Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-24-00714105 Date: 2025-08-19 Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Never Forgotten National Memorial Foundation, Plaintiff And: His Majesty the King (Parks Canada), Defendant

Before: Schabas J.

Counsel:

• Joel Vale and David Fogel, for the Plaintiff
• James Schneider and Zachary Lanys, for the Defendant

Heard: August 7, 2025

Reasons for Judgment

Overview

[1] This is a motion for summary judgment by the defendant to dismiss this action based on s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24 Sch. B (the "Act").

[2] The action was commenced in 2024. It relates to an alleged breach of contract that occurred in 2016. The plaintiff does not dispute that the action was discoverable at that time. Accordingly, the action was brought long after the two-year limitation period in s. 4 of the Act.

[3] The plaintiff submits, however, that s. 4 does not apply for, essentially, two reasons:

(1) that the action is a proceeding for a declaration where no consequential relief is sought and is therefore exempted from the two-year limitation period under s. 16(1)(a) of the Act; and

(2) that ss. 2(1)(e) and 2(1)(f) of the Act exempt the action from the two-year limitation period because this is a proceeding "based on existing aboriginal and treaty rights" or is based on "equitable claims by aboriginal peoples against the Crown."

[4] For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted, and the action is dismissed.

[5] The issues are appropriate to dispose of on summary judgment. The parties have put their best foot forward. My findings do not require me to make findings of credibility, and I am in as good a position as a trial judge to resolve the issues raised.

[6] In short, I find that the claim for declaratory relief will serve no practical purpose and is simply sought to circumvent the limitation period in s. 4. I am also satisfied that this is not a proceeding exempted under s. 2 of the Act. The plaintiff is not an "aboriginal person" nor does it act on behalf of "aboriginal peoples." The action is for breach of contract; it is not "based on existing aboriginal and treaty rights", nor does it involve "equitable claims by aboriginal peoples against the Crown."

Background

[7] The plaintiff, Never Forgotten National Memorial Foundation (the "Foundation"), was established in May 2012 as a not-for-profit corporation. The Foundation's purpose is to establish and operate a national memorial site honouring deceased Canadian soldiers who fought in overseas conflicts.

[8] On October 6, 2014, the defendant Parks Canada entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Foundation (the "MOU") regarding the construction of a memorial on national park land in Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia (the "Project"). The MOU "set out the broad general features that the Participants intend for the realization of the Foundation's construction and maintenance of the Memorial in the Park that it will donate to Canada."

[9] Either party could withdraw from the MOU at any time on 120 days prior written notice. Parks Canada gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the MOU on February 6, 2016, and withdrew effective June 10, 2016.

[10] The Foundation commenced this action on February 5, 2024. The Statement of Claim alleges that Parks Canada "illegally cancelled" the MOU and acted in bad faith so as to cause the Foundation damage from the time and money the Foundation spent attempting to move the Project ahead.

[11] The action seeks specific performance requiring that Parks Canada continue to proceed with the MOU or, alternatively, $3,000,000 in special damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages. The Foundation also seeks the following declarations:

(i) that Parks Canada, in bad faith, changed and then terminated the parties' agreement;

(ii) that Parks Canada breached the MOU to the detriment of the plaintiff; and

(iii) that Parks Canada misled the Foundation, causing the Foundation to spend its funds in reliance of the parties' good faith agreement.

[12] Anticipating the limitations problem, the Foundation's Statement of Claim asserts that the proceeding "(a) is based on existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada, which is recognized and affirmed in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and (b) is based on equitable claims on behalf of aboriginal peoples against the Crown."

[13] The Foundation asserts that the "rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada and First Nations Peoples include their rights in The Foundation's project as agents for and on behalf of the First Nations, to be remembered and honoured" for serving in Canada's military. The Statement of Claim also pleads that the "Aboriginal peoples of Canada and First Nations Peoples have equitable, legal claims and rights, including any benefit to their full entitlements to The Foundation's project pursuant to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982."

