Reasons for Judgment

Court File No.: CV-21-75279
Date: 2025-01-20
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
Bazar McBean LLP, Plaintiff
– and –
1583057 Ontario Inc. operating as The Pop Shoppe and Brian Alger, Defendants

Appearances:
Daniel Lilko, for the Plaintiff
Brian Alger, self-represented, for the Defendants

Heard: September 3 and 6, 2024

Justice L. Sheard

Introduction

[1] The plaintiff seeks judgment against the defendants, 1583057 Ontario Inc., operating as The Pop Shoppe (“Pop Shoppe”), and its principal, Brian Alger, for the balance owing on four invoices rendered in respect of accounting services provided to Pop Shoppe.

[2] As at the date of trial, the plaintiff claims $155,649.21, representing the balance owing on the four invoices of $57,620.96, plus interest on the balance of $98,028.25.

[3] In the alternative, the plaintiff claimed damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit and, in the further alternative, relief according to the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16 (the “OBCA”).

[4] The defendants were unrepresented at trial, and, on consent, an order was granted permitting Mr. Alger to represent Pop Shoppe.

[5] The trial proceeded by way of Simplified Procedure. The plaintiff’s evidence in chief was given by way of the affidavit of David Bazar, the principal of the plaintiff, sworn July 26, 2024. The defendants did not submit an affidavit, and, on consent, Mr. Alger testified orally on behalf of the defendants. Both witnesses were cross-examined at trial.

[6] The defendants raised several defences including that: 1) the invoiced amounts were excessive; 2) the services rendered were unauthorized; 3) Mr. Alger is not personally liable; and 4) the claims, or some of them, are statute-barred.

Facts

The Parties

[7] Bazar McBean LLP is a limited liability partnership. David Bazar is a chartered professional accountant and a principal of the plaintiff.

[8] The plaintiff has provided various personal and corporate accounting services to Mr. Alger and his corporations since 2004.

[9] Brian Alger is the principal, shareholder, and sole officer and director of Pop Shoppe.

The Invoices

[10] The statement of claim was issued on February 12, 2021. The plaintiff seeks payment owing in respect of the following four invoices (collectively “the Invoices”) rendered in respect of accounting services provided to Pop Shoppe:

• (i) Invoice No. Z161050, dated May 25, 2016, in the total amount of $26,549.35, inclusive of GST/HST (“Invoice #1”);
• (ii) Invoice No. Z170997, dated June 21, 2017, in the total amount of $10,735, inclusive of GST/HST (“Invoice #2”);
• (iii) Invoice number Z171310, dated November 8, 2017, in the total amount of $1,060.79, inclusive of GST/HST (“Invoice #3”); and
• (iv) Invoice number Z201752 dated November 16, 2020, in the total amount of $19,275.82, inclusive of GST/HST (“Invoice #4”).

[11] Invoices #1, #2, and #4 contain:

• (a) a fee text indicating the services rendered;
• (b) the fee and GST/HST amounts charged; and
• (c) payment terms printed at the bottom of the page: Accounts due when rendered, interest on overdue accounts at the rate of 1.25% per month (16.1% per annum).

[12] Invoice #3 contains no fee text and, at trial, reference to Mr. Bazar’s dockets was required to understand what services were rendered.

[13] The defendants acknowledge receipt of Invoices #1 and #2.

[14] Mr. Alger’s evidence was that he has no recollection or record of receiving Invoice #3 and the defendants deny receiving Invoice #4 until after being served with the Statement of Claim (the “Claim”). Mr. Alger does not dispute that the services covered by Invoice #4 were rendered.

[15] Mr. Bazar’s evidence was that he handed invoices to Mr. Alger when they met. However, the plaintiff provided no evidence to establish that Invoices #3 or #4 were delivered prior to service of the Claim. Mr. Bazar’s dockets do not record a meeting with Mr. Alger at or near the date of Invoice #3. Also, his dockets indicate that the last time he met with Mr. Alger was on February 15, 2020, well prior to the date of Invoice #4.

Interest on Invoices

[16] Mr. Bazar asserted that at all times, he intended to claim interest on the overdue accounts in accordance with the wording set out in the Invoices and referenced in Engagement Letters and Representation Letters signed by Mr. Alger.

