crown pretrial applications were contemplated, including an application to have the said witness testify remotely (i.e., in relation to the Crown's extant application regarding the dying declarations attributed to Mr Cherrey-Rooke), as well as an application, described in the vernacular as a "Leaney application", because such applications were addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Leaney, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 393, to confirm the admissibility of evidence from a police officer (Police Constable Vedervecht), who was said to have recognized the alleged assailant depicted in surveillance video recorded before, during and after the incident as the accused, Mr Centeno-So. In the result, the matter was adjourned to the next Assignment Court for the scheduling of new application hearing dates.

e. Hearing of the Crown's pretrial application concerning Mr Cherrey-Rooke's alleged dying declarations therefore proceeded before me on November 21 and December 9, 2024. Arrangements to complete hearing of that pretrial application on December 16, 2024, were frustrated by Mr Centeno-So's inability to appear virtually, owing to his unexplained intervening transfer to a different custodial institution which lacked the necessary facilities in that regard. Further arrangements then were made to schedule completion of the Crown's pretrial application relating to Mr Cherrey Rooke's alleged dying declarations on December 18, 2024, and hearing of the Crown's Leaney application on December 20, 2024.

f. However, when the matter then came back before me on December 18, 2024, I was informed by counsel that there had been a fundamental change in plan, as a result of intervening discussion between the parties. In particular, I was informed that the parties had reached an agreement whereby the Crown would withdraw the original indictment charging Mr Centeno-So with second-degree murder, and replace that with a new indictment charging Mr Centeno-So with manslaughter; a charge to which Mr Centeno-So intended to plead "guilty". In the result:

i. The Crown withdrew the original indictment and second-degree murder charge as contemplated, and replaced it with the current indictment instead charging Mr Centeno-So with manslaughter, contrary to s.236(b) of the Code.

ii. Defence counsel then indicated that defence counsel had conducted a plea inquiry to confirm Mr Centeno-So's understanding and intentions, and had obtained written instructions from Mr Centeno-So confirming his desire to enter a contemplated plea of "guilty" to the charge of manslaughter.

iii. I then conducted my own independent plea inquiry to confirm Mr Centeno-So's understanding and intentions in that regard.

iv. Mr Centeno-So then was arraigned in relation to the single charge set forth in the replacement indictment, and entered a plea of "guilty" to that charge of manslaughter.

v. After Crown counsel's initial presentation of facts, which were acknowledged to be substantially correct by defence counsel and Mr Centeno-So personally, I made a formal finding of guilt in relation to Mr Centeno-So in relation to the s.236(b) charge of manslaughter, and directed the preparation of a presentence report pursuant to section 721 of the Code. Dates scheduled for the hearing of the Crown's further pretrial application and the originally contemplated trial then were vacated, with the matter being adjourned to assignment court for the scheduling of sentencing submissions.

g. Those sentencing submissions eventually proceeded before me on March 27 and April 10, 2025. In that regard:

i. By the time of those submissions, I had received the aforesaid presentence report, which was formally marked as an exhibit; i.e., Exhibit 1 on the sentencing hearing.

ii. I also was presented with the following additional material for consideration:

1. First, I received a document presenting supplemental agreed facts, also marked as a formal exhibit (i.e., Exhibit 2 on the sentencing hearing), after certain dates specified therein as October 8 and October 15, 2022, were corrected and amended by agreement of the parties to refer instead to August 8 and August 15, 2022, respectively, with the supplemental agreed facts set forth in the document as amended including information regarding such matters as:

a. the background of Mr Cherrey-Rooke;

b. the circumstances of the underlying offence, including an agreed and time-referenced description of events captured by video-surveillance cameras on the morning of August 7, 2022;

c. the results of the post-mortem examination of Mr Cherrey-Rooke carried out by Dr M.J. Shkrum, a pathologist working with University Hospital, at the London Health Sciences Centre, including Dr Shkrum's formal report, as well as an attached table summary of stab and incision wounds identified during that post-mortem examination, and attached toxicology and radiology reports relied upon by Dr Shkrum;

d. a biology report prepared by the Centre of Forensic Sciences, with an attached list of evidence items collected and submitted for analysis by the London Police Service, including:

i. a urine sample, vitreous humour, fingernail clippings and a blood swab obtained from Mr Cherrey-Rooke;

ii. swabs taken of the rim area of a discarded drink bottle from which Mr Cherrey-Rooke's suspected assailant was seen to have been drinking;

iii. a blood swab from a pool of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's blood located at the scene of his assault; and

iv. a "suspect DNA warrant blood sample blood stain" obtained from Mr Centeno-So;

e. a summary of post-offence conduct by Mr Centeno-So and other events leading to the location and arrest of Mr Centeno-So by police;

f. confirmation that the weapon used by Mr Centeno-So to inflict the mortal wounds sustained by Mr Cherrey-Rooke was never located;

g. an outline of a guilty plea inquiry conducted by counsel in relation to Mr Centeno-So; and

h. confirmation of Mr Centeno-So's plea of "guilty" to the charge of manslaughter, the date on which he was arrested and began his ongoing time in pretrial and presentencing custody (i.e., August 15, 2022), and agreement that Mr Centeno-So caused the death of Mr Cherrey-Rooke through an intentional unlawful assault, as described in the agreed facts.

2. Second, I received a copy of Mr Centeno-So's criminal record, which was also marked as an exhibit; i.e., Exhibit 3 on the sentencing hearing.

3. Third, I received a "USB" stick, also marked as an exhibit (i.e., Exhibit 4 on the sentencing hearing), containing three surveillance videos recorded on the morning of August 7, 2022, which were played in open court during the sentencing hearing.

4. Fourth, I received a Victim Impact Statement prepared by members of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family, which was read aloud in open court by his sisters Kassandra Cherrey & Pauline Cherrey, on behalf of the family, before being marked as another exhibit; i.e., Exhibit 5 on the sentencing hearing.

iii. Following receipt of oral submissions from Crown counsel and counsel for Mr Centeno-So (during which counsel made reference to their respective books of authorities also submitted for my review and consideration), I then called upon Mr Centeno-So directly, pursuant to section 726 of the Code, to ask whether he had anything he wished to say before determination of the sentence to be imposed for his manslaughter offence. In response, Mr Centeno-So read out a prepared letter (a copy of which also was marked as an exhibit for identification, and the content of which is addressed in further detail below), addressing comments to me and to Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family.

[3] After the completion of sentencing submissions from counsel, and those remarks made directly by Mr Centeno-So, I formally reserved my sentencing decision, and the matter was adjourned to today for delivery of my sentencing decision and the corresponding formal imposition of sentence.

Circumstances of the Offence

[4] The circumstances underlying the manslaughter offence in respect of which Mr Centeno-So has pled guilty and been convicted were outlined in extensive detail during the acknowledged and agreed facts, which also were supplemented to some extent by the comments of counsel, as well as comments made by Mr Centeno-So to the author of the aforesaid presentence report, and his direct remarks made at the conclusion of sentencing submissions, following my inquiry in that regard pursuant to section 726 of the Code.

[5] While I have regard to all of those underlying circumstances in arriving at an appropriate sentence for the crime committed by Mr Centeno-So, I will not repeat all of that previously provided information in its entirety here. However, I note that those underlying circumstances included the following:

a. At the time of the underlying manslaughter offence, on August 7, 2022, Mr Centeno-So and Mr Cherrey-Rooke were friends. Both were involved in what is euphemistically described as the "drug subculture" here in the city of London, and both had lived, from time to time, in the same homeless encampment areas located in the east end of London. In that regard:

i. As described in further detail below, when addressing the circumstances of the offender, Mr Centeno-So was 27 at the time of the offence, and had struggled for many years with drug addiction and homelessness.

ii. Mr Cherrey-Rooke was 31 at the time. Although he had grown up in the London area, and was maintaining contact with his parents, sisters and other members of his extended family, at the time of his death he was living a transient lifestyle outside of the family home due to his addiction issues and involvement in London's drug subculture.

iii. In his direct remarks made to the court and Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family, in response to my section 726 inquiry, Mr Centeno-So provided further confirmation that he "knew Devon well and considered him as a friend".

b. The underlying events leading to the death of Mr Cherrey-Rooke occurred in the early morning or dawn hours of August 7, 2022, in an area of east London located near various commercial businesses situated to the northeast of the intersection of Dundas Street East and Clarke Road. Most of the relevant events which followed were captured on video recordings (albeit sometimes from a distance and with some brief interruptions and obstructions), made by surveillance cameras maintained by a Salvation Army Thrift Store situated in the area, at 1960 Dundas Street. Some of those events also were observed by a number of civilian witnesses, who happened to be in the area despite the early morning hour. In that regard:

i. At approximately 6:03am that day (after daylight already had come to the area), Mr Centeno-So (wearing a distinctive red shirt with black sleeves), and a female associate named Tia Card attended at the rear of business premises known as the Wrap Boss Auto Spa (located at Unit 3, 1982 Dundas Street, London), where they sat down on a curb. In his direct remarks made to the court and Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family, in response to my section 726 inquiry, Mr Centeno-So indicated that, on the morning in question, he was "heavily under the influence of crystal meth and fentanyl", and deprived of "regular sleep", such that the events of that morning were "all a blur" from his perspective.

ii. At approximately 6:21:02am, Mr Cherrey-Rooke attended the same area, where he approached Mr Centeno-So and Ms Card, threw or placed a bag or satchel he had been holding on the ground nearby, and began speaking towards Mr Centeno-So in an animated fashion (e.g., flailing his arms around and occasionally spinning in circles), as Mr Cherrey-Rooke remained standing and Mr Centeno-So and Ms Card remained seated. The agreed statement of facts included an agreement that a "dispute" arose between Mr Cherrey-Rooke and Mr Centeno-So during the course of that interaction. In comments to the author of the presentence report, Mr Centeno-So indicated that the disagreement between Mr Cherrey-Rooke and Mr Centeno-So was "about an issue that had transpired earlier in the day", with the author of the presentence report clarifying, in his concluding "Assessment" remarks, that the two men apparently were in disagreement "over drugs sold to [Mr Cherrey-Rooke] by Mr Centeno-So earlier in the day".

iii. The duration of that "animated" conversation and dispute or disagreement between the two men was slightly under three minutes; i.e., with the interchange lasting until approximately 6:23:50am, at which time Mr Cherrey-Rooke bent over towards Mr Centeno-So and Ms Card, picked up the bag or satchel he had placed on the ground, and then began walking (at approximately 6:24:01am), in a westerly direction along the line of a nearby fence that ran in an east-west direction and separated the Wrap Boss Auto Spa property from the parking area of a Home Depot outlet situated to the north, on the other side of that fence.

iv. Approximately nine seconds later (i.e., at approximately 6:24:10am), Mr Centeno-So got up from the curb area where he had been sitting with Ms Card and began running towards Mr Cherrey-Rooke; i.e., chasing after him. In that regard, Mr Centeno-So admits that he intentionally pursued Mr Cherrey-Rooke to initiate an attack on Mr Cherrey-Rooke; i.e., with an intention to assault Mr Cherrey-Rooke in an unlawful act.

v. Approximately four seconds after that (i.e., at approximately 6:24:14), Mr Cherrey-Rooke seemed to realize that Mr Centeno-So was chasing him and also began to run, in an apparent effort to get away from Mr Centeno-So. At 6:24:20am, both men were continuing to run in a westerly direction, along the southern side of the fence line described above.

vi. All of the aforesaid events were captured on video by a camera at the rear of the nearby Salvation Army Thrift Store that was facing eastbound to the rear of that building.

vii. By 6:24:23am (i.e., just a few seconds later), both men apparently had passed through a hole or break in the fence described above and into the Home Depot parking area located to the north of that fence, where their further interactions were captured on video by another camera situated at the rear of Salvation Army Thrift Store that was facing northwest; i.e., towards the parking lot of the Home Depot situated on the other side of the fence described above, still depicted in the video foreground. In that regard:

1. At 6:24:23am, Mr Centeno-So caught up to Mr Cherrey-Rooke as the two men were running, and pushed Mr Cherrey-Rooke onto the ground. Mr Cherrey-Rooke is seen falling backwards to the ground, where he then flipped over.

2. By 6:24:27am, Mr Cherrey-Rooke was crawling backwards on the ground, and apparently still trying to get away from Mr Centeno-So, as Mr Centeno-So remained standing and positioned over top of Mr Cherrey-Rooke.

3. A second later (i.e., at 6:24:28am), as Mr Cherrey-Rooke continued to crawl backwards and started to turn away from Mr Centeno-So, the latter began swinging his right arm to strike at Mr Cherrey-Rooke repeatedly (i.e., six times), as Mr Cherrey-Rooke remained on the ground and Mr Centeno-So remained on his feet while bending over and downwards towards Mr Cherrey-Rooke, as the latter was writhing around on the ground and/or trying to crawl away. In particular:

a. The first swing/strike was made at approximately 6:24:28am, with Mr Centeno-So swinging his right arm back and then at Mr Cherrey-Rooke, striking Mr Cherrey-Rooke's left side as Mr Cherrey-Rooke was defensively kicking at Mr Centeno-So; i.e., at approximately 6:24:29am.

b. The second such swing/strike by Mr Centeno-So at Mr Cherrey-Rooke, as the latter remained on the ground, came four seconds later, at approximately 6:24:32am.

c. The third such swing by Mr Centeno-So at Mr Cherrey-Rooke, as the latter remained on the ground, came just two seconds later; i.e., at approximately 6:27:34am.

d. A few seconds later (i.e., at approximately 6:27:37am), Mr Cherrey-Rooke once again defensively was trying to crawl backwards on the ground, away from Mr Centeno-So, when the latter once again, while continuing to stand over Mr Cherrey-Rooke, bent over to swing his right arm down at Mr Cherrey-Rooke a fourth time.

e. By 6:27:39am (two seconds later), Mr Cherrey-Rooke was still on the ground but now on his right side, as Mr Centeno-So swung down again with his right arm, from his standing position, to deliver a fifth strike at Mr Cherrey-Rooke.

f. The sixth and final strike delivered by Mr Centeno-So with his swinging right arm occurred another two seconds later, at approximately 6:24:41, as Mr Centeno-So once again swung his right arm downwards at Mr Cherrey-Rooke as the latter remained on the ground. With that, the blows Mr Centeno-So was inflicting with his swinging right arm ceased at approximately 6:24:42am.

4. Mr Centeno-So admits that he intentionally pursued and assaulted Mr Cherrey-Rooke, inflicting injuries on Mr Cherrey-Rooke during the attack Mr Centeno-So initiated, with a "sharp bladed instrument"; a weapon that is not visible from a distance in the relevant video images captured by the surveillance cameras, and which was never recovered, but which admittedly was produced by Mr Centeno-So and used while he was swinging his right arm and inflicting blows on Mr Cherrey-Rooke in the manner described above. Details of the injuries sustained by Mr Cherrey-Rooke in that regard were confirmed by Dr Shkrum during his later post-mortem examination of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's body. In particular:

a. Apart from other noted "blunt trauma cutaneous injuries", including multiple abrasions and contusions to Mr Cherrey-Rooke's forehead, nose bridge, fingers, hips, lower mid-back and knees (none of which were considered to have contributed to Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death), Dr Shkrum noted and confirmed that Mr Cherrey-Rooke had sustained three "sharp force" wounds.

b. One was a superficial "incised" wound on Mr Cherrey-Rooke's right chest; i.e., with an "incised" wound being one longer than it is deep, and something often described as a "cut" or "slash".

c. Another was a "stab" wound (a wound deeper than it is wide), to Mr Cherrey-Rooke's left lateral chest, resulting in:

i. perforation of his left hemidiaphragm and spleen;

ii. a "left hemothorax", or the presence of blood in the pleural space on the left side of the chest, between the lung and chest wall; and

iii. a "smear hemoperitoneum", or the presence of blood in the peritoneal cavity or space surrounding Mr Cherrey-Rooke's abdominal and pelvic organs.

d. The third "sharp force" injury was another "stab" wound, inflicted on Mr Cherrey-Rooke's posterior left thigh, which transected (or cut across) a branch of his profunda femoris artery, or "deep femoral artery"; i.e., the largest branch of the femoral artery in the thigh, which is the primary supplier of blood to the thigh area, and an important source of collateral circulation to the lower leg.

e. Dr Shkrum concluded that, although all three of those "sharp force" wounds contributed to the severe blood loss and hemorrhagic shock that caused Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death, the most serious injury in that regard was the wound to Mr Cherrey-Rook's left thigh.

5. At 6:24:46am on the morning in question (approximately five seconds after the last swing and strike inflicted upon Mr Cherrey-Rooke through use of Mr Centeno-So's left arm), Mr Centeno-So, in what apparently was the final blow delivered during the attack, then kicked Mr Cherrey-Rooke while the latter continued to lay on the ground.

6. There is no suggestion that Mr Cherrey-Rooke, at any point during that described attack initiated and carried out by Mr Centeno-So, was armed with any weapon of any kind. Mr Centeno-So also acknowledges and admits:

a. that Mr Cherrey-Rooke was not consenting to fight;

b. that Mr Centeno-So was not acting in self-defence;

c. that Mr Centeno-So recognized and foresaw a risk of harm to Mr Cherrey-Rooke based on Mr Centeno-So's actions;

d. that Mr Centeno-So acted on his own and was solely responsible for Mr Cherrey-Rooke's injuries;

e. that without Mr Centeno-So's actions, the attack would not have occurred at all, and Mr Cherrey-Rooke would not have died; and

f. that Mr Centeno-So accordingly caused the death of Mr Cherrey-Rooke through the intentional unlawful assault described above.

