Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-24-4-242-000 Date: September 9, 2025

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King and Shaquille Chalmers

Counsel: Anna Stanford and Stephanie Abrahams, for the Crown Daniel Kirby and Mary Murphy, for the Accused

Heard: June 2, 2025

K.L. Campbell J.:

Reasons for Sentence

A. Overview

[1] On March 26, 2025, following his jury trial on a charge of first-degree murder, the accused, Shaquille Chalmers, was found guilty of the lesser, included offence of manslaughter in connection with his killing of the deceased, Marvin Matthew, on May 26, 2023.

[2] The accused had been involved in a romantic, long-term relationship with his girlfriend, Cheyenne Fitzsimons. They had been living together in a second-floor apartment in a building located at 65 Dynevor Road in Toronto. They had a young son together, named Josiah, who was five years old at the time of the offence. The 32-year-old accused worked as a security guard at Paragon Security, at a location near the intersection of Yonge and Bloor Streets in Toronto. The 36-year-old Ms. Fitzsimons worked in a restaurant doing catering.

[3] There were certain ongoing difficulties in the personal relationship between the accused and Ms. Fitzsimons. At one point, in the midst of these difficulties, in approximately March of 2023, Ms. Fitzsimons began having a romantic and sexual relationship with Marvin Matthew. Ultimately, the accused learned about this relationship and, needless to say, he was not happy about it. The accused wanted Ms. Fitzsimons to end that relationship and work on fixing the problems that existed between them. While Ms. Fitzsimons verbally agreed with this proposal, she continued to secretly see Mr. Matthew.

[4] On May 15, 2023, there was an incident at the home of the woman who was babysitting Josiah. Mr. Matthew and Ms. Fitzsimons were together, outside, at her residence, when the accused also appeared. This led to an emotional, verbal confrontation between Mr. Matthew and the accused. Eventually, the accused told Mr. Matthew to leave, but Mr. Matthew refused. The accused then walked back to his own parked car, retrieved a knife from the passenger side of the vehicle and promptly slashed holes in all four tires of the vehicle rented by Mr. Matthew. The accused then left the area.

[5] The accused was ultimately charged with "mischief" as a result of this tire-slashing incident. However, the accused was released on bail shortly thereafter, but on condition, inter alia, (1) that he not have any contact with Ms. Fitzsimons or Mr. Matthew; and (2) that he not attend at the apartment premises at 65 Dynevor Road in Toronto. While he initially went to reside with his mother at another location when he was first released from jail, within a week the accused again began living with Ms. Fitzsimons in the same second-floor apartment at 65 Dynevor Road in Toronto. This conduct by the accused was clearly in direct violation of his governing judicial interim release order.

[6] On the evening of May 26, 2023, the accused was scheduled to work an evening shift, and was out of the apartment. Obviously, Ms. Fitzsimons and Mr. Matthew thought he was at work and not returning home for some time. When the accused was out of the apartment, Ms. Fitzsimons and Mr. Matthew returned to the apartment. After smoking some marijuana on the balcony, and having a shower together, Mr. Matthew and Ms. Fitzsimons began having consensual sexual intercourse in the main bedroom of the apartment unit.

[7] While this sexual activity was taking place, the accused returned to the apartment. He was in possession of a large hunting knife. The Crown argued that the accused knew what was happening in the apartment, and he had taken the opportunity, moments before, to retrieve the knife from a secret location in an empty dumpster, just outside the apartment building, with the plan of attacking Mr. Matthew with the knife and killing him. However, the defence argued that, in his capacity as a security guard, the accused always had this knife on his person, essentially, as part of his employment, even though his employer had never authorized his use of the knife as part of his employment. Moreover, the defence argued that the accused never planned or intended to kill Mr. Matthew.

[8] In any event, when the accused entered the apartment, he saw clothes on the floor just inside the apartment door, and he heard noises from the main bedroom in the apartment. The accused testified that he thought it might be an "intruder." The accused testified that, after pulling out his hunting knife, he opened the bedroom door, turned on the light in the bedroom and walked in. Once inside the bedroom, he immediately saw Mr. Matthew and Ms. Fitzsimons, naked together on the bed engaged in sexual intercourse.

