Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-25-00088983-0000 Date: 2025-07-28

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

UL Lawyers Professional Corporation – Applicant

V. Merja, Counsel for the Applicant

- and -

Bradley Hopkins and Korie Hopkins – Respondents

C. Genova, Counsel for Respondent

Heard: May 20, 2025

The Honourable Justice A. J. Ohler

Reasons for Decision

Procedural History and Background Facts

[1] UL Lawyers Professional Corporation (the "applicant") brings this application against its former clients, Bradley and Korie Hopkins, seeking an assessment of its fees pursuant to section 28.1(11) of the Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15. The legal fees are subject to an assessment conducted by a judge because the retainer agreement is a contingency fee agreement.

[2] This application came before the court on a short motion list. The applicant's record includes affidavits from the two lawyers who had carriage of the respondents' file, Amelio The and Sunish Uppal.

[3] The respondents' record includes an affidavit from the successor lawyer, David Levy, and each of the respondents.

[4] The applicant did not file any materials in response to the respondents' affidavits. No cross-examinations were conducted.

Background Facts

The Motor Vehicle Accident and Retainer of the Applicant

[5] On January 14, 2016, the respondents' vehicle was rear-ended, resulting in serious injuries.

[6] On January 18, 2016, the respondents retained the applicant to represent them with respect to tort and accident benefit claims. Mr. Hopkins and Mrs. Hopkins each signed separate contingency fee agreements.

[7] On August 30, 2017, Mr. Hopkins was denied benefits under a mortgage disability policy. On September 26, 2017, Mr. Hopkins retained the applicant with respect to his mortgage disability benefits and commenced an action against his insurer, claiming total damages of $1,500,000.

[8] According to the applicant, the contingency fee retainers included a term that if the respondents terminated the retainers, they would be charged on a hourly basis for the work completed on their matters.

[9] Three contingency fee agreements were filed on this application: one each for Mr. and Mrs. Hopkins and a separate agreement with respect to Mr. Hopkins' disability benefits action. All three are identical.

[10] The agreements do not state that if the retainer is terminated, the respondents will be responsible for fees at the hourly rate. Under a section titled "Ending the Relationship" "By You" the agreements read:

By law, you are always free to end the services of any counsel and retain different counsel. If, however, you elect to proceed by way of Contingency Fee Agreement then, even though you will always be able to terminate services, we will be entitled to that Contingency Fee unless it appears that there has been a default, negligence, improper delay or other conduct on our part that has afforded you reasonable grounds to change your lawyer.

Aside from fees and consideration as to whether or not you could be required to still pay the contingency fee specified and/or another amount calculated in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct, you or your subsequent counsel would be required to file a Notice that you were either intending to represent yourself or have other counsel represent you.

Our hourly fee may vary from time to time or will depend on which lawyer or assistant helps with the work. [Emphasis added.]

The agreement goes on to explain the applicant's hourly rate for various professionals.

[11] On its face, the retainer agreements filed do not make plain that if the respondents terminated the retainer, they would be required to pay for services at the hourly rate. This agreement states that in the event of termination, the applicant will be entitled to its contingency fee. That said, the agreements provide hourly rates for various professionals. While the agreements state that fees will be calculated "in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct", the agreements do not set out what that means.

[12] The affidavits of Mr. Uppal and Mr. The both state that: "it was clearly communicated to the Respondents that failure to comply with the retainers would result in them incurring fees at an hourly rate for all work completed on the file." Neither affidavit provides details on how that condition was "clearly communicated" to the respondents.

Work Completed by the Applicant

[13] The affidavit of Mr. The sets out much of the work completed on the respondents' files. The work focused on building Bradley's accident benefits claim to achieve a catastrophic impairment designation which provided him access to $2,000,000 in medical rehabilitation and attendant care benefits, which was critical to ensuring he had access to ongoing care. The work involved "meticulous coordination of medical assessments, review of voluminous medical records, strategic planning for insurer examinations and persistent efforts in challenging benefit denials at the License Appeal Tribunal" to ensure Mr. Hopkins received all entitled benefits. It also included preparation for catastrophic impairment insurer examinations. On November 17, 2018, the insurer deemed Mr. Hopkins catastrophically impaired.

[14] According to the affidavit of Mr. Uppal, he dedicated extensive time in assisting Mr. The build the accident benefits claim into a catastrophic impairment, spending "numerous hours extensively preparing the Respondents for their various medical assessments and reviewing their medical records." The respondents take issue with various meetings alleged to have taken place, as set out below.