7. At 6:25:50am (i.e., approximately four seconds after delivering the final kicking blow to Mr Cherrey-Rooke), Mr Centeno-So walked to pick up the bag that Mr Cherrey-Rooke had been carrying (before dropping it during the attack), and began walking away in the same direction from which he had come; i.e., to and through the same hole in the fence through which he and Mr Cherrey-Rooke had passed, to rejoin Ms Card in the same area where he had left her. As he was doing so (i.e., after the attack had been completed), Mr Cherrey-Rooke yelled (in a manner loud enough to be heard by a civilian witness in the Home Depot parking lot), "I am dying, Tony!" Mr Centeno-So nevertheless kept on walking.

viii. Following the attack, Mr Cherrey-Rooke got up for a short time, stumbling and attempting to walk to the west before he fell to the ground again at 6:25:33am. Approximately two minutes later (i.e., at 6:27:32am), Mr Cherrey-Rooke once again managed to stand, before once again stumbling and falling back to the ground; i.e., at approximately 6:28:11am. He did not manage to rise again. Other individuals in the area began to approach Mr Cherrey-Rooke as he continued to lay on the ground of the Home Depot parking area, bleeding profusely from his wounds. The police arrived on scene at approximately 6:35:04am, and Emergency Medical Services (or "EMS") arrived shortly thereafter. Despite being initially conscious after the attack, Mr Cherry-Rooke deteriorated rapidly. Although he was transported by EMS to Victoria Hospital here in London, where staff attempted life-saving measures to supplement those attempted by police and EMS at the scene of the incident, Mr Cherrey-Rooke was pronounced dead at 7:33am, and the aforesaid post-mortem examination was ordered. It would be conducted by Dr Shkrum the following day.

ix. Meanwhile, as noted above, Mr Centeno-So had left the immediate location of Mr Cherrey-Rooke after the attack had ended, and retraced his path through the hole in the fence between the Home Depot parking area and the property to the south of that fence, back to the area at the rear of the Wrap Boss Auto Spa business where Mr Centeno-So initially had been sitting with Ms Card that morning, and where she was still waiting. His movements in that regard were captured on video once again by the nearby surveillance camera at the rear of the nearby Salvation Army Thrift Store; i.e., the camera that was facing eastbound to the rear of that building. In particular:

1. At 6:25:16am (i.e., approximately one minute and 30 seconds after delivering his final kicking blow, inflicted on Mr Cherrey-Rooke), Mr Centeno-So reappeared in the video being recorded by that camera. He is seen walking slowly back towards Ms Card, carrying the bag Mr Cherrey-Rooke had been carrying, and which Mr Centeno-So had picked up in the Home Depot parking lot.

2. At 6:25:56am, Mr Centeno-So very deliberately removed the distinctive red shirt with black sleeves that he had been wearing throughout all of the events described above; i.e., during his attack on Mr Cherrey-Rooke that had just been witnessed by a number of other civilians in the area. Removal of that red shirt with black sleeves revealed that he was wearing a white shirt underneath. In any event, Mr Centeno-So then pulled a dark blue hooded jacket or sweatshirt out of his backpack, put that dark blue jacket or sweatshirt on over top of his white shirt (i.e., replacing the red shirt with black sleeves he had worn over top of that white shirt during the attack), and put the red shirt with black sleeves into the backpack, which he then placed on his back.

3. At 6:27:05am (i.e., approximately two minutes and 19 seconds after delivering his final kicking blow to Mr Cherrey-Rooke, and approximately eight minutes prior to the arrival of the police), Mr Centeno-So and Ms Card walked east along the fence line (i.e., to the south of the fence described above), and out of the relevant camera's view.

x. Through other obtained and reviewed video surveillance, police nevertheless were able to follow the movements of Mr Centeno-So and Ms Card as they moved through the surrounding streets. For example, video recorded by cameras located at a Wal-Mart store located at 330 Clarke Road (in a shopping mall located across Dundas Street to the south of the areas described above, where the attack occurred), showed Mr Centeno-So at approximately 9:25am on the morning of August 7, 2022 (i.e., approximately three hours after the final kicking blow inflicted by Mr Centeno-So on Mr Cherrey-Rooke), drinking from a container that he discarded between rocks that make up a barrier near the roadside of that area. Police were able to locate that discarded retainer, and took swabs therefrom that were sent to the Centre of Forensic Sciences for the possible detection of blood or DNA. Results of those tests found evidence of Mr Centeno-So's DNA on the container, and it was agreed by the parties that Mr Centeno-So's DNA was indeed detected on that container.

xi. Police also were able to identify Mr Centeno-So through their review of the security camera footage recorded in the area of where the incident took place.

c. On August 15, 2022, a search for Mr Centeno-So led police to a specified apartment unit located at 931 Wonderland Road, here in London, where Mr Centeno-So was located hiding in a closet of the apartment and arrested. He has remained in custody from then until today. As noted earlier, the weapon used by Mr Centeno-So during his lethal attack on Mr Cherrey-Rooke was never located.

[6] With my earlier introductory comments and that outline of the circumstances underlying the offence of Mr Centeno-So in mind, I now return to my current task of determining the appropriate sentence Mr Centeno-So should receive in relation to his manslaughter offence and conviction, in respect of which he already (by my calculations) has spent 1103 days (i.e., three years and seven days), in actual pretrial and presentence custody since the time of his arrest in relation to this matter on August 15, 2022, and prior to the formal imposition of sentence today.

[7] In that regard, I will note and emphasize again, for the purpose of clarity, that, although the supplemental agreed facts marked as Exhibit 2 on the sentencing hearing initially contained repeated reference to the arrest of Mr Centeno-So having occurred on October 15, 2022, the parties were agreed that the said arrest actually occurred on August 15, 2022; i.e., with Exhibit 2 on the sentencing hearing being corrected and amended accordingly by way of party agreement.

[8] The parties were agreed that, in relation to the anticipated custodial sentence to be imposed on Mr Centeno-So today, in relation to his crime of manslaughter, he should receive credit for his time in pretrial and presentence custody from the time of arrest up until today at the rate of 1.5 days for each actual day, pursuant to subsection 719(3.1) of the code; i.e., for an effective credit of 1,655 days (four years, six months and 11 days), if I have done the mathematics correctly.

Circumstances of the Offender

[9] The personal circumstances of Mr Centeno-So were outlined in considerable detail in the presentence report I mentioned earlier, with that information being supplemented to some extent during the course of submissions by counsel and the comments made directly by Mr Centeno-So to the court and Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family in response to my section 726 inquiry.

[10] I have reviewed and considered all of the information provided to me, in relation to the personal circumstances of Mr Centeno-So, but note for present purposes that it includes the following indications:

a. He was born here in Canada on a specified date in November of 1994, making him 27 at the time of his manslaughter offence, and 30 at the time of sentencing.

b. He is of Mexican and Cambodian descent; a rich heritage that nevertheless (as addressed in further detail below), unfortunately has led to his being racialized to some extent in Canadian society.

c. He was the younger of two children born to his biological parents, who separated when Mr Centeno-So was very young; i.e., with Mr Centeno-So indicating to the author of the presentence report that the separation occurred when Mr Centeno-So was just "an infant", but Mr Centeno-So's father recalling, to the author of the presentence report, that termination of the relationship between him and his former wife (Mr Centeno-So's mother), happened when his son was five years of age. Whatever the precise timing of its occurrence, that parental separation unfortunately seems to have been one marked by hostility and legal conflict, and a sustained determination by Mr Centeno-So's mother that he should have little or nothing to do with his father. In particular:

i. Following his parents' separation, Mr Centeno-So continued to reside with his mother, with his mother being opposed to his father being involved with the children, such that Mr Centeno-So did not even see his father for many years.

ii. In family court proceedings, Mr Centeno-So's father was unsuccessful (attributing that lack of success to many lies said to have been told by his ex-wife), and he was not allowed to be with his children during the years that followed – leading to ongoing regret that he did not fight harder for his son Mr Centeno-So at the time or during the hardships experienced by his son that followed thereafter.

d. In that regard, the life that awaited Mr Centeno-So following the separation of his parents was challenging to say the least, and marked by one apparent hardship after another. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

i. His mother remarried shortly after his parents' separation, but that marriage was short-lived and ended in another separation.

ii. His mother then married again, but to a man who was abusive, and with whom Mr Centeno-So did not enjoy any form of positive relationship. Such realities resulted in Mr Centeno-So being exposed to considerable violence, and caused a great deal of further strain within the family home. In relation to such challenges, Mr Centeno-So nevertheless did not receive much support from his mother, who was often working (as the family also apparently struggled to cope with significant financial strain), and left Mr Centeno-So's maternal grandmother to do much of the child-rearing, with the family residing in a multi-generational home owned by Mr Centeno-So's great-grandmother. Although Mr Centeno-So's father apparently did try to intervene on behalf of his son at some point during that troubled period, the primary result of such attempts apparently was further conflict (i.e., in the form of conflict between Mr Centeno-So's biological father and his abusive stepfather that was significant enough to result in police intervention), which Mr Centeno-So also was obliged to experience and endure. His father's lack of success in the family courts and with attempts at intervention, along with financial strains and increasingly busy work commitments, apparently led his father to either stop trying in that regard, or to refrain from trying as much as he would like to have done in retrospect.

iii. It was during these formulative years (in or around 2004, when Mr Centeno-So was just 10 years old), that he began running away from the family home; i.e., struggling to separate himself from the dysfunction in that home, frustrated by denial of his repeated requests to have contact with and/or live with his biological father, and indicating that he would rather be homeless than reside with his stepfather.

iv. All of the childhood instability I have described was then compounded severely with the death of Mr Centeno-So's great-grandmother, at which point the members of his extended family who had been living together effectively lost their home, spread out into various apartments, and moved quite often. It seems Mr Centeno-So also began to experience increasing rejection and alienation from his mother, in part because of his growing resemblance to his biological father, towards whom Mr Centeno-So's mother apparently continued to harbour marked feelings of hostility.

v. At the age of 14, Mr Centeno-So relocated to the home of his biological father; a home the Children's Aid Society (which apparently had become involved in Mr Centeno-So's life by that point), determined to be a "suitable" residence for Mr Centeno-So. Although the father and son had what Mr Centeno-So generally described as a "good relationship", it also was one that appeared to lack familiarity and depth, owing to the many years of separation and resulting estrangement that effectively had been imposed on the two of them by Mr Centeno-So's mother and resulting family court custody and access arrangements, or the lack thereof; i.e., with Mr Centeno-So essentially having been denied all contact with his biological father until his "pre-teen" years, shortly before they began to live together. In the result, Mr Centeno-So recalled that he and his father effectively were reduced to "getting to know each other" during their residence together, and a pattern of Mr Centeno-So intermittently running away (preferring to live "on the streets" without a home, but also without rules), apparently continued.

vi. Perhaps unsurprisingly, having regard to all of the instability, changes in family structure and other challenges I have described (all of which were very difficult to experience and survive from Mr Centeno-So's perspective), Mr Centeno-So also struggled to obtain a formal education. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. As his family moved frequently, Mr Centeno-So was obliged to attend several different elementary schools, and missed a lot of school owing to instability in his family home situation. He struggled with such changes and, although he apparently was not formally diagnosed with any learning disability, experienced significant academic challenges, resulting in his desk often notably being placed near his teachers; i.e., in an apparent effort to facilitate his learning and address his behavioural challenges.

2. Such behavioural issues included Mr Centeno-So fighting several times over the years, resulting in a number of school suspensions. From a very early age, he also connected with negative peers during his school years (e.g., peers which encouraged his participation in mischief, stealing, and other forms of misbehaviour), which further impeded his ability to be successful in school.

3. The pattern of having to change schools also continued into Mr Centeno-So's period of secondary school education; i.e., with his having to attend no less than three different secondary schools. His education in that regard was frequently interrupted, and he increasingly began "rejecting social conventions", including formal education. He eventually stopped attending school altogether by the time he was 16 years old. He is thought to have the functional equivalent of a grade 10 education.

4. In the result, the presentence report indicates that Mr Centeno-So has limited employable skills, and lacks the life skills required to find and maintain suitable full-time employment.

vii. At the age of 17 (i.e., before he had even reached his age of majority), Mr Centeno-So eventually left his father's home permanently as well, to live on his own. Since that time and even slightly before that, however, his challenges and life struggles have continued, with his overall situation arguably having gone from bad to worse. In that regard:

1. At the time of his manslaughter offence, he was still homeless, and living on the streets of London, where he apparently was racially marginalized by other members of London's drug subculture; i.e., by individuals within that subculture who are said to have regarded Mr Centeno-So as "non-white", and to have referred to him by the street name "Asian Tony".

2. Mr Centeno-So has struggled to support himself through gainful employment. In particular, although there are indications in the presentence report that he has worked sporadically in agricultural work (i.e., completing various jobs as a farm hand), and in roofing and landscaping labouring jobs, he has never held employment for any long periods of time. He instead generally has been unemployed and supported through Ontario Works throughout most of his adult life. He himself acknowledges that, since he has ceased to reside with members of his family, he generally has supported himself through criminal behavior.

3. Mr Centeno-So's inability to maintain steady employment undoubtedly has been complicated by his longstanding issues with substance abuse and addiction. In that regard:

a. Mr Centeno-So says that his substance abuse began at the age of 13, when he began using alcohol and quickly became a chronic user of marihuana.

b. While alcohol apparently has never been his substance of choice, and he seems not to have developed any dependency in that regard, Mr Centeno-So's use of narcotics progressed from marihuana to more serious and addictive drugs, such that, by the age of 20, he was using cocaine, heroine and crystal methamphetamine (or "crystal meth"), with the latter becoming his preferred substance of choice.

c. Despite obvious struggles with the effects and side-effects of such serious narcotics (including hospitalization for lung infection from his use of crystal meth), and a professed desire to cease using such substances, he consistently has found himself returning to their continued use with only short periods of sobriety; most notably, via forced sobriety during his periods of incarceration. In that regard:

i. Mr Centeno-So indicated to the author of the presentence report that he deliberately has chosen to refrain from participation in programming for substance abuse while incarcerated (to the extent such programming has been available), citing an "inability to be vulnerable while in a custodial environment" as his main reason for such non-participation.

ii. However, previous efforts by probation services to connect Mr Centeno-So with programming available upon his release from custody (e.g., such as reintegration programs available through the St Leonard's Society, and addictions programming available through the Thames Valley branch of the Canadian Mental Health Association), also have been unsuccessful.

iii. Perhaps not surprisingly, having regard to such realities, Mr Centeno-So admittedly has always returned to using illicit narcotics upon being discharged from custody. He has never been successful at maintaining sobriety when not incarcerated.

iv. Moreover, in recent years, his struggles with his obvious substance abuse disorder have been compounded by the addition of fentanyl use to his ongoing use of crystal meth.

d. Mr Centeno-So himself acknowledges that such struggles with substance abuse and his associated lifestyle have had a negative impact on his ability to maintain employment; e.g., insofar as they have rendered him incapable of following the routines necessary for regular attendance at work.

e. As noted above, Mr Centeno-So also acknowledges that his substance abuse played a significant role in his lethal attack on Mr Cherrey-Rooke; i.e., insofar as he was "heavily under the influence of crystal meth and fentanyl", and substantially deprived of regular sleep, at the time of that attack.

f. Currently, while in custody, Mr Centeno-So is taking Suboxone to assist in management of his craving for narcotics, and is clean and sober. In that regard:

i. Defence counsel indicates and confirms that the condition of Mr Centeno-So has improved remarkably over the course of his incarceration; e.g., with Mr Centeno-So experiencing an obvious significant improvement in his level of coherence and ability to communicate, as well as weight gain and an appearance that generally seems more healthy.

ii. Mr Centeno-So's father also has indicated a belief that his son wants to change his life.

iii. Mr Centeno-So himself has indicated to the author of the presentence report that he would like to live a pro-social lifestyle, and recognizes that doing so requires maintenance of sobriety and a corresponding ability to find and maintain employment.

iv. In his direct comments to the court and Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family, in response to my section 726 inquiry, Mr Centeno-So emphasized his recognition of the need for change, the efforts he is making in that regard, and his hopes and plans for the future. For example:

1. He noted that, while in custody, he has regularly attended "smudge" ceremonies to cleanse his soul, finished bible studies, and is currently engaged in work to complete his schooling.

2. He expressed a desire to continue with counselling, as well as addictions and anger management, once he has the chance to be part of society again.

3. He outlined his ambitions to start changing his life by further studies to become an electrical engineer, with a view to starting his own business in that regard and employing a lot of other people to give them productive jobs for the future.

