Court File and Parties

Superior Court of Justice – Ontario 7755 Hurontario Street, Brampton ON L6W 4T6

Re: Paradigm Change Consulting Inc., Balawnt Bhandal, Goginder Kaur Bhandal, and Navneet Bhandal, plaintiffs

And: Amanjeet Boparai, Vishvjeet Boparai, Shamsher Singh Brar, and Jaspal Kaur Boparai, defendants

Before: Justice Ranjan Agarwal

Counsel:

• Shayan Kamalie and Michael Campbell, for the plaintiffs (moving parties)
• Satish Mandalagiri, for the defendants (responding parties) Amanjeet Boparai, Vishvjeet Boparai, and Jaspal Kaur Boparai
• No one appearing for the defendant Shamsher Singh Brar

Heard: July 7, 2025

Endorsement

I. Introduction

[1] The plaintiffs were defrauded by Navdeep Boparai. He owes them at least $1.6m. At the same time that Navdeep was committing fraud, Navdeep's sons and wife bought several properties in Mississauga and Brampton. The plaintiffs allege that these transfers are fraudulent conveyances from Navdeep. On this motion, they seek a Mareva injunction over the Boparai defendants' assets.

[2] The Boparai defendants respond that the plaintiffs haven't provided particulars of their claim, making it an abuse of process. They submit that the statement of claim should be struck out.

[3] For the reasons discussed below, I endorse an order for a Mareva injunction, along with costs of $50,000. The plaintiffs have shown a strong prima facie case that Navdeep conveyed funds to the Boparai defendants to hinder judgment execution against him. Absent a freezing order, there's a serious risk that the Boparai defendants may dissipate or encumber these assets. And their defence has no merit—the plaintiffs have provided enough information for the Boparai defendants to know the case they have to meet.

II. Background

A. Facts

[4] The plaintiffs Balwant Bhandal and Goginder Bhandal are the plaintiff Navneet Bhandal's parents. Navneet owns and operates the plaintiff Paradigm Change Consulting Inc.

[5] The family made three investments with Navdeep between 2017 and 2019. In Paradigm Change Consulting Inc. v. Boparai, 2024 ONSC 7068, Justice Wilkinson found that Navdeep defrauded the plaintiffs. She granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs against Navdeep and his companies for $1,617,679.53.

[6] Justice Wilkinson described the fraud that led to this judgment in her reasons. The parties are related by marriage. The plaintiffs invested in a private mortgage on a property in Wellandport, Ontario, through Navdeep. In April 2019, he told them that the property had been sold, and they were owed around $1.2m. He offered them another investment opportunity in North Bay, Ontario. But the plaintiffs weren't willing to invest in that project until they received the funds from the Wellandport investment. As a result, Navdeep then sent the plaintiffs four payments totalling $1,354,101 as repayment of their initial investment, and they concurrently sent him four payments totaling $1.355m to invest in the North Bay project.

[7] Later, after he was sued, Navdeep admitted that he didn't actually have the funds from the Wellandport investment to pay back the plaintiffs: the "exchange of funds that [Navdeep] orchestrated made it appear that the Plaintiffs were receiving and then re-investing their funds in the North Bay project, when in fact they never actually received the funds." See Paradigm Change, at para 137. Navdeep's representation that he was returning the plaintiffs' investment to them was false.

[8] Separate from the Wellandport/North Bay fraud, Balwant paid $400,000 to Navdeep to set up a family trust. The funds weren't paid back. Though Navdeep acknowledged the debt, he said it was a loan. Justice Wilkinson rejected this characterization and ordered him to repay the funds.

[9] Navdeep's appeal was dismissed, with reasons to follow. The balance of the plaintiffs' claim against Navdeep was tried in June 2025. The trial judge reserved.

[10] The defendant Jaspal Boparai is Navdeep's wife. The defendants Amanjeet Boparai and Vishvjeet Boparai are Navdeep's sons. The defendant Shamsher Brah is Jaspal's nephew—the plaintiffs aren't seeking an injunction against him.

[11] The plaintiffs allege that Navdeep engaged in several fraudulent conveyances to the Boparai defendants designed to hide his ill-gotten gains from the plaintiffs.

