Court File and Parties

Court File Nos.: CV-17-00001665-0000, CV-17-00002802-0000, CV-17-00004749-0000, and CV-19-00002946-0000

Date: 2025-08-01

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Court File No. CV-17-00001665-0000 ("Rewa Action")

Re: The Regional Municipality of Halton, Plaintiffs

And: Marion Rewa, Nicolas Rewa, Defendants

Marion Rewa, Nicolas Rewa, Rewa Consultant Limited, 1103882 Ontario Limited, Third-Party Defendants

Counsel:

• Sezen Izer, counsel for the Plaintiff
• Nicolas Rewa, Defendant on his own behalf

Court File No. CV-17-00002802-0000 ("Greco Action")

Re: The Regional Municipality of Halton, Plaintiffs (Defendant by Counterclaim)

And: F. Greco & Sons Limited o/a Greco Construction, Michael Greco, John Frank Greco, John Paul Greco, Sirron Systems Incorporated, Sirron Systems Inc., Sirron Group International, Sirron Electrical Contracting Corporation, David Allan Norris, Meehan's Industrial Maintenance Ltd., Patrick Vincent Meehan, Jason Matthew Mote, Giulio (Julio) Cerelli, Canadian Precision Machine Shop Limited, Wahan Aghaian, Eli Ishkanian and Lisa Snowball, Defendants

And Between: Sirron Systems Incorporated, Sirron Systems Inc., Sirron Group International, Sirron Electrical Contracting Corporation, David Allan Norris, Defendants (Plaintiffs by Counterclaim)

Counsel:

• Sezen Izer, counsel for the Plaintiff (Defendant by Counterclaim)
• David Allan Norris, on his own behalf, and for Sirron Systems Incorporated, Sirron Systems Inc., Sirron Group International, Sirron Electrical Contracting Corporation, Defendants (Plaintiffs by Counterclaim)

Court File No. CV-17-00004749-0000 ("Ohashi Action")

Re: The Regional Municipality of Halton, Plaintiffs

And: David Atsushi Ohashi, Pamela Gloria Ohashi, Synteg Inc., Sypar Limited Liability Company, Marino Woo, Floval Equipment Ltd., Todd McLaren, John Doe Inc., and John Doe, Defendants

Counsel:

• Sezen Izer, counsel for the Plaintiff
• Paul Starkman, counsel for the defendants, David Atsushi Ohashi and Pamela Gloria Ohashi

Court File No. CV-19-00002946-0000 ("Red Welding Action")

Re: The Regional Municipality of Halton, Plaintiffs

And: R.E.D. WELDING AND FABRICATING LTD., COURTNEY EDWARDS, DOMINGOS SANTOS, RODRIGO VALENTE, A. VENCZEL AND ASSOCIATES, AUREL VENCZEL, CHAI CONSULTANT, CHONG (JOHN) CHAI, CHONG YONG YONG, CHONG YONG CHAI, ALL-BOND ROOFING LTD., MARC JAMIESON, CAVE CONTRACTING INC., STEPHEN CAVE, KING YORK PAVING LTD., ROMEO DI CRESCE, RAY IANNELLO, ANTONIO GIANFORCARO, KING STAR PAVING INC., FABIO MONTAGNESE, FABRIZIO MONTAGNESE, FORTE CONCRETE INC., JOHN GRECO, VASYL GUDYMA, OLEKSIY POBEREZHNYY, UKRETE CORP., PRIME DYNAMIX INC., RICK VANLEEUWEN, RICHARD L. VANLEEUWEN, FTTM CORPORATION INC., ARTHUR G. B. THOMAS, ESQ., KELVIN JOHN, LISA M. JOHN-WESTE, WORKHOLICS, MELISSA ALEXIS LANCASTER, 8663157 CANADA CORP. o/a ADAPTIVE AUTOMATION SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, THOMAS BATH, STEPHEN ROSS, SABRINA GRAHAM, 2318844 ONTARIO INC., DAVID NORRIS, 2199173 ONTARIO INC., 2206396 ONTARIO INC., LBS ACCOUNTING & FINANCIAL SERVICES INC., MELISSA LANCASTER, LANCASTER BUSINESS SERVICES INC., GLENDON LANCASTER, STEFAN DU CHAUSSEE, ATRUSH PROPERTIES INC., AMIN ATRACH, CAMILLE ATRACHE, AUTHENTIC CONSTRUCTION LTD. o/a AUTHENTIC CUSTOM HOMES, PAUL MELVIN GILLIS, 2221651 ONTARIO INC. o/a GENTILE STONE SUPPLY, GINO GENTILE, DONNA COOK-GENTILE, 1151076 ONTARIO INC. o/a GENTILE STONE MASONRY, REDSTONE LTD., DAVID PAUL RICHARDSON a.k.a DAVE PAUL RICHARDSON, KEVIN RICKARD, VICTORIA LILIAN RICKARD, SNOW BIZ INC., DANIEL BEALIEU, BRYAN W. GUIDOLIN and DAVIS LEAL, Defendants