[14] The Foundation also asserts that it "was established as an agent for and on behalf of the war dead of the First Nation Peoples, including over 114,000 war dead of all races, colours and creeds, who were buried in marked and unmarked graves in foreign countries, were lost at sea or otherwise were consumed into the landscape of war."

The Summary Judgment Motion

[15] Parks Canada's evidence on this motion was presented in an affidavit by Howard Edward Kennedy, who served as Parks Canada's Project Manager for the Project between 2013 and March 2016. Mr. Kennedy's evidence is that during his time as Project Manager, the Foundation never informed him that it was acting pursuant to any Aboriginal or treaty right to build the Project, or that the Foundation represented any group of Indigenous persons in an agency relationship. Mr. Kennedy was not cross-examined.

[16] The Foundation put forward an affidavit from Tony Patrick Trigiani, who is the founder, incorporator, director, and chief executive officer of the plaintiff. On cross-examination, Mr. Trigiani testified that he and the Foundation are "one and the same" and that "I'm the Foundation."

[17] Mr. Trigiani provided evidence about the Foundation and the Project. His affidavit also addressed the involvement of the Confederacy of Mainland Mi'kmaq (the "Confederacy") and its then Executive Director with the Project, which is relevant to the assertion of Aboriginal and treaty rights. No other evidence was provided by the plaintiff.

[18] Rule 20.04(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, states that "the court shall grant summary judgment if […] the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence." The word "requiring" was added in 2010. At that time Rule 20 was also amended to provide judges with the discretion to use additional fact-finding powers designed to expand the scope and use of summary judgment.

[19] In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue of summary judgment, including when it is appropriate and the test to be met. Karakatsanis J. summarized the Court's position as follows, at para. 4:

In my view, a trial is not required if a summary judgment motion can achieve a fair and just adjudication, if it provides a process that allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, apply the law to those facts, and is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result than going to trial.

[20] At para. 49 of Hryniak, Karakatsanis J. continued:

There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.

[21] In Royal Bank of Canada v. 1643937 Ontario Inc., 2021 ONCA 98, 154 O.R. (3d) 561, the Court of Appeal noted, at para. 27, that "motion judges are required to engage with the Hryniak framework process…look at the evidentiary record, determine whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, and assess, in their discretion, whether resort should be taken to the enhanced powers under rr. 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure."

[22] The Hryniak framework is summarized by the Court of Appeal at para. 24 of Royal Bank as follows:

1. First, the motion judge should have determined if there was a genuine issue requiring a trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the enhanced fact-finding powers under r. 20.04(2.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Second, if there appeared to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, the motion judge should have determined if the need for a trial could be avoided by using the enhanced powers under r. 20.04(2.1) – which allowed her to weigh evidence, evaluate the credibility of a deponent, and draw any reasonable inference from the evidence – and under r. 20.04(2.2) to order that oral evidence be presented by one or more parties. [citations omitted]

[23] In addition, on a motion for summary judgment, the parties are required to put their best foot forward on the issues. As the Court of Appeal stated in Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hylton, 2012 ONCA 614, at para. 5:

A party moving for summary judgment has the evidentiary burden of showing there is no genuine issue for trial. Once this burden is discharged the responding party must prove that its defence has a real chance of success. Each party must put its best foot forward to establish whether or not there is an issue for trial. The court is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence the parties would present at trial. [Emphasis added.]

[24] The best foot forward requirement also means the full foot forward. As Corbett J. stated in Sweda Farms Ltd. v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200, at para. 33, aff'd 2014 ONCA 878, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 97: "The court will assume that the parties have placed before it, in some form, all of the evidence that will be available for trial." Or, as Karakatsanis J. stated when she was a judge of this court: "The court is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence which the parties will present if there is a trial": New Solutions Extrusion Corporation v. Gauthier, 2010 ONSC 1037, at para. 12, aff'd 2010 ONCA 348.