4. He wants to do work with the Habitat for Humanity charity; something he now regards as a personal life goal.

5. More generally, he indicated and emphasized his general life goal and intention to stay out of trouble with the law, in order to maintain and fulfil his aspirations. He says he will always strive to be a better person that he was on the day Mr Cherrey-Rooke died.

g. I frankly do not doubt the sincerity of Mr Centeno-So's currently expressed intentions and hopes in that regard. However, in my view, the obvious problem and challenge with prospects of rehabilitation in this case, having regard to the historical long-term pattern demonstrated by Mr Centeno-So, is the difficulty of finding a way to ensure that he is able to follow through and does follow through on such intentions upon his release from custody, without a rapid return to substance abuse and all of the negative prospects that inevitably would entail for Mr Centeno-So and others, including the possibility if not probability of further violence. In that regard:

i. Mr Centeno-So himself acknowledges the important role his current incarceration has played in helping him to attain and maintain his current sobriety.

ii. As noted above, if past is prologue, the consistent history of Mr Centeno-So reverting to substance abuse shortly after release from incarceration does not inspire hope for the future, without some form of very meaningful steps being taken to avoid that same outcome from being repeated yet again.

iii. Mr Centeno-So's father is aware of his son's struggles with substance abuse, and has encouraged him "to quit" such behaviours during past discussion of such matters when Mr Centeno-So has visited his father's home while sober, seeking his father's love, affection and support, without "judgment". However, while Mr Centeno-So repeatedly has told his father that he "wants to stop", he also repeatedly has indicated to his father that he simply "does not know how" to do so. While his father believes Mr Centeno-So sincerely wants to change his life, he also indicates that Mr Centeno-So definitely will need supports to do so, as he has limited pro-social skills.

iv. As emphasized by the author of the presentence report, Mr Centeno-So clearly would benefit from programming related to substance abuse, anti-criminal thinking, and the development of pro-social life skills, specifically to improve his employability. It therefore was troubling to read additional comments in the presentence report indicating:

1. that although Mr Centeno-So advised that he would like to live a pro-social lifestyle, and recognized that doing so requires a sober lifestyle and the ability to find and maintain employment, he also was unable to verbalize any plan on how he would accomplish that goal; and

2. that while Mr Centeno-So expressed hope of being able to maintain sobriety after his release from custody, he nevertheless had not attended any programming while incarcerated and was ambivalent to the idea of attending residential treatment for support with his substance abuse disorder.

3. Mr Centeno's ability to maintain steady employment also no doubt has been complicated by his ongoing conflict with the law, which apparently began in his mid-teens (i.e., after he relocated to live with his biological father), and has continued thereafter. In that regard, Mr Centeno-So has acquired what is often euphemistically described as an "unenviable" criminal record of considerable length. It is a criminal record frequently seen in relation to those who suffer from long-term unemployment, homelessness and serious addiction to illicit narcotics; i.e., in relation to individuals who resort to various forms of property crime and other illegal behaviour to fund their ongoing access to drugs, and who exhibit violent behaviour when under the influence of narcotics. In that regard:

a. The criminal record of Mr Centeno-So began with several Youth Justice convictions in February and July of 2010 (at the age of 15), and more Youth Justice convictions in October of 2011 (at the age of 16), followed by a steady succession of Adult Court convictions extending from December of 2014 through to March of 2022; i.e., approximately five months before his killing of Mr Cherrey-Rooke on August 7, 2022, and corresponding commission of the manslaughter offence that brings Mr Centeno-So before me now.

b. In total, Mr Centeno-So had compiled a total of 54 convictions on his criminal record before his manslaughter offence brought the total to 55. As for those 54 earlier convictions:

i. I would characterize 27 of those convictions as non-violent property-related crimes; e.g., possession of property obtained by crime on 11 occasions, theft under $5,000 on eight occasions, break and enter and theft on four occasions, mischief on two occasions, possession of break in instruments on one occasion, and unlawfully being in a dwelling house on one occasion. Again, experience suggests that such criminal activity is typical of those who are unemployed and addicted to drugs, who then resort to such property crime to fund their addiction and ongoing access to narcotics.

ii. I would characterize 16 of those 54 earlier convictions as ones associated with various types of non-violent failure to comply with various terms, procedures and orders associated with our administration of justice system; e.g., failure to comply with the terms of an undertaking on two occasions, failure to comply with the terms of a recognizance on four occasions, failure to appear and/or to attend court on four occasions, failure to comply with a court disposition on one occasion, and failure to comply more specifically with terms of a probation order on five occasions. Those types of offences similarly are typical of those seen in relation to individuals struggling with serious addictions and homelessness, who frequently have difficulty with adherence to schedules and punctual attendance, and/or who struggle to avoid repetition of the same criminal behaviours that resulted in earlier court dispositions and probation orders.

iii. One of those 54 earlier convictions relates to possession of a "Schedule 1" controlled substance; i.e., an unspecified narcotic nevertheless falling into the category of those drugs our society regards as the most serious and dangerous. The nature of the offence speaks for itself. More surprising, perhaps, given all the other indications I have received of Mr Centeno-So's prolonged addiction to very serious drugs, is the fact that his lengthy criminal record includes only one such offence contrary to the provisions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

iv. While the earlier convictions I have mentioned so far (44 of 54) were non-violent, in my view the remaining 10 of those earlier 54 convictions involved violence and/or indications of a violent nature; e.g., uttering threats on five occasions, escape lawful custody on one occasion, resisting arrest on one occasion, assault with a weapon on two occasions, and robbery with violence on one occasion. As noted earlier, crimes of violence and/or indications of a violent nature are also typical of those struggling with serious drug addiction, who experience corresponding reduction in proper self-control. However, regardless of such explanations, and whatever sympathy one may have for those struggling with such serious addiction issues, such crimes of violence clearly are troubling, insofar as they obviously pose danger to others in our society. They are more troubling still when such an offender begins to commit violent crimes with increasing frequency or otherwise threatens further violence; e.g., insofar as it may indicate that struggles with addiction and corresponding difficulty with self-control are becoming more pronounced, posing a greater threat to others. In the case of Mr Centeno-So, I note that his criminal record includes no crimes of violence between 2010 and 2016, and assaultive behavior in 2016 that was followed by approximately six years of generally non-violent crime apart from his escape from lawful custody in 2018 and resisting arrest in 2020. However, in early March of 2022 (i.e., just five months before his killing of Mr Cherrey-Rooke), Mr Centeno-So once again received convictions for more violent behaviour and indications of further inclination to violence; e.g., by committing robbery with violence, and uttering threats on five other occasions.

c. Despite that lengthy list of convictions, extending over the course of 12 years, and with the imposition of convictions occurring at intervals usually less than the maximum interval I noted of 1½ to 2 years, the sentences received by Mr Centeno-So to date generally have not resulted in extended custodial sentences. In particular, apart from early attempts to curb Mr Centeno-So's criminal behaviour via orders of probation and/or community service, most of his convictions were addressed by custodial sentences (often to be served on a concurrent basis), of no more than 1-3 months in duration, served in large measure by Mr Centeno-So's time spent in presentence custody, to be followed by periods of probation. The longest custodial sentence imposed in relation to Mr Centeno-So, before today, seems to have been one of 388 days imposed in June of 2018 (for a constellation of mostly property-related offences, accompanied by breaches of probation and an escape from lawful custody), addressed in large measure by the 342 days Mr Centeno-So had spent in pretrial custody.

d. In the result, Mr Centeno-So has never had to serve any of his custodial sentences in a federal institution, where programming to address substance abuse issues and other rehabilitation concerns is more readily available.

e. While Mr Centeno-So has been connected to Probation Services consistently since 2014, its file information reflects limited success in terms of intervention due to Mr Centeno-So's repeated incarceration, his challenges with reporting (e.g., insofar as he often attended the Probation Office at unscheduled times and/or as the office was closing, preventing any meaningful intervention), his failure to comply with court ordered conditions and tasks on numerous occasions, and his repeatedly incurring new charges despite being under supervision.

f. In that regard, another sad and aggravating reality of the underlying situation before me is that Mr Centeno-So was on probation when he committed his crime of manslaughter, and killed Mr Cherrey-Rooke.

5. Although Mr Centeno-So no doubt has made associations during his time living on the streets, interacting with others struggling to survive within London's drug subculture, his positive familial and other supports appear to have been quite limited and at times effectively non-existent. In that regard:

a. Over the course of his life, Mr Centeno-So apparently has had only one significant romantic relationship. He has no current partner, no children, and no dependents.

b. Mr Centeno-So sadly also now has no contact whatsoever with his mother; a situation which apparently has lasted for approximately eight years. The reasons for that no doubt are complex but, in addition to the concerns I noted earlier, apparently include his mother disapproving of Mr Centeno-So's lifestyle.

c. As noted earlier, Mr Centeno-So was the younger of two children born to his biological parents, although there are references in the presentence report to Mr Centeno-So having "siblings"; i.e., in the plural. I infer from those indications that, in addition to his one full biological sibling, Mr Centeno-So also has one or more half-siblings or step-siblings through other relationships entered into by his biological parents. In any event, it seems that only one of those siblings, half-siblings and/or step-siblings has made any effort to contact Mr Centeno-So during the years he has spent in pretrial and presentence custody since August of 2022.

d. Mr Centeno-So nevertheless does appear to have at least some ongoing contact with his biological father, Mr Centeno, who co-operated in the provision of information to the author of the presentence report, indicated a continued willingness to support his son, and suggested that his current wife and Mr Centeno-So's siblings shared the father's desire to have Mr Centeno-So "come home" and lead a pro-social life; e.g., with the father and his family expressing a desire to support Mr Centeno-So in leading a prosocial lifestyle, including the finding and maintaining of full time employment and Mr Centeno-So hopefully starting his own family.

e. Finally, by way of information regarding Mr Centeno-So's circumstances, I note his acceptance of responsibility for his actions leading to the death of Mr Cherrey-Rooke, his expressions of regret and remorse in that regard, and my belief that those indications are sincere and genuine. In that regard:

i. Mr Centeno-So's acceptance of responsibility for causing the death of Mr Cherrey-Rooke is inherent in his plea of guilty to the charge of manslaughter (the mitigating effect of which is discussed in further detail below), his formal acknowledgement of the facts underlying my finding of guilt, and his similar willingness to acknowledge the supplemental agreed facts presented for my consideration.

ii. However, Mr Centeno-So also has acknowledged his misconduct, and expressed his feelings of remorse and regret, in comments made to the author of the presentence report; e.g., verbalizing remorse for his actions, and emphasizing that he thinks about what happened every day and regrets the outcome.

iii. Such comments were echoed and supplemented in the remarks made by Mr Centeno-so directly to the court and Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family, in response to my section 726 inquiry. In that regard:

1. Mr Centeno-So emphasized that he was taking full accountability for his actions, having thought deeply about what happened since that morning in August of 2022, and "driving [himself] crazy, praying and wishing that he could change what occurred that day", which he regards as "the lowest time of [his] life". He described the many mental health issues he has experienced thinking about his actions; e.g., in the form of "PTSD, insomnia, depression, anxiety and constant night terrors for what [he] did that day".

2. He nevertheless also emphasized, at length, his realization and acceptance that his acting with violence has come at a great cost to others. In that regard, he said that he "knew Devon well", "considered him a friend", and acknowledged the emotions that "Devon's family are dealing with" because of Devon's death and their resulting grief; e.g., expressing his "deepest sincere condolences to Devon's family", to whom he felt "forever indebted", adding that, "from the bottom of [his] soul, not a day goes by without Devon in [his] thoughts", and that he is "forever sorry" for what he has done. He concluded his remarks by saying "I'm sorry" again to the attending members of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family.

3. Mr Centeno-So was tearful and shaking while he read his prepared remarks in that regard in a quivering voice, with a number of pauses while he attempted, not always successfully, to regain his composure. Based on my years of experience in receiving section 726 comments from convicted offenders, I had no doubt that those of Mr Centeno-So were heartfelt and genuine.

[11] With all of those preliminary comments, circumstances of the offence and circumstances of the offender in mind, I turn next to a brief overview of the parties' respective positions concerning the appropriate sentence to be imposed on Mr Centeno-So for his crime of manslaughter.

Party Positions

[12] In that regard, I have considered at length, and reflected deeply upon, the submissions of counsel in their entirety (including their detailed comments regarding aggravating and mitigating considerations, as well as suggested manslaughter sentencing precedents), reflected in part in my further comments below.

[13] The brief indication and summary of those party positions that follows should not suggest otherwise.

[14] With those caveats, however, the sentencing position and requests of Crown counsel generally may be outlined as follows:

a. In relation to a suggested or proposed custodial sentence for Mr Centeno-So's manslaughter offence:

i. The expressed position of Crown counsel was revised somewhat during the course of sentencing submissions; i.e., with an initial suggestion that the appropriate range of sentencing was 10-12 years, prior to Mr Centeno-So receiving any credit for his time spent in pretrial and presentence custody, but with that initial suggestion or position subsequently being revised by Crown counsel to one of 8-12 years, upon further reflection of the sentencing precedents placed before me for consideration and an express desire to suggest only a range of custodial sentencing options that was "fair". In passing, I will note that my highlighting of Crown counsel's change of position in that regard, during the course of sentencing submissions, is in no way intended as a criticism. To the contrary, I regard such ongoing consideration and possible revision of the Crown's position (particularly in the direction of a possible more lenient custodial sentence being suggested in relation to an accused), as a reflection of proper mindfulness that the role of Crown counsel is not to "win" as much as possible, but instead strive constantly to see that appropriate justice is done in the circumstances of a particular case.

ii. Crown counsel acknowledged that even that suggested 8-12 year range of sentencing was at the apparent "high end" of sentences normally imposed in relation to manslaughter, but submitted that was appropriate having regard to the circumstances, including the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to which I will return shortly. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. Crown counsel submitted in particular that Mr Centeno-So's misconduct in causing Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death fell, on the spectrum between accident and deliberate conduct falling just short of the intent required to commit second-degree murder, towards the latter or "high" end of that scale; e.g., having regard to the obviously deliberate, vicious and brutal nature of the uninterrupted lethal attack, involving multiple blows inflicted via a knife or other sharp bladed instrument (brought to the attack by Mr Centeno-So), and a final callous kick, all inflicted on an unarmed, defenceless and vulnerable victim (who was simply trying to avoid and/or escape that attack while running or crawling after he had been pushed to the ground), without any suggestion or air of reality to any notion that the underlying situation here involved any kind of consensual fair fight that got out of hand (i.e., in respect of which Mr Centeno-So then acted disproportionately), or any suggestion, let alone any possibility, that Mr Centeno-So was in any way exercising a lawful right of self-defence.

2. Other aggravating considerations, particularly emphasized by Crown counsel, included:

a. Mr Centeno-So's lengthy criminal record, including crimes of violence, and the fact that Mr Centeno-So was on probation, in relation to a crime of violence committed less than a year earlier, when he attacked and killed Mr Cherrey-Rooke;

b. the fact that Mr Centeno-So deliberately left the scene of the attack, without making any effort to assist Mr Cherrey-Rooke or call for assistance (despite Mr Cherrey-Rooke's express indication that he was dying), and thereafter deliberately changing his upper body clothing; and

c. the devastating impact that Mr Centeno-So's crime obviously has had on Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family.

3. While acknowledging the existence of numerous mitigating considerations in this case (including Mr Centeno-So's guilty plea), it was submitted that a custodial sentence falling short of that suggested 8-12 year range (prior to Mr Centeno-So receiving credit for time spent in pretrial and presentence custody), would not adequately address the principles of sentencing applicable to this case.

iii. As noted earlier, Crown counsel did not dispute and in fact agreed that Mr Centeno-So should receive, in relation to any custodial sentence I imposed, credit for the time he has spent in actual pretrial and presentence custody, credited at a rate of 1.5 days for each actual day, pursuant to s.719(3.1) of the Code.

b. As for the Crown's position in relation to ancillary orders:

i. It was noted that the situation called for making of a mandatory DNA sample order; i.e., the order in Form 5.03 required by section 487.04 of the Code (including its designation of manslaughter contrary to section 236 of the Code as a "primary designated offence" in that regard), and subsection 487.051(1) of the Code, which requires the court to make such an order authorizing the taking of the number of bodily substances reasonably required for the purpose of DNA forensic analysis from a person convicted of such a "primary designated offence".

ii. It also was noted that the situation called for the making of a mandatory weapons prohibition order; i.e., the mandatory order required by subsection 109(1) of the Code, which provides, inter alia, that where a person is convicted … of an indictable offence in the commission of which violence against a person was used … and for which the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more …, the court that sentences the person … shall, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, … make an order prohibiting the person from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance" during the period specified in the order as determined by subsections 109(2) and 109(3) of the Code. Although Crown counsel referred briefly in his submissions to such an order being made "for life", I think the required mandatory order, having regard to the reality that the order under s.109(1) of the Code would be made in relation to a first conviction for the offence of manslaughter, would be one more accurately described as a mandatory order which:

1. would prohibit Mr Centeno-So from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance during a ten-year period beginning today; and

2. would prohibit Mr Centeno-So from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life.

iii. In response to my inquiry as to whether the Crown also would be seeking a non-communication order pursuant to s.743.21 of the Code (i.e., an order generally prohibiting Mr Centeno-So from communicating directly or indirectly with any victim, witness or other person identified therein during the custodial period of his sentence, having regard to indications in the victim impact statement received from Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family that they were concerned about possible retribution being sought by Mr Centeno-So and/or his associates if they were upset about the sentence imposed on Mr Centeno-So), Crown counsel confirmed that such an order was indeed being sought, with a request that the said non-communication order specifically apply to Corrielee Drankowsky (Mr Cherrey-Rooke's mother), Peter Drankowsky (Mr Cherrey-Rooke's stepfather), and the two sisters of Mr Cherrey-Rooke (Kassandra Cherrey and Pauline Cherrey), who presented the family's victim impact statement, as noted above.

[15] With similar caveats to those noted above, the sentencing position and requests of defence counsel generally may be outlined as follows:

a. In relation to a suggested or proposed custodial sentence for Mr Centeno-So's manslaughter offence:

i. It was the submission of defence counsel that an appropriate custodial sentence for the manslaughter offence in this particular case and these particular circumstances generally would be "approximately" six years, prior to Mr Centeno-So receiving any credit for time spent in pretrial and presentence custody at the agreed rate of 1.5 days for each actual day spent in such custody pursuant to s.719(3.1) of the Code, subject to the express caveat and request that the court not impose any net custodial sentence that, at the time of its imposition, would require Mr Centeno-So to spend less than two more years in custody. In that regard:

1. The implicit if not express request was for imposition of a custodial sentence having a minimum duration, after Mr Centeno's receipt of credit for pretrial and presentence custody, that would require and therefore essentially permit Mr Centeno-So to serve the net remaining balance of his custodial sentence in a federal penitentiary rather than a provincial correctional facility. Indeed, defence counsel Mr Zegers expressly confirmed that the defence was "not asking" for the court to impose any custodial sentence that would require Mr Centeno-So to serve a net custodial sentence of "anything less than two years" (i.e., after his receipt of credit for time spent in pretrial and presentence custody), as it was considered "essential" for Mr Centeno-So's rehabilitation that he "go to [a] federal institution" to receive treatment known to be available to him there.

