Court File and Parties

Citation: 2025 ONSC 4514

Court File No.: CV-25-000002033-0000

Date: 2025/08/01

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Canadian Equipment Finance & Leasing Inc., Applicant

And: 8777691 Canada Inc. and Sandeep Singh, Respondents

Before: Justice I.F. Leach

Counsel:

• Qasim Kareemi, for the Applicant
• Dhanbir Jaswal, counsel for the Respondents

Heard: August 1, 2025

Endorsement

Application Overview

[1] Before me is an application by a financing company seeking various orders to assist it with location and repossession of equipment covered by financing and guarantee agreements made with the respondents; agreements that are said to have been breached.

[2] When the matter was called, as one of the final matters on my docket for regular motions court here in London today, counsel for the applicant spoke to the matter, (on behalf of the applicant and as agent for counsel representing the respondents), and indicated that the parties had consented to the making of an agreed interim order, with that consent and draft Order having been uploaded to Case Centre.

[3] I independently find the terms of the proposed consent order to be appropriate, based on my review of the application material filed to date, and therefore have reviewed, finalized and signed the requested interim Order accordingly, as per the parties' consent. In that regard:

a. The terms of that interim Order include provisions requiring the respondents to deliver up possession of the relevant equipment to the applicant, to provide information concerning the whereabouts of the equipment, and to cooperate with facilitating access to any premises where the equipment may be located for the purpose of removing it.

b. The final term of that interim order adjourned the balance of the application sine die, returnable on seven days notice.

[4] The matter was adjourned accordingly.

Forum Shopping and Venue Concerns

[5] I nevertheless think it appropriate to document my concerns regarding the decision by the applicant and its counsel to initiate and pursue this litigation here in London, and my decision that the applicant should be denied any and all recovery of any costs associated with the appearance before me today; i.e., to express court disapproval of the apparent forum shopping inherent in that conduct.

[6] In that regard, I had occasion today, in addressing a separate and unrelated matter appearing on my docket which nevertheless involved the same applicant counsel, (see BMW Group Financial Services Canada v. Iknight Entertainment Inc., 2025 ONSC 4494), to raise similar concerns regarding the practice of forum shopping that continues to manifest itself here in London on an all too frequent basis.

[7] At the risk of repetition to those reading both that endorsement and this one, but in order to ensure that my concerns are readily available to judges dealing further with this particular matter if and when it is back before the court, I will indicate that I have exercised my discretion to deny the applicant herein the recovery of any and all costs in relation to today's appearance for the following reasons:

Judicial Concerns Regarding Forum Shopping

a. Our courts increasingly have expressed concern about mounting incidents of forum shopping, whereby litigants are choosing to initiate proceedings in court venues of this province that have no rational connection to the underlying matters at issue, apparently in order to gain a perceived litigation advantage by doing so; e.g., circumventing the time involved in obtaining relief in venues rationally connected with the underlying dispute by taking unilateral steps to initiate proceedings elsewhere. For example:

i. I raised that concern in The Toronto Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc., 2024 ONSC 5377, emphasizing that the already heavy dockets in regular motions court here in London were having to devote additional time to collection measures in relation to credit arrangements agreed upon elsewhere, between parties located elsewhere, in relation to property located elsewhere; i.e., litigation in respect of which the underlying matters at issue had no apparent rational connection to London, Middlesex County, or even the Southwest Region.

ii. I emphasized that concern again in The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Defenders Transport Inc., 2024 ONSC 5689, wherein I explained my view at the time that, while there currently appeared to be no mechanism in the existing Rules of Civil Procedure permitting the court to have such venue concerns formally addressed by way of an appropriate motion unless and until a responding party seeks or choose to bring a motion, the court still retains a discretionary jurisdiction to express its disapproval of such litigation conduct via appropriate cost determinations, when the record in a particular case provides a justification for doing so.