[15] The tort claim included filing the statement of claim, the preparation of affidavits of documents, preparing the respondents for and attending at examinations for discovery and completing responses to undertakings.

[16] The applicant also prepared materials for accident benefits claims. This included obtaining medical records and submitting those records to the accident benefits insurer. According to the affidavit of Mr. The, the applicant prepared the respondents for "multiple insurer examinations." Again, the respondents claim that some of the preparation meetings billed did not take place.

Dissatisfaction with the Applicant, Retainer of New Firm

[17] The respondents have provided affidavits to the effect that during the applicant's retainer, they experienced issues with the applicant's responsiveness. Their inquiries were either ignored, or not responded to in a timely manner and had difficulty speaking directly with the lawyer handling their claims.

[18] By September 18, 2019, the respondents retained Howie Sacks & Henry LLP ("HSH"), who confirmed they would protect the applicant's reasonable account from any settlement or judgment proceeds, subject to the respondents' right of assessment.

Communications between Successor Law Firm and the Applicant

[19] On October 3, 2019, the applicant provided HSH with a disbursement account with respect to both respondents. On October 4, 2019, HSH wrote to the applicants confirming that HSH would pay the disbursement account.

[20] On January 27, 2020, the applicant sent a "partial fee account" for Mr. Hopkins in the amount of $122,322.50. A covering letter advised that the entirety of the time for Mr. Uppal was not accounted for. The letter did not provide a reason why the account was not complete. It further noted that the total account would "range from $121,000.00 and $200,000.00."

[21] That same day, HSH received a similar letter enclosing a "partial fee account" for Mrs. Hopkins in the amount of $59,649.88. Again, the letter indicated that the entirety of Mr. Uppal's time had not been captured and included an estimate that the total account "will range from $60,000.00 to $120,000.00" but did not provide any explanation.

[22] Neither account included breakdowns of time. Both included a summary of work performed, but not the person who completed the task. A fee breakdown at the end of the account included a summary of time for the two lawyers, paralegals, law clerks and articling students.

[23] On January 29, 2020, HSH wrote to the applicant and expressed concern at the size of the accounts and advised that the accounts would be re-visited at the conclusion of litigation.

[24] Mr. Levy soon discovered that the applicant's file included an executed application to the License Appeal Tribunal for Mr. Hopkins' non-earner benefits, dated June 2019, but was not actually filed by the applicant.

[25] On May 21, 2020, the applicant sent amended fee accounts for the respondents. Again, the accounts did not include time breakdowns for each entry and did not note who completed the work. Mr. Hopkins' "new" account was valued at $139,512.63. This "new" account included an additional 17.8 hours for Mr. Uppal, an additional 21.6 hours for Mr. The, and additional time for a paralegal and law clerk. Mrs. Hopkins' "new" account was valued at $73,760.75. It included an additional 14.2 hours for Mr. Uppal, an additional 17.9 hours for Mr. The, and additional time for paralegals, law clerks, an articling student and a student-at-law.

[26] The accounts did not include any explanation for the amendments.

[27] On May 25, 2020, Mr. Levy requested contemporaneous dockets and an explanation why the accounts had increased.

[28] The applicant has not provided any contemporaneous dockets to support their time entries. The affidavits filed on this application are silent as to why they have not and are silent on the reasons for the increase in accounts between January 2020 and May 2020.

Settlement of Claims, Request for Assessment of Accounts

[29] The respondents settled their claims:

• On December 16, 2020, the respondents' tort claim settled for $475,000 inclusive of HST
• On December 17, 2020, Mrs. Hopkins settled her accident benefits claim for $325,000 inclusive of HST
• On December 22, 2020, Mr. Hopkins settled his accident benefits claim for $400,000 inclusive of HST
• On July 18, 2022, Mr. Hopkins settled the disability benefits claim for $17,500 inclusive of HST

[30] On January 11, 2021, HSH wrote to the applicant to advise that matters had settled. The parties were unable to resolve the issue of the applicant's accounts.

[31] On February 25, 2021, HSH took out a Notice of Preliminary Appointment and Order for Assessment.

The Solicitor Negligence Claim

[32] HSH was retained by the respondents to advance a solicitor negligence claim against the applicant, arising out of its representation of the respondents on the tort action. A statement of claim was issued on April 6, 2021. The main allegations include:

• In June 2016, Mrs. Hopkins' non-earner benefit was denied by her accident benefits insurer. The applicant did not make an application to the License Appeal Tribunal to pursue that benefit and the limitation period was missed.
• In October 2017, Mr. Hopkins' non-earner benefit was denied by his accident benefits insurer. The applicant did not make an application to the License Appeal Tribunal to pursue that benefit and the limitation was missed.
• The applicant commenced a tort action for their personal injuries only and did not advance claims for damages available under the Family Law Act.