B. Litigation History

[12] Paradigm initially sued Navdeep for breach of contract in November 2022. The plaintiffs changed lawyers, and started a fraud claim against Navdeep and his companies in June 2023. They obtained a Mareva injunction against Navdeep in November 2023. Again, the court granted partial summary judgment against Navdeep and his companies in June 2024.

[13] The plaintiffs started this action in July 2024. The plaintiffs allege breach of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, RSO 1990, c F.29, against all of the defendants. They also plead breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment against Jaspal.

[14] In response to the claim, the defendants demanded particulars from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs supplied particulars two weeks later.

[15] The Boparai defendants then changed lawyers. Their new lawyer demanded more particulars. The plaintiffs contended that the particulars sought by the Boparai defendants were "improper" and "not sent in good faith". That said, the plaintiffs supplied particulars again a week later.

[16] The Boparai defendants were unsatisfied. As a result, they moved to strike the statement of claim. While that motion was pending, the plaintiffs moved for a Mareva injunction. They also moved, without notice, for an interim non-dissipation order. At a case conference in May 2025, the parties consented to an interim order until the hearing of the plaintiffs' motion for a Mareva injunction.

[17] In late June 2025, the plaintiffs were granted a without notice order for a certificate of pending litigation over two properties owned by the Boparai defendants.

[18] For the plaintiffs' motion, the defendants rely on an affidavit from Vishvjeet. He was cross-examined in February 2025. I found that Vishvjeet was evasive and unresponsive. I ordered him to re-attend for cross-examination, which he did. Vishvjeet served an undertakings chart, along with several documents, just before the motion hearing.

C. Law

1. Mareva Injunctions Generally

[19] An interlocutory injunction may be granted by an interlocutory order, where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so. See Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 101(1). A Mareva injunction, also known as a freezing order or non-dissipation order, prevents a defendant from dealing with their assets. See Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A., [1980] 1 All ER 213 (CA).

[20] The test for an interlocutory Mareva injunction is:

(a) a strong prima facie case;

(b) whether the defendants have assets in the jurisdiction;

(c) a serious risk of dissipation of those assets;

(d) irreparable harm will be suffered without the Mareva order;

(e) the balance of convenience favours the moving party; and

(f) an undertaking on damages.

See SFC Litigation Trust v. Chan, 2017 ONSC 1815 (Div Ct), at para 17, citing Chitel v. Rothbart (1982), 39 OR (2d) 513 (CA), at para 41.

[21] In Chitel and SFC, the courts identified two other guidelines for an interlocutory injunction:

(a) the plaintiff make full and frank disclosure of material facts; and

(b) the plaintiff tell the court of any material facts or points of law that favoured the other side.

[22] The Boparai defendants pressed these two guidelines in their factum. But these requirements apply only when the plaintiff moves for a Mareva injunction without notice. Both Chitel and SFC were without notice cases. See also Business Development Bank of Canada v. Aventura II Properties Inc., 2016 ONCA 300, at para 23. But this motion is with notice. As a result, these specific guidelines don't apply.

2. Fraudulent Conveyances

[23] Every conveyance of real property or personal property made with intent to defeat, hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties, or forfeitures are void as against such persons and their assigns. See Fraudulent Conveyances Act, s 2.

[24] A creditor is entitled to invoke the Fraudulent Conveyances Act to recover the proceeds of a conveyance void under the statute from a fraudulent transferee. The fraudulent transferee is and bears all the liability of a trustee of the property or its proceeds for the benefit of creditors. See Allen v. Hennessey (1997), 107 OAC 69, at para 5 (CA).

[25] The elements of a fraudulent conveyance claim are (a) the plaintiff is a creditor (i.e., a person to whom a debt is due); (b) the debtor is an insolvent person or unable to pay their debts in full; and (c) the debtor conveyed their property to another person with intent to defeat, hinder, delay, or prejudice creditors. See EnerWorks Inc. v. Glenbarra Energy Solutions Inc., 2012 ONSC 414, at para 51.