[9] According to the accused, Mr. Matthew, who was a large man, stopped his sexual activities with Ms. Fitzsimons, disentangled himself from her, stood up and then came towards the accused, who was obviously armed with his large hunting knife. The accused testified that, at the time, Mr. Matthew was naked and completely unarmed. According to the Crown, however, once the sexual activity stopped, the accused immediately attacked the naked and defenceless Mr. Matthew with his hunting knife.

[10] In any event, it is not disputed that in the physical confrontation that then took place between these two men, the accused admittedly stabbed Mr. Matthew six or seven times with his hunting knife, many times in his chest/torso area, and ultimately killing him. The Crown contended that this unprovoked attack on Mr. Matthew was a planned and deliberate attack on the deceased, motivated by anger and jealousy, and conducted by the accused for the purpose of killing him. The accused contended, however, that he was only acting in lawful self-defence in relation to the advancing, and physically larger, Mr. Matthew.

[11] Immediately after the accused entered the bedroom, turned on the lights and confronted Mr. Matthew, Ms. Fitzsimons quickly ran, completely naked, from the bedroom and out into the apartment building itself. Ultimately, after running around the apartment building looking for help, Ms. Fitzsimons was permitted inside a neighbour's apartment, where she placed a 911 call seeking the assistance of the authorities in relation to this event. This call was recorded and played for the jury as a "spontaneous declaration" by Ms. Fitzsimons.

[12] During this 911 call, Ms. Fitzsimons was in a very emotional state, in that she seemed to be crying, sobbing and moaning. Moreover, during this relatively short, but quite intense phone call, Ms. Fitzsimons told the 911 operator: (1) that Ms. Fitzsimons wanted the police to come to her apartment unit at 65 Dynevor Road; (2) that she had been "home" with her 38 or 39-year-old boyfriend, Mr. Matthew, but that her 30-year-old, ex-boyfriend, the accused, Mr. Chalmers, who still had a key for her unit, came in, "jumped over the bed" and "started stabbing" her boyfriend with a "knife" – she described it that way twice – but she also said that her ex-boyfriend had "jumped over, off onto the bed;" (3) she was unsure whether her boyfriend, Mr. Matthew, was "alive or dead" at that point as she just "ran out of the apartment;" (4) she had been in the hallway literally "fucking naked" for "so long" thereafter, and had been "locked" out, and had been "banging on doors," but no one was helping her; and (5) these events happened about "15" or "20" minutes" earlier, and that she had been outside her apartment, naked, trying to get help since then.

[13] Given the positions of the parties, and the instructions that were provided to the jury, in finding the accused guilty of the lesser, included offence of manslaughter, the jury must have concluded: (1) that the accused was not acting in lawful self-defence in stabbing Mr. Matthew to death; (2) the accused must not have planned and deliberated over the killing of the deceased; and (3) the accused must have unlawfully stabbed Mr. Matthew to death, but without the intention required for the crime of second-degree murder (another lesser, included offence that was also left with the jury). It is, of course, upon this factual basis that the accused must now be sentenced, for the offence of manslaughter.

[14] The accused now appears for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing in this matter, the Crown advanced the position that the accused should be effectively sentenced to a term of 11½ years imprisonment for this crime of manslaughter. More particularly, the Crown argued that, after the accused has been given the appropriate credit for the time he has already served in pre-sentence custody, the accused should be given a sentence of 8½ years imprisonment (this position expressly took into account the credit that the accused should receive for the "lockdown" conditions he endured at the Toronto South Detention Centre). Indeed, the Crown indicated that, but for the credit the accused deserved for the "lockdown" conditions, she would have proposed the imposition of a 12 year term of penitentiary imprisonment. On the other hand, defence counsel for the accused argued that, in all of the circumstances, the accused should be given a sentence toward the lower end of the admittedly appropriate range of 8 to 12 years imprisonment. More particularly, defence counsel suggested that, after the accused is given the appropriate credit for all of his pre-sentence custody (including the "lockdown" conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre), the accused should be given a sentence of approximately 5½ years imprisonment.

[15] Of course, these positions were advanced by the parties at the sentencing hearing on June 2, 2025. It is now more than three months later, namely, September 9, 2025, and the accused is still in custody. Accordingly, as I will detail later, the accused must be given the appropriate credit for all of his pre-sentence custody.