Counsel:

• Sezen Izer, counsel for the Plaintiff
• David Allan Norris, on his own behalf and defendants: FTTM Corporation Inc., 2318844 Ontario Inc., 2199173 Ontario Inc., 2206396 Ontario Inc.

Before: The Honourable Regional Senior Justice E. Ria Tzimas

Heard: June 26, 2025

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] In accordance with my endorsement following the case management conference of May 21, 2025, there were three motions before the court as well as certain "housekeeping issues" in relation to the much-anticipated examinations for discovery.

[2] The Ohashi motion is dismissed in its entirety, with costs. The Norris motion is allowed in part, without costs. The Rewa motion is adjourned with costs.

[3] Each motion is dealt with separately below. At the conclusion I address certain outstanding housekeeping matters related to the scheduling of the discoveries.

Ohashi Motion, CV17-4749 ("Ohashi Action")

[4] The Ohashi Defendants (the Ohashi) brought a motion for an order that Edward Nagel not be permitted to be one of Halton's deponents at the Examinations for Discovery. In the alternative, they proposed that his evidence be limited to the content of his contemporaneous notes, prepared during his engagement with Halton as a participatory expert.

[5] Counsel for the Ohashi framed the concerns underlying the requested order with reference to the obligations of participant and litigation experts. He suggested that the gate-keeping functions of a trial judge in relation to experts, extended to the case management judge. As a gatekeeper of the litigation process, the case management judge could block the participation of Mr. Nagel as one of Halton's deponents because he refused to produce his working papers and notes underlying his two reports where he described the fraud scheme at issue.

[6] Counsel structured his opposition to Mr. Nagel's participation as Halton's proponent in the discovery process in terms of the following issues:

1. Nagel's Evidence as a Participatory Witness;
2. The Admissibility of Participatory Expert Evidence; and
3. Deficiencies with Schedule A and Improper Privilege Claims by Halton.

In his factum counsel also included submissions regarding the examination of the plaintiff in advance of the examinations of the various defendants.

[7] Halton opposed the motion and asked for costs. Counsel reminded the court that Mr. Nagel was being put forward as one of two Halton representatives for examinations for discovery at the request of numerous defendants. Halton agreed to the request and a corresponding order was made at the conclusion of case management conference in October 2024.

[8] Halton also advised the court that Mr. Nagel had already produced his working papers and notes underlying his two reports. Regarding the alleged deficiencies, Halton agreed that it would be producing a Supplemental Affidavit of Documents in the coming few weeks that would include Mr. Nagel's additional notes and working papers.

[9] The only Nagel documents Halton would not be producing were those over which it claimed litigation privilege. Halton explained that in addition to his forensic analysis, Mr. Nagel advised Halton on settlement negotiations with various defendants. Those documents were protected by litigation privilege and would not be produced.

[10] In my review of the submissions, I find that the Ohashi motion is without merit for the following reasons.

[11] First, the thrust of the Ohashi motion had little to do with whether Mr. Nagel was a suitable representative for Halton's discovery. Rather, it was designed to disqualify Mr. Nagel from any participation in the litigation. To accomplish such an outcome, counsel grounded his submissions on a deliberate mischaracterization of Mr. Nagel's role at discoveries. By describing Mr. Nagel as a participant expert at discoveries, counsel went down a path of legal submissions and argument that had nothing to do with the discovery process, or whether Mr. Nagel was a suitable representative. Mr. Nagel is to be Halton's representative at Halton's examination for discovery, with authority to bind Halton. He will be there to answer any relevant questions and offer explanations to any of the defendant who choose to examine him.

