Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-19-629088 Date: 2025-07-30

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Mehrnaz Amirpour, Plaintiff

- and -

The Mortgage Alliance Company of Canada, Maryam Sani and Advantageous Mortgage Inc., Defendants

Before: Associate Justice Todd Robinson

Appearing:

• M. Zatovkanuk, for the plaintiff
• M. Amirpour, in person

Heard: May 16, 2025 (by videoconference)

Reasons for Decision (Motion to Remove Lawyer from Record)

Background

[1] This is an action by the plaintiff, Mehrnaz Amirpour, arising out of mortgage advice and financing arrangements made for the purchase of a condominium property in Toronto. Ms. Amirpour alleges that The Mortgage Alliance Company of Canada and Maryam Sani breached their mortgage broker agreement by failing to arrange a sufficient and proper mortgage and that a disadvantageous mortgage was ultimately arranged by Maryam Sani through her wholly owned and controlled corporation, Advantageous Mortgage Inc. The action was set down for trial in September 2024.

[2] The plaintiff's lawyers bring this motion seeking an order removing them from the record. Ms. Amirpour opposes her lawyers' removal.

[3] Although I understand Ms. Amirpour's opposition to this motion and have sympathy for the position in which a removal order will put her, I am satisfied that the lawyer-client relationship is irreparably broken. In the circumstances, a removal order is properly granted.

Analysis

[4] Subrule 15.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 (the "Rules") permits a lawyer to move, on notice to their client, for an order removing them as lawyer of record. Although not cited by either side, the principles to be assessed in determining a removal motion opposed by a client are well-settled. I set them out in my prior decision in Denney v. Chambers, 2021 ONSC 5948, at para. 7, as follows:

(a) The principles governing exercise of the court's discretion to allow or refuse withdrawal "transcend the simple canons of contractual interpretation".

(b) In deciding whether to allow a lawyer to be removed from the record under rule 15.04 of the Rules, the court's discretion is informed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the court is not acting as the Law Society of Ontario (the "LSO"). Whether the Rules of Professional Conduct were violated or are being violated is a question for the LSO itself.

(c) The Rules of Professional Conduct require that a lawyer have "good cause" or "justifiable cause" to terminate a relationship, which must also consider and balance the amount of notice available to ensure that the clients are not left with too little time to find alternate counsel: see Rule 3.7-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the related commentary.

(d) Withdrawal may be sought for an ethical reason, meaning that an issue has arisen in the solicitor-client relationship where it is now impossible for counsel to continue to act for the client. This includes circumstances such as instructions to act in violation of the lawyer's professional obligations or a client's refusal to accept the lawyer's advice on an important trial issue. Generally, the court will grant removal in such circumstances since counsel may be required to withdraw in order to comply with their professional obligations. It would be inappropriate for the court to require counsel to continue to act when to do so would put them in violation of professional responsibilities.

(e) Withdrawal may also be sought for non-payment of legal fees or another non-ethical reason. In these circumstances, the court may exercise its discretion to refuse counsel's request having regard to the following non-exhaustive list of factors:

(i) whether it is feasible for the client to represent herself or himself in the litigation, having regard to considerations such as the particular circumstances of the client and the complexity of the proceeding;

(ii) other means of the client obtaining representation;

(iii) conduct of counsel, such as whether counsel gave reasonable notice to the client to allow the her/him to seek other means of representation, or if counsel sought leave of the court to withdraw at the earliest possible time;

(iv) impact on the client from delay in the proceedings;

(v) impact on the other parties in the proceeding and, if applicable, witnesses and jurors, including consideration of the expected length and complexity of the proceeding; and

(vi) the history of the proceeding, including whether the client has changed lawyers repeatedly.

(f) One of the court's principal concerns on a removal motion is ensuring that the client is able to obtain new counsel without being prejudiced beyond the loss of historical knowledge that is necessarily incidental to a change of counsel. Prejudice to a client from a withdrawal is thereby always a significant factor to be considered. Serious prejudice militates strongly against permitting withdrawal, consistent with Rule 3.7-3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which expressly provides that a lawyer is not permitted to withdraw if serious prejudice would result to the client.

(g) The court is also concerned with ensuring that granting a removal order does not cause serious harm to the administration of justice.