B. The Victim Impact Evidence

[16] The Crown tendered a "Victim Impact Statement" that had been prepared by Mr. Dale Matthew, the eldest brother of the deceased. In this statement, Mr. Matthew detailed the importance of the deceased to their family, and the tragic trauma they experienced when they were informed of his death.

[17] More specifically, the author of the statement described how the deceased had always been a "gentle giant," at 6'4" tall and weighing 230 pounds, but he was always the "peacemaker" and "protector," who made the people around him "feel safe." Further, he described how the accused had, in killing the deceased, stolen their family's "future with him" and how birthdays and holidays now feel "hollow" and "broken." He effectively told the accused, in this statement, that in killing the deceased, he had "destroyed a family," "shattered a mother's heart" and "ripped away" their family's "peace." These are all assertions by Mr. Matthew that I fully understand and will take into account as relevant in the sentencing of the accused.

[18] However, as sometimes happens, the author of the "victim impact statement" went well beyond the legislated purpose of the statement, and he included many statements that were beyond the proper scope of s. 722 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, chap. C-46. Some of these comments focused on the predictable consequences of a jury trial, or which were (in one way or another) simply inconsistent with the verdict reached by the jury, or which expressly urged the imposition of the "maximum sentence" upon the accused so as not to "disgrace" the memory of the deceased.

[19] Thankfully, this precise situation has been expressly contemplated by Parliament, as s. 722(6) of the Criminal Code now provides that, in considering a victim impact statement, the court "shall take into account the portions of the statement" that are "relevant" to the determination of the sentence to be imposed upon the accused, and "disregard any other portion." That is what I will do in relation to this evidence.

[20] There were a few portions of the "victim impact statement" that I held, following the objections of defence counsel for the accused, should simply be entirely redacted, so that Mr. Matthew could not even read them aloud in open court (i.e., where the author suggested that Ms. Fitzsimons was equally guilty in the killing of the deceased, and that the accused was, in fact, guilty of murder, not just manslaughter). However, in accordance with s. 722(6) of the Criminal Code, I will, respectfully, simply disregard all of the other irrelevant aspects of the "victim impact statement" of Mr. Matthew. See generally: R. v. Penny, 2010 NBCA 49, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 372, at paras. 28-32; R. v. Berner, 2013 BCCA 188, 297 C.C.C. (3d) 69, at paras. 9-29; R. v. Cook, 2017 ONSC 1434, at para. 38-43; R v. Beals, 2023 ONSC 555, [2023] O.J. No. 233, at paras. 73-97; R. v. Spalding, 2023 ONSC 2136, at paras. 52-60.

C. The Personal Circumstances of the Accused

[21] The accused was born and raised, at least largely, in Brampton, Ontario. His parents both worked, and they were able to provide the accused with a comfortable home, and a "normal" and "healthy" upbringing. He never experienced any form of abuse or neglect. Instead, he had a "good upbringing," enjoyed "strong family values," and appeared to demonstrate a "hardworking lifestyle."

[22] His parents separated when he was just five years old, and thereafter the accused lived with his mother, but he maintained at least sporadic contact with his father and his siblings. When his mother entered a new relationship, the accused's step-father was a "nice man" and the accused never had any "issues" with him. The accused also enjoyed a close relationship with his extended family. The accused continues to be strongly supported by his family, even to this day.

[23] The accused has a grade 12 education and has obtained his high school diploma. He was a "good student" who was "never in trouble with school." After high school, while working, the accused attended college in Toronto for a time, hoping to eventually become a "fire-fighter," but he eventually quit this college course before its completion.

[24] The accused met Ms. Fitzsimons in 2016. After dating for a few months, they began living together. Later, Ms. Fitzsimons became pregnant with their child, and the accused saw their relationship as a permanent one.

[25] Shortly after their child was born, he was taken to a Toronto hospital, where it was discovered that he had suffered "multiple bone fractures." Later, the child was placed in foster care. Eventually, however, the child was returned to the accused and Ms. Fitzsimons.

[26] In terms of his employment history, the accused worked at Pearson International Airport as a "luggage handler" and "de-icing technician" as well as a security officer and ultimately as a Shift Supervisor.

