Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-23-102-MO Date: 2025-08-11 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

In the Matter of the Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18, as amended

Between: The Attorney General of Canada on behalf of the United States of America Requesting State – Applicant

And: Juan Andres Donato Bautista Person Sought – Respondent

Before: The Honourable Justice Catrina D. Braid

Counsel:

• Adrienne Rice, Counsel for the Requesting State/Applicant
• Brian Greenspan, Naomi Lutes and Anna Zhang, Counsel for the Person Sought/Respondent

Heard: May 30, 2025

Extradition Ruling

I. OVERVIEW

[1] The United States of America seeks the extradition of Juan Andres Donato Bautista ("Mr. Bautista/the respondent") to stand trial in Florida. Mr. Bautista was arrested on September 28, 2023, pursuant to a provisional warrant. On November 9, 2023, the U.S. certified its Record of the Case (the "ROC") for prosecution in support of an extradition request.

[2] On December 20, 2023, the Minister of Justice (the "Minister") issued an Authority to Proceed pursuant to s. 15 of the Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18 (the "Act") authorizing the Attorney General of Canada (the "Attorney General") to seek an order for Mr. Bautista's committal for extradition. The Authority to Proceed lists the Canadian offence corresponding to the alleged conduct as laundering proceeds of crime, contrary to s. 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code. It is alleged that the respondent laundered bribe proceeds that he received in connection with his role as the Chair of the Commission on Elections in the Philippines ("COMELEC"). The purported bribes were paid by companies that were awarded contracts to supply voting machines and election services for the 2016 Philippine elections.

[3] The respondent states that an indictment was filed in Florida after the provisional arrest warrant, the Authority to Proceed, and the ROC were issued. He submits that this indictment "fundamentally changed the landscape" and that the Authority to Proceed, the ROC, and the provisional warrants, have all been superseded by the indictment. He further submits that the ROC is rendered wholly unreliable by the "superseding indictment"; and, alternatively, that it would constitute an abuse of process to order committal where the ROC relates to "charges no longer alleged by the requesting state." If the court does not accept those submissions, the respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that committal ought not to be ordered.

[4] In these reasons, I shall consider the following issues:

• A. Overview of the Extradition Process
• B. What is the Impact of the New Indictment?
• C. Does the Evidence Justify Committal?

[5] For the reasons set out below, I order the committal of the respondent into custody to await surrender.

II. BACKGROUND

[6] The respondent is a citizen of the Philippines. He is part owner of a company called Baumann Enterprises Limited ("Baumann Enterprises"), which has a bank account at the Bank of Singapore ("the Baumann Account").

[7] The respondent served as the Chair of COMELEC from April 2015 to October 2017. During that time, bidding processes for election machines and related services for the 2016 Philippine election were held, and the respondent awarded those contracts.

[8] In 2018, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in Florida began investigating Mr. Bautista for bribery and money laundering. During its investigation, Homeland Security established a connection between two shell companies and the company that was awarded contracts for election equipment and services. In August 2016, these shell companies tried to send $2 million USD to the Baumann Account.

[9] The ROC refers to the following transfers (and attempted transfers) to and from the Baumann Account:

• i. On August 16, 2016, a $500,000 USD wire transfer was sent from a shell company to the Baumann Account but did not arrive due to an issue at the originating bank.

• ii. On August 22, 2016, a second $500,000 USD wire transfer was sent from a shell company to the Baumann Account but did not arrive due to an issue at the originating bank.

• iii. On August 29, 2016, $960,000 USD was transferred from the Baumann Account to a bank account in the U.S. and ultimately used to purchase a property in San Francisco. This transfer created an overdraft in the Baumann account, with an account balance of -$725,442.99 USD.

• iv. On August 29, 2016, $499,975 USD was wired from a shell company to the Baumann Account.