[17] Mr. Alger testified that although Mr. Bazar never explicitly told him so, he always felt that he could pay the Invoices over time. As of 2016, Mr. Alger and the plaintiff had had a professional relationship for 12 years. He paid invoices when he was able to and Mr. Bazar never demanded payment of interest.

[18] Mr. Alger testified that the plaintiff never sent him statements showing amounts outstanding on the Invoices and/or interest owing. The plaintiff was unable to offer evidence to contradict Mr. Alger’s testimony.

[19] Mr. Alger acknowledged receiving an email on March 17, 2017 that listed outstanding invoices, however, it did not mention interest owing. Mr. Bazar’s evidence was that no mention is made of interest, as the email simply listed the invoices on which a balance was owing and was not a statement.

The Engagement Letters

[20] The defendant produced three Engagement Letters, each signed by Mr. Alger. One is dated September 1, 2015, and two are dated March 2, 2019. Each Engagement Letter set out the scope of the work to be performed and that the fees would be charged on the basis of time spent by the service provider, charged at the hourly rates set out.

[21] The following is taken from the September 1, 2015 Engagement Letter and is found in all the Engagement Letters:

Fees will be determined on the basis of time spent on this engagement at our regular hourly rates…Interest on overdue accounts will be charged at 1.25% monthly (16.1% annually). By acceptance of this engagement letter, you personally agree to be responsible for our fees, disbursements and interest and you agree that we may obtain credit card and other personal information about you and the company and may share that information for credit and collection purposes.

The arrangements outlined in this letter will continue in effect from year to year unless changed by mutual agreement. If at any time our services as your accountants are no longer required, you will notify us in writing and deliver such notice by registered mail.

[22] Mr. Alger acknowledged that he assumed that fees were charged in accordance with the Engagement Letters.

[23] Mr. Alger acknowledges signing the Engagement Letters but testified that it did not occur to him that he was signing in his personal capacity.

The Representation Letters

[24] The plaintiff also produced three Representation Letters, signed by Mr. Alger, dated September 1, 2015, March 2, 2019 and June 4, 2019. Each letter stated that should the company be unable to pay the defendant’s fees and interest, the [undersigned – Mr. Alger] would be personally liable to do so.

[25] The latter two Representation Letters made specific reference to Invoice #1 stating:

Your invoice #Z161050 for $26,549.35 dated May 25, 2016 remains unpaid, due to cash flow issues only but it has been reviewed and it is satisfactory and will be paid. This representation is being made for the benefit of Bazar McBean LLP, and no claim will be made that the invoice should not be paid in full.

[26] Invoices #2 and #3 had been delivered and, according to Mr. Bazar, were outstanding as at June 4, 2019. Those Invoices are not mentioned in any of the Representation Letters.

[27] Mr. Alger’s evidence was that until he was served with the Claim, he was aware only that Invoice #1 and, “possibly”, a second invoice, were outstanding.

[28] The plaintiff produced time dockets for the work performed in respect of the Invoices. Unless stated otherwise in these reasons, the defendants have not put forth any evidence to challenge this evidence.

Plaintiff’s Oppression Remedy Claim

[29] As alternative relief, the plaintiff asks for a declaration that the defendants effected or intended to effect a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or disregards the interests of the plaintiff, or that Pop Shoppe operated in a manner that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff, a creditor.

[30] While this relief was not strongly pursued at trial, the plaintiff did lead evidence in support of the plaintiff’s allegation that the Pop Shoppe used funds to finance a related corporation, Mother’s Pizza, and to declare a dividend to Mr. Alger at a time when the plaintiff was owed $37,284.35.

[31] According to Mr. Alger, Pop Shoppe’s 2017 financial statements, prepared by Mr. Bazar, incorrectly show that investment as a loan from Pop Shoppe to Mother’s, which was not his intention. In any event, that financial transaction occurred years prior to the invoices that are the subject of this litigation.

[32] I accept the explanation from Mr. Alger that he improperly or, in error, took money from Pop Shoppe, rather than from his own bank account, which was his intention at the time.

[33] In their Statement of Defence (the “Defence”), the defendants deny that Mr. Alger breached the parties’ reasonable expectations engaging the oppression remedy provisions of the OBCA. In addition, the defendants assert that the plaintiff does not have standing as a creditor of the Pop Shoppe to trigger the relief afforded under section 248 of the OBCA to allow a finding that Mr. Alger is personally liable to the plaintiff.