[27] Friends of the accused described him as "easy going" and dedicated to his goals. While he grew up, at least in part, in a "rough" neighbourhood, he tried "extra hard to stay away from trouble" and "accomplish positive things." In his job at the airport, his co-workers described the accused as an "excellent person to work with," in that he was "calm and composed" as well as "knowledgeable" and "reliable."

[28] The family of the accused appears to be "shocked" at the commission of this offence by the accused. They know him to be a fun, quiet, shy, gentle man, and suggest that the offence was "out of character" for him to have committed. They suggest that the accused must have been "provoked" to act this way.

[29] A friend of the accused advised the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that he and the accused had completed "extensive training" in how to "de-escalate dangerous situations," how to "compose their emotions" and how to "avoid physical confrontation at all costs."

[30] It was in 2023 that the accused discovered that Ms. Fitzsimons was seeing the deceased, even though she initially denied being "unfaithful" to the accused. The accused explained that he felt "hurt" and "used" when he learned about this affair. Eventually, however, Ms. Fitzsimons promised the accused that she would stop seeing the "other guy." The accused told the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that one day, he unexpectedly entered the apartment and saw Ms. Fitzsimons and the deceased "in bed together," and that the deceased then "attacked" him and that he had "acted in self-defence." Of course, by this point in time, the jury had clearly rejected this "self-defence" assertion by the accused.

[31] The accused denied that he had any type of substance abuse problem, and he stated that "alcohol and drugs were not factors in the current offence."

[32] The accused has no prior criminal record, either as a youth or as an adult.

[33] The accused has been in jail, awaiting his trial (and now his sentence) for a significant period of time. During this period of pre-sentence custody, the accused has successfully completed a considerable number of short "life-skills" programs or courses, including ones on Financial Literacy, Overdose Recognition and Response, Use of Leisure Time, Anger Management, Being an Effective Father, Substance Use, It's a Gamble, Thoughts to Action, Problem Solving, Supportive Relationships, Change is a Choice, Building Up, Recognizing Healthy Relationships, Managing Stress, Planning for Discharge, Goal Setting, Looking for Work, and Maintaining Employment.

[34] In summary, it seems that the accused was raised in a pro-social environment, he developed a positive attitude towards continuing education, he created a solid work-ethic in terms of his employment, and he is possessed of personal qualities that will help him towards his ultimate rehabilitation. In that regard, the accused currently plans to take over his father's small "trucking business" whenever he is ultimately released from custody following this sentence.

D. The Absence of Any True Remorse on the Part of the Accused

[35] The accused told the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that he "feels terrible" for the victim and his family. He said that he had written a letter of apology to the victim's family, telling them how sorry he was for the pain he had caused, and about his deep regret for how his actions had forever altered their lives. But, in that letter, he acknowledged that nothing he could do would bring the deceased back to his family. Further, the accused said that not a day went by where he did not think about what he had done, and that he was "so sorry for [his] behaviour and for causing so much pain to the innocent people." The accused explained that the offence was "not in his character" and that he did not know "what happened to [him] and why [he] did it." He "truly regrets" his actions. However, it is noteworthy that the accused also told the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that the deceased had "attacked" him, and that he had acted in "self-defence" in killing the deceased.

[36] I have no hesitation in saying that I do not accept the sincerity of any of these statements of alleged remorse on the part of the accused. Indeed, I reject them. The accused has demonstrated, at least to me, that he is selfishly willing to say anything to save his own skin, regardless of whether what he says is true or false. In my opinion, the accused has proven to be an inaccurate historian – and there can be no denying that unmistakable reality. Accordingly, I do not accept his feigned remorse.

[37] One example from the trial proceedings in this case will clearly illustrate how motivated the accused is to prevaricate to his perceived tactical advantage in these proceedings.