iii. In The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc., 2025 ONSC 85, (addressing the change of venue motion brought in Toronto pursuant to my earlier decision in The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc., supra), R.S.J. Firestone emphasized, at paragraphs 29-30, that parties have an obligation "to choose a litigation venue rationally connected to the matters at issue", (emphasis added), and that "the practice of forum shopping must stop", as it is "not fair to other litigants or the court system as a whole".

iv. In BFT Mortgage Services Inc. v. Getz, 2025 ONSC 2908, and Royal Bank of Canada v. Gill, 2025 ONSC 3085, Justice Kurz emphasized the same concerns regarding forum shopping, in cases where litigation had been commenced in court venues, (Halton/Milton and Hamilton respectively), where the underlying substantive disputes had nothing whatsoever to do with those chosen litigation venues, apart from perceptions by the parties initiating the litigation that it was more convenient for them to do so from their perspective; e.g., having regard to their choice of counsel. In his aforesaid decisions, Justice Kurz provided extensive reasons for his view that the court has inherent jurisdiction to determine that a proceeding has been brought in the wrong location and make orders accordingly, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 13.1.02(2) suggesting that the court may have ability to make orders transferring a proceeding to a county other than the one where it was commenced only where a party to the proceeding has brought a motion in that regard, apart from the differentiated circumstances governed by Rule 13.1.02(1) where the court is expressly permitted to raise venue concerns and make transfer orders on its own initiative.

Prior Warnings to Applicant's Counsel

b. I repeatedly have raised such venue selection and forum shopping concerns, and many of the above authorities, with counsel representing the applicant herein, in relation to such applications being brought here in London; i.e., applications wherein the underlying dispute, (as opposed to counsel retained to address that dispute), has no rational connection with London, Middlesex County or the Southwest Region.

c. When I have raised such concerns, counsel for the applicant consistently has argued that such applicants are entitled to proceed as they have been doing, via their chosen counsel, in this venue; e.g., because the Rules of Civil Procedure as currently framed ostensibly give parties the ability to initiate litigation in whatever court venue they choose, (without the court having any ability to address or alter that venue selection in the absence of a party motion raising issues related to venue), and because the applicants and their counsel perceive the bringing of such applications in London to be more convenient from their perspective, particularly insofar as the applicants have chosen to retain counsel with an office here in London.

d. I in turn repeatedly have reiterated my view, expressed in The Toronto Dominion Bank v. Defenders Transport Inc., supra, that a party's unilateral selection of counsel is not a factor connecting the underlying dispute with a venue, but really speaks only to how and where that party arbitrarily chose to pursue a claim in relation to that dispute. In other words, unilateral party selection of counsel, (merely to suit the convenience of that party and/or its counsel, without any apparent regard whatsoever to the countervailing interests of the court or other litigants in relation to proper venue selection), does not establish a rational connection between a venue and the underlying matter, or dispel associated concerns about forum shopping.

e. In relation to such applications, I therefore repeatedly have asked applicant counsel to convey such concerns to his clients, and to urge such applicants to pursue their claims in venues rationally connected to such claims, (claims which counsel based in London can just as easily initiate and pursue in appropriate venues in an era of electronic filings and virtual proceedings), instead of continuing to burden the London court with such matters.

f. I also have expressed disapproval of such conduct by awarding such applicants reduced costs, or by signalling my intention to do so prior to applicant counsel foregoing a request for costs on an elevated scale, or any costs at all.

g. Such applicants nevertheless have continued to bring such applications here in London, adding to the already busy and frequently overloaded docket here, despite such matters having no rational connection with this venue. In this particular case, for example:

Analysis of This Case's Lack of Connection to London

i. The parties to the relevant financing and guarantee agreements were:

1. the applicant, Canadian Equipment Finance & Leasing Inc., a corporation based in Breslau, Ontario, which is a community forming part of the city of Waterloo, situated in the Central West Region of this court;

