CITATION: R.J.P. v. L.A.K., 2025 ONSC 3828
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
R.J.P.
Applicant
– and –
L.A.K.
Respondent
Brian Ludmer, for the Applicant
Tamara Stomp, for the Respondent
HEARD: June 17, 2025
RULING ON MOTION
1This motion for interim orders regarding school enrolment and summer parenting time was heard mid-trial. The parties have completed twelve days of trial. Another six days of trial are scheduled in September.
2The applicant father seeks an interim order permitting the children, F.P. (born February 13, 2019) and T.P. (born April 19, 2021), to attend Lakeview Montessori School pending the final trial decision. He also seeks expanded parenting time during July and August 2025.
3The respondent mother has concerns about Lakeview Montessori and wants the children to attend St. Williams Catholic Elementary School, which is located within the district of both parties’ residences.
4On the issue of summer schedules, the respondent agrees that the applicant should have more time with the children but submits that it is in T.P.’s best interest to spend no more than three consecutives overnights with the applicant given her age. She also wishes to ensure F.P. and T.P. see their older siblings.
5For the reasons that follow, I order that the children attend Lakeview Montessori School in the fall. To be clear, this order is on an interim basis. There will be more evidence led at trial on issues concerning the children’s education that may lead to a different result on a final basis. For example, there was a paucity of evidence on the motion regarding the social lives of the children in their neighbourhood, The applicant’s ability to pay the private tuition costs of Lakeview Montessori, and alleged bullying at the school. On the record before me, however, I conclude that it is in the children’s best interests that the status quo continues.
6I also order summer parenting time that is a compromise of the schedules suggested by each of the parties.
1. School Enrolment
Positions of the Parties
7The children have been attending Lakeview on consent of both parents for the past few years. F.P. is six years of age and will be starting grade 1 in the fall, while T.P., who is four years old, will be in junior kindergarten.
8The evidence at trial to date about the children’s experience at Lakeview has been positive. Ms. Stein, a school administrator, testified that both children are doing well. F.P. is advanced in math and geography and is reading at an age-appropriate level. The applicant testified that the children love the school and are well taken care of there. He believes that the school is academically superior to publicly funded schools for a variety of reasons, especially the small class sizes. He is also concerned about the impact of changing schools on the children in light of the high-conflict nature of this litigation.
9The respondent initially supported the children attending Lakeview Montessori and for a time herself worked one day a week as an Early Childhood Educator at a different Montessori school. However, she has developed four main concerns about Lakeview Montessori over the past year:
a. She is concerned about academic supports at the school. For example, she testified in her affidavit material that Lakeview did not flag or support F.P.’s difficulty with letter and number reversal.
b. She is concerned about the three-year Montessori cycle, which places children in classrooms with both older and younger children.
c. She believes administrators and teachers at Lakeview Montessori have given preferential treatment to the applicant on issues of decision making and feedback.
d. The respondent disagrees that F.P. is happy at the school and mentions instances of bullying without providing details.
10Mr. Ludmer for the applicant submitted that I should give no or little weight to the respondent’s untested evidence. He argued that my direction to the parties to file their “submissions” on the motion by June 6, 2025 precluded the respondent from filing affidavit evidence.
11As I pointed out to Mr. Ludmer at the hearing, his position was both unfair and wrong at law. Whether I used the term “submissions” or “material” or “motion”, common sense dictates that I need an evidentiary basis on which to make the interim orders requested, just as any judge does on a motion for interim relief. That I am the trial judge does not obviate the need for evidence. I made myself available mid-trial to accommodate the parties. The suggestion that I should only consider the evidence led at trial to date is unreasonable. We are only part way through the applicant’s case in chief, but the timing is such that a summer parenting schedule and a decision regarding fall enrolment must be made now. It was entirely appropriate for the respondent to file an affidavit on the motion.