[33] On August 27, 2021, HSH wrote to the applicant to confirm that settlement funds were being held in trust pending the assessment hearing.

Assessment Hearings

[34] A preliminary assessment hearing was scheduled for August 18, 2022. On that date, the applicant received an adjournment to prepare a finalized bill, copies of contemporaneous dockets and copies of the signed retainer agreements.

[35] On October 5, 2022, the applicant provided a third version of their accounts, over three years after the applicant ceased representing the respondents. Again, the applicant did not provide contemporaneous dockets in support of this set of accounts.

[36] The third version of Mr. Hopkins' account was valued at $97,737.50 before HST. The third version of Mrs. Hopkins' account was valued at $42,900 before HST.

[37] The accounts did not include any explanation for the decrease in fees.

[38] On October 7, 2022, the parties re-attended before the assessment officer. HSH expressed concern with respect to the validity of the retainer agreements. The parties were advised to proceed with a motion before the Superior Court. This motion was abandoned and a new Order for Assessment was taken out by the respondents.

[39] On December 6, 2023, a preliminary hearing was held. The assessment officer advised the parties that a solicitor application must be brought by the applicant in Superior Court.

[40] On January 6, 2025, the solicitor negligence action was resolved with LawPRO. The parties did not disclose the terms of the resolution.

[41] On February 12, 2025, the applicant issued the Notice of Application for this assessment.

Entries Disputed by the Respondents

[42] On this application, the respondents dispute the accuracy of the accounts. Mr. Hopkins has provided an affidavit that the October 2022 accounts, include fees for meetings, never occurred. Mr. Hopkins swears that he was billed for 19 two-hour preparation meetings which did not occur, and 18 one-hour discussions that did not occur. The preparation meetings were purported to have taken place prior to insurer examinations and the discussions were purported to have taken place after the same insurer examinations. Similarly, Mrs. Hopkins swears that she was billed for eight two-hour preparation meetings for insurer examinations and eight one-hour discussions following those examinations that did not occur.

[43] Mr. Levy's affidavit sets out additional concerns including:

• A one-hour entry to review each medical report when received, regardless of its length;
• A four-hour review of Mr. Hopkins' hospital records on May 9, 2016;
• A three-hour "complete file review" with respect to Mrs. Hopkins' file on July 14, 2016;
• A three-hour "complete file review" with respect to Mr. Hopkins' file on March 31, 2017;
• One 2.3-hour client meeting in Hamilton on July 17, 2017, duplicated in both accounts;
• One one-hour client call on December 3, 2017, duplicated in both accounts;
• One two-hour "meeting with client re: assessments for determination of catastrophic impairment" on August 6, 2018, duplicated in both accounts; and
• An eight-hour review of Mr. Hopkins' accident benefits file and a seven-hour review of Mrs. Hopkins' accident benefits file, on the same day, March 18, 2019.

[44] The applicant did not file a response to the concerns set out above.

Legal Principles

The Burden of Proof

[45] The applicant bears the burden on this application. In Monkhouse Law v. Belyavsky, 2024 ONSC 4970, at paragraph 37, Centa J. reviewed the burden of proof applicable to the assessment of a lawyer's accounts:

In an assessment, the lawyer bears the onus of proving on a balance of probabilities that the account is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. The lawyers defending the reasonableness of their account decide what evidence they will present to meet their burden of proof.

Assessing the Account Rendered

[46] The review of a lawyer's account pursuant to the Solicitors Act is to be assessed on a quantum meruit basis, which considers the reasonable value of the lawyer's account. It is an error in principle for an assessment to focus on the mechanical application of an hourly rate to a given number of hours: see Newell v. Sax, 2019 ONCA 455.

[47] Under the quantum meruit analysis, the court is to determine the reasonable value of services rendered, taking a nuanced, contextual approach, having regard to all the relevant circumstances: Newell v. Sax, at para. 39.

[48] The factors a court is to consider in conducting the quantum meruit analysis are set out in Cohen v. Kealey & Blaney, [1985] O.J. No. 160 (C.A.) and include:

i. The time expended by the solicitor; ii. The legal complexity of the matters to be dealt with; iii. The degree of responsibility assumed by the solicitor; iv. The monetary value of the matters in issue; v. The importance of the matter to the client; vi. The degree of skill and competence demonstrated by the solicitor; vii. The results achieved; viii. The ability of the client to pay; and ix. The reasonable expectation of the client as to the amount of fees.