[34] In my view, the plaintiff has failed in establishing this alternate ground of liability and, in particular, I find that the evidence does not establish that there is a financial connection between Pop Shoppe and Mother’s.

Preliminary Findings of Fact

[35] Based on the evidence before me, I make these preliminary findings of fact:

1. Invoice #1 was personally delivered to the defendants at a meeting between Mr. Bazar and Mr. Alger;
2. No payments have been made toward Invoice #1;
3. Invoice #2 was personally delivered to the defendants at a meeting between Mr. Bazar and Mr. Alger; and
4. Invoice #3 and Invoice #4 only came to the attention of the defendants on or after the commencement of the Claim.

Issue #1: Are any of the plaintiff’s claims statute-barred?

[36] As noted at the outset of these reasons, a significant issue to be determined was whether a claim for payment of any of the Invoices is barred by operation of law.

The Law

[37] The plaintiff’s claim is subject to the Limitations Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 24, Sch B (the “Act”). Under s. 4 of the Act, a claim is statute-barred unless brought within two years of the date on which it was discovered.

[38] Subject to s. 13 of the Act, the limitation period on the plaintiff’s claims would begin to run on the second anniversary of the date on which the plaintiff “discovered” that an Invoice was unpaid.

[39] Relevant to the facts in this case, s. 13 of the Act provides that in respect of a claim for payment of a liquidated sum, the limitation period can be reset in certain circumstances and reads, in part, as follows:

Acknowledgments
13 (1) If a person acknowledges liability in respect of a claim for payment of a liquidated sum, the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a charge on personal property or relief from enforcement of a charge on personal property, the act or omission on which the claim is based shall be deemed to have taken place on the day on which the acknowledgment was made.
(2) An acknowledgment of liability in respect of a claim for interest is an acknowledgment of liability in respect of a claim for the principal and for interest falling due after the acknowledgment is made.
(8) Subject to subsections (9) and (10), this section applies to an acknowledgment of liability in respect of a claim for payment of a liquidated sum even though the person making the acknowledgment refuses or does not promise to pay the sum or the balance of the sum still owing.
(9) This section does not apply unless the acknowledgment is made to the person with the claim, the person’s agent or an official receiver or trustee acting under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) before the expiry of the limitation period applicable to the claim.
(10) Subsections (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7) do not apply unless the acknowledgment is in writing and signed by the person making it or the person’s agent.
(11) In the case of a claim for payment of a liquidated sum, part payment of the sum by the person against whom the claim is made or by the person’s agent has the same effect as the acknowledgment referred to in subsection (10).

[40] Section 13(9) of the Act was considered in Cross Bridges Inc. v. Z-Teca Foods Inc., 2016 ONCA 27 (“Cross Bridges”). At para. 10, the court found that under s. 13(9) of the Act, for an acknowledgement to reset the limitation clock, it must be made before the expiry of the limitation period applicable to the claim.

[41] In T. Hamilton and Son Roofing Inc. v. Markham (City), 2018 ONSC 2665 (“T. Hamilton”), following 1702108 Ontario Inc. v. 3283313 Canada Inc., 2016 ONCA 420, the court stated: “At a minimum, a s. 13 acknowledgment must ‘constitute a clear and unequivocal acknowledgement of the debt claimed’”: at para. 48.

[42] Referring to s.13(11) of the Act, Michel v. Spirit Financial Inc., 2020 ONCA 398 found that partial payments made after the expiry of the limitation period could not save the debts from being statute-barred.

[43] In Ryu Electric Inc. v. Sam Bung Hong, 2017 ONSC 5109, aff’d 2018 ONCA 920, the court found that when periodic payments made by the debtor were made “on account”, as opposed to being related to a particular invoice, the limitation period on the outstanding balance owed, was re-set.

[44] At paras. 50 and 51 the court stated, in part:

[50] … In cases where a debtor makes periodic payments on a running account, the court will treat the balance as a single debt and the periodic payment as being made in respect of the entire balance [reference omitted]. As such, a periodic payment in relation to the entire balance owing on account has the effect of an acknowledgment of the debt and serves to re-set the limitation period.