[12] To put things in their proper perspective, nowhere in my endorsement of October 11, 2024 was there any reference to Mr. Nagel testifying at the discoveries as a participant expert. I cautioned Halton on the implications of Mr. Nagel representing Halton at the examinations for discovery and indicated that in such circumstances, he would lose the ability to testify as an independent Rule 53 expert. For greater clarity, it is helpful to reproduce the operative paragraphs of the October 11, 2024 endorsement:

3. Starting with [Edward] Nagel, there is no dispute that he has been the forensic accountant who has been working on this case and has "connected all the various dots" to allow Halton to advance its claims against the various defendants. I accept that Mr. Nagel is the person with the best knowledge of the alleged fraud scheme and the resulting damages. Especially given Halton's indication that his answers will bind Halton, I see no difficulty with him being the representative. Halton however must appreciate that they could not at a later stage proffer him as an independent litigation expert. His role at trial would [be] that of a participant expert, or to help simplify this concept, analogous to the treating physician who comes to court to give evidence on a party's condition. (emphasis added).

4. Halton must also appreciate that [Edward] Nagel will be subjected to very broad questions about his investigations, his methodology, or to it into colloquial terms, how he came to "connect the various dots" to arrive at his conclusions.

[13] The directions are clear. The cautions directed to Halton concerning Mr. Nagel's future involvement at trial were informed by the case law concerning the parameters, distinctions, and obligations of Rule 53 experts and participant experts, raised by counsel for the Ohashi on this motion. Counsel's submission that the court was either misled at the case management conference last October, or that the parties failed to put before the court the case law governing the requirements and obligations of participant experts was entirely unfounded and disingenuous. To be crystal clear, nothing in the October endorsement waives any obligations Mr. Nagel would have to satisfy at trial, were Halton to call him to testify. But at this exploratory stage of the litigation, the issues concerning the admissibility of Mr. Nagel's evidence at trial are not engaged.

[14] Even if admissibility issues could be engaged at this stage of the litigation, counsel did not lay out any foundation to the admissibility challenge. Instead, he relied on blanket statements without any reference to what specifically would be inadmissible and why that would be. Would the concerns relate to the authenticity of the record, hearsay, reliability, or relevance? The reality is that counsel could not advance such a discussion because the discoveries have yet to take place. He alleged that Mr. Nagel was not producing his notes and working papers, but as I discuss more fully below, that is not the case. Until the discoveries take place, it is impossible to pronounce on admissibility, without knowing the specific concern.

[15] Before I leave the specific subject, given counsel's persistent preoccupation with Mr. Nagel's participation at discoveries as a participant expert, I find it necessary to clarify that at the discovery stage, a party's representative is there to answer the questions that are put to him or her. The opposing parties may ask questions to understand the case to be met, to test the strength of the theory and to evaluate the documentary evidence in support of that theory. Until and unless the answers given at the discovery are either expressly adopted by the testifying witness at trial, or are read into the trial record, the answers given at discovery are not evidence. To be concerned about the admissibility of the answers, that may be given at discoveries is at best premature.

[16] More to the point, there is no reason to disqualify Mr. Nagel from being Halton's representative at the discoveries on speculation that he will not be able to satisfy his obligations as a participant expert or that his answers to the questions that are put to him will be inadmissible. At the discoveries, the defendants will have every opportunity to ask their questions and probe every which way to understand his theory and his answers. If they are unclear about the content of Mr. Nagel's notes, his methodology, his note-taking practices, and anything else underlying his conclusions in the two reports he has already produced, the defendants may put their questions to him. If Mr. Nagel refuses to answer questions that are relevant to the litigation, those refusals may become the subject of a motion. The October 11, 2024 endorsement cautioned Halton about the breadth and depth of the questions that Mr. Nagel would be expected to address.

[17] The foregoing comments bring me to the second issue raised by the Ohashi, namely, the adequacy of Halton's affidavit of documents, the prospect of a supplemental affidavit, and/or associated productions. As with the concerns about Mr. Nagel's involvement in the discovery process, the Ohashi complaints concerning the adequacy of Halton's productions were superficial, vague, and amounted to little more than a blanket challenge based on a random review of a few documents listed in Halton's affidavit. Their submissions became even more problematic as counsel shifted away from a complaint about the adequacy of Halton's productions to the allegation that Halton failed to produce any of Mr. Nagel's working papers and notes.

[18] Having reviewed Halton's productions, the responding submissions, and recognizing that those productions already included a substantial volume of Mr. Nagel's working papers, the Ohashi position did not make any sense. I gave counsel the opportunity to clarify the parameters of his clients' complaint only to be confronted with the ultimate position that Halton failed to produce any of Mr. Nagel's working papers and notes.