2. At the time of sentencing submissions, and reservation of my sentencing decision, defence counsel had not carried out any precise calculations in that regard; i.e., to determine the credit Mr Centeno-So would receive for the time he had spent in actual pretrial and presentence custody since his arrest on August 15, 2022, up until today, if credited at the agreed rate of 1.5 days for each actual day pursuant to s.719(3.1) of the Code.

3. As noted above, I nevertheless have done that calculation and, (if I have done so correctly), the relevant credit to be received by Mr Centeno-So in that regard amounts to an effective credit of 1,655 days; i.e., four years, six months and 11 days.

4. In effect, the defence therefore has asked that I impose a custodial sentence for Mr Centeno-So's crime of manslaughter having a minimum duration of six years, six months and 11 days; i.e., a custodial sentence that would require Mr Centeno-So to spend a further two years in custody, to be served in a federal penitentiary.

ii. Defence counsel submitted that the particular misconduct underlying Mr Centeno-So's manslaughter offence lay on the lower end of the spectrum between the accidental causing of death and deliberate misconduct falling short of second-degree murder. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. Defence counsel emphasized that the assault appeared to be somewhat spontaneous (i.e., without any obvious planning or deliberation), and the relatively short duration of the attack, which unquestionably was lethal but also lasted just 26 seconds from the time Mr Centeno-So rose to chase Mr Cherrey-Rooke to delivery of the final kick that brought the assault to an end. It also was emphasized that the wounds inflicted initially appeared to be less serious than they were, and indeed were not instantly fatal, which in turn was said to be another indirect indication of Mr Centeno So's intent when engaging in the attack.

2. It was submitted that, having regard to all the circumstances, Mr Centeno-So's assault on Mr Cherrey-Rooke therefore should be viewed as one demonstrating an obvious intention to wound rather than kill, particularly insofar as Mr Centeno-So had no awareness that the stab wounds he was inflicting would happen to pierce or sever, or did happen to pierce or sever, organs or arteries (and a significant branch of the profunda femoris artery in particular), that would cause Mr Cherrey-Rooke to bleed so profusely and thereby bring about his death. In the circumstances, it was said, Mr Centeno-So realistically had no appreciation that the wounds he had inflicted were life-endangering when he walked away from Mr Cherrey-Rooke without rendering or calling for assistance.

3. More generally, the proposed custodial sentence was said to be appropriate, having regard to all the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to which I will return shortly. In that regard:

a. Mitigating considerations, particularly emphasized by defence counsel, included:

i. Mr Centeno's extremely challenging upbringing, background and life circumstances, which included his immersion in what was said to be a "street ethic in which violence and knives are used to resolve disputes", and his addiction to narcotics that influenced his actions at the time of the offence;

ii. Mr Centeno-So's guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility (sparing Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family and the court system an extended trial), in circumstances where there were said to be triable issues, and where there also were said to be no indications that Mr Centeno-So had attempted to evade or avoid responsibility for his actions;

iii. Mr Centeno-So's genuine expressions of remorse; and

iv. Mr Centeno-So's prospects for rehabilitation, including his current maintenance of sobriety, his current use of Suboxone to control his cravings for narcotics, and his professed desire to engage in significant rehabilitation programs that have not really been available to Mr Centeno-So while he has been awaiting trial in provincial holding institutions such as the Elgin Middlesex Detention Centre and/or Central North Correction Centre.

b. While acknowledging the existence of numerous aggravating considerations in this case (including the admittedly vicious nature of Mr Centeno-So's lethal attack on Mr Cherrey-Rooke, and the devasting impact Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death unquestionably has had on his family), it was submitted that the custodial sentence sought by the Crown was too high, and that the custodial sentence sought by the defence was more in keeping with the manslaughter sentencing precedents relied upon by the defence.

b. As for the defence position in relation to ancillary orders, counsel for Mr Centeno-So generally took no position in relation to the ancillary orders being sought by the Crown. Certainly, there was no opposition expressed to the making of such orders.

[16] With those competing sentencing positions in mind, I turn next to sentencing objectives, directions and principles applicable to such matters.

Sentencing Objectives – Legislative Directions and General Principles

[17] As emphasized by section 718 of the Code, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute (along with crime prevention initiatives), to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

a. denunciation of unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

b. deterring the offender and others from committing offences;

c. separation of offenders from society, where necessary;

d. assisting in the rehabilitation of offenders;

e. providing reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

f. promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, and their acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community by their conduct.

[18] Pursuant to section 718.1 of the Code, a sentence should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence, and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

[19] Pursuant to section 718.2 of the Code, I note that, amongst other considerations, the court is obliged to take into account:

a. that a sentence should be reduced or increased to account for any mitigating or aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, factors deemed by Parliament to be aggravating circumstances include, pursuant to subsection 718.2(iii.1) of the Code, evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation;

b. that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

c. that an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and

d. that all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community, should be considered for all offenders.

[20] I also note that, pursuant to section 718.04 of the Code, when a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who was vulnerable because of personal circumstances (which in my view would include a person such as Mr Cherrey-Rooke, an unarmed homeless person living on the streets of London while suffering from addiction to drugs), the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

[21] The sentencing objectives outlined above are applicable in relation to all convictions, and I accordingly have them in mind throughout the process of arriving at a just sentence for Mr Centeno-So, in relation to the manslaughter offence that brings him before me now.

[22] However, provisions of the Code and other authorities provide further guidance as to how these general sentencing objectives should be applied in dealing with the offence of manslaughter. In that regard, I note the following:

a. Manslaughter is not an offence specifically defined in the manner one normally sees in the Criminal Code; i.e., in the sense that the offence of manslaughter effectively is defined somewhat by the process of elimination, rather than a specific immediate outline of its essential elements. In particular, section 234 of the Code defines the offence of manslaughter as "culpable homicide that is not murder or infanticide".

b. Pursuant to subsection 236(b) of the Code, the maximum punishment for manslaughter is life imprisonment. There is no minimum punishment for the offence.

c. In the result, the crime of manslaughter generally is regarded as unique, in that it inherently is a very serious offence (i.e., insofar as it results in the death of another person, and "the taking of life is always a terrible tragedy and most serious offence no matter what the circumstances", as emphasized by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Simcoe, 2002 CarswellOnt 719, at paragraph 24), but it also has been long recognized to attract a very broad and immensely varied range of sentences, depending on the circumstances. See, for example, R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290, at paragraph 233; and R. v. Clarke, [2003] O.J. No. 1966 (C.A.), at paragraph 7. In that regard:

i. The sentencing options available to a sentencing court for the offence of manslaughter are said to be "like no other"; see R. v. Clemons, 2003 MBCA 51, [2003] M.J. No. 101 (C.A.), at paragraph 7. They clearly vary from a suspended sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment; see R. v. Dasilva, [1988] B.C.J. No. 1744 (C.A.), at paragraph 13.

ii. Such varied outcomes reflect the reality that manslaughter is a form of culpable homicide covering a very wide range of circumstances in which a person has been unlawfully killed, with corresponding wide-ranging degrees of moral blameworthiness. Even for impulsive killings, there are different degrees of moral culpability. As discussed in further detail below, such considerations make it difficult to speak of a range of punishment applicable to the offence, and explain why it is sometimes difficult to reconcile one sentence for manslaughter with another. See R. v. Stone, supra, at paragraph 233; R. v. Reid, 2012 ONSC 7521, at paragraph 45; and R. v. Brinton, 2014 ONSC 5970, at paragraph 28.

iii. However, as repeatedly explained and recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada, the broad sentencing range for the crime of manslaughter set out in section 236 of the Code accords with the principle that punishment must be meted out with regard to the particular moral culpability or blameworthiness of an offender. See, for example: R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at page 647; R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paragraph 20; and R. v. Stone, supra, at paragraph 233.

iv. At one end of the manslaughter spectrum of culpability, there will be circumstances that may approximate an unintentional and almost accidental killing (which properly will attract a lighter sentence), while at the opposite extremity of the spectrum, there will be circumstances approaching very near to murder; e.g., where the circumstances indicate an awareness of risk just short of what would be required to infer the intent required for murder. The penalties for manslaughter must remain flexible to address this wide variety of circumstances in which manslaughter may occur, with the appropriate sentence in each case being tailored to suit the degree of moral fault of the offender. See, for example: R. v. Creighton, supra, at paragraph 20; R. v. Carriere (2002), 164 C.C.C. (3d) 569 (Ont.C.A.), at paragraph 10; R. v. E.H., 2005 BCCA 3, [2005] B.C.J. No. 4 (C.A.), at paragraph 20; and R. v. Reid, supra, at paragraph 45.

v. The determination of a fit sentence for the crime of manslaughter is therefore a very fact-specific exercise, with the appropriateness of a sentence being a function of the purpose and principles of sentencing (set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Code), as applied to the facts that led to the conviction. The facts of the offence (including the context in which the death was caused and the relationship between the victim and the offender), the circumstances of the offender, and the offender's moral blameworthiness are all considerations. See, for example: R. v. Dasilva, supra, at paragraph 13; R. v. Simcoe, supra, at paragraph 24; R. v. Ferguson, [2008] 1. S.C.R. 96, at paragraph 15; R. v. Cleyndert, [2006] O.J. No. 4038 (C.A.), at paragraph 13; R. v. Hermiz, [2007] O.J. No. 1589 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 14; R. v. Reid, supra, at paragraph 46; R. v. MacKinnon, 2022 ONSC 1349, at paragraph 73; and R. v. Mohamed, 2023 ONSC 6294, at paragraph 31.

d. The fact-specific nature of sentencing for the crime of manslaughter, and the very wide range of facts which a manslaughter case may feature, therefore make it inherently difficult, as noted earlier, to establish any precise range of sentencing for the offence, and the imposition of a correct sentence in such cases accordingly has been described as one of the most difficult tasks a court has to face. See, for example: R. v. Clemons, supra, at paragraph 6; and R. v. Hermiz, supra, at paragraphs 11 and 12. However:

i. Recognizing that an appropriate sentence for manslaughter must reflect our society's concern for the sanctity of life, and that a lengthy sentence ordinarily must be imposed having in mind the gravity of the crime, severe sentences generally are imposed for the crime of manslaughter (i.e., in order to ensure a sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence), with many if not most sentences for manslaughter being at least in the penitentiary range. See R. v. Head, [1985] O.J. No. 153 (C.A.), at paragraph 14; and R. v. Turcotte (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.), at paragraph 19.

ii. For a time at least, our Court of Appeal appeared to indicate, by way of its decision in R. v. Clarke, [2003] O.J. No. 1966 (C.A.), at paragraph 7, and to have confirmed, by way of its decision in R. v. Cleyndert, [2006] O.J. No. 4038 (C.A.), at paragraph 4, that there effectively was a sub-category of manslaughter that should be regarded as "aggravated manslaughter" for the purpose of sentencing, with the appropriate range of sentence for such "aggravated manslaughter" usually being 8-12 years of imprisonment. While not specifically defining what sort of circumstances or factors would bring a particular instance of manslaughter within that apparently suggested subcategory of "aggravated manslaughter" and that corresponding 8-12 year range of sentencing, the Court of Appeal arguably provided indirect indications in that regard by identifying the following particular constellation of aggravating factors that brought the particular situation in that case within the concept:

1. a frail, vulnerable and defenceless victim being subjected to an armed attack;

2. an attack causing death occurring in the victim's own home;

3. use of a knife during commission of the offence;

4. brutality of an attack, as indicated by numerous stab wounds, more than one of which could have caused death, and some of which were inflicted with considerable force;

5. subsequent concealment and/or hiding of a knife used in an attack;

6. failure to promptly call for help or medical assistance;

7. attempts by the offender to divert suspicion away from the offender;

8. an offender flying into a "pure rage" against a supposed friend who had only slightly provoked the offender; and

9. a devastating impact on the family of the victim.

iii. In R. v. Devaney, [2006] O.J. No. 3996 (C.A.), our Court of Appeal nevertheless indicated and/or clarified, at paragraphs 33-34 of its decision, that it was "not useful to attach a label to a subcategory of the offence" of manslaughter, and that adding such a descriptive label to a set of facts within the defined offence "adds a level of complexity to the sentencing exercise that is both unnecessary and potentially diverting for the court, and could lead to errors". The sentencing exercise in each case of manslaughter instead should focus simply on imposing a sentence "that fits the facts and circumstances of the particular case and the particular offender". The concept of identifying and naming subcategories of manslaughter for the purpose of comparing cases and imposing similar sentences was specifically rejected, with our courts being directed to "instead compare the circumstances of each situation on a case-by-case basis". In that regard:

1. I note in passing that the Ontario Court of Appeal's direction in that regard has made me reticent, with respect, to rely upon manslaughter sentencing precedent from Alberta proffered for my consideration by defence counsel in this case; i.e., insofar as the Alberta Court of Appeal, via its decision in R. v. Laberge, 1995 ABCA 196, apparently has committed the courts of that province to a specific approach to sentencing in manslaughter cases, by the creation of three specified sub-categories of moral culpability for manslaughter based on general descriptions of the risk of injury involved, to be used as "starting point" scenarios and "rungs on a ladder" for determining an appropriate sentence for manslaughter. With respect, that seems at odds with the views of Ontario's Court of Appeal expressed in R. v. Devaney, supra, even though the Alberta Court of Appeal has since confirmed, via its decision in R. v. Wharry, 2008 ABCA 293, that the "categories" described in R. v. Laberge, supra, are not to be associated with rigid sentencing ranges.

2. A differential provincial approach to sentencing in manslaughter cases, suggesting caution in relying on sentencing precedents from other Canadian jurisdictions, is also suggested by the repeated willingness of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to indicate that the general range of sentence for manslaughter is 4-15 years of imprisonment. See, for example: R. v. Green, 2001 BCCA 672, at paragraph 10; R. v. David, 2007 BCCA 255, at paragraph 7; and R. v. Engebretsen, 2016 BCCA 182, at paragraph 13.

e. In terms of possible predominance of sentencing principles in relation to the crime of manslaughter:

i. It has been noted that the principles of denunciation and deterrence are not always paramount in manslaughter cases. Nor is the goal of rehabilitation always subordinate to those objectives in relation to such matters. See R. v. Reid, supra, at paragraph 52.

ii. As emphasized by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Head, supra, at paragraph 14, imposition of an appropriately lengthy sentence for manslaughter that reflects society's concern for the sanctity of life, and its revulsion that anyone in a state of self-induced intoxication would take an innocent life, also should not be so lengthy as to inhibit reasonable prospects for rehabilitation (with a view to the offender becoming a useful citizen when released from custody), especially in cases where an offender expresses extreme remorse and the prospects for rehabilitation are promising.

iii. However, it also has been noted and emphasized that denunciation and deterrence are ordinarily the predominant sentencing principles in cases of manslaughter. See R. v. Hermiz, supra, at paragraph 17. Such an approach is consistent with a view, generally adopted by our appellate courts, that emphasis must be placed on deterrence in cases of homicide, and that denunciation and general deterrence command the imposition of a custodial sentence in cases of unlawful killing, absent exceptional circumstances. See R. v. Costa, [1996] O.J. No. 299 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 33; and R. v. Gordon, 2020 ONSC 7395, at paragraph 28.

[23] Bearing in mind the general sentencing objectives and guidance outlined above, I turn next to a consideration of possible aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, starting with the former.

Aggravating Factors

[24] In that regard, I start by noting my view that a number of aggravating considerations, often highlighted in other manslaughter cases, are absent here. That is not to say that their absence is a mitigating factor. I simply note that their absence inherently makes this case less serious than it would have been had such aggravating factors been present. For example:

a. At the time of embarking upon and/or carrying out his lethal attack on Mr Cherrey-Rooke, Mr Centeno-So was not immediately engaged in any other unlawful activity, such as active drug-trafficking.

b. Mr Centeno-So did not attempt to attribute his victim's death to others, wrongly suggest that the victim was in any way responsible for the events leading to his death, or otherwise lie to the police.

c. There are no indications that Mr Centeno-So has misbehaved in any way during his time in predisposition custody.