• v. On August 31, 2016, $500,000 USD was wired from a shell company to the Baumann Account. These two wire transfers eliminated the overdraft in the account.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Overview of the Extradition Process

[10] Extradition is primarily a function of the executive branch of government. It is a product of international agreements between states relating to the surrender of persons who are alleged to have committed crimes in other countries. According to the Act, the functional responsibilities with respect to each stage of extradition are divided between the judiciary and the executive. The phase involving the potential committal of the fugitive is the responsibility of the judiciary. The phase involving the potential surrender of the fugitive to Canada's extradition partner is the responsibility of the executive: USA v. Kwok, 2001 SCC 18, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532, at para. 27.

[11] The Minister and extradition hearing judge have distinct roles under the Act. Each operates independently of the other and neither intrudes into the other's area of responsibility: Germany v. Schreiber, [2000] O.J. No. 2618 (S.C.), at para. 72.

[12] Extradition serves pressing and substantial Canadian objectives: protecting the public against crime through its investigation, bringing fugitives to justice for the proper determination of their criminal liability, and ensuring – through international cooperation – that national boundaries do not serve as a means of escape from the rule of law: M.M. v. United States of America, 2015 SCC 62, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 973, at para. 15.

[13] Extradition is meant to be an expeditious process to determine whether a trial should be held, and to ensure prompt compliance with Canada's international obligations: United States of America v. Dynar, [1997] SCJ No. 64, at paras. 85 and 121-122; M.M., at para. 64.

[14] There are three stages to the extradition process in Canada:

• i. the Authority to Proceed
• ii. the extradition hearing and committal
• iii. the surrender phase

i. The Authority to Proceed

[15] After receiving an extradition request from an extradition partner, the Minister must determine, pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Act, whether to issue an Authority to Proceed. The Authority to Proceed commences the extradition process in Canada; it authorizes the Attorney General to seek, on behalf of the extradition partner, an order of committal respecting the person sought to be extradited.

[16] Before issuing an Authority to Proceed, the Minister must be satisfied that the basic requirements for extradition under s. 3 of the Act are met and is concerned, in part, with foreign law: M.M., at paras. 19-20. The Minister must ensure that the request of the extradition partner is compliant with the law and the applicable treaty. Her decision, albeit of a political nature, may involve considerations of foreign law that are beyond the scope of the extradition hearing: Schreiber, at para. 65.

ii. The Role of the Extradition Judge

[17] The jurisdiction of the extradition judge is statutory and limited. The committal phase serves an important, but circumscribed, screening function: M.M., at para. 36.

[18] The role of the extradition judge is two-fold: (1) to assess the evidence to determine whether there is admissible evidence of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial for the alleged offence that is set out in the Authority to Proceed; and (2) to confirm that the person sought is the person before the court. If the extradition judge determines that there is admissible evidence of such conduct, and that the person sought is the person before the court, the extradition judge is to commit the person sought to await surrender. The extradition judge is not concerned with foreign law: United States of America v. Yang, [2001] O.J. No. 3577, at para. 5.

[19] Extradition is meant to be an expeditious process by which Canada surrenders persons sought to its partner nations in prompt compliance with its international obligations. The hearing is not a trial, nor should it be allowed to become a trial as though it were a domestic criminal proceeding: Schreiber, at para. 57; M.M., at para. 64.

[20] The committal hearing involves a similar test as a preliminary inquiry. The extradition judge will generally order the committal of the fugitive if there is admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict the person sought. There must be sufficient evidence to establish a case that could go to trial in Canada. The extradition judge's role is not to determine guilt or innocence or to engage in the ultimate assessment of reliability: United States of America v. Ferras, 2006 SCC 33, at paras. 46 and 54.

[21] It is not the function of the extradition judge to consider the means by which the foreign officials may have prepared the evidence for the extradition hearing. Nor is it the judge's function to weigh the ultimate issue of the effect of any delay on the trial in the jurisdiction of the extradition partner. In addition, it is not open to the extradition judge to consider the application of any defences that might be raised at trial by the person sought: Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, at para. 38; USA v. Lépine, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 286, at paras. 10 and 20. The ultimate guilt or innocence of the person sought for extradition is not an issue for the extradition court: M.M., at paras. 62 and 83.