[19] The spot-checking of Mr. Nagel's productions during Halton's oral submissions, confirmed to the court that Mr. Nagel has produced working papers and notes. Whether that production has been comprehensive, will be a question for Mr. Nagel to answer at discoveries. On the face of the materials before me, it is impossible to make any finding on the adequacy of the working papers and notes.

[20] When confronted with the reality that several documents were, on their face, Mr. Nagel's notes and reporting memos, counsel for the Ohashi did not have a satisfactory response. The best he could come up with was the suggestion that he could not be certain that the memo notes attributed to Mr. Nagel were his own because they were typed; there were no hand-written notes. With the greatest of respect, in this digitized and paperless age, absent specific concerns about the authenticity of the working documents, counsel's allegations against Mr. Nagel were outright unprofessional. Questions about how Mr. Nagel works, whether he records notes on paper, using pen or pencil, on a tablet, or using dictation, would all be fair play at discoveries. But to challenge the authenticity of Mr. Nagel's notes without any credible basis, was one more indicator of the attempt to disqualify Mr. Nagel from any participation in this litigation.

[21] As to the sufficiency of Halton's affidavit of documents, Halton's admission to the productions having certain deficiencies and being incomplete, with the corresponding commitment that a supplemental affidavit would be delivered in the coming weeks was satisfactory for the time being. That said, given the several months of preparation, I would have expected Halton to be more proactive and to have responded to the concerns raised with a greater sense of urgency. To advise the court that 'more is coming' in a supplemental affidavit, is not putting one's best foot forward. The defendants should not have had to bring their motion for Halton to commit to delivering a further supplemental affidavit of documents.

[22] In short, the concerns over the adequacy of Halton's productions, are at best, premature and without a proper foundation to allow for a more prescriptive court order. At the same time, they not nearly sufficient or credible to result in Mr. Nagel's disqualification as Halton's representative.

[23] Turning to the order of the examinations for discovery, the Ohashi and certain other self-represented defendants, namely, Norris, Rewa and Lisa Snowball, have asked that Halton be examined ahead of all the defendants. Other defendants have remained silent. Although the Ohashi and Halton did not advance any oral submissions on this point, both included extensive submissions in their written submissions.

[24] Having reviewed the respective submissions, as well as the concerns raised by Norris and Rewa, I am not persuaded by the arguments advanced in favour of Halton being examined in advance of the defendants.

[25] To begin with, Halton has the presumptive right to determine the order of examinations. The defendants did not displace that presumption.

[26] Counsel for the Ohashi argued that Halton should be examined first because all the defendants have are bald allegations and a claim for damages to the tune of $23 million. These submissions were exaggerated, incredible and uncompelling. With the benefit of two reports from Mr. Nagel and Halton's extensive productions, counsel can hardly say that the defendants do not know the case they have to meet. They have enough to work with to go to discoveries and to formulate their questions. If, after the discoveries are complete, these, and other defendants conclude that there is no genuine issue to be tried against them, they will be free to pursue those remedies. For the time being, they will have to prepare for the examinations. To the extent that such preparation will be onerous and expensive, there is nothing to prevent the defendants from pooling their resources to hire their own expert to help them evaluate the case they will have to meet.

[27] Most significantly, any concerns the defendants may have about the order of examination are far outweighed by the nature of Halton's actions against the various defendants and the underlying fraudulent conduct at issue. Halton's concerns about collusion and the potential for witnesses to change their evidence during their respective examinations based on evidence that Halton might disclose during its examination for discovery is real. That alone is sufficient to conclude that Halton's representatives will be discovered at the conclusion of the first round of discoveries of the defendants.

[28] In the result, the Ohashi's motion is dismissed in its totality. The concerns associated with Mr. Nagel's participation at the examinations for discovery as Halton's representative, do not engage any future obligations at trial as a participant expert at trial. The sufficiency of Halton's productions will be addressed by a supplemental affidavit as well as the questions and answers at the discoveries.

[29] Any future concerns or objections by the Ohashi in relation to the adequacy of Halton's productions will require them to lay out a proper foundation through their questions of the Halton witnesses, with specific explanations for any alleged deficiencies. Until that occurs, I see no basis for any additional motions touching on the discovery process. What is essential is for the parties to get on with the litigation and get to the discoveries.

[30] As to costs, this motion entirely unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources. Halton is therefore entitled to the costs of the motion. If the parties are unable to agree to a sum, then costs submissions, limited to four pages, double-spaced, at 12 pt font, are to be filed on the following timetable: Halton's submissions are to be served and filed by August 22, 2025. The Ohashi responding submissions are to be served and filed by September 14, 2025.