[25] This case nevertheless does present numerous aggravating considerations, which in my view include the following:

a. Whatever the particular nature of the "sharp bladed instrument" Mr Centeno-So used during his lethal assault on Mr Cherrey-Rooke (probably a knife, based on the submissions I received during the course of sentencing), it was not a weapon of opportunity that just happened to be immediately available when the assault occurred. Mr Centeno-So clearly brought it with him to the incident.

b. Mr Centeno-So's victim was vulnerable (insofar as Mr Cherrey-Rooke was homeless and struggling with drug addiction), completely unarmed and essentially defenceless.

c. In my view, while Mr Centeno-So's attack may not have been premeditated (i.e., in the sense that it clearly seemed to exhibit virtually no forethought or planning), and it may have been short-lived, it also most certainly was no accident. To the contrary, it was deliberate and particularly vicious. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, and as already noted:

i. It was a one-sided attack, entirely initiated by Mr Centeno-So as an aggressor who had to get up, and actively chase and catch up to his victim, before pushing that victim to the ground to carry out the assault.

ii. In response, Mr Centeno-So's victim acted in a completely defensive manner; e.g., trying to run away and otherwise escape from the assault, engaging in nothing but some minor and ineffective attempts at legitimate self-defence by kicking at Mr Centeno-So while lying on the ground, writhing and trying to escape the blows being inflicted upon him.

iii. Mr Centeno-So's assault did not involve a single impulsive or reflexive blow, but numerous repetitive blows (six strikes with his arm and one kick), that clearly were quite deliberate and took some effort to land on their target as his victim writhed on the ground beneath him. In my view, those blows or attempted blows also were forcefully delivered.

iv. Mr Centeno-So used a sharp-bladed instrument when inflicting the six blows using his arm, in circumstances where he admittedly recognized and foresaw a risk of resulting harm to his victim.

v. The callous and contemptuous nature of the attack was underscored by the final kick Mr Centeno-So delivered as he walked away from his injured victim, as his victim was still lying on the ground.

d. While the assault may not have occurred while Mr Centeno-So was actively engaged in other unlawful activity, there are indications, apparently provided by Mr Centeno-So himself, that it was prompted by Mr Centeno-So taking offence with his victim having taken issue with Mr Centeno-So's sale of illicit drugs to his victim earlier that day.

e. Following the attack, Mr Centeno-So did nothing to assist his victim, or call for assistance from anyone else in that regard, despite Mr Cherrey-Rooke's express indications to Mr Centeno-So that Mr Cherrey-Rooke was dying. While I accept that Mr Centeno-So may not immediately have recognized that Mr Cherrey-Rooke's wounds were indeed fatal, he reasonably must have known that Mr Cherrey-Rooke was likely to have sustained serious wounds after being struck repeatedly with a knife or whatever other sharp-bladed instrument was used in the attack.

f. Mr Centeno-So not only failed to render any personal aid to Mr Cherrey-Rooke, or call for help from others, he also left the scene of the assault before the arrival of police and other first responders.

g. While Mr Centeno-So may not have engaged in any active attempts to cast suspicion and responsibility for the attack onto others, I do not think it accurate to say (as defence counsel did during the course of submissions), that Mr Centeno-So did nothing to divert attention from his own responsibility for the assault. In my view, his immediate change out of the distinctive upper body clothing he had been wearing at the time of the attack (an attack witnessed by other individuals obviously in the area), and his replacement of that clothing with a very different coloured top, within minutes of the attack, and after he had withdrawn to a location not visible to those who had witnessed the attack, reflected an obvious attempt to conceal his involvement in the incident and/or make it more difficult for him to be located based on any witness description of the attacker.

h. There is also the matter of Mr Centeno-So's criminal record, which is my view is a serious aggravating consideration, and one that gives very serious cause for concern. In that regard:

i. As noted above, that record is not only lengthy (in terms of the number of convictions accumulated by Mr Centeno-So), but it extends over a very lengthy period of time, with further convictions attained at regular intervals never lasting more than 1½ to 2 years at most, with demonstrated recidivism occurring more frequently than that.

ii. As also noted above, that record includes crimes of violence, and that level of violence obviously has escalated to the point where it now has resulted in the death of another individual.

iii. As discussed further herein, there is now a very well-established pattern, in relation to Mr Centeno-So, of offending, sentencing, incarceration and enforced sobriety having little or no effect on Mr Centeno-So's long term behaviour, as repeated release from custody into society has resulted in repeated and rapid return to substance abuse and further criminal activity, with no effort by Mr Centeno-So while out of custody to meaningfully pursue any programming to help with his substance abuse issues or other steps towards long term rehabilitation. The resulting cycle of addiction, offending, sentencing, release and further offending has remained unbroken for many years now, despite the proffered support of Mr Centeno-So's father and Probation services.

iv. As noted above, there is also the specific aggravating factor of Mr Centeno-So being on probation for another crime of violence at the time of his manslaughter offence.

v. Having regard to such realities, I am not persuaded that Mr Centeno-So has any real insight into his substance abuse issues, or the need (obvious and pressing for many years now), to take serious steps towards meaningful treatment and rehabilitation in that regard.

vi. In my view, all of this strongly suggests that Mr Centeno-So needs to be separated from society, while meaningful and sustained efforts are made to address his rehabilitation while he is in custody.

i. In addition to all of the aggravating considerations I have noted and described up to this point, a further and perhaps most serious aggravating factor, in this case, is the reality of the tragic consequences inflicted by the manslaughter offence committed by Mr Centeno-So. In that regard:

i. A sentencing judge must take into consideration, as a circumstance deemed to be an aggravating factor pursuant to s.718.2(a)(iii.1) of the Code, evidence that an offence has had a significant impact on a victim having regard to his or her age and other personal circumstances, including the victim's health and financial situation.

ii. In that regard, I question whether the death of Mr Cherrey-Rooke itself legally can or should be considered an aggravating consideration, as suggested by defence counsel during the course of submissions, as the death of Mr Cherrey-Rooke unlawfully caused by Mr Centeno-So (i.e., his culpable homicide), forms an essential element of the manslaughter offence itself, as distinct from an aggravating consideration in relation to that offence.

iii. However, Mr Cherrey-Rooke clearly was not the only victim of Mr Centeno-So's crime of manslaughter. In particular, as one might expect, and as emphasized and detailed in the victim impact statement presented for my consideration, the members of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family have suffered, and suffered greatly, as a result of Mr Centeno-So's tragic killing of Mr Cherrey-Rooke, and almost certainly will continue to suffer from that senseless untimely death for the rest of their lives. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. Every human life inherently has precious value but, as emphasized by the surviving members of his family, Mr Cherrey-Rooke also was a treasured grandson, son, brother, nephew and incredible uncle; an essential component of his extended family, as well as a extremely valued friend to many others. He is remembered fondly, and no doubt always will be:

a. for the love, caring, adoration and kindness he extended to others through deliberate and sustained efforts to be present and helpful in the lives of others, and make a difference in that regard, despite his personal struggles with addiction during the final year of his life;

b. for his passionate love of singing and recorded music;

c. for his sense of humour and fun that delighted in making others laugh, and feel happy and special;

d. for a generosity of spirit that prompted him to continually give to others when he himself had very little to give – which arguably is the greatest form of generosity; and

e. for his hopes concerning the future, despite the struggles experienced during the final year of his life that he remained determined to overcome.

2. While those memories remain, for those who knew him, Mr Cherrey-Rooke himself is now obviously gone, and his tragic death has created a horrible and inescapable void and devastating impact for those who remain. As emphasized in the family's victim impact statement:

a. All members of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's extended family feel that his life has been "stolen" from them, leaving a depth of pain impossible to put into words. Each holiday, milestone and other occasion that should bring happiness instead brings keen reminders of loss, sadness, pain and a sense of being incomplete, because Mr Cherrey-Rooke is no longer physically there, and never will be.

b. In the result, each member of the family has been struggling with ongoing grief, anger and a sense of injustice that remains undiminished in the years since Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death. They regard his senseless killing and loss as a tragedy they will carry with them forever.

c. Mr Cherrey-Rooke's parents, in particular, apparently have been completely shattered by his death, experiencing unimaginable pain and grief on a daily basis as they struggle, with the support of their surviving family members, to cope with the trauma of having to bury their son and endure his ongoing loss.

d. Therapy has become a necessary part of the lives of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's surviving family members, and is still ongoing. The financial cost of that, and the extended leaves working members of the family have been obliged to take from work to cope with their pain, has added another layer of hardship to their already devastating situation.

3. While I have spoken about those who knew, loved and remember Mr Cherrey-Rooke, I also am mindful that they are not the only ones who have experienced and will experience his loss. As emphasized by his sisters, Mr Cherrey-Rooke now has at least one nephew born after his death, who will never have the chance to meet his uncle or experience the joy of his life directly.

iv. All of this profound loss, and devastating impact on the family of Mr Cherrey-Rooke was entirely avoidable, and is entirely attributable to the senseless actions of Mr Centeno-So.

Mitigating Factors

[26] As for mitigating considerations, I start by noting the absence of various mitigating considerations frequently seen and relied upon in relation to such offences. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

a. At the age of 27 (when Mr Centeno-So committed his offence of manslaughter), he was relatively young, with a good deal of life hopefully ahead of him, but in my view, he could no longer be described as a "youthful" offender.

b. Nor, most certainly, was he a "first time" offender, with no criminal record. In my view, his criminal record also could not be characterized as "minor", given its length, its indicated frequency of offending, and its inclusion of crimes of violence.

c. There was no suggestion that there was any provocation (in the legal sense of that term), leading to Mr Centeno-So's crime.

d. There similarly was no suggestion that Mr Centeno-So's actions could be characterized as self-defence, or that there was any air of reality to any such suggestion in this case. Mr Centeno-So was not obliged to chase after Mr Cherrey-Rooke to embark on his attack, to follow through on that attack, or continue that attack once it had begun. If there was any attempt at self-defence in this case, it was done by Mr Cherrey-Rooke; e.g., in the form of his apparently feeble and obviously ineffective attempts to kick at Mr Centeno-So from his position on the ground as Mr Centeno-So was attacking him.

e. Mr Centeno-So did not turn himself into the police, or otherwise willingly surrender himself into police custody. As noted earlier, he was located only via an active police search, leading to the discovery of Mr Centeno-So hiding in a closet.

f. While Mr Centeno-So has experienced racialization (which I take into account in terms of his having experienced a very challenging life), Mr Centeno-So apparently lacks any indigenous heritage that would merit any Gladue considerations.

g. Mr Centeno-So also has no children or other dependents of any kind who look to him for financial support of any kind when he is not in custody.

[27] I will emphasize that the absence of such mitigating considerations is certainly not an aggravating consideration. I note their absence simply to underscore that this case of manslaughter is distinguishable, in that regard, from others where one or more of such mitigating considerations was present.

[28] Having said all that, in my view there clearly are a number of mitigating considerations to be taken into account. In particular:

a. Mr Centeno-So clearly had a very difficult and challenging upbringing. To say that Mr Centeno-So never had the chances many Canadians enjoy is a vast understatement. He clearly lacked family stability and support, or financial security. He was deprived of a meaningful positive father figure at a formulative time in life, as well as any meaningful education or training for life, and was permitted to drift and/or escape into a world of negative peers and illicit drugs. In the result, he tragically joined the ranks of the addicted, homeless and all-too frequently ignored and/or forgotten who struggle to survive in recesses of our community that are often shunned and avoided. Even there, within that "drug subculture" of our community, he was subjected to being racialized. One can have nothing but sympathy for someone who has endured such a life.

b. I am mindful that Mr Centeno-So committed his offence while heavily under the influence of narcotics, which no doubt impaired his judgment, increased his impulsivity, and subordinated the normally "very kind" and "good" character described by his father. In some respects, that arguably reduces the degree of his moral blameworthiness for his conduct on the morning in question. However, as emphasized by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Head, supra, at paragraph 14, an appropriate sentence for manslaughter, while taking into account an offender's prospects for rehabilitation, must also reflect our society's revulsion that anyone in a state of self-induced intoxication would take an innocent life. I am also mindful that, in this case, Mr Centeno-So knew or should have known, based on his past experience, that his use of narcotics repeatedly led to his engaging in criminal conduct, including crimes of violence.

c. Mr Centeno-So deserves significant credit for his manslaughter guilty plea and formal acceptance of responsibility for causing Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death. In that regard:

i. As noted above, offender acceptance of responsibility is a principal goal of criminal sentencing. It is also the first step in meaningful efforts at rehabilitation.

ii. I also agree with defence counsel's emphasis on the reality that Mr Centeno-So's guilty plea resulted in a significant saving of currently over-stretched resources of the court and a corresponding burden to the community; e.g., insofar as it obviated the need for a scheduled three-week criminal jury trial in relation to Mr Centeno-So's misconduct. It also brought an end to the uncertainty the family and friends of Mr Cherrey-Rooke had been experiencing, at least in terms of wondering whether anyone would be formally held responsible for Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death. They were also spared from having to endure a prolonged public trial in that regard, where the circumstances of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death would have been discussed repeatedly in the course of testimony from numerous witnesses involved in this matter in various ways, as well as counsel arguments and submissions.

iii. At the time of Mr Centeno-So's guilty plea, there were triable issues remaining that arguably enhanced the value of that guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility; i.e., insofar as the identity of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's attacker arguably was not immediately clear, at least from the surveillance video that captured the events of the attack that morning from a significant distance.

iv. Having said all that, I think it also fair to say that the mitigating effect of the guilty plea in this case did not have the force it might have had in other circumstances. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. While defence counsel submitted that it was always Mr Centeno-So's intention to plead guilty, the reality is that the plea of guilty in relation to manslaughter (a culpable homicide capable of being viewed as a lesser and included offence to the original more serious charge of second-degree murder), came very late in the figurative day; i.e., weeks before the matter was to proceed to trial early in the new year, following the Christmas and New Year holiday period.

2. The matter had not only proceeded well past the preliminary inquiry held in October and November of 2023 (i.e., more than a year before Mr Centeno-So's guilty plea), but had also been the subject of pretrial application proceedings where the circumstances of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death were discussed in detail, including playing of the relevant surveillance video capturing the incident. In other words, the family and friends of Mr Cherrey-Rooke were not entirely spared the process of such court proceedings in relation to the matter.

3. While I agree that the identity of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's attacker arguably was not immediately discernible from the surveillance video of the incident, recorded from a distance, thereby creating a triable issue in that regard, I also think it fair to say that the Crown's evidence regarding identity was ample and strong. In particular, while no finally argued determinations had been made in that regard, the Crown was possessed of a number of eye-witnesses, professed police identification of Mr Centeno-So through review of all the obtained surveillance video recording the movements of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's attacker that morning, and the results of DNA testing of the discarded drink container used by that attacker, which confirmed the presence of Mr Centeno-So's DNA on that container. In other words, Mr Centeno-So's formal acceptance of responsibility for the attack, as Mr Cherrey-Rooke's attacker, conceded a triable issue of identity where the probability of his identity as the relevant attacker responsible for causing Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death seemed strong.

d. As noted above, Mr Centeno-So expressed significant remorse for his actions, and Mr Cherrey-Rooke's resulting death, and I believe that remorse is both genuine and strong. That too is a significant mitigating factor, and one that often bodes well in terms of offender rehabilitation.

e. I think the prospects of rehabilitation in this case are a mitigating factor in this case, but not as strong a mitigating consideration as defence counsel suggested, insofar as I think those prospects are clouded by what I consider to be significant concerns about whether those prospects currently have a realistic chance of success. In that regard:

i. As already noted earlier in these reasons:

1. Mr Centeno-So has accepted responsibility and is genuinely remorseful for his conduct, both of which bode well for his rehabilitation.

2. Mr Centeno-So also still has some support in the community, in the form of his father and other members of his father's family, who apparently have expressed a desire for Mr Centeno-So to reside with them and receive their ongoing support when he is released from custody, as he makes efforts to move beyond this incident and its consequences, and start afresh on a road to a more positive life.

3. Mr Centeno-So himself has emphasized his hopes and plans in that regard, and I accept that his statements in that regard are sincere.

4. Mr Centeno-So also is currently sober and drug-free, which has resulted in a general marked improvement in his health, thinking and rational decision making, and he indicates that he already has taken steps while in custody to embark on the new prosocial path he wants to pursue.

5. While not someone reasonably capable of being described as a youthful offender, Mr Centeno-So is still relatively young, with many years of his life ahead of him. In other words, he has a good deal of time hopefully remaining to him, in which to turn his life around and direct it to a more prosocial path.

ii. Having said all that, in my view there is very real cause for concern about whether those prospects and aspirational hopes for rehabilitation are likely to be realized. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. I find it very troubling that, during his discussions with the author of the presentence report between Mr Centeno-So's guilty plea on December 18, 2024, and completion of the presentence report on January 6, 2025, Mr Centeno-So himself was unable to articulate any plan in relation to how he would accomplish his goal of achieving a more prosocial life, by maintaining sobriety and developing the ability to find and maintain employment, despite his having been in custody since his arrest on August 15, 2022 (i.e., over 30 months), in a state of enforced sobriety, with ample time to reflect upon such matters.

2. I similarly find it troubling that there was no indication, in the presentence report, that Mr Centeno-So had engaged, by the time of his discussions with the author of the presentence report, in any of the rehabilitative steps he described during his direct comments made in response to my section 726 inquiry. Indeed, Mr Centeno-So was indicating, at the time of those discussions:

a. that he had not attended any programming while incarcerated;

b. that his decision to refrain from participation in programming for substance abuse while in custody was a deliberate one, based on his belief that doing so would render him more vulnerable while in a custodial environment; and

c. that he also was ambivalent about attending residential treatment upon his release from custody.

3. With respect, although Mr Centeno-So is commendably sober now and thinking more clearly, absolutely nothing about the history to date of Mr Centeno-So's issues with substance abuse and his involvement with the criminal justice system instills any faith whatsoever that he will, following his release from custody, maintain sobriety and a prosocial path, avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system, and/or engage in any meaningful programming to address his addiction issues and otherwise help him achieve those prosocial goals and aspirations. To the contrary, each and every time he has been released from custody and enforced sobriety, he quickly and admittedly has reverted to his substance abuse, resulting in further criminal activity; substance abuse that has become more pronounced (insofar as it now has progressed to use of crystal methamphetamine and fentanyl as his preferred narcotics), and criminal activity that has become more violent, to the point of causing death. The support of his father has been available to him in the past, but that has not brought about any change. In my view, the only realistic prospects for sustained rehabilitation depend on Mr Centeno-So actively and meaningfully engaging in substance abuse programming, on a sustained and prolonged basis, while he is in custody; i.e., in the hope that such programming will have lasting effects once he is released from custody. That in turn suggests (as defence counsel implicitly recognized in the request for sentencing with a net remaining duration of at least two years), that a lengthier sentence would not crush Mr Centeno-So's prospects for rehabilitation but facilitate them. Of course, that too nevertheless depends on Mr Centeno-So willingly changing his attitude towards engaging in such programming while in custody.