2. the corporate respondent, 8777691 Canada Inc., which is based in the city of Oakville, Ontario, also situated in the Central West Region of this court; and

3. the individual respondent Sandeep Singh, (president of the corporate respondent and a guarantor of the corporation's obligations under the financing agreement), who resides in the city of Brampton, Ontario, also situated in the Southwest Region of this court.

ii. While the agreements contain no express indication of where they were executed, it seems reasonable to infer that they were concluded in the Central West Region where the parties were located.

iii. The application material filed to date in this matter indicates:

1. that the two named respondents are still located in Oakville and Brampton, respectively;

2. that the respondents maintained the equipment at a number of yards located within the city of Oakville from which they operated their trucking business;

3. that the applicant has enlisted the service of a Bailiff in Oakville to assist the applicant with its efforts to locate and repossess the relevant equipment; and

4. that the said Bailiff has been undertaking such efforts by making visits to the respondents' known yard properties in Oakville.

iv. The application material contains no indication that the relevant equipment the applicant seeks to recover is currently located within, or even thought to be currently located within, the city of London, the county of Middlesex, or anywhere in the Southwest Region.

v. In short, not one aspect of the underlying matter in dispute, the parties to that dispute, or the relief sought in relation to the dispute, involves the city of London, the county of Middlesex, or the Southwest Region. The only connection with this city, county and court region is that the applicant has chosen to retain counsel with an office here in the city of London.

vi. In my view, this application accordingly presents yet another blatant example of inappropriate forum shopping, which continues, on a regular basis, to divert limited court resources in this venue from other matters that do have a rational connection to London, Middlesex County and/or the Southwest Region. There is absolutely no reason why the applicant and its chosen counsel could not have initiated and pursued this proceeding in a courthouse located in the Central West region which has obvious connections with the underlying dispute; i.e., by electronically filing its application in that region, with the application thereafter being addressed via one or more virtual hearings held by a courthouse in that region, which clearly has a rational connection to the underlying dispute, the parties involved, and the underlying property the applicant is seeking to recover. The applicant and its counsel have done otherwise simply because they feel that they can, and that doing so promotes convenience from their narrow perspective of self-interest.

vii. Although such venue and forum shopping concerns repeatedly have been raised with applicant counsel, applicant counsel "respectfully disagrees" that such conduct raises any concerns, or any concerns of importance, meriting any change in such a practice.

Costs Determination

h. For now, at least, I stop short of finding that I have or should exercise the jurisdiction, described by Justice Kurz, to order transfers of venue in the absence of any party motion raising such issues pursuant to Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

i. However, as the venue and forum shopping concerns repeatedly being raised by the judiciary essentially are being ignored, and/or not being taken seriously, in my view matters have reached a point where such conduct merits a more severe expression of disapproval through exercise of the court's discretion regarding costs; i.e., via the complete denial of costs in relation to such applications, if the facts of the dispute underlying such an application have no rational connection to this venue. For the reasons outlined above, that clearly appears to be the situation in this case, and such conduct needs to be condemned and effectively discouraged.

j. While I was not called upon to address and decide the substantive merits of this application today, (in light of the interim consent order to which the parties have agreed, which adjourns the balance of the application sine die returnable on seven days notice), and therefore will leave any formal determination regarding overall costs of the proceeding to the judge eventually deciding the matter on its merits if and when it is before the court again, I do have the ability to address costs of today's proceedings before me, in respect of which the matter also deliberately was stood down until the end of my hearing day; i.e., until all matters with a rational connection to this venue had been given the priority they deserve.

k. For the reasons outlined above, the applicant shall be denied any and all costs associated with today's appearance, and applicant counsel is hereby directed to ensure that a copy of this endorsement is provided to the judge presiding over any substantive hearing of the application when further costs associated with the application are being addressed.

Adjournment

[8] For now, as noted above, the matter is adjourned sine die, returnable on seven days notice.

Justice I.F. Leach

Date: August 1, 2025