[22] If the extradition judge orders committal, the person sought has a right of appeal against this decision to the Court of Appeal.

iii. Role of the Minister Once Committal is Ordered

[23] If the judge orders the committal at the conclusion of the extradition hearing, the next step of the process permits the Minister to order the surrender of the person sought to the extradition partner. This next step in the extradition process is political in nature: Kwok, at para. 32.

[24] Under the provisions of the Act, there are a number of considerations that the Minister is obliged to assess. Pursuant to s. 43(1), the person committed may make submissions to the Minister on any ground that would be relevant to the decision as to whether to order surrender.

[25] There are two statutorily enumerated considerations for the Minister to take into account, and that applicants can address in submissions. Pursuant to s. 44(1)(a) of the Act, the Minister shall refuse to make a surrender order if satisfied that the surrender would be unjust or oppressive, having regard to all the relevant circumstances. Under s. 47(a) of the Act, the Minister may refuse to make a surrender order if satisfied that the person sought to be extradited would be entitled, if that person were tried in Canada, to be discharged under the laws of Canada because of a previous acquittal or conviction.

[26] In deciding whether or not to order surrender, the Minister must consider whether surrender would violate the person's rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter. The applicable test is whether ordering surrender would "shock the conscience of Canadians" or whether extradition would place the person in an "unacceptable" situation. In making this assessment, the Minister must consider and balance all relevant factors, such as Canada's international treaty obligations and the need to respect the fugitive's constitutional rights: United States of America v. Cobb, 2001 SCC 19, at para. 34; USA v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, at paras. 63-69; and Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.

[27] Many appellate court decisions have stressed the important division of responsibility in relation to potential issues under the Charter. The power is statutorily vested in the executive to order the surrender of the person sought. It is the Minister who is obliged to consider potential surrender against arguments that such would amount to an abuse of process, place the fugitive in double jeopardy, or otherwise violate the guarantees in the Charter: Mellino, at para. 37; Kwok, at paras. 35-37; Logan v U.S.A., 2015 NBCA 60, at para. 31.

B. What is the Impact of the New Indictment?

The Respondent's Position Regarding the "Superseding Indictment"

[28] The respondent submits that the Authority to Proceed, the ROC, and the provisional warrant have been superseded by the indictment. The respondent makes two arguments:

1. that the ROC is rendered wholly unreliable by the "superseding indictment."
2. In the alternative, the respondent argues that it would constitute an abuse of process to order committal where the ROC relates to "charges no longer alleged by the requesting state."

[29] The following is a chronology of events that are relevant to the respondent's submissions regarding the "superseding indictment":

• September 19, 2023: a criminal complaint against the respondent was filed in Florida.
• September 28, 2023: the respondent was arrested on a provisional warrant issued under s. 31(1) of the Extradition Act.
• November 9, 2023: the ROC was certified.
• December 20, 2023: the Minister of Justice issued the Authority to Proceed.
• August 8, 2024: an indictment against the respondent was filed in Florida.
• October 7, 2024: the Supplemental ROC was certified.
• January 27, 2025: the Second Supplemental ROC was certified.

[30] The respondent has filed copies of the criminal complaint and the indictment. Both U.S. court documents refer to money laundering offences.

[31] A person sought for extradition may only introduce evidence that is relevant to the tests set out in s. 29(1) if the judge considers it reliable: Extradition Act s. 32(1)(c). In this case, the Attorney General concedes that the evidence is reliable, but argues that it is not relevant. The respondent submits that the U.S. court documents are relevant to the reliability of the ROCs and to an alleged abuse of process. I shall consider the two arguments raised by the respondent in order to determine whether the evidence is relevant.

Respondent's Submission that the ROC is Rendered Wholly Unreliable by the "Superseding Indictment"

[32] The respondent states that the ROC is rendered wholly unreliable by the superseding indictment. This submission requires an examination of the law regarding the inherent reliability of the ROC and considerations raised by Ferras.