[26] The types of facts that can support an inference of such an intention to convey property away from creditors—present or future—are often described as "badges of fraud":

• the debtor's financial state at the time of the transaction was precarious, including deficiencies in income, assets, solvency, and an inability to pay debts

• the existence of a family or close relationship between the parties to the transaction

• the transfer effectively divested the debtor of a substantial portion or all of their assets

• the transfer had the effect of defeating, hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors

• there was evidence of haste in making the transaction

• there was evidence of secrecy, fabrication, falsehood, destruction or loss of documents, or suspicious circumstances in the making of the transaction

• the transaction occurred near in time to notice of debts or claims against the debtor

• the consideration for the transfer did not correspond to the value of the property

• the absence of a business purpose or other justification for the transaction

• the transferor retained possession or use of the property

• the transferor retained a benefit or an ownership interest in the property

See Ontario Securities Commission v. Camerlengo Holdings Inc., 2023 ONCA 93, at para 12.

3. Particulars

[27] Every pleading shall contain a concise statement of the material facts that the party relies on for the claim, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 25.06(1). Where fraud is alleged, the pleading shall contain full particulars, but knowledge may be alleged as a fact without pleading the circumstances from which it is to be inferred. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 25.06(8).

[28] Particulars are ordered, first, to clarify a pleading sufficiently to enable the adverse party to frame their answer, and, second, to prevent surprise at trial. See Antonacci v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (2000), 181 DLR (4th) 577 (Ont CA), at para 33. Particulars for pleadings are normally ordered only if (a) they're not within the knowledge of the party demanding them; and (b) they're necessary to enable the other party to plead their response. See Pennyfeather v. Timminco Limited, 2011 ONSC 4257, at para 61.

[29] Before particulars are ordered, the pleadings themselves should satisfy the requirements of the rules. When a pleading fails to meet the requirements of the rules, the appropriate remedy is not particulars but the striking out of the pleading, usually with leave to amend. See Pennyfeather, at para 52.

[30] The court may strike out or expunge all or part of a pleading, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that the pleading is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 25.11. A statement of claim is scandalous if the pleading is irrelevant, argumentative, inserted for colour, or contains bare allegations. It's frivolous and vexatious if it's devoid of material facts. It's scandalous and vexatious if the document contains only argument, or makes "unfounded and inflammatory attacks" on the other party's integrity. See George v. Harris, [2000] OJ no 1762 (Sup Ct), at para 20. That said, motions under rule 25.11 should be granted only in the "clearest of cases". See Air Canada v. WestJet Airlines Ltd. (2004), 72 OR (3d) 669 (Sup Ct), at para 6.

III. Analysis and Disposition

A. Issue #1: Should the Statement of Claim Be Struck as Scandalous, Frivolous, or Vexatious?

[31] The Boparai defendants argue that the statement of claim is devoid of material facts, or pleads facts about Navdeep that aren't in their knowledge. As a result, they argue that the statement of claim is frivolous or vexatious. The plaintiffs respond that they have pleaded all of the material facts in their knowledge. They submit that the defendants know the other facts, which is shown by Vishvjeet's evidence on the Mareva injunction.

[32] I agree with the plaintiffs. They have pleaded sufficient facts to enable the Boparai defendants to frame their answer. Their second response provides further particulars. If they haven't pleaded all of the facts, these facts are in the Boparai defendants' knowledge.

[33] The rest of the particulars demanded by the Boparai defendants aren't necessary to clarify the pleading. For example, the Boparai defendants demand to know why Navdeep isn't a party to this action. That's not a material fact necessary to defend the claim. Similarly, the Boparai defendants request "any pleadings, defence, cross examination transcripts or court orders taken for any action related to the cause action" against Navdeep, and the "status of any proceedings" against Navdeep. Again, the Boparai defendants don't need this information to file a statement of defence.

[34] As a result, there's no basis to strike the statement of claim as scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious. I endorse an order that the Boparai defendants shall deliver a statement of defence by August 27, 2025.

B. Issue #2: Do the Plaintiffs Have a Strong Prima Facie Case for Fraudulent Conveyance?

[35] My analysis focuses on the plaintiffs' fraudulent conveyance claims. Though the plaintiffs also argue that they have a strong prima facie case of fraud and breach of contract against Jaspal, I don't need to consider this submission given my finding that there's a strong prima facie case for fraudulent conveyance.