4. I am mindful that assisting and promoting such potential rehabilitation of an offender is always a relevant consideration in sentencing, and I certainly do not lose sight of that throughout this process. However, in my view, such considerations take a figurative "back seat" to consideration of necessary denunciation and deterrence in this particular context. In that regard, I once again note:

a. the provisions of s.718.04 of the Code, which require a court imposing a sentence for an offence involving the abuse of a person vulnerable because of personal circumstances to give "primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence"; and

b. my finding (for reasons outlined above), that Mr Cherrey-Rooke was such a vulnerable person at the time of his killing by Mr Centeno-So.

[29] Counsel representing Mr Centeno-So suggested in passing that, in considering possible mitigating factors, I also should take judicial notice of detrimental conditions existing at the Elgin Middlesex Detention Centre that probably have inflicted extraordinary hardship on Mr Centeno-So during his time in pretrial and presentence custody; i.e., thereby giving rise to another mitigating consideration. However, I note that the supplemental agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties includes an express agreement that there would be "no additional credit sought based on jail conditions". I infer, from that agreement, an underlying consensus that Mr Centeno-So actually did not experience any extraordinary hardship from the conditions of his pretrial and presentence incarceration that should be regarded as a mitigating consideration.

Suggested Comparables

[30] In addition to the matters outlined above, I also have considered the sentencing authorities provided to me by counsel by way of suggested comparison to the circumstances of this case; i.e., bearing in mind the sentencing objective, noted above, that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.

[31] The reality, however, is that no two cases are exactly alike. As emphasized by Chief Justice Lamer in R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paragraph 92:

Sentencing is an individualized process, and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise or academic abstraction. As well, sentences for a particular offence should be expected to vary to some degree across various communities and regions in this country, as the "just and appropriate" mix of accepted sentencing goals will depend on the needs and current conditions of and in the particular community where the crime occurred.

[32] Moreover, as noted above, such challenges in relation to finding cases providing firm guidance in relation to parity of sentencing are even more pronounced in relation to the crime of manslaughter.

[33] Crown counsel nevertheless referred me, for purposes of comparison, to the following seven manslaughter sentencing precedents, all decided by this court, here in Ontario, which I will address in their chronological order:

a. In R. v. Browne, [2002] O.J. No. 900, the offender was 20 years old at the time of his manslaughter offence, and had never been to prison. He had a troubled family history predisposing him to depression and alcoholism. He himself had abused alcohol and become alcohol dependent since the age of 12, which had led to his abuse of other serious mind-altering drugs, including cocaine, with resulting addiction. At the time of his offence, the offender had consumed alcohol to the point of substantial intoxication, agreed to accompany two of his drug-dealing friends to a sale of illicit drugs, and chose to take a steak knife him to the meeting. Following that drug sale, one of his friends initiated an altercation with the deceased in an effort to retake possession of the drugs that had just been sold. In the struggle that followed, the offender decided to intervene, and struck a single blow to the chest of the deceased, causing death. During lengthy predisposition custody, the offender took some positive steps to come to grips with his addictions, expressed a measure of insight into the nature of those difficulties and demonstrated what was described as a "quiet resolve" to address those issues, although there was still apparently "much work to be done" in that regard. The offender pled guilty to manslaughter, accepting responsibility, sparing the community the cost of a lengthy trial, and the victim's family the agony of a public trial that would have tarnished the victim's memory by allegations of drug activity. Justice Watt (as he then was), was presented with and accepted a joint submission requesting imposition of a custodial sentence that was the "functional equivalent" of a 12-year sentence, reduced to a net custodial sentence of eight years via credit for the offender's presentence custody. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation currently before me:

i. Mr Centeno-So was not actively involved in unlawful drug-dealing at the time of his offence, although the offence did stem from a dispute about his selling of drugs to Mr Cherrey-Rooke.

ii. While Mr Centeno-So also brought a knife to the altercation that resulted in Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death, Mr Centeno-So used it to strike at his victim six times rather than once, managing to inflict three wounds in that regard rather than one, although a knife wound to the chest arguably carried more obvious lethal risks than the knife wounds inflicted on Mr Cherrey-Rooke by Mr Centeno-So.

iii. Mr Centeno-So comes from a similarly troubled background, also has the benefit of a guilty plea, and also has expressed acceptance of responsibility and remorse that appear to be sincere.

iv. Mr Centeno-So nevertheless was not as youthful at the time of his manslaughter offence. Nor was he an offender facing his first prison sentence. Nor does he seem to have taken steps towards rehabilitation while in predisposition custody comparable to those taken by Mr Browne.

v. In this case, I also am not presented with a joint sentencing submission.

b. In R. v. Reid, supra, the offender was 23 at the time of his manslaughter offence. He had a troubled and challenging childhood, which included his birth to teenage parents who never lived together or married, instability without structure or discipline, a father who was a cocaine addict, a mother who abused alcohol, frequent family relocation, limited schooling which ended in grade nine, placement in a group home for a time, and development of his own alcohol and drug abuse issues by the age of 14, leading to addiction by the age of 19 to cocaine and crack cocaine. He had maintained a series of labouring jobs, while also selling marihuana to fund his own drug addiction. While he had a criminal record limited to one conviction for violence, he had never before experienced any imprisonment. In particular, after being charged with robbery while intoxicated, he voluntarily took steps to address his addictive behaviour while in the community; e.g., via steps that included attendance at an addiction support group, as well as meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, and a John Howard Society self-management program. He also took steps to complete vocational training, prior to pleading guilty to a lesser and included offence of assault causing bodily harm, in respect of which he received a suspended sentence and probation. Between that time and his manslaughter offence, he began to relapse into alcohol abuse; a process accelerated in the wake of his younger brother being killed in a car accident. On the occasion of his manslaughter offence (at which time the offender was still on probation), he and the 19-year-old victim (whom he knew well and often socialized with), had been drinking hard liquor together with another friend, went to and returned from a fair, and then returned to a residence where a verbal quarrel led to physical fight between the offender and his victim, during which the two were yelling at and punching each other in what was described by onlookers as a "fairly even" fight. However, during the fight, which moved outside, the offender grabbed a knife which happened to be stuck into a nearby post on an exterior deck of the house, and stabbed his victim once in the abdomen with what must have been considerable force to produce the resulting wound. That wound nevertheless produced only a small amount of blood immediately thereafter, and no one at the time appeared to recognize immediately that it was serious. However, shortly thereafter, the victim walked away slowly, stumbled and sat down at the side of a nearby road. The offender appeared to be in immediate shock as he realized what he had done, and immediately told the friend and host that he had stabbed the victim. However, he did not call an ambulance when asked by the host to do so, and that task apparently fell to others. By the time paramedics arrived, the victim was dead. Although the offender himself also called 911 after the victim had been pronounced dead, indicating that the police should attend to "pick him up", and that he "needed a lawyer", he also had washed and changed his clothes before doing so, minimized his conduct in statements to the police and others, initially lied to the police about the underlying incident leading to the victim's death (e.g., by alleging that the victim was assaulted and stabbed by others at the fair), emphasized alleged misconduct and assaultive behaviour of the victim, and exhibited behaviour generally described by the police as "evasive, coy and uncooperative". The family of the victim was devastated. The offender nevertheless eventually pled guilty to the offence of manslaughter following his preliminary hearing, expressing remorse and regret for his actions, their immediate consequences, and their larger impact. The presentence report underscored the offender's recognition of his unresolved grief issues and substance abuse problem, the latter of which was characterized as "extremely problematic"; e.g., insofar as it was said by family members to produce a complete change of character whenever the offender was drinking. The offender had substantial family support in the community, had been working with an addiction counsellor during predisposition custody, while also pursuing educational programs. There was no joint sentencing submission. In the result, Justice Fuerst, emphasizing that the offender's particular manslaughter offence fell "closer to the murder end" that it did to the "accident end of the spectrum", imposed a custodial sentence of eight years, prior to credit for predisposition custody. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation currently before me:

i. There are similarities, insofar as Mr Centeno-So also comes from an extremely troubled background, also knew and apparently socialized with his victim (considering Mr Cherrey-Rooke a friend), also was intoxicated at the time of the incident (via a known and recognized issue with substance abuse), and the death resulting from the manslaughter in this case also appeared to be unpremeditated, brought about through use of a knife, with the offender making no attempt to aid the victim or call for assistance in that regard. He too was on probation for a crime of violence at the time of his manslaughter offence. Mr Centeno-So similarly has the benefit of a guilty plea, acceptance of responsibility and expressions of remorse. In both situations, the victim's family experienced devastating feelings of loss.

ii. Mr Centeno-So nevertheless did not overtly try to attribute Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death to the actions of others, actively lie to police in an effort to deflect responsibility, or blame Mr Cherrey-Rooke in any way for the events leading to his death. The sharp instrument wounds inflicted by Mr Centeno-So arguably also were inflicted to an area of the body not as obviously life-threatening as a stab wound to the abdomen.

iii. On the other hand, Mr Centeno-So was an older offender; Mr Centeno-So had a much, much lengthier criminal record, including multiple prior custodial sentences; the circumstances surrounding Mr Centeno-So's offence involved nothing in the nature of a mutual, consensual or "fair fight" that suddenly got out of hand; Mr Centeno-So brought a knife to the altercation rather than grabbing at a knife that unfortunately happened to be present at the scene; Mr Centeno-So struck at his victim six times with a knife rather than once, inflicting three wounds rather than one; Mr Centeno-So fled the scene, rather than remaining to speak to the police or indeed calling for police attendance; and it appears that Mr Centeno-So has made far less effort in the past, and while in predisposition custody, to address his clear substance abuse issues.

c. In R. v. Brinton, supra, the offender was 46 at the time of sentencing, with a good work history, and a criminal record that nevertheless was described as "old, very sparse and completely unrelated". On the occasion that led to the manslaughter conviction, the offender and the victim drank alcohol together before proceeding to the victim's residence. At some point in the late evening, the two men fought, in circumstances where the offender had a knife and the victim was unarmed. The offender stabbed the victim once in the abdomen and once in the chest, with the chest wound proving fatal. Immediately after the fatal stabbing, the offender continued to drink (while his friend lay dead beside him), and then took steps to discard the knife that had been used, and which was never found. However, the offender admitted shortly after the incident that he had stabbed and killed the victim, indicating that that he had acted in self-defence. He then turned himself in to the police, was cooperative, and made admissions against his own self-interest. The offender was charged with second-degree murder but, on the day of scheduled jury selection and trial commencement, entered a plea of guilty to the offence of manslaughter; i.e., foregoing his assertion of self-defence, which was characterized by the sentencing judge as something that would have been a "viable defence at trial". The offender had substantial support in the community, as evidenced by a series of letters from friends and family emphasizing the offender's general good character and "peaceable disposition". Quite apart from his guilty plea, the offender also consistently had expressed genuine remorse for the victim's death. In the result, Justice Conlan accepted a joint sentencing submission, whereby the offender received a custodial sentence of six years, prior to the offender receiving credit for presentence custody. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation currently before me:

i. Mr Centeno's situation also involves a fatal stabbing committed by the armed offender in relation to an unarmed victim; a guilty plea that avoided a contemplated lengthy trial; acceptance of responsibility; and genuine expressions of remorse.

ii. Mr Centeno-So is a younger offender, and his guilty plea came slightly earlier in the proceeding. The sharp instrument wounds he inflicted also arguably carried less obvious risk of fatal injury than stab wounds to the abdomen and chest.

iii. However, Mr Centeno-So has a much more serious criminal record, including crimes of violence, and a serious untreated substance abuse issue that is clearly fueling such behaviour. Whereas Mr Brinton had spent most of his longer life working productively in a prosocial manner without running afoul of the law (and certainly doing so without any related criminal behaviour or crimes of violence), and was expressly characterized by Justice Conlan as someone who definitely was not a "career criminal or chronic recidivist", the same cannot be said, I think, of Mr Centeno-So. Mr Centeno-So also did not immediately indicate or admit that he had caused Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death, or surrender himself to police in that regard. Nor is there any suggestion whatsoever that Mr Centeno-So had any viable claim of self-defence that he voluntarily chose to abandon. Mr Centeno-So does not appear to have the community support that was available to Mr Brinton. Nor am I presented with a joint sentencing submission.

d. In R. v. Corbett, 2015 ONSC 6118, the offender had been charged with second-degree murder, but was found guilty of manslaughter after a trial by judge and jury. At the time of the incident leading to the offender's manslaughter conviction, the offender was 25 years old. He had experienced a troubled childhood, in deprived circumstances that included family abandonment by his father when the offender was just two years old; the offender witnessing sexual abuse of his two younger half-sisters; a learning disability and resulting struggles with education leading to aggressive behaviour and expulsion; frequent absence of his mother; and placement in foster homes when not staying with his grandmother from time to time. He had a minor criminal record, but had always managed to remain gainfully employed. He had a daughter from a prior relationship whom he was co-parenting, and in respect of whom he had a positive relationship and was paying child support. He and the victim were friends who had resided together for a time in a shared apartment before a disagreement regarding payment of rent led to the victim moving out of the apartment while leaving a number of possessions behind, including a television set; an item the offender intended to retain until the victim had paid what the offender felt was owed towards rental of the apartment. When the victim attended at the apartment in a later attempt to retrieve the television, a fight ensued. In the course of that confrontation (which involved mutual pushing, shoving and grabbing), the victim was stabbed once in the neck with a knife, producing a wound that obviously had been inflicted via the application of considerable force. He stumbled down the exterior steps of the apartment residence to the nearby street, where he died. Instead of making any effort to render or call for assistance, the offender left the victim in the street, made a clumsy attempt to hide the relevant knife, fled the scene and the apartment via its other entrance, disposed of clothing with blood-related evidence, and initially encouraged others to lie to the police to direct suspicion away from himself. The victim was found a short time later by police, who arrived in response only to calls from others passing by; i.e., in circumstances where the police therefore found it difficult to identify the victim, and were unable to notify the victim's family until the following day, after the offender had surrendered himself to the police in the intervening late evening hours. The victim's family and friends (and the victim's mother in particular), were devastated by the victim's death, including the need for leaves of absence and thoughts of suicide. The matter proceeded to trial, where the offender had advanced a claim of self-defence that was left with the jury. Implicit in the jury's verdict was a rejection of that defence, but also a rejection of the Crown's theory that the offender had meant to cause the death of the victim, or meant to cause him bodily harm while reckless as to whether or not death ensued. The trial and sentencing judge found, based on other evidence presented at trial, that the offender had a sheathed knife in the apartment, took the knife out of the sheath and placed it in his pocket before following the significantly larger victim outside, and then removed the knife and stabbed the victim during a struggle that followed. While the offender arguably had shown a lack of remorse, that generally was attributed to his position regarding self-defence, and regard was had to indications that the offender had been expressing regret concerning the incident and death of his "best friend". Given the element of self-defence (which nevertheless did not justify his conduct), his minimal criminal record, and his established history of being a good citizen and good father (despite his troubled upbringing), he was considered to have good prospects of rehabilitation. In the result, Justice Hambly imposed a custodial sentence of five years, prior to the offender receiving credit for presentence custody and stringent bail terms and conditions. By way of comparison and contrast with the circumstances currently before me:

i. Both cases involved the an offender, with a troubled and challenging upbringing, causing a death of a friend by stabbing, with the offender bringing a weapon to an altercation that was used against an unarmed victim whose death had a devastating impact on the victim's family. Both offenders were of a comparable age when the killing occurred. Both could easily have walked away or otherwise refrained from the relevant interaction with the victim, without further incident. Both made no effort to help the victim, or to call for help from others. Both offenders fled the scene. Both took steps to remove and/or dispose of clothing worn during the incident.

ii. There are a number of considerations arguably suggesting more lenient treatment for Mr Centeno-So; e.g., insofar as he has the benefit of a guilty plea, acceptance of responsibility and expressions of remorse. The blows inflicted by Mr Centeno-So with a sharp bladed instrument also did not carry lethal risks as obvious as a deep stab wound to a victim's neck. Mr Centeno-So's actions to avoid being identified as his victim's attacker arguably paled in comparison to those of Mr Corbett; e.g., insofar as Mr Centeno-So never encouraged others to lie to the police on his behalf.

iii. However, there also arguably are many considerations suggesting a more serious custodial sentence for Mr Centeno-So. For example, he does not have a "minor" criminal record, but a substantial criminal record including crimes of violence, and was on probation for a crime of violence at the time of his offence. He generally has not led a prosocial life with a strong and sustained work history (despite his challenging upbringing), has no demonstrated history of being a good parent, and has no children or other dependents who rely upon him when he is not in custody. Unlike Mr Corbett, Mr Centeno-So has a serious untreated substance abuse issue which has fueled his repeated criminal behaviour, including violence, and the relevant incident of manslaughter itself. There was no suggestion that the incident leading to Mr Cherrey-Rooke's death involved any element of self-defence, let alone a viable assertion of self-defence that was left with a jury.