[33] Where a requesting state has certified an ROC, there is a presumption of reliability. In this case, the U.S. has provided its "certification" or "good word" that the evidence in the ROCs is available and sufficient under American law to justify the Applicant's prosecution. That certification raises a presumption that the evidence in the ROCs is reliable and available for trial: Ferras, at paras. 30, 52, 58, and 77.

[34] Unless rebutted, this presumption of reliability will stand. The extradition judge is permitted to remove evidence from judicial consideration if they are satisfied that the evidence is so manifestly unreliable or defective that it should be disregarded and given no weight: Ferras, at paras. 52 and 54.

[35] Evidence may be so defective or unreliable as to warrant the court disregarding it due to problems inherent in the evidence itself, problems that undermine the credibility or reliability of the source of the evidence, or a combination of these two factors. However, it is only where concerns regarding the reliability of the evidence are sufficiently powerful to justify the complete rejection of the evidence that these concerns become relevant to the determination of whether committal is justified: USA v. Anderson, 2007 ONCA 84, 85 O.R. (3d) 380, at para. 30.

[36] Even after Ferras, the extradition judge's role in assessing the reliability of the evidence is restrained. Stated another way, it is only where the evidence supporting committal is "so defective", "appears so unreliable", or is "manifestly unreliable", such that it would be "dangerous or unsafe" to act on it, that the extradition judge is justified in refusing committal. Such a basis for refusing committal attaches a high threshold: M.M., at paras. 63 and 72.

[37] The respondent argues that the "superseding indictment" should be considered in assessing the reliability of the overall evidence and that it rebuts the presumption of reliability of the ROC. He submits that this court can use common sense to make inferences about the state of the evidence based on the "superseding indictment." However, in his submissions, the respondent assumes two legal concepts that can only be assessed through the consideration of foreign legislation:

• i. The respondent submits that the new indictment supersedes the criminal complaint and renders it inoperative. The accuracy of this statement cannot be determined without considering foreign law.

• ii. The respondent submits that there are notable differences between the indictment and the ROC. In addition, he states that, since the U.S. is no longer alleging facts set out in the ROC, this means that it has either abandoned those allegations or shifted its focus. The respondent asks the court to consider the U.S. court documents to determine whether evidence is still available for trial. However, the legal significance and/or consequence of any missing details in the indictment is unknown without consulting foreign law.

[38] During submissions, the respondent's counsel conceded that this court cannot examine foreign law. This concession is an accurate one. The extradition judge does not have jurisdiction to consider foreign law: United States of America v. Kavaratzis, at para. 17. In issuing the Authority to Proceed, it is the responsibility of the Minister to consider the foreign charges. All functions within the extradition process that are not expressly assigned by statute to the extradition judge remain with the executive: Kwok, at para. 31.

[39] An extradition judge does not consider the following:

• i. the law of the foreign state: Kavaratzis, at para 17; Yang, at para 5;

• ii. the nature of the charges in the foreign state or the foreign charging document United States of America v. Drysdale, at paras. 81-83; or

• iii. the jurisdiction of the foreign state to prosecute: Extradition Act, s 5; Kavaratzis, at para 17.

[40] The trial judge in the United States deals with the offence under the law of that country. The extradition judge in Canada, however, is concerned with whether the underlying facts of the charge named in the Authority to Proceed would, prima facie, have constituted a crime if they had occurred in Canada. The courts of both countries deal with the offence under their own law: McVey v. United States of America, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475, at pp. 527-528.

[41] The respondent is asking this court to look at the criminal complaint and indictment. However, the extradition judge must be guided by the Authority to Proceed and not the foreign court documents. The Authority to Proceed procedure eliminates the need for the extradition judge to refer to the foreign court documents. The extradition judge is not concerned with foreign law: United States of America v. Saad, [2004] O.J. No. 1148, at para. 23. The Act does not require the extradition judge to consider the foreign warrant or indictment. The evaluation of evidence at the extradition hearing relates solely to the Authority to Proceed: Drysdale, at para. 83.