[36] At the outset, it's important to note that the plaintiffs aren't alleging that Vishvjeet or Amanjeet are parties to Navdeep's fraud. If the plaintiffs succeed in proving that Navdeep conveyed money to Vishvjeet, Amanjeet, or Jaspal to prejudice the plaintiffs from recovering their stolen funds, then those transactions would be voided. The plaintiffs would have a right to recover from Vishvjeet, Amanjeet, or Jaspal, who would be holding the conveyed assets in trust for the plaintiffs.

[37] As a result, on this motion, the plaintiffs need only show that they have a strong prima facie case for fraudulent conveyance against Navdeep. On that point, there's no dispute that the plaintiffs are Navdeep's creditors—under the judgment, he owes them $1.6m. As of the hearing of this motion, he's not paid that debt in full and there's no stay of proceedings.

[38] Thus, the only issue is whether the plaintiffs have a strong prima facie case that Navdeep conveyed money or property to the Boparai defendants to defeat or prejudice the plaintiffs. Based on the totality of the evidence, I find that the plaintiffs have a strong prima facie case that he did just that.

1. Preliminary Issue: The Scope of the Boparai Defendants' Response

[39] In response to the plaintiffs' arguments, the Boparai defendants submit that there's a reasonable explanation for most or all of the impugned transactions. Their lawyer pointed to various documents that he says explain away the plaintiffs' suspicions.

[40] The problem here is that the Boparai defendants didn't depose to any of these explanations. Only Vishvjeet swore an affidavit for this motion. There's no evidence from Amanjeet or Jaspal. And Vishvjeet's affidavit has no substantive evidence. His approach to his motion is disclosed by his evidence:

I am not in a position to provide any information regarding the purchase of the properties at 14 Fairmont Close, Brampton and 16 Fairmont Close, Brampton, given that the Plaintiffs have not provided particulars as requested from them pertaining to any factual information or evidence they have with regards to the allegations containing paragraph 43 of the statement of claim; the paragraph 70 of the affidavit is a copy of those allegations.

[41] When Vishvjeet was cross-examined the first time, he was evasive and non-responsive. For example, the plaintiffs asked, "What does your corporation do?" Vishvjeet's answer: "I have a business. I'm not here to discuss that." Vishvjeet's lawyer added: "That's his answer. He has own business. That's it." Another example: the plaintiffs asked, "Has your mother worked in the last decade?" The answer: "I'm not here to answer what my mom does or not."

[42] When Vishvjeet was cross-examined again just before the motion hearing, he was more cooperative. He produced hundreds of pages of documents to support the bona fides of the impugned transactions. But, as I discuss below, he never explained these documents. He didn't come prepared for the cross-examination. He could've provided an explanation in his undertakings chart. Or he could've moved for leave to deliver an affidavit under Rules of Civil Procedure, r 39.02(2). Instead, he just dumped the documents into the record.

[43] The Boparai defendants argue that the timetable for this motion didn't allow them to sufficiently respond. As I discuss below, I don't accept that explanation. The Boparai defendants made a strategic decision not to respond to the substantive allegations made against them. They have known the case they need to meet since September 2024. They know or ought to know that Navdeep, their father and husband, has been found liable for fraudulent misrepresentation. Even if they believe this lawsuit is a nuisance, they could've and should've put into evidence their version of the events. Any compression in the timetable was caused by Vishvjeet's non-cooperation on the first cross-examination.

2. Background

[44] The Boparai defendants didn't provide their evidence in a narrative. As a result, I've had to piece together the background facts from Vishvjeet's affidavit, his cross-examination transcripts, and his undertakings chart.

i. The Boparai Defendants' Employment

[45] Vishvjeet is in his mid-30s. He worked as an insurance agent from 2017 to 2020, earning around $55,000 annually. He became a mortgage agent in 2021, and earned $330,000 that year. Then, he started a digital marketing and sales business in 2022—he hasn't filed tax returns but estimates the business earned between $20,000 and $50,000 since then, though he's on track to earn over $100,000 in 2025.

[46] Amanjeet is in his early 30s. He has a university degree, and works for a bank as a mortgage agent. Amanjeet earned between $40,000 and $50,000 in 2017 and 2018, but his income has increased to over six figures since then. It's ranged between $170,000 and $620,000, averaging around $360,000.

