Court File and Appearances

Court File No.: FS-24-109811
Date: 2025-06-12
Court: Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Applicant: Jaskaran Singh Meen
Respondent: Harmanpreet Kaur

Before: Ranjan K. Agarwal
Applicant Counsel: Ramandeep Virk
Respondent Counsel: Parveen Malik
Heard: 2025-05-20

ENDORSEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] Jaskaran Meen sponsored Harmanpreet Kaur’s immigration to Canada. He agreed to financially support her for three years and make sure that she didn’t need social assistance. They separated as soon as she arrived. Jaskaran has paid no support. Harmanpreet is receiving Ontario Works. Her expenses are far more than her income.

[2] At the motion hearing, Jaskaran conceded that Harmanpreet was entitled to spousal support. Duration isn’t an issue. Thus, I must decide the quantum. I endorse an order that Jaskaran shall pay interim spousal support to Harmanpreet in the amount of $1,150 per month, starting on July 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month until further order of this court. I also endorse an order that Jaskaran shall pay Harmanpreet’s costs, fixed in the amount of $3,500.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[3] The parties were married in India on March 12, 2023. Jaskaran returned to Canada on April 18, 2023. Harmanpreet came to Canada on August 9, 2024, as a sponsored spouse.

[4] As a sponsor, Jaskaran gave an undertaking to financially support Harmanpreet for three years:

I undertake to provide for the basic requirements of the sponsored person and their family members who accompany them to Canada, if they are not self-supporting. I promise to provide food, clothing, shelter, fuel, utilities, household supplies, personal requirements, and other goods and services, including dental care, eye care, and other health needs not provided by public health care. I understand that the money, goods or services provided by me must be sufficient for the sponsored person(s) to live in Canada.

[5] He also undertook that if Harmanpreet received social assistance, he’d repay the amount:

I understand that all social assistance paid to the sponsored person or their family members becomes a debt owed by me to His Majesty in right of Canada and the province or territory concerned. As a result, the Minister and the province or territory concerned have a right to take enforcement action against me (as sponsor or co-signer) alone, or against both of us.

[6] Though the parties dispute how they came to be separated, there’s no dispute that they have lived separate and apart since August 20, 2024.

[7] Since October 2024, Harmanpreet has been receiving social assistance from Ontario Works ($733 monthly). Her monthly housing expenses are $1,150 ($1,000 for rent and $150 for utilities). She also deposes that she has another $1,000 in monthly expenses for cell phone, home internet, groceries, etc. She says she’s borrowed $14,500 from her family.

[8] Jaskaran works for National Energy Equipment. In 2025, he earned $83,909.

[9] Jaskaran started this case in August 2025. Harmanpreet answered the case in January 2025. The parties had not scheduled a case conference yet—Jaskaran’s lawyer is not in the country for several months. In my view, that’s no excuse to delay the important first step in a family law case. As a result, I directed the parties to schedule a case conference immediately.

B. Law

[10] A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay such periodic sums as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse. See Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 15.2(1).

[11] If an application is made under section 15.2(1), the court may make an interim order requiring a spouse to pay such periodic sums as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse, pending the determination of the application under section 15.2(1). See Divorce Act, s 15.2(2).

[12] In making an interim order under subsection 15.2(2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse, including: (a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (c) any order, agreement, or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

[13] The following additional general principles apply in dealing with motions for interim spousal support:

• the party claiming interim spousal support has the onus of establishing that there is a triable case, both with respect to entitlement and quantum—the merits of the case as a whole are to be dealt with at trial
• if a spousal support claimant can’t establish an arguable case for entitlement to spousal support, the motion for temporary relief should be dismissed, even if the claimant has need and the other party has the ability to pay
• the motion judge need not carry out a complete and detailed inquiry into all aspects and details of the case, or to determine the extent to which either party suffered economic advantage or disadvantage because of the relationship or its breakdown
• the main goal of interim spousal support is to provide income for dependent spouses from the time the proceedings are commenced until the trial—interim support is meant to be in the nature of a “holding order” to maintain, insomuch as possible, the accustomed lifestyle pending trial
• the courts shouldn’t unduly emphasize any one of the statutory considerations above others
• assuming that a triable case exists, interim support is to be based mainly on the motion judge’s assessment of the parties’ means and needs—the goal of encouraging self-sufficiency is of less importance
• if there’s a need to resolve contested issues of fact, especially those connected with a threshold issue, such as entitlement, it becomes less advisable to order interim support.

See Liddell-MacInnis v. MacInnis, 2021 ONSC 1787, para 65; Evans v. Chambers, 2025 ONSC 235, para 36.

[14] A sponsorship undertaking is an agreement under the Divorce Act, s 15.2(4)(c). See Singh v. Singh, 2013 ONSC 6476, para 72. As a result, it’s a relevant factor in determining entitlement. See Gidey v. Abay, para 28.

III. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION

A. Issue #1: Is Harmanpreet entitled to spousal support?

[15] At the hearing, Jaskaran conceded that Harmanpreet is entitled to interim spousal support.