[42] The "superseding indictment" does not invalidate ongoing extradition proceedings, nor does it require the Attorney General to file additional material. The Act does not require the requesting state to file the formal indictment as part of the extradition record. Nor does the foreign indictment provide the basis for the proceedings before the extradition judge. The question for the extradition hearing judge is whether there is prima facie admissible evidence of allegations that would constitute a criminal offence if committed in Canada: United States of America v. Adam, [2001] O.J. No. 4156, at para. 12.

[43] In this case, it is impossible to interpret the significance of the wording in the U.S. court documents without consulting foreign law, which I am prohibited from doing. In addition, the Authority to Proceed provides the basis for the extradition proceeding, not the foreign indictment. Therefore, the U.S. court documents are not relevant to the issue of reliability of the ROCs.

Respondent's Submission Regarding Abuse of Process

[44] The respondent submits that it would constitute an abuse of process to order committal where the ROC relates to "charges no longer alleged by the requesting state."

[45] As with the prior issue, this submission requires consideration of foreign law, which I am prohibited from doing. As I previously noted, the Authority to Proceed provides the basis for the extradition proceeding, not the foreign indictment. Therefore, the documents are not relevant to the allegation of abuse of process.

Should the U.S. Court Documents, Filed by the Respondent, be Considered?

[46] As noted previously, the person sought for extradition may only introduce evidence that is relevant to the committal test and if the judge considers it reliable: Extradition Act s. 32(1)(c); M.M., at paras. 73-75.

[47] The relevance of the proposed evidence is to be assessed in light of the limited weighing of evidence required of an extradition judge in applying the test for committal under s. 29 of the Act. Where a person sought seeks to introduce evidence that is directed at undermining the reliability of the evidence of the requesting state, they must persuade the extradition judge that the proposed evidence could support the conclusion that the ROC is so unreliable or defective that it should be disregarded. If the proposed evidence, taken at its highest, is not realistically capable of meeting this standard, it ought not to be received because there is no reasonable likelihood that it will impact the question of committal: M.M., at paras. 76 and 78. I apply a similar analysis to the question of whether the proposed evidence could support the conclusion that proceeding with the extradition hearing would constitute an abuse of process.

[48] In this case, the U.S. court documents are irrelevant. The proposed evidence, taken at its highest, is not realistically capable of meeting the admissibility standard as there is no reasonable likelihood that it will impact on the question of committal: M.M., at para. 77. Therefore, the U.S. court documents will not be considered by this court.

[49] As a result, I do not accept the respondent's challenge to the reliability of the ROC, nor do I accept the respondent's submissions regarding an alleged abuse of process.

C. Does the Evidence Justify Committal?

[50] At the committal hearing, I am required to consider:

1. whether there is evidence of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada on the offence that is named in the Authority to Proceed.

2. whether, on a balance of probabilities, the respondent is the person sought by the extradition partner: Extradition Act s. 29(1)(a); Republic of the Philippines v. Pacificador, [1993] O.J. No. 1753, at para. 8.

1) Is There Evidence to Justify Committal for Trial in Canada on the Offence of Laundering Proceeds of Crime?

[51] The evidence available to the U.S. is set out in the ROCs which have been certified by Robert J. Emery, an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. The certification confirms that the evidence summarized in the ROCs is sufficient under the laws of the U.S. to justify prosecution.