[47] Jaspal retired in 2017 or 2018. She has not earned any employment income since then.

ii. The Properties

[48] Amanjeet and Vishvjeet are frequent real estate investors. They have been buying and selling properties since 2014. They have owned 10 properties in the Greater Toronto Area, Edmonton, and Ottawa. The plaintiffs have focused their submissions on three transactions that they submit are suspicious.

[49] On April 30, 2019, Navdeep and Jaspal sold the house at 33 Summitgreen Crescent, Brampton, to Amanjeet and Vishvjeet for $899,989.05. Amanjeet and Vishvjeet funded the purchase through a $193,855.63 downpayment and a $719,600 mortgage. Amanjeet paid the downpayment by bank draft.

[50] I don't know much else about this sale. For example, I don't know if this was a principal residence or an investment property. I don't know if Navdeep or Jaspal had a mortgage on the property, or what they did with the equity. If this was Navdeep and Jaspal's primary residence, I don't know where they lived after the sale. Given that Navdeep, Amanjeet, and Vishvjeet live together or next door since then, it's plausible that all four of them continued to live at 33 Summitgreen Crescent but the ownership, for unknown reasons, changed. I also don't know where Amanjeet got the downpayment funds from. To the extent that the answers to these questions are buried somewhere in the hundreds of pages of undertaking answers, they weren't brought to my attention.

[51] For context, the sale of the Wellandport property closed on April 1, 2019. Navdeep's fraudulent exchange of funds happened in June 2019. The issues around the alleged family trust happened in November and December 2019.

[52] On February 7, 2020, Amanjeet and Vishvjeet sold 33 Summitgreen Crescent to a third party for $995,000. After discharging the mortgage, Amanjeet and Vishvjeet each received $113,181.14 from the sale. I don't know where they or their parents lived immediately after this sale.

[53] On March 19, 2020, Amanjeet and Vishvjeet bought a house at 14 Fairmont Close, Brampton, for $1.7m. They paid $750,000 as a downpayment, and borrowed $950,000 under a mortgage.

[54] The source of Amanjeet's and Vishvjeet's downpayment was the subject of much debate at the hearing, again because they didn't explain this transaction. In the end, I accept that they used the $225,000 they got from the sale of 33 Summitgreen Crescent and their bank gave them a bridge loan of $480,000.

[55] Amanjeet lives at 14 Fairmont Close with Navdeep. I don't know where Jaspal lives, though I infer it's with Amanjeet and Navdeep. I also don't know where Vishvjeet lived. It's plausible that he also lived at 14 Fairmont Close.

[56] On March 31, 2020, Amanjeet and Vishvjeet sold the house at 20 Attraction Drive, Brampton, to a third party for $1.16m. I infer that this was an investment property. After discharging the mortgage and paying off the bridge loan, there was a shortfall of $15,476.83.

[57] On August 18, 2021, Shamsher and Jaspal bought a house at 86 Torrance Woods, Brampton, for $1.292m. Vishvjeet's evidence is that Shamsher didn't qualify for a mortgage, so Jaspal agreed to help him because she had a good credit history. The down payment was $259,179.57. There's no evidence from either Jaspal or Shamsher, so I don't know how Shamsher funded this down payment.

[58] On May 16, 2023, Amanjeet and Vishvjeet bought the house at 16 Fairmont Close, Brampton—next door to 14 Fairmont Close—for $2.459m. Vishvjeet lives in this house. They didn't borrow any money to pay the purchase price—it was "in cash". Vishvjeet's evidence about where he and Amanjeet got the funds to buy this house was confusing and inconsistent:

• Vishvjeet's affidavit said nothing about this transaction

• on his first cross-examination, he refused to disclose where they got the funds

• he also said that he had not received any money from Navdeep since 2017

• on his second cross-examination, he was evasive about the source of the funds—eventually he testified that Navdeep gave him a loan through their respective businesses

• Vishvjeet testified that they had applied for a mortgage but it was delayed, so they needed a private loan

• in Vishvjeet's undertaking answers, he produced a loan agreement between his numbered company and Banta Singh Rai/Trust Settler Boparai 2018 Family Trust

• the loan agreement was signed by Navpreet Singh for the Trust, which the Boparai defendants' lawyer says is Navdeep's brother

• Vishvjeet testified that Navdeep facilitated the actual signing of the loan document

• the loan has favourable terms—it's an unsecured, 10-year loan with a three percent interest rate payable at the end of the loan term

[59] On June 16, 2023, Amanjeet and Vishvjeet borrowed $1.2m, which is secured by a charge on the 16 Fairmont Close property. But Vishvjeet didn't use the loan proceeds to pay back the Trust: "Why pay back the loan - like I got a mortgage for like, I think, now 25/30 years, why I don't have to pay that back immediately? You have time to pay it back."