[38] When Mr. Chalmers was in the witness box during his trial testifying, and was being cross-examined by the Crown, he was shown a video recording from the apartment building showing him walking down the apartment stairwell from the second floor, where the apartment was located, just moments before he subsequently went back upstairs, entered the apartment and attacked and ultimately killed the deceased. The video recording showed, with unmistakable clarity, that the accused was wearing a pair of black gloves on his hands at the time. Yet, when the Crown suggested to the accused that he was wearing these gloves, the accused repeatedly denied that the video recording showed that he was wearing these gloves. The accused maintained this position, that he was not wearing gloves as he descended the stairs, while the Crown repeatedly showed him the video recording that clearly showed that he was. I dare say that everyone in court that day, who saw this video recording (including me), believed that the video recording clearly showed the accused descending the stairs wearing black gloves on his hands – and yet the accused somehow steadfastly and repeatedly denied that obvious reality. I do not know why the accused lied to the jury on this point, but I have no doubt that a deliberate lie it was. Indeed, in my Charge to the Jury near the conclusion of the trial, I recalled this evidence for the assistance of the jury, and told them that they were entitled to make of it what they would.

[39] In any event, I do not accept as genuine this belated assertion by the accused that he is now remorseful about his killing of the deceased. He certainly was not the least bit remorseful about it during the trial. Certainly, I did not detect a hint of remorse when the accused testified that the naked and unarmed deceased attacked him, after the accused had interrupted the consensual sexual intercourse between the deceased and Ms. Fitzsimons, when the accused was clearly armed with a hunting knife.

[40] In my view, Mr. Chalmers is now of the opinion that an expression of remorse will assist him on the question of the sentence to now be imposed upon him, and so he is now selfishly asserting his utter remorse in killing the deceased. In fact, I do not believe he is at all remorseful, but he is willing to say he is, so that it will strategically benefit him on sentencing.

[41] All that said, the complete absence of true remorse by the accused cannot be viewed as any type of aggravating factor on the issue of sentence, but rather may only be properly viewed as the absence of a potential mitigating factor. See, for example: R. v. Kozy, 74 O.R. (2d) 545, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 500 (C.A.), at pp. 505-506; R. v. Anderson, 16 B.C.A.C. 14, 74 C.C.C. (3d) 523 (C.A.), at pp. 535-536; R. v. Valentini, 43 O.R. (3d) 178, 132 C.C.C. (3d) 262 (C.A.), at para. 80-85; R. v. L (C.), 2013 ONSC 277, [2013] O.J. No. 114, at paras. 80-81; R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, 151 O.R. (3d) 65, at paras. 9-22; R. v. F.A., 2022 ONSC 5696, at para. 48; R. v. Kovacs, 2024 ONSC 1586, at para. 27; Affirmed: 2025 ONCA 49. That is how I have viewed it in the circumstances of this case – as the absence of a potential mitigating factor.

E. The General Sentencing Principles

[42] According to s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the "fundamental purpose" of sentencing is to contribute to "respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society" by imposing "just sanctions" that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and others from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[43] According to s. 718.1 of the Code, the "fundamental principle" of sentencing is that a sentence "must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender."

[44] Section 718.2 of the Code also dictates that, in imposing sentence, the court must also take into account a number of principles, including the following:

• A sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender;

• A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

• When consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

• An offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and,

• All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

F. Analysis

1. Enhanced Credit for Pre-Sentence Custody Served by the Accused

[45] The accused has now been in custody for a total of some 837 days (or approximately 2 years and 3½ months). The parties agree that, as required by s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, the accused should be given credit for having already served 1½ days of imprisonment for each day of pre-sentence custody. By my calculation, that means that the accused must be credited with having already served a sentence of approximately 3 years and 5½ months duration. See: R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, at paras. 7, 34, 68-80, affirming, 2013 ONCA 147, 114 O.R. (3d) 641.

2. Additional Credit for Harsh "Lockdown" Conditions

[46] Defence counsel argues that the accused should receive additional credit to account for the harsh "lock down" conditions he has experienced while detained in pre-sentence custody.

[47] According to the materials filed on the sentencing hearing, between May 29, 2023 and May 22, 2025, the accused was under "lock down" conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre for a total of 174 days (or, approaching 6 months). During such "lock down" conditions, inmates had reduced access to phone calls, showers and "yard" privileges. However, 143 of those days were only "partial lockdowns" of part of the institution, for a part of the day. Further, there were no affidavit materials filed that suggested that these conditions had an adverse effect on the accused. I am, however, prepared to assume that these pre-sentence conditions had a predictably adverse effect on the accused, and rendered his time in pre-sentence custody somewhat more difficult than it would have been in the absence of such "lockdown" conditions.