[25] Limitations issues often present a discrete set of facts or "cut and dried issues" which make summary judgment appropriate: Machaj v. RBC General Insurance Company, 2015 ONSC 4310, 127 O.R. (3d) 395 at para. 5, rev'd on other grounds 2016 ONCA 257, 348 O.A.C. 230. As Myers J. stated in RNC Corp. v. Johnstone, 2020 ONSC 7751, 153 O.R. (3d) 503, at para. 3:

A limitation period can present a neat issue with its own set of facts. In many cases, a motion for summary judgment on a limitation period can require the court to review just a few facts that are discrete or separate from the facts that form the merits of the claim and require no findings on the credibility of any witness's testimony. Resolving a case on that basis can be a very efficient, affordable process that avoids the need for lengthy, complex, expensive discovery and trial on the merits.

[26] I am satisfied that this is an appropriate matter for summary judgment. The issues are legally and factually limited, involving whether exceptions to the application of the limitation period apply. This can be determined on the record before me without making findings of credibility and by drawing only limited inferences, largely from the absence of evidence. To the extent that I may engage in some weighing of the evidence it is appropriate and "in the interests of justice" to do so rather than leave it to the trial judge who will be in no better position to address the issues. Summary judgment will thereby "save the parties the cost and delay associated with going to trial on a number of other issues": 2287913 Ontario Inc. v. Blue Falls Manufacturing Ltd., 2015 ONSC 7982, at para. 10.

Issues

[27] As stated, the Foundation does not dispute that the cause of action was discoverable pursuant to s. 5 of the Act, as of February 5, 2016, when Parks Canada gave notice that it would be withdrawing from the MOU. Alternatively, the action was discoverable on June 10, 2016, when the withdrawal became effective. Either way, the action was not brought within two years as required under s. 4 of the Act. Accordingly, this leaves two issues to be decided on this motion:

(a) whether the action is a proceeding for a declaration where no consequential relief is sought and is therefore exempted from the two-year limitation period under s. 16(1)(a) of the Act; and

(b) whether ss. 2(1)(e) and 2(1)(f) of the Act exempt the action from the two-year limitation period because this is a proceeding "based on existing aboriginal and treaty rights" or is based on "equitable claims by aboriginal peoples against the Crown."

Analysis

Declaratory Relief is Not Available

[28] The plaintiff seeks to rely on s. 16(1)(a) of the Act which states:

There is no limitation period in respect of,

(a) a proceeding for a declaration if no consequential relief is sought.

[29] The first problem with the plaintiff's position is that its Statement of Claim seeks consequential relief. The plaintiff requests, first, an order for specific performance of the MOU. In the alternative, the plaintiff seeks damages. Counsel for the Foundation conceded that the action, insofar as it seeks specific performance and damages, is barred. However, he submitted that no consequential or coercive remedial order would flow from the declarations sought by the Foundation if just those declarations were granted. Therefore, he submitted, there is no "consequential relief" being sought.

[30] As counsel for the Foundation put it, the Foundation wants declarations so that people who gave time and money to the Foundation in support of the Project "don't feel like fools" as they were victims of bad faith. Additionally, counsel referred to cases involving declarations that the government has acted disrespectfully towards First Nations people, saying that such language at least "gives moral comfort." However, counsel went on to say that the Foundation is still promoting the Project and said that if it obtains the requested declaratory relief, it will use the declaration(s) to try to revive the Project with Parks Canada by pointing out that Parks Canada acted "dishonourably".

[31] Leaving aside for now the applicability of First Nations jurisprudence, granting declaratory relief is discretionary. As stated by the Supreme Court in Ewert v. Canada, 2018 SCC 30, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 165 at para. 81: "A court may, in its discretion, grant a declaration where it has jurisdiction to hear the issue, where the dispute before the court is real and not theoretical, where the party raising the issue has a genuine interest in its resolution, and where the respondent has an interest in opposing the declaration sought . . ."