Legal Framework
12In Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712, 13 R.F.L. (8th) 191, at para. 37, Audet J. stated that when parents disagree, the decision with respect to the choice of school is ultimately a matter of judicial discretion. Her Honour summarized a number of general principles that have emerged from the case law to assist the court in making a decision that is in the child’s best interests. These include:
a. In developing a child’s educational plan, the unique needs, circumstances, aptitudes and attributes of the child must be taken into account;
b. When considering school placement, one factor to be considered is the ability of the parent to assist the child with homework and the degree to which the parent can participate in the child’s educational program;
c. The emphasis must be placed on the interests of the child and not on the interests or rights of the parents;
d. The importance of a school placement or educational program to promoting the child’s linguistic and cultural heritage;
e. Whether there is any prospect of one of the parties moving in the near future and whether a move will mean new childcare providers or other unsettling features;
f. The court will look to any decisions that were made by the parents prior to the separation or at the time of separation with respect to schooling;
g. Any problems with the existing or proposed school will be considered;
h. Proximity to the residence of one parent or the other or their convenience are not determinative. A decision as to the choice of school should be made on its own merits and the child’s needs;
i. Third-party ranking systems should not factor into the court’s decision because these systems do not take into account the best interest of a particular child;
j. If an aspect of a child’s life, such as school placement, is to be disrupted by an order of the court, there must be good reason to do so. Before a court will order a child to transfer schools, there must be convincing evidence that the change is in the child’s best interests.
13Any change of school must be considered from the child’s perspective. A school-age child will likely have already formed attachments to the school he or she attends. Continuing the child’s existing school placement promotes stability in the child’s life: Ursic v. Ursic (2006), 2006 CanLII 18349 (ON CA), 32 R.F.L. (6th) 23 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 32.
14A child’s need for stability, consistency and familiar supportive relationships is often heightened during the emotionally stressful period of parental separation: Lang v Qureshi, 2025 ONSC 585, at para 37.
Analysis
15Based on the evidence filed by the parties and having regard to the factors set out above, I make the following findings:
a. Both parents are invested in their children’s education and want to see them succeed academically. No learning disability or other exceptionality has been identified in the children that makes one of the proposed schools superior to the other.
b. Both parents are capable of supporting their children’s learning. The respondent’s evidence, which I accept, is that she has worked diligently with F.P. on his spelling to help him overcome his tendency to write some letters and numbers backward. Her criticism that F.P.’s teacher should have done more to address the issue is not a compelling reason to change schools. I accept Ms. Stein’s evidence that transposition of letters and numbers is a common problem among kindergarten-aged children.
c. The respondent’s concerns about Lakeview Montessori privileging the applicant are not borne out by the evidence to date. I find that the administrators were caught in the middle. More likely than not, the disputes regarding who was authorized to pick up the children and who was allowed to register the children for after-school clubs arose from confusion about the scope of the respondent’s sole decision-making authority. The parties themselves disagree on that scope. Moreover, I see no impediments to the respondent participating fully in the children’s education and school life. For example, should she wish to have photographs of the children’s artwork sent to her, she may make the request just as the applicant did.
d. The respondent favours St. Williams because it “supports the children’s spiritual development in a way that reflects both sides of their family heritage”. However, I have insufficient evidence of that heritage to make any findings about the importance of a Christian upbringing to either party.
e. Both parties currently rent their residences and neither has presented evidence of a plan or intention to move. Both residences are in the St. Williams and Lakeview Montessori catchment areas.
f. The parties agreed to the children attending the Lakeview Montessori pre-school program. Under an interim consent order dated August 23, 2024, they agreed to extend the children’s enrollment another year. Notably, it has always been the case that the applicant agreed to take on the full cost of tuition. At trial, he testified that he commits to continuing to be fully responsible for this expense, though I have concerns about his ability to do so given his sizeable debts and the ongoing costs of this lengthy trial.
g. There are no alleged problems with St. Williams. It offers the provincially mandated curriculum, before- and after-school care, and bussing. Like other publicly funded schools in the province, its class sizes are bigger than those of private schools, but as the applicant said at trial repeatedly, his older son, J.P., has done very well academically despite (or because of) getting the majority of his education in the publicly funded system. Similarly, there are no significant problems with Lakeview. While The respondent raises questions about the ability of Lakeview Montessori to meet the children’s long-term academic needs or identify when formal interventions, such as Individualized Education Plans, are needed, there is no evidence that Lakeview Montessori is unable to meet those needs. The only problems identified are those regarding the respondent’s perception of preferential treatment, which I addressed in subpara. (c) above and about which I say more later in these reasons, and a passing reference to bullying. Finally, the respondent points to the lack of March Break and Christmas programming at Lakeview Montessori but offered no evidence of such programming at St. Williams.