The Time Expended by the Solicitor

[49] The applicant submits that they performed most of the work on the respondents' files, setting the matter up for a faster resolution by HSH. The applicant submits that the time building Bradley's accident benefits claim into a catastrophic impairment claim required a great deal of time.

[50] I have several concerns about the amount of time spent by the applicant on this file.

[51] I appreciate that an assessment of accounts is not to be a mechanical calculation. That said, the applicant argues that the respondents knew that if they were to end the retainer, they would be responsible for payment of fees at the hourly rate. If that was the agreement, it would make sense for the applicant to keep track of their time on this file and be in a position to render an account in a timely fashion and with some precision.

[52] I agree with the respondents that the applicant's accounts require close scrutiny, given the history of this matter. It is concerning that the accounts in this matter have evolved over time, with little explanation. The first accounts were provided in January 2020, four months after the retainer was terminated. Those accounts were accompanied by a letter advising that the accounts were incomplete and set out a very wide range for the expected final fees. There is no explanation why the initial accounts were not complete. The second accounts were provided in May 2020, and were within the range communicated in January. Neither the January 2020 or May 2020 accounts included time entries or any notation of who completed what work. In May 2020, HSH requested contemporaneous dockets. They were never produced. It was not until October 2022, nearly three years after the retainer was terminated that the applicant provided accounts which included time entries and identification of the person completing the work. These accounts were substantially less than the May 2020 accounts. The applicant has not provided any explanation for the discrepancies between these dockets.

[53] On review of the accounts, many of the time entries are vague. For instance, the timekeeper would bill for review of medical records, without any indication as to the purpose of the review. Taking a bird's eye view of the entries in the context of the litigation, it was often difficult to discern the purpose for the time spent. Often, the applicant billed for "file review" or review of documents, with no meaningful action taken following that review –such as sending a letter, taking a telephone call, attending a meeting, or the preparation of a document or pleading.

[54] The following areas of concern result in the deduction of time from the accounts.

[55] First, the respondents have provided sworn affidavits that various meetings docketed by the applicant did not take place. The applicant did not provide any responding materials on this issue, or contemporaneous notes or documents to support that the meetings occurred. On this record, and in the absence of a response, I am satisfied that fees billed for the disputed meetings must be deducted from the accounts. This results in a deduction of $19,687.50 from Mr. Hopkins' account and $9,000 from Mrs. Hopkins' account.

[56] Second, the applicant asks the court to approve fees for time docketed after the date the retainer was terminated. The contingency fee agreement does not indicate that the firm will continue to bill after the retainer is terminated, nor would any client agree to pay for services after the retainer is concluded. There is no evidence before me that the work billed was necessary to transfer the file. Accordingly, $287.50 will be deducted from Mr. Hopkins' account and $112.50 will be deducted from Mrs. Hopkins' account.

[56] Third, on a number of occasions, the applicant appears to have engaged in what appears to be double billing. In the absence of contemporaneous dockets, the court cannot find that the time showing on both accounts has already been split between the two accounts. For instance:

• On January 18, 2016, both Mr. Hopkins and Mrs. Hopkins were charged for a two-hour, "initial client meeting" with Mr. Uppal. In the absence of any contemporaneous dockets to support that this meeting was in fact four hours, it appears to be a duplicate account. One hour will be deducted from each account.
• On July 17, 2017, both Mr. Hopkins and Mrs. Hopkins were charged 2.3 hours for a "client meeting in Hamilton (incl. travel time)." Again, this appears to be a duplicate billing. The docket for this date will be split between the respondents.
• On December 3, 2017, both Mr. Hopkins and Mrs. Hopkins were charged for a one-hour "telephone call with client." Again, this appears to be a duplicate billing. The docket for this date will be split between the respondents.
• On August 6, 2018, both Mr. Hopkins and Mrs. Hopkins were charged two hours for "meeting with client re: assessments for determination of catastrophic impairment (incl. travel time)." Again, this appears to be a duplicate billing. The docket for this date will be split between the respondents.
• On November 20, 2018, both Mr. Hopkins and Mrs. Hopkins were charged 2.7 hours for "examination for discovery preparation meeting (incl. travel time)." Again, this appears to be a duplicate billing. The docket for this date will be split between the respondents.