[48] In R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, [2016] O.J. No. 5255, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized, at para. 6, that credit in relation to pre-sentence incarceration is not "capped" at the statutory limit of 1½ days for each day of pre-sentence custody in s. 719(3.1) of the Code, but rather may, in appropriate circumstances, include additional credit for "particularly harsh presentence incarceration conditions." Further, the court in Duncan noted that, in considering whether any enhanced credit should be given for such conditions, the sentencing court should "consider both the conditions of the pre-sentence incarceration and the impact of those conditions on the accused." Further, the court suggested that where an accused has served a significant part of his or her pre-sentence incarceration in "lock down" conditions, which had an "adverse effect" on the accused, such additional credit will be appropriate. See also: R. v. Henry, 2016 ONCA 873, [2016] O.J. No. 5897, at para. 9; R. v. Johnson, 2017 ONSC 3512, at paras. 66-81; R. v. Powell, 2017 ONSC 7437, at paras. 37-39; R. v. Borsi, 2019 ONCA 989; R. v. Rajmoolie, 2020 ONCA 791, 155 O.R. (3d) 64; R. v. Peti, 2025 ONCA 536.

[49] Defence counsel suggests that the accused should be given an additional 6 months custodial credit for enduring these "lockdown" conditions. I must say that such a generous credit seems extravagant to me. There is no helpful mathematical formula that can be applied in these circumstances to conveniently calculate the appropriate credit for these types of harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody, which have had a negative impact upon an accused. Rather, the specific nature of the appropriate credit is left to the discretion of the sentencing court. In my view, in the circumstances of this case, given the duration and extent of the lock down conditions, and their presumed adverse impact on the accused (in the absence of any supporting evidence as to their effect), he should be extended a further custodial credit that is equivalent to approximately 2½ months imprisonment.

3. Conclusion on Custodial Credits

[50] Adding these various custodial credits together results in a total credit of approximately 3 years and 8 months imprisonment. Accordingly, the penitentiary sentence that would otherwise have been imposed upon the accused will be fairly reduced by that total credit.

4. The Total Global Sentence to be Served by the Accused

[51] In all of the circumstances of the present case, in my view the main sentencing principles to be applied must be deterrence and denunciation.

[52] The manslaughter offence committed by the accused was exceptionally serious. Tragically, the accused needlessly took the life of Marvin Matthew. The accused was completely sober at the time of the offence – he was not under any influence from alcohol and/or drugs. He was neither unlawfully provoked by the deceased, nor was the accused acting in lawful self-defence. The crime emotionally traumatized all members of the grieving family of the deceased, and predictably deprived them of his cherished company forever.

[53] The crime of manslaughter, of course, encompasses a broad scope of unlawful activity that causes the death of another person, and which is properly described as "culpable homicide." In the present case, the accused, in stabbing the deceased to death with his hunting knife, was not acting in lawful self-defence – so found the jury. Indeed, in her submissions, the Crown called the self-defence position, advanced by the accused in his trial testimony, "absurd" and "patently false." However, in also finding the accused not guilty of second-degree murder, the jury must also have concluded that the accused unlawfully caused the death of the deceased without the necessary intent for the crime of murder. In other words, in stabbing the deceased to death, the accused neither: (1) meant to cause the death of the deceased; nor (2) meant to cause the deceased bodily harm that the accused knew was likely to cause his death and was reckless whether death ensued or not.

[54] Of course, the accused must now be sentenced in a manner that is not inconsistent with the jury's verdict in this case. In my view, however, this case of manslaughter was one of near-murder. The accused forcibly attacked an unarmed, naked, vulnerable man and stabbed him multiple times with a hunting knife (twice in his heart), and then left him in the apartment bedroom, where he died in a pool of his own blood. And die, Mr. Matthew quickly did. The accused thereafter took no steps whatsoever to even try to assist either the deceased or Ms. Fitzsimons. In my view, given the violent nature of this armed assault, the accused could only have intended to cause serious body harm to the deceased. There is really no other sensible way of looking at this serious criminal misconduct by the accused.