[51] The scenario would have been different, if I had found that the nature of the relationship between the parties was such that the various invoices were treated as separate or discrete debts. Were that the case, Ryu Electric would have been free to allocate specifically unallocated payments to statute-barred debts, but the allocation by Ryu Electric would not have had the effect of re-setting the limitation period. [Citation omitted]

[45] Similarly, in T. Hamilton, the court held that part payment restarted the limitation period, having found that, even though payment was made in response to a new invoice, it related to the original contract and was “not the payment of a different or additional contract”: at paras. 55, 56.

[46] In this case, the limitation period defence is relevant only to Invoices #1, #2, and #3. Invoice #4 was issued November 16, 2020, within two years of the issuance of the Claim.

Application of s. 13 to the Facts

(i) Invoice #1

[47] The plaintiff asserts that the limitation period respecting Invoice #1 was reset when the defendants acknowledged liability to pay invoice #1 in the following emails:

(a) Email of March 15, 2017

[48] In an email exchange of March 15, 2017, the plaintiff provided Mr. Alger with a list of outstanding invoices, including Invoice #1. In Mr. Alger’s reply to this email, he acknowledged receipt of the list of invoices and stated: “I will begin to work on getting these balances paid down as soon as possible.”

[49] As at March 15, 2017, Invoice #1 (dated May 26, 2016) was not then statute-barred, as less than two years had expired since its delivery.

[50] Mr. Bazar’s evidence was that he understood Mr. Alger’s response to mean that he was confirming the amounts he owed on the invoices, including Pop Shoppe invoices, and was committing to paying them. I agree.

(b) Emails December 2017 to February 2018

[51] In emails entitled “Follow Up”, Mr. Bazar and Mr. Alger exchanged emails from December 2017 to February 2018.

[52] In an email exchange of December 9, 2017, Mr. Alger responded to Mr. Bazar’s “Follow Up” email stating: “Not forgotten about you! Nothing new to report…” He followed this with an email on December 13, 2017 stating: “Will have something to you by Friday with regards to Mother’s - B”

[53] On December 14, 2017, Mr. Bazar emailed: “Thanks for that. What about Pop Shoppe?”

[54] There is a further email exchange on January 2, 2018 in which Mr. Alger asks for a statement just for Mother’s and confirming that Mr. Bazar had previously sent him statements for all accounts [the March 17, 2017 email].

[55] In his email of February 12, 2018, Mr. Alger responded to Mr. Bazar’s inquiry about Pop Shoppe:

Hi David,

I sent you two cheques on Friday, each for $1000. The first one is good to cash. The second one is post-dated until the end of the month. I was waiting on funds from Stefan at Beverage World but his mother passed away last week so that has delayed everything since he's been out of the office.

For the time being please apply these cheques against my Pop Shoppe account. I need to get that down and get you back on my corp tax whenever possible. We have a couple of things happening with Mother's this month so hopefully that situation will resolve itself once something happens there.

[56] In my view, in this email exchange, Mr. Alger is clearly acknowledging receipt of Invoice #1 and his intention to take steps to pay it.

[57] I find that Mr. Alger’s email referenced above, constitutes an acknowledgement of liability in respect of Invoice #1 and engages the operation of one or both of section 13(1) and s. 13(11) of the Act to re-set the limitation period for Invoice #1 to February 12, 2018.

[58] Given that finding, when the Representation Letters of March 2, 2019 and June 4, 2019, were signed, the limitation period respecting Invoice #1 had not yet expired. These Representation Letters specifically acknowledge that Invoice #1 was outstanding in full, which acknowledgements again engage section 13 of the Act, so as to reset the limitation period to June 4, 2019.

[59] For those reasons, I find that when the Claim was issued on February 2, 2021, the claim with respect to Invoice #1 was not statute-barred.

(ii) Invoice #2

[60] The plaintiff created a spreadsheet for the purpose of this litigation, showing Invoices rendered and payments received. The spreadsheet shows that the last payment made by Pop Shoppe was on March 2, 2019.

[61] I conclude that any payments made by Pop Shoppe can relate only to Invoice #2 because:

• (a) the Representation Letter of June 4, 2019, signed by Mr. Alger, states that Invoice #1 “for $26,549.35…remains unpaid”;
• (b) the defendants deny receiving Invoice #3 and the plaintiff has failed to establish that invoice #3 was delivered; that the defendants had knowledge of it prior to issuance of the Claim; and/or that the defendants acknowledged liability for payment of Invoice #3. Consequently, I cannot find that any payments made by Pop Shoppe were intended to be applied against Invoice #3; and
• (c) the plaintiff’s spreadsheet shows that no payments were made in 2020, so it is clear that the defendants made no payment towards Invoice #4.

