Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-24-00086955-00OT
Date: 2025-07-22
Court: Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Plaintiff: Danielle Tasson
Defendant: Klick Inc. dba Klick Health

Before: Frederick L. Firestone

Counsel:
N. Y. Chsherbinin, for the Plaintiff
C. Cunningham and M. Stemmler, for the Defendant

Heard: July 22, 2025, In Writing

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] This is a wrongful dismissal action. The defendant Klick Inc. (“Klick”) brings this motion for an order transferring this action from Hamilton (Central South Region) to the Toronto Region.

[2] The plaintiff Danielle Tasson (“Tasson”) opposes the motion.

Procedural History

[3] The action was commenced on September 6, 2024. The Statement of Defence was filed on October 8, 2024, and a Reply was filed on October 25, 2024. Discoveries were completed on February 11, 2025. Tasson filed the Trial Record on February 12, 2025.

[4] This motion is brought pursuant to Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”) and the procedures set forth in the Consolidated Civil Provincial Practice Direction amended February 1, 2024 (the “Practice Direction”) regarding the transfer of a proceeding from one region to another. In accordance with the Practice Direction, I am to determine this motion in writing.

Plaintiff’s Circumstances

[5] At paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim, Tasson pleads that she is a 37-year-old new mother, residing in the City of Toronto.

[6] The choice of venue was not challenged in the Statement of Defence. A motion to transfer was not brought prior to this action being set down for trial. A Notice of Trial Scheduling Court has been delivered by the Hamilton Court office.

Legal Framework

[7] In determining this motion, I am to consider the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b).

[8] The factors set forth in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) are to be applied holistically. No one factor is more important than another. The factors are to be examined together and balanced in determining whether a requested transfer is desirable in the interests of justice: The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc. et al., 2025 ONSC 85, at para. 13.

[9] The balancing of the Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) factors is not a purely numerical or counting exercise: The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc. et al., 2025 ONSC 85, at para. 14; Bruce Power L.P. v. BNT Canada, L.P., 2018 ONSC 5968, at para. 16.

[10] At first instance a plaintiff is entitled to commence a proceeding in a court location of their choice. This is specifically provided for in the Rules: Chatterson et al. v. M&M Meat Shops Ltd., 2014 ONSC 1897, at para. 14. If the plaintiff’s choice of venue is reasonable and the defendant challenges such venue, a comparison of the two venues is required. The defendant is required to establish that its proposed alternate venue is “significantly better” than the venue chosen by the plaintiff: Chatterson, at paras. 28-29.

Analysis

[11] In adopting a “holistic approach” to the factors enumerated in subrule 13.02(2)(b) and considering all of the evidence in the record before me, including the plaintiff’s evidence about her childcare issues, I am not satisfied that the venue proposed by the moving party is “significantly better” than the venue chosen by Tasson.

[12] At her examination for discovery on February 11, 2025, the issue of childcare was raised. Tasson testified that she had support from her mother and had a temporary nanny for part of the week. Specifically, she gave evidence that she had to move back with her mother in Port Credit to get support for half of the week. While her permanent residence was her house in Toronto, she spent half the week in Port Credit.

[13] In the responding affidavit sworn April 7, 2025, filed in opposition to this motion, Tasson testified that she is resident in Ontario, where she has a number of residences including in Toronto, Port Credit and Hamilton.

[14] In that responding affidavit, Tasson deposed that following her dismissal, she was no longer able to partially reside with her mother in Port Credit and has been residing up to, on average, half of the week in Hamilton, due in part to her childcare needs. She deposed that at her discovery she was never asked to explain where she has been residing after her dismissal, the inference being that this is why she did not mention Hamilton as one of the locations where she resides. Tasson deposed that her primary Toronto home address remains unchanged, but Hamilton is the preferred location because it is near her residence, in case the trial is in person.

[15] In accordance with Part V of the Consolidated Civil Provincial Practice Direction, judge-alone trials are to be held in person unless all parties consent to a virtual trial and the court approves. To date there has been no order made approving a virtual trial. This along with the evidence given regarding childcare needs are important considerations under subrule 13.1.02(2)(vii) and (ix) regarding the plaintiff’s initial choice of venue.

[16] Klick requests that an adverse inference be drawn and that I conclude that Tasson does not in fact reside in Hamilton on the basis of various refusals given at the cross-examination on her responding affidavit which took place on June 3, 2025, and that this determination be made in conjunction with the pleadings and other evidence in the record. Based on the totality of the evidence and explanation given by Tasson, I am not prepared on this transfer motion to discount her evidence in its entirety.

[17] I also note that given her work schedule, a substantial share of the events and damages sustained occurred at a location other than Toronto, including the termination which took place remotely when Tasson was in Port Credit.

[18] Regarding the conveyance to the parties, I am alive to the fact that Klick is located in Toronto, that its Managing Director resides in Richmond Hill, Ontario, and that its Chief Legal Officer resides in Toronto. This is to be considered along with and in conjunction with Tasson’s evidence regarding her chosen venue which was made in part because of her childcare needs.

Conclusion

[19] Adopting a “holistic approach” to the consideration of the factors enumerated in subrule 13.1.02(2), I find the plaintiff’s choice of venue was a reasonable one. I am not satisfied that the evidence on this motion establishes that the venue proposed by the moving party is “significantly better” than the one selected by Tasson or that the requested transfer is desirable in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the motion to transfer is dismissed.

[20] I encourage the parties to agree on the issue of costs. If they are unable to agree, the plaintiff is to deliver its cost submissions of no more than 2 pages by July 30, 2025. The defendant shall deliver its responding submissions of the same length by August 7, 2025. Any reply of 1 page is to be delivered by August 12, 2025.

Frederick L. Firestone
Date: July 22, 2025