(h) The court is not strictly bound by the terms of the parties' contractual arrangements. Granting or refusing a removal motion has no bearing or effect on a claim for breach of contract or for compensation that the client or the lawyer may choose to bring.

[5] The nature of Ms. Amirpour's opposition required me to hear submissions on the unredacted motion record provided for my review pursuant to subrule 15.04(1.3) of the Rules and Ms. Amirpour's responding record, neither of which is to form part of the public record. It also required me to hear submissions on matters squarely captured by lawyer-client privilege. I accordingly conducted the hearing in camera. Since submissions involved lawyer-client privileged matters, I am unable to provide the same detail I would provide in other motion decisions about my assessment of the evidence and arguments.

[6] From what I have read in the materials and heard from the submissions of both lawyer and client, I have my own views on how they came to this point. However, I ultimately need not make any determination of fault as between them. The reality is that the course of submissions only solidified that the relationship has unquestionably broken down on both sides.

[7] Two cornerstones of a functioning lawyer-client relationship are trust and respect. It is evident to me from the materials and, more acutely, the submissions made at this hearing that both of them have been lost here. I see no hope of them being restored. The relationship is irreparably broken. In my view, it would be a disservice to both lawyer and client to compel them to continue forward in this litigation together. In saying that, I am not disregarding Ms. Amirpour's apprehensions about the impact of her lawyers being removed from the record at this late stage of the proceeding. Ms. Amirpour has legitimate concerns about her ability to find new counsel. However, I am confident that there are options and lawyers that will be willing assist her.

[8] I expect it will feel daunting to start the search for a new lawyer, but there are resources that may be able to help Ms. Amirpour both in finding a new lawyer to assist her in advancing this action to trial and in representing herself in the interim. Ms. Amirpour may find the court's resources for self-represented litigants to be useful (https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/areas-of-law/civil-court/self-help/). That website also includes links to services for finding legal help and representation, such as the Law Society Referral Service and Pro Bono Ontario (if eligible).

[9] I strongly encourage Ms. Amirpour to document her efforts to find and retain a new lawyer. That may be necessary to support any future adjournment request or to explain why it has taken longer than expected to retain a new lawyer.

[10] The Rules contemplate thirty days to retain a new lawyer. I am satisfied that an extended period should be afforded to Ms. Amirpour. Given the state of the litigation, what I have read in the confidential materials, and what I have heard in-camera, I am also satisfied that the requirement in subrule 15.04(8)(b) of the Rules to deliver a notice of intention to act in person prior to the expiry of the period find a new lawyer and the consequences of failing to appoint new counsel or service a notice of intention to act in person are unnecessary burdens. I am dispensing with subrules 15.04(8) - (9) pursuant to my authority in rule 2.03 of the Rules, providing Ms. Amirpour with 45 days to find new counsel, and deeming that she has delivered a notice of intention to act in person if a new lawyer has not been retained and a notice of appointment of lawyer has not been served within that time. Doing so will avoid a technical and unnecessary motion to dismiss this action for non-compliance with the removal order.

[11] Regardless of whether Ms. Amirpour retains a new lawyer or seeks to act in person, I encourage her to seek legal advice on next steps.

Costs

[12] The moving lawyers seek costs of this motion against their client of $2,000, citing Ms. Amirpour's opposition and unwillingness to sign a notice of intention to act in person. Ms. Amirpour opposes any costs. Costs are infrequently sought on removal motions and are discretionary. There has been a clear and irreparable breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship here. Ms. Amirpour had legitimate concerns that led to her opposing this motion. Conversely, the moving lawyers' concerns in continuing to act in the circumstances of their relationship with Ms. Amirpour were also legitimate. Although unsuccessful, Ms. Amirpour's decision to oppose was not unreasonable and, in my view, should not attract adverse costs on a motion of this nature.

Disposition

[13] For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's lawyers shall be removed as lawyers of record following compliance with subrule 15.05(b) of the Rules. The provisions of subrules 15.04(8) - (9) of the Rules are hereby dispensed with. Ms. Amirpour shall have 45 days after being served with the removal order to appoint a new lawyer of record by serving a notice under subrule 15.03(2), failing which she shall be deemed to have served a notice of intention to act in person under subrule 15.03(3) without further formality. There shall be no costs of this motion.

[14] I have signed an amended form of the draft order submitted, which I have amended electronically prior to signing.

Associate Justice Todd Robinson

Date: July 30, 2025