[52] The Authority to Proceed identifies laundering proceeds of crime, contrary to s. 462.31 of the Criminal Code of Canada, as the Canadian criminal offence corresponding to the alleged conduct for which the respondent is sought for prosecution by the U.S. Section 462.31 states:

462.31 (1) Every one commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession of, sends or delivers to any person or place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any means, any property or any proceeds of any property with intent to conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, knowing or believing that, or being reckless as to whether, all or a part of that property or of those proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of (a) the commission in Canada of a designated offence; or (b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted a designated offence. [Emphasis added]

[53] A designated offence is defined in section s. 462.3(1) of the Criminal Code as: (a) any offence that may be prosecuted as an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament, other than an indictable offence prescribed by regulation, or (b) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact in relation to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

[54] In this case, the Attorney General submits that the designated offence is either fraud on the government under s.121 of the Criminal Code or bribery under s. 3 of the Corruption of Foreign Officials Act. Both are indictable offences and are identifiable as designated offences underlying the money laundering offence.

The Available Evidence

[55] The ROC refers to the following available evidence:

• The anticipated testimony of Special Agent Colberd Almeida that Co-Conspirators 1, 2, 3, 4, Vendor A President, and others, created "slush funds" in the Philippines, Hong Kong, and elsewhere, as a source for bribe payments to be used to obtain the 2016 Philippine election contracts. These contracts, per communications from Co-Conspirators 1 and 2, appeared to be critical to the survival of their companies.

• Special Agent Almeida's anticipated testimony that Shell Companies X and Y, which were associated with Vendor A President, were established as mere shell companies for the primary purpose of facilitating financial transactions.

• Mr. Bautista was Chair of COMELEC and was responsible for awarding three contracts for election equipment and services totaling USD 199 million to Company 4. Per the contracts, the respondent was also responsible for certifying whether Company 4 had met certain milestones justifying further payment under the contracts.

• Mr. Bautista's failure to include his interest in Baumann Enterprises and the Baumann Account in his 2015 and 2016 Sworn Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth.

• Wire transfers and attempted wire transfers from Shell Companies X and Y totaling USD 2 million to Baumann Enterprises during Mr. Bautista's time as COMELEC chair. Special Agent Almeida is expected to testify that these payments disguised as loans were actually bribe payments. The first two transfers from the shell companies, totaling $1 million USD, were unsuccessful. The next two transfers, totaling almost $1 million USD, were initially successful. They were later reversed by the bank.

• Email communications between Co-Conspirators 1, 2, and 3 from August 2016 leading up to the first $500,000 USD payment to the Baumann Account in which they discussed pressure to make the payments, using the "extra fees" from over-invoiced contracts to make the payments, and reducing the dollar amount of the payments to minimize risk.

• Instructions for the transfers found on Co-Conspirator 2's electronic media. The instructions included D.L., the Relationship Manager for the Baumann Account, as the point of contact. Records show that Mr. Bautista had emailed D.L. shortly before the transfer to inform her about it. Wire transfer information for the Baumann Account was located in Co-Conspirator 1's Gmail account.

• A draft loan contract between Baumann Enterprises and Shell Company X found in an August 8, 2016, email in Mr. Bautista's Yahoo Account, which had been created by Co-Conspirator 1. The same draft loan contract was found on Co-Conspirator 2's electronic media, as was a purported loan contract between Baumann Enterprises and Shell Company Y. The respondent's former wife had also found a copy of a loan contract between Baumann Enterprises and Shell Company Y in his Manila residence.

• Records from the Baumann Account showing that Mr. Bautista was unsuccessful in convincing bank compliance officials that the wire transfers from Shell Companies X and Y were legitimate through the supporting "loan" documentation.

• The anticipated testimony of Special Agent Almeida about the conspirators' revised plan to use Shell Company X, Philippines Metal Company, and Philippine MSB to resend the payments. Payments to Baumann Enterprises and the Philippine Metal Company were detailed in a spreadsheet from December 2016 found in a Vendor A employee's Gmail account.

Actus Reus

[56] The actus reus of laundering proceeds of crime captures a broad array of activities involving property or the proceeds of property. Almost anything done with property will satisfy the conduct component of the offence: R. v. Trac, 2013 ONCA 246, at para 83.