Accounting for the changes above, $1,893.75 will be deducted from each account.

[58] Fourth, on March 18, 2019, the applicant billed a total of 15 hours by one lawyer for reviewing both files. Mr. Hopkins was charged eight hours for "Review of Accident Benefits File from Certas Direct Insurance." That same date, Mrs. Hopkins was charged seven hours for "Review of Accident Benefits file from Certas Direct Insurance Company." I find billing 15 hours on a single day for review of the file is unreasonable. I note that at this point in time, the respondent, Mr. Hopkins, had already been found to be catastrophically impaired and both had attended at examinations for discovery. There is no explanation in the docket itself as to why it was necessary to review both files with such intensity. In other words, there is nothing to suggest that this work was conducted in preparation of any event. There is no explanation as to why the review of Mrs. Hopkins' file would have taken almost as long as the review of Mr. Hopkins' file, given that there is no suggestion Mrs. Hopkins' injuries were as significant as her husband. These dockets will be deducted from the accounts, resulting in a deduction of $3,000 from Mr. Hopkins' account and $2,625 from Mrs. Hopkins' account.

[59] Finally, there is work billed that does not demonstrate value to the respondents.

[60] First, on December 4, 2018, Mr. Hopkins was billed for seven hours spent reviewing seven reports, by seven different medical professionals, all dated October 30, 2018. Each of these reports apparently relates to his catastrophic injury designation. That same day, the same lawyer billed three hours for preparation of the statement of claim with respect to the denial of his mortgage disability benefits. It is unreasonable to spend seven hours reviewing these reports given that the insurer accepted the extent of his injuries were catastrophic and the applicant had notice of that designation by November 27, 2018. These seven hours spent reviewing these reports are to be deducted from his account, resulting in a deduction of $2,625.

[61] Second, after Mr. Hopkins had been deemed to have suffered a catastrophic injury, and after the application before the License Appeal Tribunal had not been filed, counsel billed 36 hours for reviewing medical records. The dockets do not indicate the purpose of this review, or why it was necessary, given this stage of the litigation. As best the court can discern, the next step in the litigation was mediation for the tort claim that did not take place. These dates include:

• February 26, 2019 – seven hours
• April 8, 2019 – eight hours
• April 9, 2019 – nine hours
• July 9, 2019 – four hours
• July 23, 2019 – five hours
• August 12, 2019 – three hours

Accordingly, an additional 36 hours, or $13,500 are to be deducted from Mr. Hopkins' account.

[62] As stated above, it is difficult to assess the value of much of the work billed, given the vague nature of the dockets. It is extremely difficult to assess the value of the work billed after examinations for discovery were complete and the responses to undertakings were prepared, in and around early 2019. The affidavits filed are of no assistance. There is no chronology of the litigation to correspond the steps taken with the documents and during oral argument, counsel made no effort to review the accounts with the court.

[63] I cannot find that the accounts filed demonstrate value to the respondents after mid-March 2019. On Bradley's account, the firm billed an additional $8,888 from mid-March to the end of the retainer. Most of the entries relate to letters received or sent by paralegals, law clerks, and/or students. There is nothing to explain the purpose for this correspondence, nor is there any way to assess the value provided by this work. It would appear nothing was happening on the file. For the same period, Mrs. Hopkins was billed $7,150; the entries are similar. In my view, these amounts are excessive. In the absence of any evidence supporting or explaining the purpose for these entries, each account for this period will be reduced to one-third, resulting in a deduction of $5,925.33 from Mr. Hopkins' account and a deduction of $4,766.67 from Mrs. Hopkins' account.

[64] To summarize all of the above, $46,919.08 is deducted from Mr. Hopkins' account while $18,397.92 is deducted from Mrs. Hopkins' account.

The Legal Complexity of the Matter

[65] The applicant argues that this was a complex matter involving catastrophic injuries and presented "significant legal and procedural complexities."

[66] The respondents argue that from a liability standpoint, the tort claim was not at all complex, given it involved a rear-end motor vehicle collision. The respondents accept that the damages were complex, but that the quantification and assessment of those damages was performed by HSH; no experts were retained during the 44-months the applicant had carriage of the file.

The Degree of Responsibility Assumed by the Lawyer

[67] There is no dispute that the applicant had complete responsibility for the respondents' matters during its retainer, which supports a generous interpretation of their accounts.

The Monetary Value of the Matters at Issue

[68] The matters eventually settled for a total of $1,217,500 inclusive of HST.