NORRIS MOTION, CV-17-2802 ("Greco Action")

[31] Mr. Norris' motion sought "full and timely documentary disclosure." He submitted that even with all of Halton's productions to date, Halton is withholding core documents that go directly to the truth of the fraud, conspiracy, damages, and manipulation of purchasing procedure allegations. He also alleges that there are several unrelated documents that are bundled into a single production. Finally, he took issue with the adequacy of the descriptions for the Schedule "B" documents.

[32] The specific Schedule A requests related to the following:

(a) Annual Audited Financial Statements (1998-2017)

(b) External and Internal Audit Reports

(c) SCADA and Instrumentation Contracts

(d) Emails and Correspondence involving Sirron Systems and related entities

(e) Edward Nagel's Reports, Notes and Drafts

(f) Victim impact statements

(g) Accounts Payable Records

(h) Vendor Performance Reviews

(i) Contract Bid Evaluations and Recommendations to Halton Council

(j) List of Electronic Discovery Search Terms

[33] In its formal submissions, Halton submitted that the requests for additional documents were premature and should be canvassed during the examinations for discovery. "If and when the foundation for such requests has been laid out through proper questions of Halton's witnesses, then these issues can be more properly revisited at that time by way of an undertaking or future motion." That said, during its submissions, Halton made various concessions.

[34] The most practical approach to this motion is therefore to enumerate each concern and provide my findings and direction. As a general proposition, while I agree with Halton's submission that most of these requests are premature and ought to be canvassed during the discoveries, there is also a practical side to some of the requests that should not be ignored. Postponing motions to some future date is a losing proposition for everyone involved. Similarly, at least for some of the requests, even if in Halton's view they are irrelevant or do not contain the information anticipated by Mr. Norris, the path of least resistance is to provide him with the documents and let him satisfy himself.

[35] Having said the above, Mr. Norris and others cannot complain about the productions being voluminous and difficult to review, when they are the ones asking for more documents.

(a) Annual Audited Financial Statements

Since the said statements are available, Halton shall produce them to Mr. Norris, even if in Halton's view, they are not relevant to the litigation. Mr. Norris should be put in a position to be able to make that assessment on his own. If it turns out that Halton was right about the documents not being relevant, Mr. Norris' insistence on receiving them may attract costs consequences.

(b) External and Internal Audit Reports

Since the external audit reports are included with the audited financial statements, Mr. Norris will receive them as part of the production under the previous heading. Since Halton did not perform any internal audits, there is nothing for Halton to produce.

(c) SCADA and Instrumentation Contracts, Procurement Documents, and Related Evaluations

I accept Halton's indication that these documents have already been produced. I also accept Halton's willingness to produce a list of all documents so that Mr. Norris may arrive at his own assessment of the documents he says are relevant.

(d) Emails and Correspondence Involving Sirron Systems and Related Entities

Strictly speaking Halton does not have a production obligation under this category. However, at the heart of this request lies Mr. Norris' inability to access his emails anymore since his computer was seized. This makes it impossible for him to assess relevance, specify his requests, or identify what might be missing from Mr. Nagel's culling of what he determined to be relevant, or even challenge Mr. Nagel's theory. It is therefore in the interests of justice to address this concern as practically as possible.

In the exchanges during oral submissions, I understood that the production of the Sirron emails involved a simple exporting, and that Mr. Norris was prepared to do the sorting. Given Mr. Norris' representation that he personally gave quotes to Halton as lump sum quotations, there is merit to his concerns about those communications being excluded from Halton's collection.

Given the exchange with the court during oral submissions, the parties shall proceed as follows:

(i) Halton shall arrange with Mr. Norris to export the emails to him for his review.

(ii) Mr. Norris will review the exported emails for the purposes of his defence.

(iii) Following that review, Mr. Norris shall list in his affidavit of documents those documents he considers relevant for his defence.

(iv) Once Halton exports the emails, Mr. Norris shall have up to 90 days to review and "triage" the documents. If this period is inadequate, he may schedule a case management conference with my office and Halton to discuss the need for additional time. He should first do his best to complete the task within the 90 days and be able to explain how much he accomplished within the 90 days.

(e) Nagel's Reports, etc.