e. In R. v. Golov, 2018 ONSC 6789, the offender was a youthful first offender (i.e., with no criminal record), who came from a very supportive family, and was gainfully employed at the time of the relevant incident. However, he himself had been the victim of a brutal stabbing several years earlier, in respect of which he had received six stab wounds requiring surgery. His brother also had been the victim of a shooting. As for his manslaughter offence, he was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter after a trial by judge and jury. He and his unarmed and clearly inebriated victim had met through a chance encounter in a ravine behind a shopping plaza; an encounter that led to the exchange of verbal insults, the victim approaching the offender while apparently "spoiling for a fight", and the offender pushing the victim away. The offender was younger and in better physical shape than the victim. The offender claimed that, after his friend had rode his bike away from the immediate area, the offender remained to change a shirt drenched in perspiration, at which point the offender had attempted to strangle him by grabbing around the offender's throat, leading the offender to act in self-defence; i.e., by the offender retrieving his knife and slashing "wildly" with his eyes closed. In that regard, the offender was seen, from a distance, repeatedly "punching" the victim in the upper chest area, before the victim then "doubled up", clutching his stomach with both hands, and died. It was determined later by the pathologist that the victim had sustained four stab wounds to the upper chest area, all in "the front to the back". The fatal wound had been inflicted over the victim's left nipple. The offender denied having intended to kill the victim. He ran away from the scene, without rendering assistance or calling 911, claiming that he would have done so had he known the victim was injured, but also admittedly failed to return to the scene or call for assistance once he saw blood on his knife. The offender then disposed of the knife and washed the clothing he had been wearing, after he got home. The victim's death had a devastating impact on his family. The trial and sentencing judge, Justice Andre, found that the jury's verdict carried an implicit rejection of the offender's claim of having acted in self-defence, and therefore rejection of the offender's assertion that the victim had tried to strangle the offender. The verdict nevertheless also was found to reflect an implicit conclusion that the killing had been provoked by the victim's conduct (e.g., by calling the offender derogatory names and inviting the offender to fight), although the offender also easily could have left the scene as his friend had done before the stabbing, instead of staying under the pretext of needing to remove his shirt. Notwithstanding his claim of self-defence, he had expressed remorse for the killing of his victim, and had completed a number of correspondence courses run by a religious organization. In the result, Justice Andre sentenced the offender to a custodial sentence of six years, prior to his receipt of credit for pretrial custody. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation before me:

i. Both situations involve a killing resulting from an offender bringing a sharp bladed weapon to an altercation, and using that weapon to inflict lethal stabbing injuries on a vulnerable unarmed victim, whose death was devastating to the victim's family. In both situations, the offender easily could have refrained from engaging with the victim, and simply walked away. In both situations, the offender was significantly younger than his victim, and apparently in better physical shape. In both situations, the offender inflicted multiple stab wounds on his victim, and then failed to render or call for assistance, and instead fled the scene. Both offenders engaged in apparent efforts to conceal their involvement in the killing; e.g., by efforts made in relation to clothing worn during the relevant incident. Both offenders engaged in some efforts towards predisposition self-rehabilitation by engaging in activities and/or programs of a religious nature.

ii. Mr Centeno-So has the benefit of a number of mitigating considerations not available to Mr Golov. For example, Mr Centeno-So arguably had a more challenging upbringing, apart from the prior isolated incidents of severe violence experienced by Mr Golov and his brother. Mr Centeno-So also has the benefit of a guilty plea, formally accepting responsibility for his misconduct and sparing the community and the victim's family a lengthy trial, which Mr Golov did not. The wounds Mr Centeno-So inflicted on his victim also arguably were not directed at areas of the body carrying as much obvious lethal risk as repeated stabbing wounds to the chest.

iii. However, there are numerous factors suggesting that Mr Centeno-So should receive a more severe custodial sentence for his crime. He is not a youthful first-time offender, with a generally prosocial life devoid of criminal activity, and a history of gainful employment. He suffers from a serious untreated substance abuse problem that has fueled his criminal activity, violent behaviour and his manslaughter offence, posing a greater risk to the community in the absence of meaningful treatment to address such issues, and he lacks the same level of support in the community. In Mr Centeno-So's case, there also was no suggestion of any victim provocation or a potentially viable (albeit rejected) claim of self-defence left with a jury or otherwise.

f. In R. v. Gordon, 2020 ONSC 7395, the offender similarly was charged with second-degree murder, admitted killing the victim, but entered a plea of not guilty arguing self-defence. He too was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter after trial by judge and jury. At the time of the offence, the offender had just turned 18. He apparently came from a single-parent home where he had experienced relationship issues with his mother, who had invoked the assistance of child protection services at times, as the offender was leaving home for days and weeks at a time. That in turn led to the offender being placed in a group home, from which he ran away to lead a life with no fixed address, drifting between various cities and supporting himself by selling crack cocaine, and being victimized by gang violence during his teen years without becoming a gang member himself. At the time of his manslaughter offence, he had only a minor criminal record, without any apparent indications of violence, but was on bail conditions at the time with conditions that he not possess drugs or weapons, and that he remain in his residence. The underlying incident occurred in a vehicle being driven by the victim, and stemmed from a dispute about drugs and payment for drugs; i.e., insofar as both men were involved with illicit drugs, with the victim being a customer and the offender his dealer. The dispute began as a verbal one, but escalated into physical violence after the victim had pulled his vehicle into the parking lot of a pharmacy. The incident was captured to some extent on surveillance video which showed, inter alia, the vehicle rocking back and forth, before both men then exited the vehicle's passenger door, and the offender was thrown into a guardrail and punched by the victim. While no weapon was visible during the initial stages of the ensuing fight outside the vehicle, the offender then produced and brandished, in an initially defensive manner, a knife he had brought to the scene. The victim then grabbed the offender's arm, in an apparent effort to prevent the offender from using that knife. Near the end of the struggle (by which point the offender had gained the upper hand in the fight and was no longer overpowered or in danger), a third party entered the fray in an apparent effort to separate the offender and the victim. It was at or near that point that the offender stabbed the victim in apparent anger and by way of retaliation, but with no intent to kill the victim, and without knowing that the inflicted stab wounds were likely to cause the death of the victim, who was described as vulnerable. The offender left the scene and fled, after which he discarded evidence and changed his clothing in an apparent effort to avoid arrest and prosecution. The victim's family was devastated by his loss. Despite his unsuccessful assertion of self-defence, the offender had admitted his responsibility for the killing, and expressed remorse for his conduct and the death of the victim in the course of sentencing. He had engaged in rehabilitative programs while in predisposition custody, and had community support available to him. In the result, Justice Forestell indicated that a seven-year custodial sentence would have been appropriate, absent consideration of collateral consequences associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, which reduced the sentence imposed to six years and nine months prior to the offender receiving credit for predisposition custody. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation currently before me:

i. Both situations stemmed from a dispute related to illicit drug trafficking. Both situations involved use of a knife brought by the offender to the altercation; a knife then used by the offender to inflict multiple stab wounds on an unarmed and vulnerable victim, whose resulting death was devastating to the victim's family. Both offenders were subject to court ordered terms and conditions at the time, which should have prevented the offence from occurring had there been compliance in that regard. Both offenders fled the scene, and both engaged in efforts to conceal their involvement in the killing.

ii. Mr Centeno-So has the benefit of a guilty plea (sparing the community and victim's family a lengthy trial), which Mr Gordon did not.

iii. On the other hand, Mr Golov was a significantly younger offender (who had just attained his age of majority at the time of his offence), and he had only a modest/limited criminal record. The circumstances of his offence also involved a viable (albeit rejected) claim of self-defence; via conduct that was found to have begun in circumstances of legitimate self-defence which then escalated to a disproportionate and inappropriate response. While Mr Golov was engaged in drug-trafficking, there is no indication that he himself suffered from any serious drug addiction, let alone any serious untreated drug addiction making him prone to violent behaviour. Mr Golov also appeared to have more support in the community. His prospects for rehabilitation seemed much more promising than those of Mr Centeno-So.

g. Finally, Crown counsel referred me to R. v. Mohamed, supra, in which the offender pled guilty to the crime of manslaughter, triggering a sentencing process that included a "Gardiner hearing" into aggravating circumstances alleged by the Crown. At the time of the underlying killing, the accused was 24 years old, and had no criminal record. He and his siblings apparently had been raised by their mother in a single-parent home, in challenging circumstances, but without any involvement with the criminal law, after their father had died in gun violence. The offender himself also apparently had been the target of a shooting, and suffered from severe PTSD. He was a devout Muslim, who had not completed high school, but who nevertheless had a history of gainful employment mixed with receipt of social assistance. The underlying manslaughter offence occurred when he and the victim were visiting, along with others, the apartment residence of a mutual friend. A disagreement of some kind arose between them, which they were told to take outside. The victim stepped into the hallway and pulled the offender with him, following which there was a brief altercation during which the victim received three stab wounds and two incised wounds, including a stab wound to his jugular vein, and a stab wound to his back that punctured his lung and also caused significant blood loss. The victim re-entered the apartment and collapsed, with others quickly becoming involved. The offender tried to re-enter the apartment but was refused entry, while someone in the apartment (not the offender), called 911. The offender then fled the scene, following which he disposed of the knife in a state of panic. Despite life-saving attempts, the victim died from the stab wound to his jugular vein; a loss which devastated his family. The sentencing judge, Justice Goldstein, found that the underlying situation was not one in which either the victim or the offender was "spoiling for a fight"; it instead was a confrontation that somehow escalated. It was also accepted that there was an air of reality to the offender's claim of self-defence, insofar as the victim had pulled the offender into the hallway. However, the offender was armed with a knife and used it, while the victim was unarmed, to the knowledge of the offender. In the course of sentencing, the offender was cooperative, indicated that he took full responsibility for his conduct, was very remorseful, and apologized to the victim's family. He also completed his high school education while in predisposition custody, although his otherwise promising potential for rehabilitation was marred somewhat by a large number of reported institutional misconducts. It nevertheless was accepted that conditions of the offender's predisposition custody had been particularly harsh, involving numerous lockdowns and "triple bunking" that had caused the offender significant stress and detrimental consequences to his already precarious mental health; a consideration regarded as a mitigating factor. In the result, Justice Goldstein imposed a custodial sentence of 9 years, prior to the offender receiving credit for presentence custody. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation currently before me:

i. Both offenders had challenging upbringings, and were somewhat close in age at the time of their respective manslaughter offences. Both situations involved an unlawful killing involving the offender using a knife, brought to the altercation by the offender, to inflict multiple stab wounds on the victim, whose death devastated the victim's family. Both offenders fled the scene without rendering or calling for assistance. Both offenders entered a guilty plea, sparing the community and family of the victim a prolonged trial. Both offenders expressed acceptance of responsibility, remorse and apologies to the victim's family. Both offenders undertook some efforts at self-improvement during the course of their predisposition custody.

ii. The wounds inflicted by Mr Centeno-So did not carry such obviously lethal risks as a stab wound to a victim's jugular vein. There also is no indication whatsoever that Mr Centeno-So's conduct while in custody has been anything but exemplary.

iii. On the other hand, Mr Centeno-So is not a first-time offender, with any indication of a prosocial life during his adult years. His assault was not committed in the context of a dispute or altercation involving any suggestion of a viable claim of self-defence on his part. His offence occurred in the context of a dispute regarding drugs, and was fueled by a serious substance abuse problem that has remained untreated. For the reasons I have indicated, I do not find that Mr Centeno-So has endured any particularly harsh conditions of presentence custody in respect of which he should receive mitigating consideration. I also have found Mr Centeno-So's victim to have been a vulnerable person, which was expressly not the case in relation to Mr Mohamed's victim.

[34] Apart from passing references to terse descriptions of cases cited in Clayton C. Ruby's Sentencing, 10th ed., (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2020), in respect of which few details and no copies of the actual underlying cases were provided for detailed review and consideration, counsel for Mr Centeno-So referred me, for purposes of comparison, to the following four manslaughter sentencing precedents, all decided by courts in provinces other than Ontario, which I once again will address in chronological order:

a. In R. v. Houle, [2013] A.J. No. 889 (Q.B.), the offender pled guilty to offences of manslaughter and indignity to human remains. The reported decision does not provide much information regarding his background, apart from indications that he was 28 at the time of sentencing, and had a very limited criminal record involving a single prior conviction from six years earlier for assault with a weapon, in respect of which he had received a suspended sentence. He also was acknowledged to be of aboriginal descent. The circumstances of the misconduct underlying his sentencing were unusual. In particular, the offender had a known history of "waking up violently if he was startled awake", and had provided his female friend with an earlier warning in that regard. On the occasion in question, he and that female friend had consumed an undetermined amount of alcohol and may also have engaged in the use of illicit drugs before they returned to the offender's residence, consumed more alcohol, engaged in sexual activity, and both eventually fell asleep. At some point, the female friend woke before the offender, and attempted to wake him. The offender reacted violently, grabbing a serrated steak knife that happened to be lying nearby, and stabbed his female friend once in the left side of her neck. Moments after becoming fully awake, the offender realized and understood what had happened, and saw his female friend moving around the apartment with a great deal of blood spurting from her wound. He attempted to apply pressure to the wound, and moved the friend into the bathtub where he could clean and see the wound to see how bad it was. However, the bleeding continued and the friend went into convulsions before she stopped moving, had no pulse and appeared to be dead. At no time during that ordeal did the offender make any attempt to call for assistance from any individual, any medical service or the police, to obtain help for his friend. Experiencing a panic attack and thinking that no one ever would believe what had happened, he then began to dismember his friend's body before he became ill, stopped what he was doing, and passed out from the effects of his continued intoxication. The offender thereafter cooperated fully with the police and prosecuting authorities, providing an inculpatory statement to the police and waiving the requirement for a preliminary inquiry. The offender also expressed sincere remorse for his actions. As evidenced by several victim impact statements, the impact on the victim's family was devastating. In the result, the court imposed a custodial sentence of six years for the manslaughter offence. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation currently before me:

i. Apart from both offenders being of somewhat comparable age, and the underlying killings having been caused by a stabbing, I frankly find it very difficult to draw meaningful comparisons between the particular circumstances of that highly unusual fact scenario and the misconduct that brings Mr Centeno-So before me now, as far as the respective underlying manslaughter offences are concerned.

ii. At most, it seems to me that, from a general perspective, the killing in that particular case was, compared to the case before me, one that was much closer to the "accident" end of the manslaughter spectrum, which in turn would suggest that the sentence to be imposed on Mr Centeno-So should be more severe. The presence of Gladue considerations in that case would suggest the same thing. However, information about the circumstances of the offender in that case is relatively sparse, making any more precise comparisons with the circumstances of Mr Centeno-So difficult. In that case, the offender also attempted to render personal assistance to the victim, although he failed to contact others for assistance.

iii. More generally, the sentencing decision in that case was expressly influenced, in large measure, by the Alberta Court of Appeal's categorization approach to manslaughter offences which, as noted earlier, seems at odds with our Court of Appeal's rejection of such an approach.

iv. For the above reasons, I am reluctant to regard the decision as a useful precedent in relation to the sentencing decision to be made in this particular case.

b. In R. v. Bennett, 2016 NBQB 78, [2016] N.B.J. No. 83 (Q.B.), the offender was found guilty of manslaughter following a trial by judge and jury. The offender was 18 at the time of his offence, had no criminal record and had what was described as an "exemplary" character; e.g., with numerous subsequent character references describing him as a young person of "good character, generous spirit and gentle temperament". The victim was the offender's uncle, who was a drug addict with a history of increasingly aggressive and threatening behaviour as his addiction escalated, and he repeatedly stole items from his family to support his addition. While the offender and his uncle previously had enjoyed a very close relationship, that relationship had deteriorated because of the uncle's behaviour. A week before the incident leading to the offender's crime of manslaughter, he was assaulted by his uncle when the offender tried to retrieve a computer modem stolen by his uncle. On the night of the killing, the uncle attended the offender's home, exchanged words with the offender's friends, and started a fight. The offender came to his friend's assistance with a knife (in what was described as a disproportionate response to the threat and intervention in a "fair fight", and "not a mere accident"), stabbing his unarmed uncle six times, with two of those wounds eventually proving fatal. The offender immediately had a friend call 911 for assistance, and complied with directions provided by the dispatcher. He cooperated completely with the police, and never denied that he had stabbed his uncle. Although the jury implicitly had rejected the offender's claim of self-defence, it was accepted that there was at least an air of reality to the offence; i.e., insofar as the offender's actions were a response to a threat, and intervention to assist another in response to that threat was considered necessary, although the particular response of the offender was unreasonable. The sentencing judge nevertheless expressly emphasized that the offender "did not go looking for a fight", which "unfortunately came to him". The family impact of the offence in those particular circumstances was multi-layered, insofar as the underlying offence resulted in the death of one family member and the probable long-term incarceration of another, while the family home was forever tarnished as the site of the killing. However, the offender's prospects for rehabilitation were considered to be very strong. In addition to the character references noted above, he had worked for Habitat for Humanity, had been furthering his education, and there was a "high degree of optimism" that he would be making positive contributions to society in the future. In the result, the court imposed a custodial sentence of four years, prior to the offender receiving credit for time spent in predisposition custody. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation before me:

i. Both situations obviously involved the offender using a sharp bladed weapon to inflict multiple stab wounds on an unarmed victim.

ii. Mr Centeno-So has the benefit of a guilty plea, and formal acceptance of responsibility, which Mr Bennett did not.

iii. Beyond that, however, I find it difficult to find points of comparison that would not suggest the need for a significantly more severe custodial sentence on Mr Centeno-So. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. Mr Centeno-So was not a very youthful first-time offender when he committed manslaughter.

2. The context of Mr Bennett's offence involved his innocently enjoying time with friends in his home, whereas Mr Centeno-So's offence originated in a dispute regarding an illicit drug transaction earlier that day.