[32] However, courts do not grant declarations which have no practical effect. As the Supreme Court stated in Shot Both Sides v. Canada, 2024 SCC 12, 490 D.L.R. (4th) 585 at para. 68, "[d]eclarations should not be issued where there is no practical effect." This is a long-standing principle which seeks to ensure courts are not simply providing legal advice or engaging in hypothetical disputes.

[33] In Karkhanechi v. Connor, Clark & Lunn Financial Group Ltd., 2022 ONCA 518 at para. 38, the Court of Appeal held that "declaratory relief should be narrowly construed to ensure that s. 16(1)(a) is not used as a means to circumvent limitation periods." It continued, directing that "courts should be vigilant when examining the substance of a declaratory request where an associated compensatory claim may be statute barred, to ensure that the declaration is not being requested to subvert a limitation period." As it stated at para. 39, "if securing a declaration about a legal state of affairs has no apparent purpose in the circumstances of the case other than to be used to ground a statute-barred attempt to secure compensation, the declaration is, in substance, a request for compensatory relief."

[34] In Wesley v. Alberta, 2024 ABCA 276 at para. 85, Slatter J.A. described the mischief of allowing such cases to proceed, stating:

Assume as an example that a debt was owed, but two years have passed and the defendant is now entitled to "immunity from the claim". Obtaining a declaration that the debt was owing and was never paid does not provide the plaintiff with any effective remedy. It subjects the defendant to all the mischief that the Limitations Act is designed to prevent. To avoid the risk of this kind of litigation, the defendant must still retain all the documentation related to the debt, suffer the stress of the claim, and incur the expense of defending it. The defendant remains at risk of the loss of documentary evidence, the fading memories of witnesses, or the simple inability to locate those witnesses. Where the claim was insurable, and there is some doubt as to whether the relief claimed is truly declaratory, the defendant must identify the policy that covered it, and provide (possibly late) notice to the insurer. [citations omitted]

[35] Here the plaintiff's compensatory claim is barred, yet it seeks declarations in order to gain some hoped-for leverage with Parks Canada in moving ahead with the Project. At the same time the plaintiff acknowledges that should the Court grant any declaratory relief, Parks Canada is in no way obliged to revive the Project or have anything to do with the Foundation.

[36] The Aboriginal and treaty rights cases do not assist the plaintiff. As the Supreme Court stated in Shot Both Sides at para. 70: "Declaratory relief takes on a 'unique tenor' in the context of Aboriginal and treaty rights because it is a means by which a court can promote reconciliation to restore the nation-to-nation relationship." The Court continued, at para. 73, stating that "[c]larity on these rights, duties, and conduct can help to uphold the honour of the Crown, guide the parties in the reconciliation process mandated by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and assist with efforts to restore the nation-to-nation relationship."

[37] This is not a case like Wesley or Shot Both Sides in which the declarations requested dealt with actual treaty rights, Aboriginal title and the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the plaintiff, all of which would inform relations going forward. Here, the declarations sought relate to the MOU – a commercial agreement.

[38] Granting the declaratory relief will have no practical utility. The dispute between the parties is over; the MOU which was terminated years ago. There can be no claim for specific performance or damages. Courts do not grant declarations to make people feel better or to assist a party in exercising some form of moral suasion. Declarations in the plaintiff's favour would have no legal impact on any future negotiations with the defendant. In my view, therefore, the declaratory relief is sought to circumvent limitation periods and does not support an exemption under s. 16(1) of the Act: Karkhanechi at para. 40.

[39] Accordingly, s. 16 does not assist the plaintiff.

This is Not a Proceeding "Based on Existing Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" or on "Equitable Claims by Aboriginal Peoples Against the Crown"

No Agency Relationship

[40] The plaintiff, through Mr. Trigiani, asserts that it acts as agent for the Confederacy. This is different from the assertion in the Statement of Claim that the Foundation "was established as an agent for and on behalf of the war dead of the First Nation Peoples", but also for the "over 114,000 war dead of all races colours and creeds…" However, the evidence does not support either assertion.