At this point, I accept Halton's indication that they would be producing a Supplementary Affidavit within a couple of weeks. By the time the endorsement is released, it will be more than a couple of weeks. If Halton has yet to produce the Supplementary Affidavit, it shall have until August 29 to complete that obligation.

(f) Victim Impacts Statements

This request was withdrawn. Instead, there is agreement to produce the working papers to the calculation of damages claimed in the Victim Impact Statements.

(g) Accounts Payable Records

I note Halton's indication that "Nagel did obtain records reflecting all invoices issued by Sirron to Halton and all payments issued by Halton in respect of Sirron invoices, as well as copies of all available Sirron invoices and a very large volume of other records relating to payments owing to or issued to Sirron by Halton. All of these records have been or will be produced by Halton". As I am not clear on the timeline for such production, I expect Halton to complete this task by August 29, 2025. If that date presents difficulties, I would like a further explanation and a proposal for a realistic date. In any event, Mr. Norris should have the requested documents, at least 6 months before he is examined for discovery.

(h) Vendor Performance Reviews

Halton's indication that performance reviews do not exist is a complete answer. I note the reference to a formal review process. Halton is silent on whether it had any informal reviews with its various vendors. I leave it to Mr. Norris to decide if he wishes to explore this in the discoveries.

(i) Contract Bid Evaluations

I accept Halton's response in its factum on this point. Mr. Norris will have to identify with specificity what documents or categories of documents are missing before there can be any further court order. As presented in the respective submissions, Halton and Mr. Norris are deadlocked. Halton says that all relevant documents were produced. Mr. Norris offers a blanket justification for the request but fails to say what is actually missing. Mr. Norris may probe further in his discovery questions directed to Halton. Only after the exchange occurs, and only if he is not satisfied with Halton's answers, may he return to court for a further court order.

(j) List of Discovery Search Terms

I accept Halton's indication that it "has inquired with the third-party e-discovery platform hosting Halton's Productions to collect the search terms that were applied to the document set by Nagel over the years and will share the list once received, to the extent available".

If this production has not yet been satisfied, I ask that Halton satisfy it by August 29, 2025. If that is not possible, I would like an explanation for any further delay, and for a commitment to a new date, as close to the end of August as possible.

[36] Turning to the adequacy of Schedule B and Mr. Norris' complaint that Halton has only claimed a blanket statement, that does not accord with Halton's grouping of the documents over which it claims privilege into 113 categories. The categories are very descriptive and enable anyone wishing to challenge the privilege claimed to pursue that dispute.

[37] In my review of Mr. Norris' submissions, and in particular exhibits h, l, and j to his affidavit, it is evident that his concerns arise from earlier versions of Halton's Schedule B. I do not understand why Mr. Norris has been unable to access the latest version of Schedule B. Halton and Mr. Norris are therefore asked to exchange communications to verify the reason for this difficulty and in any event to ensure that Mr. Norris has access to Halton's most up-to-date Schedule B. If this has not already been done, it should be resolved without further delay.

[38] Give the overall result of the motion, I consider the success divided. Better communications between Halton and Mr. Norris ought to have obviated the need for the motion. In these circumstances, no costs are ordered.

REWA MOTION, CV17-1665 ("Rewa Action")

[39] The motion brought by Rewa was not heard for a few reasons. First, although the three motions were set aside for two days, June 26 and 27, at the end of the day on June 26, the court had heard only the motions brought by Ohashi and Norris. Mr. Rewa would have had to return on the following day, as scheduled. Mr. Rewa advised the court that he was not feeling well and would not be able to return the next day.

[40] More dramatically, Mr. Rewa's factum, and the submissions he intended to make were to be based on non-existent cases and non-existent legal propositions. Halton alerted the court to this problem in its own responding factum. In my own preparation and review of Mr. Rewa's materials, it was glaringly evident that the legal principles he purported to rely on were non-existent. On further probing, it became evident that the cases he put before the court were non-existent. Halton suggested that Mr. Rewa's factum may have been the product of artificial intelligence which is known to either misquote case law or simply make up cases that do not exist. Mr. Rewa admitted as much, citing his inability to hire counsel and the resulting shortcomings of having to represent himself.

[41] Halton referred the court to Ko v. Li, 2025 ONSC 2766 where the court discussed the seriousness of making submissions to the Court referring to and relying on case law that does not exist or does not stand for the proposition claimed. Halton also reminded the court that this was not the first time that Mr. Rewa cited to non-existent case law or cases that did not stand for the suggested propositions. His factum cited cases that were non-existent.