[60] For context, Paradigm first sued Navdeep in December 2022. The second lawsuit was started on June 12, 2023.

3. Analysis and Disposition

[61] If the court draws the inference of fraudulent intent due to the existence of badges of fraud, then an evidentiary burden falls to the defendants to explain their conduct to try to rebut the inference of fraudulent intent. See Purcaru v. Seliverstova, 2015 ONSC 6679, at para 11.

[62] Again, there's no evidence from Amanjeet or Jaspal. Vishvjeet's evidence has come in fits and starts. His affidavit doesn't try to rebut the inferences. His first cross-examination was an exercise in obfuscation. He didn't come prepared for his second cross-examination. He then produced hundreds of pages of documents without any explanation, leaving these inferences largely unchallenged. If Navdeep didn't fund these various purchases, either directly or indirectly, the Boparai defendants haven't said so.

[63] At bottom, the evidence on this motion raises several badges of fraud. This evidence leads me to infer that the plaintiffs have a strong prima facie case that Navdeep conveyed funds to the Boparai defendants with the intent of making himself judgment-proof:

• around the same time Navdeep was defrauding the plaintiffs, he and Jaspal sold the 33 Summitgreen Crescent property to Vishvjeet and Amanjeet—there's a reasonable inference that the family continued living together, which makes the transfer suspicious

• Amanjeet and Vishvjeet haven't been transparent about where they got the funds for the downpayment on this property—they're lawyer says they had good incomes at this time, but that's insufficient to rebut the inference that Navdeep contributed funds

• Navdeep has continued to live with Amanjeet even though he's not on title, leading to the inference that he's intentionally avoided accumulating exigible assets but has some indirect ownership interest in these properties

• the late disclosure of the Boparai Trust is suspicious—there's no evidence about the trustee or the beneficiaries, or the terms of the trust

• on cross-examination, Vishvjeet believed that Navdeep loaned him the money to buy 16 Fairmont Close—given that Navdeep facilitated the paperwork, there's a strong inference that he has some control over the Boparai Trust or the funds in the Boparai Trust even if he's not a signatory

• Vishvjeet's explanation for not paying back that loan doesn't make sense—the effect of this transaction was to transfer over $2m from the Boparai Trust to Vishvjeet, with no security and exceedingly favourable payment terms

• the loan for 16 Fairmont Close happened reasonably soon after Paradigm sued Navdeep, and it closed days after the fraud claim was served

• Jaspal's participation in the purchase of 86 Torrance Woods is suspicious—it seems unlikely that a bank would lend Shamsher over $1m based on the credit score of an unemployed retiree with no known assets

• it's a reasonable inference that Navdeep contributed funds to buy this house, and Jaspal went on title as security

C. Issue #3: Is There a Serious Risk of Dissipation of the Defendants' Assets?

[64] There's some direct evidence of a risk of dissipation. Amanjeet acknowledged loaning $103,000 to Harjit Brah, who is related to Shamsher. Amanjeet didn't produce any information about the borrower or the loan terms other than a bank draft showing the payment. This evidence shows that Amanjeet is prepared to give money away with no security or even a promissory note.

[65] The requirement that there be risk of removal or dissipation can also be established by inference, rather than direct evidence. That inference can arise from the circumstances of the fraud itself, taken in the context of all the surrounding circumstances. See 2092280 Ontario Inc. v. Voralto Group Inc., 2018 ONSC 2305 (Div Ct), at paras 22-23.

[66] In this case, Navdeep's fraud involves the buying, selling, and mortgaging of real estate properties. He was a mortgage broker before FSCO suspended his license. The Boparai defendants are sophisticated real estate investors, with multiple properties and the aptitude to buy and sell real estate often. Amanjeet is a mortgage agent, and Vishvjeet has experience as a mortgage agent.