[55] Moreover, the deceased was an entirely innocent victim. He was perfectly entitled to be romantically attracted to Ms. Fitzsimons and, with her consent, was similarly entitled to engage in sexual activity with her – whether the accused liked it or not.

[56] The accused did not own Ms. Fitzsimons – she was not his property, to be jealously guarded, protected and controlled. Ms. Fitzsimons was perfectly entitled to have romantic and sexual relationships with anyone she wanted – regardless of the views of the accused. It was clearly not for the accused to interfere with her ability to exercise those rights, and it was certainly not for him to attack, with a hunting knife, the people that she was interested in romantically and/or sexually, however much the accused may have personally wanted them to go away.

[57] It is also worthwhile recalling that, had the accused simply abided by the terms of his judicial interim release order, as he was legally required, this crime simply could not have happened, as the accused would not even have been present at the apartment building in the first place. He had been released on bail following his "mischief" offence, in slashing the tires of the rental vehicle possessed by Mr. Matthew, but he was prevented, by the clear terms of that bail order, from attending at the apartment building at 65 Dynevor Road in Toronto, or even being in the company of either Ms. Fitzsimons or Mr. Matthew. However, within approximately a week of his release, the accused blatantly breached the terms of that judicial order, when he returned to live in the apartment at 65 Dynevor Road in Toronto. Indeed, it was only his flagrant disregard of this judicial order that permitted him to enter the apartment at that very location and be present there to kill the deceased. This is, needless to say, an extremely aggravating factor in connection with this manslaughter offence.

[58] In my view the sentence to be imposed upon the accused must strive to proportionally reflect the sheer gravity of the horrendous crime committed by the accused, and his immense personal responsibility for its commission and predictably tragic consequences.

[59] In my view, a fit and appropriate total sentence for the accused, in all of the circumstances of this case, requires the imposition of an effective penitentiary sentence of at least 11 years imprisonment. In my opinion, only a sentence of this length will proportionally reflect the sheer gravity of this offence, its tragic results, and the high degree of personal responsibility that the accused must accept for this terrible crime. Indeed, I view this as really the most lenient sentence of imprisonment that can, in good conscience, be justly imposed upon the accused. Otherwise, the critical sentencing principles of application in this case will not be accorded their proper consideration and weight. See, for example: R. v. Clarke, [2003] O.J. No. 1966 (C.A.); R. v. Devaney, 213 C.C.C. (3d) 264; R. v. Cleyndert, [2006] O.J. No. 4038 (C.A.).

[60] This sentence is not quite as long as was suggested by the Crown, but neither is it at the lower end of the appropriate range, as suggested by defence counsel. Rather, it is a sentence that is within the appropriate range of sentence proposed by both of the parties, and best fits with all of the relevant factual circumstances of this case and its governing sentencing principles.

5. Ancillary Sentencing Orders

[61] In all of the circumstances of this case, I am compelled to also make the following two ancillary sentencing orders. I understand from the submissions of the parties that these orders are not controversial.

[62] First, pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order, in form 5.03, requiring that samples of bodily substances be taken from the accused for purposes of forensic DNA analysis. The crime of "manslaughter" committed by the accused is a "primary designated offence" as defined in s. 487.04 (a) of the Criminal Code and, accordingly, such an order is statutorily mandated in the circumstances.

[63] Second, pursuant to ss. 109(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, there shall be an order prohibiting the accused from the possession of any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life – and prohibiting the accused from the possession of any other firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for a period of ten years after his release from imprisonment for this manslaughter offence.

G. Conclusion

[64] In conclusion, in an effort to now impose the functional equivalent of an 11-year penitentiary term of imprisonment on the accused, he is now sentenced to a penitentiary term of imprisonment of 7 years and 4 months duration.

[65] Having already served the functional equivalent of 3 years and 8 months imprisonment, and giving the accused his fair credit for already serving that period of time in custody, the current imposition of a penitentiary sentence of 7 years and 4 months duration, will effectively result in the imposition of a total 11 year sentence of imprisonment.

[66] The accused is, of course, also subject to the two ancillary sentencing orders made today.

Kenneth L. Campbell J.

Released: September 9, 2025