[42] The difficulties Mr. Rewa's factum and anticipated submissions were profoundly troubling and pronounced, especially against the fraudulent scheme that is the subject of this litigation and for which Mr. Rewa was criminally convicted. With or without counsel, I would have expected Mr. Rewa to be coming to court to defend the action against him with "squeaky-clean" hands. Although he feigned contriteness, he was far from convincing. His explanation that he is self-represented and had to scramble to put forward his submissions was far from compelling.

[43] To begin with, even if Mr. Rewa initially thought that there was nothing wrong with his factum, he would have been alerted to its flaws when he reviewed Halton's responding factum. At that time, he could have reacted immediately and taken proactive steps to alert the court to his error, to actively withdraw his submission, seek the court's permission to amend it, and if necessary, request an adjournment to correct his ways. Mr. Rewa did none of that. Instead, he sat quietly until I confronted him with the problem. This is not behaviour of somebody who regrets his ways. Rather, it is consistent with "let's see if I get caught".

[44] Second, Mr. Rewa's incorporation into his submissions of a non-existent legal proposition in favour of expansive disclosure obligations was too precisely on point to be just the random product of either an AI generated argument or an AI hallucination. Although I did not canvas with Mr. Rewa the specifics of his approach, it suggested to me a deliberate manipulation and an attempt to knowingly advance a wrong legal proposition and to mislead the court.

[45] To illustrate the point, at least to date, AI-generated factums refer to non-existent cases, or they identify cases that are clearly irrelevant to the legal issues for which they are said to support. This is frequently the product of AI hallucination. A diligent review of the proposed authorities in any factum, either through or other official publication sources, will quickly verify if the references are "fake" or otherwise flawed.

[46] In this instance, Mr. Rewa cited the following cases in support of his motion: MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Kruger Inc., [1985] 48 DLR (4th) 566 (Ont. CA), CIBC World Markets Inc. v. Genuity Capital Markets, 2011 ONCA 525, Premform Ltd. v. Heights (R) Ltd. 2023 ONSC 955, and Deloitte & Touche v. Livent Inc. 2017 ONCA 575. Of these four cases, only Premform exists but it stood for the admissibility of evidence that was not previous disclosed in an affidavit of documents or at discoveries. To say it addressed the legal issues in dispute in this motion would be a stretch.

[47] A case with the noted parties, CIBC World Markets Inc. v. Genuity Capital Markets, exists, but with the citation . It is a decision on injunctive relief. The Deloitte citation also does not exist. A case with the same name but with a different citation, 2016 ONCA 395, is about duty of care principles. Neither of these two cases have anything to do with the issues engaged by Mr. Rewa's motion and legal issues.

[48] These three case citations and the associated submissions in the factum are typical examples of AI-generated arguments and AI hallucination. There is a sloppiness and randomness to them, and in any event, they do not stand for the suggested propositions.

[49] The citation to MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Kruger Inc., [1985] 48 DLR (4th) 566 (Ont. CA)" is quite curious and presents a different challenge. The citation or any similar case does not exist. But unlike the other three examples, quite remarkably, the suggested "expansive" test attributed to this case, to be relied on to argue against the sufficiency of Halton's document production, is precisely on point. Relying on this "case", Mr. Rewa described the legal test as one where a "document is relevant if it may reasonably lead to a train of inquiry that could assist a party in the action". This is the outcome that Mr. Rewa wanted to achieve. If the legal test were real, Mr. Rewa stood a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, at least partially on his motion. As noted above, I did not explore with Mr. Rewa his full approach to the preparation of his factum, particularly since he admitted to using AI. I must therefore be very careful about my conclusions. That said, it seems to me quite possible that Mr. Rewa's legal submissions were not purely the product of AI, but may have included some express manipulation by Mr. Rewa, for his purposes.

[50] Third, this is second time that Mr. Rewa resorted to the use of fictitious citations. Mr. Rewa filed a factum containing fictitious in 2024 in support of his motion on the Privacy Protocol Submissions. At that time, the cases were so obviously not helpful, they were simply ignored, without further thought about the source of any discrepancies. Perhaps, not having been reprimanded at the time, Mr. Rewa thought he could try again, with impunity.

[51] Fourth, Mr. Rewa's explanation that as a self-represented party he had limited resources and means to defend Halton's action against him, was no excuse for his conduct. It matters not if the fictitious cases and associated fictitious propositions are advanced by a lawyer or a self-represented party. The adverse effect on the administration of justice is the same, see Attorney General v. $32,000 in Canadian Currency, 2025 ONSC 3414, at para. 51.

