Wright v. Wright, 2025 ONSC 3743

CITATION: Wright v. Wright, 2025 ONSC 3743

COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-00685928-0000

DATE: 2025-06-24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

TAMARA CHRISTINE WRIGHT and RENATO LOMBARDO

Applicants

– and –

KARIN WRIGHT

Defendant

Joanna Lindenberg and Elaine Yu, Lawyers for the Applicants, Tamara Christine Wright and Renato Lombardo

Daniel Enright, Lawyers for the Respondent, Karin Wright

HEARD: WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

G. DOW, J.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON COSTS

1On August 13, 2024, I heard this dispute over the ownership and proposed sale of a residential/recreational property on the Bay of Quinte near Napanee in which the respondent, Karin Wright had resided from 2012. She had become owner of the property after the passing of her (then) spouse in 2017. His children inherited the property and agreed to sell it to Karin Wright at a price likely below its market value. The applicant, Tamara Wright (one of Karin Wright’s children) and her spouse, the applicant, Renato Lombardo, assisted in the financing of the purchase and creation of a document which became known as the Property Participation Agreement.

2By June, 2022, Karin Wright no longer wished to reside at that location and began steps to sell the property on the open market. Tamara Wright and Renato Lombardo objected to this relying on terms in the Property Participation Agreement. This application resulted with my decision, and Reasons released November 6, 2024 (2024 ONSC 4651).

3I found the Property Participation Agreement not to be enforceable and dismissed the application. The applicants were allowed to participate in the sale of the property on the open market as a prospective purchaser and receive back their share of funds contributed from the proceeds of sale.

4I signed a draft judgment, approved as to its form and content by the parties, on January 13, 2025.

5In my Reasons, I summarized what each side would seek in costs, if successful. I urged the parties to agree on costs. If they could not, I provided a deadline for limited written submissions as to the disposition of costs.

6It did not come to my attention that they had not agreed to costs (likely given these submissions were uploaded to Case Center and not forwarded to my assistant by email, from whom they received my decision/signed Judgment) until an email to my assistant June 10, 2025 requesting the status of my decision. I was advised that he matter is under appeal.

7I have now reviewed the submissions of counsel for Karin Wright seeking “her costs on a full indemnity scale in the amount of $268,233.87 (inclusive of HST and disbursements)” (at paragraph 1 of the Cost Submissions of the Respondent Karin Wright, dated December 5, 2024).

8This compares to the applicant’s costs as detailed in my Reasons of $149,235.87, inclusive of substantial indemnity fees, HST and disbursements (at paragraph 29 of my Reasons).

9The first respondent submission in support of this claim for full indemnity costs was the applicant, Tamara Wright’s breach of her fiduciary duty to her mother, and her failure to put her mother’s interest over that of her own. This submission relied on the disposition of costs in Doherty v. Doherty, 2023 ONSC 1536 which I relied on in my Reasons. I find that case distinguishable given it involved an estate and a situation where the respondent, Terrance Doherty “as his mother’s attorney for property and essentially drained her bank accounts, while she was living in a long-term care facility” (at paragraph 86). That did not occur in this matter. Instead, the applicants not only made a financial contribution to the transfer of the property to Karin Wright but also made efforts to maintain and improve the property.

10I do not follow the submission by the respondent who does not “allege any misconduct during the course of litigation” (at paragraph 11 of the respondent’s submissions dated December 5, 2024) that the elevated claim for costs was supported by Karin Wright having “suffered enormous loss because of the conduct of the applicants, at 87 years, Karin’s employable years are behind her and her life savings have been substantially and irreparably depleted” (at paragraph 9 of the Cost Submissions of the Respondent dated December 5, 2024). I agree with the submission of counsel for the applicant and reliance on the statement in Davis v. Clarington (Municipality) et al, 2009 ONCA 722 that “a distinction must be made between hard-fought litigation that turns out to have been misguided, on the one hand, and malicious counter-productive conduct, on the other. The former, the thrust and parry of the adversary system, does not warrant sanction: the latter may well” (at paragraph 45).

11Regarding the submission that the quantum of “costs related to the within application are reasonable in all of the circumstances” (at paragraph 12 of the Cost Submissions of the Respondent Karin Wright, December 5, 2024), I have difficulty with that statement. In particular, there is no detailed explanation for the quantum sought. I do agree with the applicant’s submission that the amount sought, ($268,233.87) is far greater than the actual costs of the applicants ($165,651.38). I am reinforced in this concern given there is usually a greater amount of legal costs incurred in bringing an application as to opposed to defending an application.

12Regarding having bettered its February 2, 2024 Rule 49 Offer to Settle, I agree with the submissions of counsel for the applicant that counsel for Karin Wright misinterpreted Rule 49.10(2) which clearly sets out what should occur where the respondent’s offer is achieved or bettered. I can only assume the respondent was seeking to use their Offer to Settle to buttress their submission that the costs award it sought be under Rule 57.01(4) which details the discretion provided under Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

13In addition, my decision, while concluding the application be dismissed, not only entitled the applicants to “their share in an open market sale” (at paragraph 28 of my Reasons) but also to “participate in the purchase of the property on the open market” (also at paragraph 28 of my Reasons).

14I rely on the often cited statement by the Court of Appeal in Boucher et al v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario et al., 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 2634, (at paragraph 26) that “the objective is to fix an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in a particular proceeding, rather than an amount fixed by the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant”.

15To that end, mindful of the applicant’s August 13, 2024 Bill of Costs, and the factors outlined in Rule 57.01, I find the respondent, Karin Wright, entitled to partial indemnity costs which I fix to be $85,000 for fees plus HST of $11,050 and disbursements, as claimed, being $9,631.60 for a total of $105,681.60, inclusive of partial indemnity fees, HST and disbursements.

Mr. Justice G. Dow

Released: June 24, 2025

CITATION: Wright v. Wright, 2025 ONSC 3743