h. Both schools are proximate to each parent’s current residence, but there is no bussing option at Lakeview Montessori. Both parents will be required to drive the children to and from school on their parenting days, which can be onerous. I have no evidence yet of the respondent’s employment schedule, however, or of any specific problems with transportation. I also have no evidence of her after-school arrangements should the children be bussed home.
i. Mr. Ludmer pointed to the lack of evidence about St. Williams’ ranking, but EQAO and Fraser Institute rankings are not relevant to my determination.
j. There is some evidence in the record that F.P. is experiencing significant anxiety. Dr. Cheng’s letter suggests a psychiatry referral. I have no doubt that the parties’ high-conflict relationship is at the very least contributing to F.P.’s unfortunate challenges. Under the circumstances, less disruption will be in his best interests. I have no specific evidence of bullying at Lakeview. On the other hand, I have both Ms. Stein’s and the applicant’s evidence that the children are comfortable and doing well at the school.
16I would have liked evidence about the continued ability of the applicant to pay the high cost of tuition at Lakeview. A risk that he is unable to fund another ten years of tuition would be relevant to my assessment of the possibility that the children will have to switch schools in the future.
17I also expected to see evidence of the children’s social life. The small class size and lack of geographic boundaries for private schools such as Lakeview Montessori mean that the children are unlikely to be living in the same neighbourhood as their school peers. Will they have the opportunity to build a local network of friends with whom they may socialize outside of school? Such evidence has been a relevant consideration in other cases: Thompson v. Sorrenti, 2022 ONSC 2481, at para. 46.
18Finally, I return to the respondent’s concerns about Lakeview’s alleged bias against her. I am not persuaded that Lakeview has shown any such bias. It is true that the applicant wrote an inappropriate letter to the school principal using derogatory language about the respondent. I suspect that this language reflected as poorly on him as it did on the respondent. It is also true that he has taken steps to curry favour with the school by making a financial donation and by applying for a seat on the board. However, these actions do not preclude the respondent’s meaningful participation in the school life of her children. While she might feel more comfortable at a new school that she perceives to be more “neutral”, the court’s concern is about what is best for the children, not what is most comfortable for her. See the discussion in the analogous case Turnbull v. Turnbull, 2018 ONSC 5060, starting at para. 101.
Disposition
19For the reasons set out above, the court orders that F.P. and T.P. shall remain registered at Lakeview Montessori School for the 2025-2026 academic year.
2. Summer Parenting Schedule
20The applicant seeks four blocks of four consecutive days of vacation time with the children, two blocks in July and two blocks in August, in addition to his regular Friday overnight parenting time. He also wishes to have Tuesday overnight parenting time with T.P. to coincide with his existing overnight parenting time with F.P. and to expand that time to include all of Tuesday. He also wishes to expand his existing 2.5 hours after school on Thursdays to a full day and overnight in alternating weeks.
21The respondent is seeking extra parenting time in July so that she has the children for a full week while her older children are home. She is also seeking a long weekend in August. She has enrolled the children in day camps for the balance of the summer and wishes to maintain consistency and stability. That said, she is proposing that the applicant have one extended weekend (three overnights) in each of July and August. The respondent helpfully prepared charts comparing the two proposals.
22In his 2023 report, Dr. Schnayer supported equal parenting time during holidays, provided that the length of the periods be limited to 3-4 days. Last summer, the children had three consecutive overnights with the applicant, though he maintained the children’s extracurricular activities and could not travel far with them as a result.
23The evidence before me is that both children have a strong and loving bond with their father. Increasing the children’s time with the applicant is consistent with Dr. Schnayer’s recommendations and with the maximum contact principle: Rigillo v. Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548, 31 R.F.L. (8th) 356.