[57] Money laundering is achieved by the injection of cash generated through criminal activity into the legitimate, commercial mainstream through the deposit of that cash with a reputable deposit-taking institution. The mere depositing of funds can achieve the conversion from a tangible physical asset easily traceable to the crime, to a credit in the account, which is an intangible asset of no obvious origin: Trac, at para. 84.

[58] The respondent submits that, even accepting that he may have had some knowledge that the funds were from an unlawful source, there is no evidentiary link between the money applied for the purchase of the property in San Francisco and proceeds of crime. The respondent therefore says that no jury, properly instructed, could convict of laundering proceeds of crime.

[59] On March 24, 2025, I released a decision relating to the application for disclosure, which is cited at United States of America v. Bautista, 2025 ONSC 1536. Although my prior decision described the alleged act of laundering as the use of bribe funds to purchase property in San Francisco, this description was taken from the defence submissions. However, the Attorney General takes the position that the actus reus of the laundering offence was accomplished when Mr. Bautista took steps to facilitate the conversion by deposit of the funds into the Baumann Account, and to legitimize the conversion by deposit of the funds coming into the account.

[60] I find that the respondent took steps to facilitate the deposit of funds into the Baumann Account, for which he is a signatory, in two ways. These acts constitute the actus reus of the money laundering offence:

• i. On August 18, 2016, Mr. Bautista sent an email to a representative at the Bank of Singapore to inform her about the incoming $500,000 USD wire to the Baumann Account from Shell Company Y. He attached wire transfer documentation. The justification for the transfer was "LOAN AGREEMENT 2016", which was the same description on the wire instructions found in Co-Conspirator 2's electronic media. Mr. Bautista's former wife had found a copy of the loan contract between Baumann Enterprises and Shell Company Y in his Manila residence. The obvious inference is that Mr. Bautista took these steps to facilitate the reception of those funds into the account.

• ii. After the August 29 and 31, 2016 wire transfers, the Bank of Singapore compliance officers had questions about the transfers. Mr. Bautista attempted to convince the compliance officials of the legitimacy of the source of those funds.

[61] The respondent argues that the evidence, at its highest, establishes a plan or an attempt to transfer funds to the respondent, or to accept bribes, which occurred outside of the United States. However, the jurisdiction question is not an issue for the extradition judge: Kavaratzis, at para. 17. A person may be extradited whether or not the conduct occurred in the territory: Extradition Act s. 5.

Mens Rea

[62] The mens rea of laundering proceeds of crime is established by evidence of: (a) intent to conceal or convert property or proceeds; and (b) knowledge or belief that all or part of the property or proceeds was obtained or derived from the commission of an indictable offence: R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, at paras. 56 and 65; Trac, at para. 83.

[63] The mens rea of the offence of money laundering includes specific intent and knowledge or belief. The accused must do something with the property with the intent to conceal or convert that property or proceeds, and they must know or believe that all or part of the property was obtained directly or indirectly from the commission of a designated offence: Trac, at para 83.

[64] The ROC sets out the following circumstantial evidence with respect to Mr. Bautista's intent to convert:

• i. In the Aug 18, 2016, email, he tried to facilitate the deposit of the funds into the Baumann Account.

• ii. When bank officials raised questions about the legitimacy of the successful transfers, Mr. Bautista tried to convince the bank officials that they were legitimate funds.

[65] The ROC sets out the following circumstantial evidence with respect to Mr. Bautista's knowledge that the funds were obtained from the commission of an indictable offence, namely bribery or fraud on the government:

• i. The relationship between the respondent and the co-conspirators who sent the funds. Mr. Bautista was the Chair of COMELEC and was responsible for awarding the election contracts; and the co-conspirators and their companies were bidding on those contracts. The co-conspirators sent the funds to the Baumann Account.

• ii. In the August 18, 2016, email from Mr. Bautista to the relationship manager at the Bank of Singapore, he stated that the incoming $500,000 USD transfer was pursuant to a 2016 loan agreement. The loan agreement contract was found on Co-Conspirator 2's electronic device, and a copy was also found by Mr. Bautista's former wife in his Manila residence.