[62] On the basis of the foregoing, I also find that s. 13(11) of the Act – part payment – applies to re-set the limitation period on Invoice #2 to March 2, 2019. As such, I find that the plaintiff’s claim for payment of Invoice #2 is not statute-barred.

(iii) Invoice #3

[63] Invoice #3 was issued on November 8, 2017, more than two years prior to the issuance of the Claim.

[64] As part of its evidence, the plaintiff read into the record the evidence given by Mr. Alger on his examination for discovery on January 19, 2023 (this evidence will be referred to as the “Read-Ins”). In the Read-Ins from question 505, Mr. Alger denied receiving Invoice #3. This evidence is consistent with Mr. Alger’s testimony at trial, and I accept it.

[65] The plaintiff’s evidence was that it treated Invoice #3 as owing on or about November 8, 2017, from which evidence I find that the limitation period in respect of Invoice #3 began on or about that date. I conclude, therefore, that when the Claim was issued on February 12, 2021, the plaintiff’s claim with respect to Invoice #3 was statute-barred.

Disposition of Issue #1

[66] For the reasons above, the plaintiff’s claim with respect only to Invoice #3 is dismissed, as statute-barred.

Issue #2: Has the plaintiff established entitlement under the Invoices?

[67] The defendants asserted that the amounts invoiced were excessive and not supported by dockets, and, as a result, should be reduced.

Analysis and Disposition of Issue #2

[68] With respect to Invoice #1, in the Representation Letters, the defendants acknowledged that Invoice #1 had been reviewed, was satisfactory, and would be paid. As such, I conclude that it is not open to the defendants to now assert that the fee is unreasonable.

(a) Invoice #2

[69] Time dockets were attached to Mr. Bazar’s affidavit, and he was specifically cross-examined with respect to Invoice #2: page 193, Trial Exhibit #1. The docket suggests that $60 was included in Invoice #2 for work completed for “Mother’s Hamilton”. Mr. Bazar explained that this entry may have been an error, but, if so, it was a minor (i.e., $60) error.

[70] With respect to Invoice #2, Mr. Alger’s evidence was that he did not know to ask for time dockets and simply accepted that the invoices reflected the time spent at the agreed-upon hourly rate. That assertion falls short of providing a basis to reduce the amount claimed.

[71] I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that Invoice #2 is otherwise properly supported by the time dockets and aside from a reduction of $60, the plaintiff is entitled to payment of Invoice #2.

(b) Invoice #3

[72] I have found that the plaintiffs are not entitled to payment of Invoice #3 because it is statute-barred. I also find that the plaintiff’s evidence concerning what work was performed in respect of Invoice #3 to be inadequate to establish entitlement to payment.

(c) Invoice #4

[73] With respect to Invoice #4, Mr. Alger testified that he takes no issue with this account and accepts that it accurately charges for services rendered at the hourly rates disclosed by the plaintiff. As such, I conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to payment of Invoice #4.

Issue #3: Is Mr. Alger personally liable for payment of the invoices?

[74] Mr. Alger is the sole proprietor, owner, officer and director of Pop Shoppe, which used Mr. Alger’s residential address as its corporate address.

[75] The plaintiff asserts that Mr. Alger signed the Engagement Letters pursuant to which he agreed to be personally responsible for the fees, disbursements and interest owing by Pop Shoppe.

[76] It is clear from a plain reading of the Engagement Letters, the relevant portions of which are set out earlier in these reasons, that Mr. Alger agreed to be personally liable for the debts of Pop Shoppe.

[77] The Representation Letters also clearly state that Mr. Alger agreed that “should the company be unable to pay the fees of Bazar McBean LLP Chartered Professional Accountants for its services, they [i.e., Mr. Alger] personally undertake to be responsible for those fees”.

[78] Again, as part of its case, the plaintiff relied on the Read-Ins of the answers given by Mr. Alger to questions 87 and 88, in which he acknowledges that by accepting the Engagement Letter, he would be personally liable for Bazar McBean LLP’s fees.

Disposition of Issue #3

[79] The Engagement Letters and the Representation Letters contain clear language that Mr. Alger is agreeing to be personally liable for payment of the amounts invoiced by the plaintiff for the accounting services rendered to Pop Shoppe.