[67] Given these surrounding circumstances, I infer that there is a serious risk that if no injunction is ordered, the Boparai defendants will either sell the properties they own or encumber them to the point that even if plaintiffs can trace their stolen funds to these assets, they won't be able to execute judgment.

D. Issue #4: Will the Plaintiff Suffer Irreparable Harm Without the Mareva Order?

[68] Irreparable harm is harm that either can't be quantified in monetary terms or that can't be cured, usually because one party can't collect damages from the other. See Ontario Securities Commission v. Cacoeli Asset Management Inc., 2025 ONCA 465, at para 18.

[69] In cases where a strong prima facie case for fraud has been established, if the defendants' assets aren't secured, the plaintiff will likely not be able to collect on a money judgment. In this case, the plaintiffs have established irreparable harm by the nature of the alleged fraud and the unexplained conveyances to the Boparai defendants. See Nanji v. Karmali, 2025 ONSC 3074, at para 59.

E. Issue #5: Does the Balance of Convenience Favour the Plaintiffs?

[70] When a strong prima facie case of fraud and irreparable harm have been demonstrated, as here, the balance of convenience favours granting the requested order. See Nanji, at para 59.

IV. Conclusion

[71] I endorse an order for a Mareva injunction against the Boparai defendants. The plaintiffs can send my judicial assistant a draft order. To the extent that the order differs from the Commercial List Users' Committee's model order, the plaintiffs will also email a blackline to the model order showing all variations sought from the model order.

[72] To ensure that this case proceeds expeditiously to trial, I'm ordering the following timetable:

• the defendants' statement of defence shall be delivered by August 27, 2025

• the plaintiffs' reply, if any, shall be delivered by September 8, 2025

• the parties shall serve affidavits of documents by October 8, 2025

• the parties shall complete examinations for discovery by December 8, 2025

• the parties shall honour their undertakings by February 6, 2026

• I strongly encourage the parties to use rule 34.12(2) for refusals but if a refusals motion is necessary, the moving party shall deliver and upload their motion record, refusals and undertakings chart, draft order, factum for a motion in writing, and costs outline by February 20, 2026

• the responding party shall deliver and upload their motion record, refusals and undertakings chart, factum, and costs outline by February 25, 2026

• the plaintiffs shall set this action down for trial by March 31, 2026

• this timetable can't be amended by the parties

V. Costs

[73] Subject to the provisions of an act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid. See Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 131.

[74] In exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs, the court may consider, together with the result in the proceeding and any offer to settle or to contribute made in writing, the factors listed in rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[75] In the usual case, costs are awarded to the prevailing party after judgment has been given. The traditional purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful party in respect of the expenses sustained either defending a claim that in the end proved unfounded (if the successful party was the defendant), or in pursuing a valid legal right (if the plaintiff prevailed). Costs awards are "in the nature of damages awarded to the successful litigant against the unsuccessful, and by way of compensation for the expense to which he has been put by the suit improperly brought". See British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, at paras 20-21.

[76] The main objective is to fix an amount of costs that is objectively reasonable, fair, and proportionate for the unsuccessful party to pay in the circumstances of the case, rather than to fix an amount based on the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant. See Boucher v. Public Accountants Council (Ontario), at para 26.

[77] That said, it would be unusual to award costs of an interlocutory injunction motion to the successful plaintiff before trial. As there has been no final determination of the parties' rights, but only an order to protect the plaintiff's position pending trial, the preferable course is to reserve the question of costs to the trial judge. See Hon Robert J Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance, looseleaf (November 2024), §2:42.

[78] This is one of those unusual cases where costs should follow the event. The plaintiffs succeeded on both motions. The plaintiffs' costs are $59,325 on a full indemnity basis. The Boparai defendants' costs are $58,959.74. Given the parity in costs between the parties, the plaintiffs' costs are necessarily proportionate and within the Boparai defendants' reasonable expectations. The Boparai defendants' conduct of these motion made the proceeding more complex than they should've been. The particulars motion was meritless. As a result, I find that a fair and reasonable amount is $50,000, inclusive fees and disbursements. I endorse an order that the Boparai defendants shall pay the costs on or before August 27, 2025.

July 28, 2025

Agarwal J