[41] The essential elements to an agency relationship are that both the principal and agent must agree to it and the principal must give the agent authority to affect its legal position. While agency is usually created by express contract, it may also be implied from conduct or the situation of the parties: 1196303 Inc. v. Glen Grove Suites Inc., 2015 ONCA 580, 337 O.A.C. 85 at paras. 69-71; CCC No. 476 v. Wong, 2019 ONSC 4207 at para. 57, aff'd 2020 ONCA 263.

The essential elements are:

(i) Authority given to the agent by the principal, allowing the former to affect the latter's legal position; and

(ii) The principal's control of the agent's actions.

[42] In this case there is no basis to find an agency relationship in 2014 or today. Mr. Trigiani's assertion of an agency relationship is not sufficient and, in any event, is contradicted by other evidence.

[43] Mr. Kennedy's unchallenged evidence is that the Foundation never informed him that it was acting pursuant to any Aboriginal or treaty right to build the Project, or that the Foundation represented any group of Indigenous persons in an agency relationship.

[44] The evidence of involvement of Indigenous people in the Project is limited. During the period when the MOU was in effect, Parks Canada told Mr. Trigiani of the need to consult the First Nations group whose territorial land would be affected, in this case the Mi'kmaq, in a meeting on August 28, 2014. Mr. Trigiani and representatives of Parks Canada then met with Dr. Donald Julien, who was at the time the Executive Director of the Confederacy. At some later date, Dr. Julien became a Patron of the Foundation.

[45] A letter dated October 24, 2014, from the Confederacy to Parks Canada signed by Dr. Julien, set out some issues that the Confederacy wished to address with Parks Canada. There is no mention of the Foundation acting as agent for the Confederacy and the language of the letter is inconsistent with such a relationship. This is supported by an email to Mr. Trigiani from Parks Canada informing Mr. Trigiani of the letter received from Dr. Julien.

[46] A Mi'kmaq Ecological Knowledge Study was then prepared for Parks Canada. It identified minimal effects and recommended that "the proponent communicate with the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq Chiefs" to discuss any future steps.

[47] Mr. Trigiani referred to meetings he had with the Confederacy and a "series of emails" that he said would support an agency relationship, but he did not produce anything. Some of his evidence was inconsistent, including when the alleged agency relationship began.

[48] There is, therefore, no documentary or other evidence put forward on this motion supporting Mr. Trigiani's claim that his Foundation acted as agent for the Confederacy and that this agency relationship began in August 2014 following Mr. Trigiani's meeting with Dr. Julien. The Foundation did not provide an affidavit from Dr. Julien or give any explanation for the absence of evidence from him. One is left with just "a self-serving affidavit [which] is not sufficient in itself to create a triable issue in the absence of detailed facts and supporting evidence": Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423 at para. 31; Broadgrain Commodities Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, 2018 ONCA 438, 80 C.C.L.I. (5th) 23 at paras. 9-10.

[49] In addition, there is no evidence that the Foundation is acting as the Confederacy's agent in this action. Dr. Julien retired in 2022 and was replaced as the Executive Director of the Confederacy by Angie Gillis. On cross-examination, Mr. Trigiani confirmed that he has not spoken to Angie Gillis since 2022. Mr. Trigiani did not discuss this action with the Confederacy prior to commencing it, he and the Foundation have not been provided with authorization to act as the Confederacy's representative, and neither Ms. Gillis or the Confederacy authorized the Foundation to commence this action or to claim a s. 35 right on their behalf.

[50] Accordingly, the evidence is wholly insufficient to find that there was an agency relationship between the Foundation and the Confederacy in 2014 or in 2025. Nor is there any evidence that the Foundation acts as agent for "the war dead of the First Nations Peoples", as asserted in the Statement of Claim. Mr. Trigiani must be taken to have put his best, and full, foot forward on this issue and the evidence does not support it. To the extent that this action asserts claims by or on behalf of Aboriginal peoples, it must be dismissed.