• iii. It is also reasonable to infer that Mr. Bautista knew about shell company Y's connection to Vendor A. There is an August 8, 2016, email from Co-Conspirator 1 that attaches the loan contract and establishes the respondent's relationship to shell company X. $500,000 USD is a significant amount of money and it is reasonable to conclude that the respondent knew who was sending those funds. In addition, the respondent attempted to justify the payments with a loan agreement. An inference can be drawn that he knew the identity of the person who entered into the loan agreement.

• iv. With respect to the wire transfer instructions themselves, the senders of the funds knew about the Baumann Account number and other bank information. They also know about D.L., the relationship manager at the Bank of Singapore. Finally, they knew the business address for Baumann Enterprises. It is reasonable to infer that all this information came from the respondent. This strengthens the inference that there is a relationship between Mr. Bautista and these parties, which strengthens the inference that he was aware of the source of the funds.

• v. Co-Conspirator 2 and Vendor A exchanged text messages referring to the issues with the wire transfers, namely that a bank had returned the funds, and they would re-send them. An inference can be drawn that the co-conspirators knew what was happening on the other side of the transfer.

• vi. Mr. Bautista failed to declare his interest in the Baumann Account and Baumann Enterprises in his Sworn Statement of Assets that he was required to file as a Philippine government official.

• vii. After the successful deposit of funds, Mr. Bautista was put on notice by bank compliance officials that the source of the funds was in question. He responded to their inquiry and attempted to persuade them that the funds were legitimate. It is reasonable to infer that he had to look into who Shell Companies X and Y were, and why they were sending him $500,000 USD. In doing so, he would have come across Vendor A and their relationship to the election contracts. It is a reasonable conclusion that he would have known that the funds were from an illicit source.

[66] As I have previously noted, the extradition judge must determine whether there is evidence of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada on the offence set out in the Authority to Proceed. The court must consider whether there is admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict the person sought. The requesting state must make out a prima facie case: M.M., at para. 36-39, 45.

[67] If there is some direct evidence of the essential elements of the offence specified in the Authority to Proceed, or circumstantial evidence from which one could reasonably draw inferences of guilt, the court must commit the person sought for extradition. Where more than one inference can be drawn, only inferences that favour the Crown are to be considered. When inferences are to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, the court must consider the evidence in its entirety: R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, at paras. 29-30; R. v. Sazant, 2004 SCC 77, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 635, at para. 18.

[68] I have examined the essential elements of the offence of money laundering. There is sufficient evidence in the ROC to establish a prima facie case justifying committal in relation to the offence of money laundering. With respect to the first portion of the test, I am satisfied that there is evidence of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada on the offence that is listed in the Authority to Proceed, namely the charge of money laundering.

2) Identity

[69] There are two parts to the identification issue under s. 29 of the Act, each with a different burden of proof: 1) is there prima facie evidence that the person sought is the person who committed the acts alleged; and 2) is there evidence proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the person before the court is the person sought by the requesting state: Danielson v. United States of America, 2008 BCCA 519, at paras. 21-22.

[70] The respondent concedes that he is the person who is sought by the requesting state. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that there is sufficient evidence in the ROC to satisfy identity under s. 29 of the Act, for the following reasons:

• a) The name of the person before the court is the same as that of the person sought for extradition; and

• b) The images contained at Exhibits A and B of the ROC clearly match the physical characteristics of the respondent.

[71] The Attorney General has therefore satisfied me, on a balance of probabilities, that the respondent is the person sought by the requesting state. Further, the Attorney General has provided prima facie evidence that Mr. Bautista is the person who committed the acts alleged.

IV. CONCLUSION

[72] For all of these reasons, I find that there is sufficient evidence on every essential element of the parallel Canadian offence upon which a jury, properly instructed, could convict. Identity has also been established. Pursuant to Section 29 of the Extradition Act, I order the committal of Mr. Bautista into custody to await surrender.

Braid, J.

Released: August 11, 2025