[69] The applicant submits the fees claimed – a total of $158,920.38 – represents only 13 percent of the total settlement achieved and that the proportionate amount is evidence that the accounts are fair and reasonable.

[70] However, the applicant did not achieve the result in this matter. The applicant has not provided evidence or submissions to support their claim that it was their work on the file that made it possible for HSH to complete these matters within 15 months of their retainer.

The Importance of the Matter to the Client

[71] I have no doubt that the matters were extremely important to the respondents and that the catastrophic impairment designation was very important to Mr. Hopkins' ongoing care.

The Degree of Skill and Competence Demonstrated by the Lawyer

[72] The applicant submits that its skill and competence is demonstrated by achieving the catastrophic impairment designation. I accept that the applicant should be compensated for this work, and the work completed to advance the tort claim.

[73] However, the court is concerned that the applicant's materials are devoid of any mention of the solicitor's negligence claim. The results of that settlement are not before me. The applicant submits that it is irrelevant to the issues on the application.

[74] I disagree. The existence of the claim itself is some evidence that the degree of skill and competence demonstrated by the applicant fell short. That said, I cannot make a further deduction from the account on this basis.

The Results Achieved

[75] This factor allows for an assessment of whether the fee is disproportionate to the ultimate success of the claim.

[76] The respondents terminated the retainer before the matters were settled. It is difficult to parse how much the applicant's work contributed to the ultimate results achieved.

[77] Mr. Hopkins did achieve the catastrophic impairment as a result of the applicant's work and I see no reason to discount the value of that work or its importance to the respondents.

The Ability of the Client to Pay

[78] There is no issue with the respondents' ability to pay.

The Reasonable Expectation of the Client as to the Amount of Fees

[79] The retainer agreement provided for a 30 percent contingency fee plus HST. I have set out above my concerns with the contingency fee agreements in this case. I note that the respondents appear not to dispute the applicant's claim that they would have known that they would be responsible for fees at the hourly rate if the retainer came to an end.

[80] At the very least, the respondents were entitled to expect that the hours spent on their files would be properly docketed.

[81] According to the applicant, had it completed the matters, it would have been entitled to fees of $365,250. On a per-hour basis, the applicant is seeking fees in the amount of $140,637.50 plus HST. This is approximately 38.5 percent of the contingency fee it would have been entitled to, had it completed the work. For the applicant, the respondents could reasonably expect to pay less than 40 percent of the work performed by the applicant.

[82] The applicant placed heavy reliance on this proportional argument to establish the reasonableness of its fees. This approach does not at all assist in the quantum meruit analysis.

[83] The applicant did not complete the work on this file or achieve the settlements obtained. The respondents could not reasonably expect to compensate the applicant based on results obtained by another law firm.

[84] The applicant is entitled to the value of the work it provided, no more and no less. The respondents' expectation would be to compensate the applicant for the work it performed.

Conclusion

[85] Considering all of the Cohen factors, I find that the applicant provided work of value to the respondents. The firm took complete responsibility for the file and the matters were extremely important to the respondents. I accept that the catastrophic impairment designation was of value, and on this record, I am not prepared to find that the applicant did not exercise skill in achieving that result. I also find that to a point, the applicant advanced the tort claim with reasonable skill, though that matter was not as complex.

[86] The applicant's accounts are unreasonable and do not demonstrate value to the clients resulting in the deductions set out above.

[87] Mr. Hopkins' account, after the deductions above at paragraph 64, is assessed at $50,818.42, plus 13% HST for a total of $57,424.82.

[88] Mrs. Hopkins' account, after the deductions above at paragraph 64, is assessed at $24,502.08, plus 13% HST for a total of $27,687.35.

Costs

[89] Success on this motion was divided.

[90] If the issue of costs cannot be resolved between the parties, the applicant shall serve and file written submissions of no more than one page, double-spaced and in 12-pt font, plus a detailed bill of costs and copies of any offers to settle attached within 14 days of release of these reasons. Within seven days thereafter, the respondents may serve and file submissions of no more than one page, double-spaced and in 12-pt font, plus a detailed bill of costs and copies of any offers to settle attached. If a party does not meet these deadlines, there shall be no costs payable to that party. In the event there are no submissions filed in accordance with these timelines, and certainly no later than August 22, costs shall be deemed resolved.

[91] A copy of the submissions shall be sent to my attention at St.Catharines.SCJJA@ontario.ca in addition to being filed with the court.

A. J. Ohler, J.

Date Released: July 28, 2025