No Aboriginal or Treaty Rights or Equitable Claims by Aboriginal Peoples

[51] Subsections 2(1)(e) and (f) of the Act state:

2(1) This Act applies to claims pursued in court proceedings other than…

(e) proceedings based on the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada which are recognized and affirmed in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982;

(f) proceedings based on equitable claims by aboriginal peoples against the Crown.

[52] In support of its argument that s. 2(1)(e) applies, the Foundation refers to two treaties: (i) the 1752 Peace and Friendship Treaty Between His Majesty the King and Jean Baptiste Cope (the "1752 Treaty"); and (ii) Treaty 5 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux and Swampy Cree Tribes of Indians at Beren's River and Norway House with Adhesions ("Treaty No. 5"). Mr. Trigiani says these treaties confer a s. 35 right to the Foundation's construction of the project.

[53] There is no support for the application of these treaties.

[54] Treaty No. 5 involves indigenous groups in present-day Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Ontario. It has nothing to do with Nova Scotia or the Mi'kmaq peoples of Cape Breton or Nova Scotia. All counsel for the Foundation could say in argument was that it was referred to for "interpretive flavour."

[55] As for the 1752 Treaty, Mr. Trigiani did not know whether it bound the Confederacy. Indeed, there was little evidence as to the role of the Confederacy and whether there is any connection between it and the rights asserted in the Statement of Claim. As noted, the Confederacy was not consulted by the Foundation before this action was commenced and did not authorize it.

[56] The 1752 Treaty was between the Crown and some Mi'kmaq groups. The Confederacy is described as a Tribal Council serving several member communities in Nova Scotia. There is no evidence that the Confederacy represents Mi'kmaq treaty rights holders or exercises those rights on their behalf. The evidence on this motion is, therefore, insufficient to establish that the Confederacy, which is not a party to the motion, is able to assert rights under the 1752 Treaty.

[57] Further, the only words in the 1752 Treaty relied on by the Foundation are that the signatories "shall have all favour, Friendship and Protection shewn them from His Majesty's Government." It is not explained how this creates a right to be "memorialized", as asserted in the pleading. Nor was the Project about fulfilling an obligation to memorialize Indigenous soldiers who died in foreign wars. It was about honouring all Canadians who died in overseas conflicts.

[58] Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 does not assist the Foundation. That section simply recognizes and affirms existing rights; it does not create new rights: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at p. 1091.

[59] Turning to s. 2(1)(f), again there is the threshold problem that this is not a claim "by aboriginal peoples against the Crown." There is no evidence that aboriginal peoples are asserting a claim to be "memorialized." To the contrary, the Confederacy is not involved in this action at all.

[60] Further, the reference to "equitable claims" applies to recognizable claims in equity like a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Indigenous peoples: see e.g. Iskatewizaagegan No. 39 Independent First Nation v. Winnipeg (City), 2024 ONSC 2163. There is, in my view, no equitable right to be "memorialized." A right to be memorialized, if it exists, must be found elsewhere.

[61] The only real cause of action in this case is breach of contract, and it is out of time.

[62] Accordingly, there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to the application of ss. 2(1)(e) and 2(1)(f) of the Act. They simply do not apply.

Conclusion and Costs

[63] I am satisfied that the summary judgment should be granted to the defendant as there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. The action is barred by s. 4 of the Act and shall be dismissed.

[64] The defendant is entitled to its costs on a partial indemnity scale. I do not agree with the submission of counsel for the Foundation that this not an appropriate case to award costs because of unexplained "underlying ethical and moral issues." There was no public interest in bringing this action and there is no reason not to make the usual order that costs follow the event. I also do not accept the plaintiff's submission that the costs sought are excessive. The plaintiff did not file a Costs Outline which could have been used for comparison purposes; in any event, the amount sought is reasonable having regard to the need for evidence, the issues raised by the plaintiff, and is in the range of what the plaintiff ought to have reasonably expected to pay. Costs shall be fixed at $45,623.67, including disbursements and HST.

Date: August 19, 2025 Schabas J.