[80] I conclude that Mr. Alger is personally liable for amounts that may be found owing by Pop Shoppe to the plaintiff in this action.

Issue #4: Is the plaintiff entitled to interest on the invoices as per their terms?

[81] Notwithstanding the wording in the Invoices and the Engagement Letters, Mr. Alger’s evidence was that at no time in his professional relationship with the plaintiff, which began in 2004, did the plaintiff ever send a statement quantifying interest due on overdue accounts, nor demand or receive payment of interest on outstanding accounts. I accept that evidence.

[82] Again, as part of its case, the plaintiff relies on the Read-Ins of the answers given by Mr. Alger to questions 216 - 226, and 244 - 247. In these passages, Mr. Alger acknowledges that he had never disputed the amount of Invoice #1. He did, however, take issue with the assertion that he understood that accounts were due when rendered and stated that Mr. Bazar had led him to believe that the Invoices could be paid when he had the cash flow to do so.

[83] The plaintiff’s evidence from these Read-Ins is consistent with Mr. Alger’s trial testimony, and I accept it.

[84] In view of the lengthy professional history between the parties during which the plaintiff never collected payment of interest on overdue accounts; the absence of any evidence that the plaintiff ever sent a statement quantifying the amount of interest on the unpaid Invoices, and the plaintiff’s evidence in the Read-Ins, I conclude that the plaintiff is estopped from claiming payment of interest on outstanding invoices at the rate set out in the Invoices.

[85] Mr. Alger’s evidence was that he was unaware of Invoice #4 until after the Claim was served. That testimony was consistent with the evidence put forth by the plaintiff, who had no proof that Invoice #4 had been delivered and, also, whose evidence included the Read-Ins of Mr. Alger’s answer to Question 537, that he did not recall receiving Invoice #4.

[86] For these reasons, I find that interest on Invoice #4 may be calculated from and after the date on which the defendants were given notice of it on or after the date on which the Claim was served.

Disposition of Issue #4

[87] For the reasons given, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to simple interest on the balances owing in respect of Invoice #1, Invoice #2 and Invoice #4, payable at the interest rate set out in the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43 (the “CJA”). These findings would have also applied to Invoice #3, had I not found that the plaintiff’s claim for payment of Invoice #3 to be statute-barred.

[88] The plaintiff will need to recalculate the amounts owing for principal and interest to accord with my findings above. For example, the principal amount of Invoice #2 is to be reduced by $60.00, and, of course, by the payments made by the Pop Shoppe.

[89] As to the date on which interest is to commence, I accept Mr. Alger’s evidence that Invoices #1 and #2 were delivered when he met with Mr. Bazar, which dates, I understand, may be found in the dockets.

[90] As for Invoice #4, interest is to commence on the date on which the defendants were provided with a copy of Invoice #4 – which may or may not be the same date on which the Claim was served.

[91] It is hoped that the parties will be able to reach agreement on the principal and/or balance owing in respect of each Invoice, and on the dates from which interest is to run on the unpaid balance. If they cannot agree, they may request a brief hearing before me to make submissions on those issues.

Orders Made

[92] For the reasons set out, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendants as follows:

1. Payment of the principal owing on Invoices #1, #2 and #4, after credit is given to payments made and the reduction of $60.00 on Invoice #2.
2. Interest on the outstanding balances of each Invoice, calculated at the CJA pre-judgment interest rate, to run from the delivery of the Invoice, or in the case of Invoice #4, from the date, after the issuance of the Claim, on which the defendants had notice of Invoice #4.
3. Post-judgment interest is to be calculated at the post-judgment interest rate under the CJA.

Costs

[93] As the successful party, the plaintiff is presumptively entitled to its costs.

[94] The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs. If they are not able to do so, each may provide written costs submissions not to exceed three pages in length, exclusive of any Bill of Costs or Offers to Settle.

[95] Written submissions are to comply with the provisions of Rule 4.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 and are to be submitted via email to my attention, through the Trial Co-ordinator.

[96] The plaintiff’s costs submissions are to be served and filed within 14 days of the release of these reasons.

[97] The defendants’ responding submissions are to be served and filed within 7 days of the delivery of the plaintiff’s costs submissions.

[98] If no costs submissions are received within 21 days of the date of these reasons, costs will be deemed to be settled and I will make no further order.

Justice L. Sheard
Released: January 20, 2025