3. In contrast to the actions of Mr Bennett, Mr Centeno-So clearly went looking for a fight; a fight that was one-sided, against a victim who was posing no threat whatsoever to Mr Centeno-So or anyone else. Unlike Mr Bennett's situation, that of Mr Centeno-So involved no suggestion of self-defence, let alone any suggestion in that regard having an air of reality.

4. Unlike Mr Centeno-So, Mr Bennett rendered immediate assistance to his victim, ensured that an immediate call was placed to 911 for assistance, remained at the scene (instead of fleeing from it), immediately acknowledged responsibility for the stabbing, and cooperated fully with the police from the outset.

5. Unlike the misconduct of Mr Bennett, Mr Centeno-So's misconduct was fueled by a substance abuse condition that effectively remains untreated, posing an ongoing threat to others if that condition is not meaningfully addressed before Mr Centeno-So returns to society after his release from custody. Whereas there was every reason to believe that the prospects for Mr Bennett's rehabilitation were excellent, there currently is ongoing reason for concern and doubt in relation to Mr Centeno-So's prospects for success in that regard.

c. In R. v. Vikilani, [2017] B.C.J. No. 2295 (S.C.), the offender was found guilty of assault and manslaughter following a judge alone trial. At the time of his misconduct, the accused had attained the age of 18 just two months earlier. He had come to Canada from Tonga at the age of three, and had continued to reside with his family. He had completed high school, had volunteered for various activities, was an exceptional athlete (having been shortlisted for a national rugby team), was employed part time, and had no criminal record. On the underlying occasion in question, he and a number of other young men had attended a house party, where the offender became intoxicated. After leaving that party, the offender proceeded with the other young men to a transit station, where they began harassing some black males, and noticed that their conduct in that regard was being recorded by a female witness. The offender and his friend "Sellam" approached that witness, and the offender assaulted her by punching her in the head. When her male friend came to her aid, the offender and his friend Sellam converged on that friend and assaulted him as well. During that assault, Sellam chased and overtook that male friend of the female witness, produced a knife and, within seconds, had fatally stabbed that male friend of the female witness in the heart. Within seconds of that stabbing, the offender Mr Vikilani also punched the male friend in the jaw, after which the male friend fell backwards, striking the back of his head on the pavement. However, the cause of the male friend's death was massive blood loss from the stab wound to his heart inflicted by "Sellam". In that regard, there is a passing reference in the headnote of the reported decision, and at paragraph 76, to Sellam having entered a guilty plea to the crime of manslaughter, and being sentenced to a custodial sentence of 4½ years in that regard. However, it is important to note and emphasize that the focus of the reported decision provided to me was not the sentencing of "Sellam", but the sentencing of Mr Vikilani who, despite having no direct participation in the relevant stabbing, and no awareness whatsoever that Sellam was armed with a knife or had inflicted a stab wound, was a participant in the assault on the male friend, such that he was a co-principal in an unlawful assault causing death. He turned himself into the police, accepted full responsibility for his own conduct on the occasion in question, expressed remorse in that regard, and apologized to the victim's family. His misconduct was entirely out of character, he retained the full support of his family, and his prospects for rehabilitation were strong. The circumstances of the offender's manslaughter offence were described by the sentencing judge as "unusual"; e.g., in the sense that the offender's conduct in participating in the underlying assault was senseless and "no accident", and needed to be the subject of denunciation and deterrence, while the offender's particular moral culpability was significantly limited insofar as he was not aware that Sellam was armed with a knife or had inflicted any stab wound when he engaged in the assault and punched the victim. There was felt to be no need whatsoever to separate the offender from society for protection of the community. In the result, the court chose to forego a suggested suspended sentence, and instead imposed a custodial sentence of six months less a day. By way of comparison and contrast:

i. Again, it needs to be emphasized that the decision does not relate to the sentencing of Sellam (whose described conduct was more akin to that committed by Mr Centeno-So), but to the sentencing of Mr Vikilani.

ii. Although there are passing references in the decision to the 4 ½ year custodial sentence imposed on Sellam, after his guilty plea (a sentence which apparently turned in part on his lack of a criminal record, his acceptance of responsibility and indications of remorse), there are no further details provided regarding his particular circumstances, or the manner in which his particular sentence was determined, such that I generally did not find those passing references to that 4 ½ year custodial sentence for manslaughter to be very helpful.

iii. As for the sentence imposed on Mr Vikilani, the circumstances of his involvement and conviction for manslaughter are so very different from those of Mr Centeno-So that I frankly did not find this particular sentencing precedent to be helpful either.

d. Finally, I was referred by defence counsel to R. v. Anderson, [2024] B.C.J. No. 574 (S.C.). The offender in that case was 25 at the time of his offence, identified as Metis, and had led what was described generally as a "wasted life" by reason of childhood trauma (including sexual abuse victimization), and mental illness, aggravated by chronic drug abuse. His mother was an abusive alcoholic. He achieved little education, and only sporadic employment, while suffering from ADHD and prolonged drug abuse. All of those factors had contributed to an extended history of criminal activity, some of which was defined by outbursts of violence largely directed towards persons known to him, including intimate partners. A review of the relevant criminal record revealed at least 14 convictions for violence, and a cycle of the offender repeatedly attributing his behaviour to drug abuse, promising the court he would do better if given another chance of recovery, court warnings that its sense of charity and hope of rehabilitation would be overtaken by concern for the community, and promises of reform then being broken via further criminal conduct. The circumstances of the offence were said to represent yet another example of the offender's sudden bursts of violence, but one having fatal and tragic consequences. At the time, the offender was experiencing auditory delusions, fueled by drugs and anger, with a voice in his head directing him to set fire to his father's home. He then proceeded to the downtown area of his small community, where he abruptly, brutally and fatally attacked and killed a vulnerable and defenceless 78-year-old male pedestrian who was unknown to the offender, and slowly making his way across the main street of the community with the aid of a walker in the early morning hours. In particular, the voice in the offender's head told him the pedestrian somehow was involved in the sexual exploitation of his daughter, at which point the offender threw the victim to the ground, and then stomped repeatedly on the victim's head while wearing heavy steel toed boots. The victim never regained consciousness, and died approximately one month later from his injuries. His daughter understandably was severely traumatized by the assault on her father and the circumstances of his death, and there was no question that her life had been severely impacted. The sentencing judge characterized the relevant attack as "deliberate and severe", "unprovoked", on a victim who was "prone, unprotected and helpless", at a time when the offender was under a court order to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. On the other hand, it was found that the offender clearly was "not operating within the boundaries of rational thought" at the time of the incident (although his drug fueled delusions were self-induced and self-inflicted, in circumstances where the offender knew or ought to have known that his conduct was "almost predictable" in the face of "continued, untreated drug abuse"), he had been willing to plead guilty to manslaughter for a good deal of the time since his arrest, and he repeatedly had expressed remorse considered to be genuine. His indigenous background was also a significant mitigating consideration. In the result, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 6.5 years, prior to the offender receiving credit for presentence custody. By way of comparison and contrast with the situation currently before me:

i. Although there clearly are distinctions in terms of the circumstances and methodology of the lethal attacks committed by Mr Centeno So and Mr Anderson (e.g., in terms of their relationship with their victims, and their method of inflicting injury), they both involved an unprovoked and vicious attack on an unarmed, vulnerable and prone victim. Both offenders also clearly had challenging upbringings, exhibiting prolonged and repeated criminal behaviour fueled by drug addiction, with cyclical hopes for reform after sentencing and release, frustrated by demonstrable repeated failure of the offender to demonstrate the strength of character required to make necessary changes in his life over the course of many years; i.e., in terms of securing meaningful treatment to address a prolonged underlying addiction to illicit drugs, coming to the fore again each time the offender was sentenced and then released from custody.

ii. Having said that, I also think it fair to say that there is no indication that Mr Centeno-So was driven by any auditory delusions or similar mental illness, or deprived of rational thought as much as Mr Anderson was at the time of his lethal assault. Mr Centeno-So appeared to act somewhat rationally before and after his attack on Mr Cherrey-Rooke, and aspects of his conduct reflect, in my view, more deliberate and controlled conduct; e.g., insofar as he was motivated by an apparently specific and real disagreement with Mr Cherrey-Rooke, brought, produced and used a sharp-bladed weapon during the attack (an aggravating circumstances not present in Mr Anderson's case), thought to deprive Mr Cherrey-Rooke of the bag or satchel he had been carrying, and took steps immediately after the attack to change the distinctive clothing he had been wearing and leave the scene before arrival of the police.

iii. Mr Centeno-So, although he has experienced racialization, also has no aboriginal descent warranting well-established and significant mitigation in that regard for reasons associated with the prolonged mistreatment of our nation's indigenous people over the course of its history.

Assessment – Appropriate Custodial Sentence

[35] With all of the above considerations in mind, I turn finally to assessment of an appropriate sentence to be imposed on for Mr Centeno-So for his offence of manslaughter in this particular case, starting with determination of the appropriate custodial sentence to be imposed.

[36] Before doing so, however, I will preface that assessment by echoing comments from other judges who have focused on the challenging task of sentencing in relation to the crime of manslaughter. In particular:

a. The criminal law, while necessarily addressing cases involving the loss of life, nevertheless cannot and does not restore life – and the objectives, principles and factors that govern the imposition of sentence for the crime of manslaughter are not meant to represent, in any way, the value of a life that has been taken. They are designed instead to reflect the moral blameworthiness of the person who commits such an offence, and the gravity of the offence, so far as the law is concerned, that the offender has committed.

b. Nothing that I say today is intended to minimize the value of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's life, or the impact of his tragic death on those who loved him; a loss in respect of which no sentence can provide compensation. However, the sentence to be imposed for Mr Centeno-So's crime of manslaughter must be guided by the purpose and principles of sentencing, and not by vengeance.

[37] In fashioning an appropriate sentence, I take into account all of the sentencing principles, aggravating considerations, mitigating considerations and sentencing precedents to which I have referred, and will not repeat those again here.

[38] On the whole, however:

a. I regard this tragic incident as one involving circumstances far closer to murder than accident, where the moral culpability of Mr Centeno-So is high. Again, his unprovoked armed lethal attack, stemming from a dispute about the sale of illicit drugs, on an unarmed and vulnerable Mr Cherrey-Rooke, albeit of short duration, was by no means accidental. He could have walked away, and refrained from any further interaction with Mr Cherrey-Rooke. He instead chased him down, pushed him down, and struck him not once, but six times with a weapon that he knew or should have known risked the infliction of very serious and potentially fatal injuries on Mr Cherrey-Rooke, before kicking him, robbing him, and leaving him to die without rendering or calling for any assistance. To the extent Mr Centeno So's actions were drug-induced, it was a self-inflicted impairment with consequences that were all too predictable, in light of Mr Centeno's past history. He also was cognizant at the time that what he had done was wrong, as he immediately took steps to change the distinctive clothing he had been wearing during the attack, and left the scene before the arrival of police and other emergency services. In my view, all of this speaks to a high degree of moral culpability.

b. In my view, the dominant sentencing principles here are denunciation and deterrence. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, while I appreciate the unfortunate and lamentable reality that those immersed and struggling to survive in London's drug subculture do often possess knives and/or other weapons for their own protection, any inclination to proactively resort to the use of such weapons to address and resolve disputes must be firmly rejected and denounced, with all concerned being made to realize that there will be serious consequences for those who use such weapons in unprovoked assaults on others; particularly those who are vulnerable, unarmed, essentially defenceless, and trying to avoid conflict.

c. While I certainly do not lose sight of the importance of rehabilitation, in this particular case, I think the demonstrated prospects of such rehabilitation for Mr Centeno-So currently are suspect and poor, for the reasons I have outlined, without Mr Centeno-So being separated from society for a lengthier period of time, for the protection of others and his own welfare, to ensure that he obtains meaningful treatment for his very serious and prolonged substance abuse problem before he is released from custody again. In that regard, while I believe Mr Centeno-So to be sincere in his desire to do better going forward, I think the long-term cycle of addiction, offending, sentencing, enforced temporary sobriety, release without treatment, failure to obtain treatment in the community, addiction and further offending is clear in this case, with increasing danger to the community that now has resulted in another person's death. In retrospect, the warning signs of increasing danger to others were clearly there and, in my view, that lamentable cycle realistically will not be broken without meaningful and sustained treatment of Mr Centeno-So's issues while he remains in custody.

[39] It has been said many times, and in many ways, that determination of an appropriate custodial sentence is more of an art than a science. However, having regard to all the circumstances and considerations outlined above, in my view an appropriate custodial sentence for Mr Centeno-So's manslaughter offence would be nine years, prior to the receipt of any credit of the time he has spent in pretrial and presentence custody. As for that credit:

a. As I indicated earlier, Mr Centeno-So has spent, as of today, 1103 days (i.e., three years and seven days), in actual pretrial and presentence custody since the time of his arrest in relation to this matter on August 15, 2022.

b. As I also indicated earlier, the parties are agreed (and I independently think it appropriate), that Mr Centeno-So's time spent in pretrial and presentence custody should be credited at the rate of 1.5 days for each actual day, pursuant to subsection 719(3.1) of the Code, for a total effective credit in that regard of 1,655 days; i.e., four years, six months and 11 days.

c. Applying that credit of 1,655 days to the custodial sentence of nine years or 3,285 days I have imposed results in a net custodial sentence of 1,630 days (or 4 years, 5 months, two weeks and six days), still to be served by Mr Centeno-So, which accordingly shall be served in a federal penitentiary.

[40] In other words, for the reasons outlined above, I will be imposing a net custodial sentence of 1,630 days (or four years, five months, two weeks and six days), in relation to Mr Centeno-So's crime of manslaughter.

Ancillary Orders

[41] As for the various further ancillary orders requested by the Crown:

a. In the circumstances of this case, an order authorizing the taking from Mr Centeno-So of the number of samples of bodily substances reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis is not only advisable but mandatory, having regard to the combined effect of the definition of "primary designated offence" set forth in section 487.04 of the Code, and subsection 487.051(1) of the Code. An order in Form 5.03 therefore shall issue in relation to Mr Centeno-So.

b. Mr Centeno-So's crime of manslaughter, contrary to subsection 236(b) of the Code, unquestionably was an indictable offence in the commission of which violence against a person (indeed, deadly violence), was used. Manslaughter contrary to subsection 236(b) of the Code is also an indictable offence in respect of which a person committing that offence may be sentenced to "imprisonment for life", and therefore a period "for ten years or more" within the meaning of subsection 109(1)(a) of the Code. Pursuant to that subsection, and the provisions of subsection 109(2) of the code, mandatory weapons prohibition orders therefore are required and shall be made. In particular:

i. pursuant to subsections 109(1)(a) and 109(2)(a) of the Code, an order shall be made prohibiting Mr Centeno-So from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance, for a period of 10 years beginning today, as this is Mr Centeno-So's first conviction for the offence of manslaughter; and

ii. pursuant to subsections 109(1)(a) and 109(2)(b) of the Code, an order shall be made prohibiting Mr Centeno-So from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life.

c. The making of non-communication orders pursuant to section 743.21 of the Code is discretionary. While there is no indication that Mr Centeno-So intends to communicate with members of Mr Cherrey-Rooke's family in the future (i.e., beyond the remarks he made to them in response to my section 726 inquiry), I think it appropriate to provide those family members with further peace and assurance in that regard, in the manner requested by the Crown. They have been put through enough, without having to contemplate the prospect of possibly hearing further from Mr Centeno-So directly or indirectly, in an unwanted and unwelcome way, while he is serving his custodial sentence. An order therefore shall be made as requested, pursuant to section 743.21 of the Code, prohibiting Mr Centeno-So from communicating directly or indirectly, during the custodial period of his sentence, with Corrielee Drankowsky, Peter Drankowsky, Kassandra Cherrey and Pauline Cherrey.

Formal Imposition of Sentence

[42] Stand up please Mr Centeno-So.

[43] For the reasons I have outlined, I am formally imposing, in relation to your crime of manslaughter, a custodial sentence of nine years, otherwise expressed as 3,285 days.

[44] In relation to that custodial sentence, you nevertheless shall receive a credit for the 1103 days (i.e., three years and seven days), you have spent in actual pretrial and presentence custody since the time of your arrest in relation to this matter on August 15, 2022, to be credited at the rate of 1.5 days for each actual day, for a total effective credit in that regard of 1,655 days (i.e., four years, six months and 11 days), resulting in a net custodial sentence still to be served of 1,630 days (or four years, five months, two weeks and six days, which therefore shall be served in a federal penitentiary.

[45] While I have no authority over such matters, it would be my strong recommendation that you be permitted to serve that sentence in a correctional institution that offers extensive programming addressing substance abuse and addiction, anger management, and educational programs that will facilitate your eventual reintegration into society in a manner that facilitates your maintenance of sobriety and steady gainful employment.

[46] There will, as well, be further ancillary sentencing orders whereby:

a. pursuant to subsection 487.04 and subsection 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, a mandatory order in Form 5.03 shall issue, compelling you to provide the number of samples of bodily substances reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis;

b. pursuant to subsections 109(1)(a) and 109(2) of the Criminal Code, you also shall be subject to the following mandatory weapons prohibition orders, namely:

i. an order prohibiting you, for a period of ten years starting today, from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive device; and

ii. an order prohibiting you, for the duration of your life, from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition; and

c. pursuant to section 743.21 of the Criminal Code, an order shall issue prohibiting you from communicating directly or indirectly, during the custodial sentence I have imposed, with Corrielee Drankowsky, Peter Drankowsky, Kassandra Cherrey and Pauline Cherrey.

[47] The e-indictment will be endorsed accordingly.

[48] Please be seated.

Ian F. Leach

Justice I.F. Leach

Released: August 22, 2025