24The children are enrolled in day camps. Other than specialized camps, such as the Sailing Camp in which F.P. is enrolled the week of July 28, there is no reason the children cannot attend some days but not every day of the week. In fact, the respondent’s schedule has the children home with her on Wednesdays, the only day she is not working, suggesting that there is flexibility in the day camp schedule.
25For the summer months, if the applicant’s work schedule permits it, he may have parenting time all of Tuesday in addition to his regular Tuesday evening and overnight time.
26The applicant’s proposal that T.P. stay overnight on Tuesdays with her brother makes sense. The justification three years ago for T.P. not staying overnight (breastfeeding) no longer applies, and it is in the children’s best interests to be together. If this overnight parenting time works well for T.P., I encourage the parties to consent to an order continuing Tuesday overnight parenting time in the fall.
27Similarly, it is in the children’s best interests to spend time with their older siblings. For this reason, I agree that the respondent should have extended parenting time the week of July 28.
28The respondent works four days a week. The applicant works from home every day but testified that he is flexible. The children benefit from meaningful time with both parents, as well as from playing with other children at day camp. They also benefit from participating in T-ball, but given their young ages, the benefits of a vacation with either parent outweigh the benefits of perfect T-ball attendance.
29I agree with the applicant that he should have long weekends with the children each month that allow him to travel with the children if he so chooses. I do not agree that he should have two long weekends each month, in addition to his weekly Friday overnights, as this would mean that the children would have only four partial weekends with their mother the entire summer.
30The applicant, therefore, shall have three long weekends this summer, either two weekends in July and one weekend in August, or vice versa. The long weekend shall start on Thursday after day camp until Monday morning if he is working, or 6:00 p.m. if he is not working. He may choose any three weekends except for the weekend of August 2, when the children shall be with the respondent.
31With the exception of F.P.’s Sailing Camp the week of July 28, the children may, but are not required to, attend day camp on Mondays and Fridays during the applicant’s long weekend parenting time.
32The respondent shall have parenting time with the children from 6:00 p.m. on Monday, July 28 to 3:30 p.m. on Friday, August 1, 2025. The applicant shall have parenting time with the children from 3:30 p.m. on Friday, August 1 to Saturday, August 2 at 9:00 a.m.
33Whichever party has parenting time with the children on August 9, shall ensure F.P. attends his T-ball Day of Champions.
3. Orders
34I, therefore, make the following interim orders:
a. F.P. and T.P. shall remain registered at Lakeview Montessori School for the 2025-2026 academic year.
b. The summer parenting schedule shall be as follows beginning June 27, 2025 and ending Monday, September 1, 2025:
i. The applicant shall have overnight parenting time with T.P. every Tuesday, along with F.P.;
ii. The applicant shall have parenting time with T.P. and F.P. every Tuesday from 8:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. in addition to his regular Tuesday parenting time;
iii. The applicant shall have three long weekends during the summer holidays. These weekends will commence on Thursdays at 3:30 p.m. and end on Mondays at 8:00 a.m. if the applicant is working or 6:00 p.m. if he is not working. The applicant may choose any three blocks except the week of July 28, and so long as all three do not fall within the same month;
iv. With the exception of F.P.’s Sailing Camp the week of July 28, the children may, but are not required to, attend day camp during the applicant’s long weekend parenting time.
v. The respondent shall have parenting time from 6:00 p.m. on Monday, July 28 to 3:30 p.m. on Friday, August 1, 2025. The Applicant shall have parenting time from 3:30 p.m. on Friday, August 1 to Saturday, August 2 at 9:00 a.m.
vi. Whichever party has parenting time with the children on August 9, shall ensure F.P. attends his T-ball Day of Champions.
c. If the parties cannot agree on costs, they may file written submissions of no more than four double-spaced pages, in addition to a bill of costs, by July 11, 2025.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Jasminka Kalajdzic
Released: June 26, 2025 Justice
CITATION: R.J.P. v. L.A.K., 2025 ONSC 3828
COURT FILE NO.: FS-22-22546
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
R.J.P.
and
L.A.K.
RULING ON MOTION
Kalajdzic J.
Released: June 26, 2025