[52] Mr. Rewa may not be a lawyer, but he is intelligent. Basic decency and honesty requires all parties to come to court with clean hands and to put their best foot forward. Misleading the court is an affront to the administration of justice and can be fatal to one's credibility.

[53] Every person who submits authorities to the court has an obligation to ensure that those authorities exist and stand for the propositions for which they are advanced. Although increasingly people are using AI applications to assist them with drafting and research, they have an obligation to verify if the tool they are using is reliable. One does not need to be a lawyer to conduct a simple search on to verify whether the cases identified by the AI-generated factum exist. One also does not need to be a lawyer to read through a case to verify if it stands for the suggested proposition.

[54] Against this backdrop, even if Mr. Rewa were feeling well and able to proceed to argue his motion on June 27, I would not permit him to proceed with flawed submissions. Although I had the option to exercise my inherent jurisdiction to dismiss Mr. Rewa's motion with costs in Halton's favour for his deliberate misleading of the court, absent a prohibition against future motions, Mr. Rewa would likely reconstitute a new motion and start all over and nothing realistically would be gained. A prohibition against future motions would be harsh, although that will be the outcome if Mr. Rewa repeats his error and submits non-existent citations and non-existent legal propositions in future submissions. There will be no other warning.

[55] Instead, Mr. Rewa's motion is adjourned, with leave to amend his motion and supporting legal submissions. The adjournment is with costs in favour of Halton on a substantial indemnity basis, for costs thrown away. Unless the parties can reach agreement on costs, Halton shall have until August 22, 2025, to serve and file costs submissions, limited to four pages, double-spaced, using 12 pt. font as well as a Bill of Costs. Mr. Rewa shall have until September 14, 2025, to respond.

[56] The adjournment is not indefinite. Mr. Rewa shall have until September 30, 2025, to serve and file an amended motion record as well as an amended factum. Halton shall have 20 days from the time they receive the amended motion to serve and file responding materials. I will then review the submissions and decide on whether an in-person attendance will be required or if I have everything I need to decide the motion.

[57] When considering his amendments, Mr. Rewa is strongly encouraged to consider the outcomes in the Ohashi and Norris motions. General complaints about Halton's productions, without any specificity or foundation for the requested order, will be dismissed. Similarly, Halton is encouraged to consider a practical approach to the requests that may be advanced. As with Mr. Norris, if there is scope to produce the requested additional documents, it may be expedient to do so.

[58] Finally, to be clear, although the adjournment offers Mr. Rewa the opportunity to renew his concerns, he is not obliged to do so. It is open to him to abandon the motion and wait until he examines the Halton representatives to set the appropriate foundation to a new motion, should that be necessary. If he does not serve an amended motion by September 30, 2025, his motion will be considered abandoned. If he decides not to renew his motion, it would be appreciated if he were to advise the court as well as Halton. That way he will not leave anyone guessing.

Housekeeping Issues

[59] June 27, 2025, was set aside for the consideration of housekeeping issues and case management. However, counsel for various defendants, including Mr. Starkman, for the Ohashi and Ms. Carr for a few defendants advised the court that they were unavailable.

[60] On or about July 10, counsel for Halton produced the proposed discovery schedule, albeit with certain asterisks and asked that the schedule be endorsed. I am prepared to endorse the proposed timetable. However, before I do so, I prefer to work through any objections in advance of its endorsement, to avoid future disputes or motions on this subject.

[61] As I see matters, there are two or three outstanding issues that should be discussed at a case management conference: the finalizing of the discovery schedule, the location for the discoveries, and the modes of participation. Mr. Rewa has raised concerns about his ability to communicate for his business purposes in the time-period when he is being examined. This specific issue may be dealt with at some point in the future, possibly at the conclusion of Mr. Rewa's motion, should he decide to renew it.

[62] On the location of the discoveries, Ms. Carr advanced some compelling arguments in an email communication which warrant consideration and a fuller response from Halton or alternatively a discussion at a case management conference.

[63] Accordingly, I ask that counsel for Halton coordinate with all those who have concerns with the noted issues (schedule, location, and mode), to identify three possible dates for a two-hour case management attendance, such date to be either in the last two weeks of August or after September 14, 2025. I will then select one of those options for the conference and have my staff communicate the date and virtual coordinates.

RSJ E. Ria Tzimas

Date: August 1, 2025