[16] That was a reasonable concession. There are three bases for spousal support: (a) contractual; (b) compensatory; and (c) non-compensatory. See Bracklow v. Bracklow, para 37. Though Jaskaran’s undertaking is a form of contract, it’s not an agreement between him and Harmanpreet.

[17] That said, the sponsorship undertaking shows that Jaskaran agreed to financially support Harmanpreet for at least the first three years after she immigrated. Non-compensatory support is often called the “means and needs” approach: it aims to narrow the gap between the means and needs of the spouses. Non-compensatory support is based on the concept of marriage as an interdependent union. As a result, the burden for meeting the needs of a disadvantaged spouse should fall on the former partner, rather than the state. See Bracklow, para 23.

[18] Non-compensatory support also responds to objectives under the Divorce Act: (a) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage (s 15.2(6)(c)); and (b) as far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period (s 15.2(6)(d)).

B. Issue #2: What is the appropriate amount?

[19] The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines provide guidance for the appropriate range of support. The quantum and duration ranges generated by the SSAG simply provide a general framework for the exercise of the court’s discretion. It’s therefore open to the court to go above and below the ranges in appropriate circumstances. See Alalouf v. Sumar, 2019 ONCA 611, paras 21-25. See also Kinsella v. Mills, 2020 ONSC 4785, para 107, for a discussion of the applicable principles.

[20] At the hearing, Jaskaran argued that the quantum should be $245 monthly, which is the SSAG mid-range. Harmanpreet asks for $2,500.

[21] In several cases involving immigration sponsorship, courts have ordered support in an amount beyond the high end of the range to generate an amount of support that will meet the recipient’s basic needs and preclude resort to social assistance. See Gidey; Singh v. Singh, 2013 ONSC 6476; and Carty-Pusey v. Pusey, 2015 ONCJ 382.

[22] I endorse an order that Jaskaran shall pay interim spousal support to Harmanpreet in the amount of $1,150 per month, starting on July 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month until further order of this court.

[23] Under the sponsorship undertaking, Jaskaran is liable to the government for any social assistance that Harmanpreet receives ($733 monthly). Even though this amount is higher than the SSAG guidelines, this figure is a suitable proxy for the minimum amount that he agreed to contribute to Harmanpreet’s costs of living when he sponsored her immigration to Canada.

[24] I appreciate that Harmanpreet believed, when she immigrated, that Jaskaran would financially support her, meaning that she wouldn’t have to pay rent, utilities, internet, groceries, or transportation expenses. She understood they would rent a basement apartment together. Now, she’s sharing a room. Her standard of living is lower than she expected it would when she emigrated from India, and she’s facing economic hardship. Jaskaran earns over $83,000 from full-time employment. His financial statement shows that he has a monthly surplus.

[25] But there’s some evidence that Harmanpreet expected to contribute to the household expenses. She’s trained as a nurse. She took the NCLEX exams to become accredited in Canada. Even part-time employment at minimum wage would make up the shortfall between her monthly expenses and spousal support.

[26] As a result, interim spousal support of $1,150 per month is a reasonable amount to meet Harmanpreet’s needs and fulfil Jaskaran’s sponsorship obligations. Although this amount is significantly more than the high-end of support calculated under the SSAG, this result is justified given Jaskaran’s undertakings.

[27] This support shall be paid until August 2027—the expiration of Jaskaran’s immigration sponsorship obligations—or the trial date, whichever is earlier. My order is without prejudice to Harmanpreet moving to extend the interim spousal support if the case isn’t finished by 2027, or either party seeking a final spousal support at trial.

[28] Harmanpreet also asks for retroactive support. A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding, or suspending, retroactively or prospectively a support order or any provision of one. See Divorce Act, s 17(1). “Retroactive” awards aren’t truly retroactive. They don’t hold parents to a legal standard that didn’t exist at the relevant time. But they’re “retroactive” in that they’re not being made on a go-forward basis: the payor is being ordered to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before. See DBS v. SRG, 2006 SCC 37, para 2.

[29] In my view, retroactive support orders are final orders that, in most cases, should be made at trial. I appreciate that between starting a case and a motion for interim support, there may be a lag that justifies a retroactive interim order. But here, there’s no evidence that Jaskaran is solely responsible for the delay. Harmanpreet could’ve moved for interim spousal support sooner. Further, she’s been receiving Ontario Works since October 2024—Jaskaran is liable to the government for these payments, which means he’s been indirectly supporting Harmanpreet even if he hasn’t been paying support.

[30] Finally, Harmanpreet asks for $25,000 in lump sum support. She didn’t press this point at the hearing.

IV. COSTS

[31] Harmanpreet seeks $4,500 in costs. She gave Jaskaran her costs outline during the hearing. Jaskaran argues that there should be no costs of this motion. He didn’t provide a costs outline at all.

[32] Subject to the provisions of an act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid. See Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 131.

[33] Under rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, in setting the amount of costs, the court shall consider, (a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues: (i) each party’s behaviour, (ii) the time spent by each party, (iii) any written offers to settle, including offers that do not meet the requirements of rule 18 of the Family Law Rules, (iv) any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates, (v) any expert witness fees, including the number of experts and their rates, (vi) any other expenses properly paid or payable; and (b) any other relevant matter.

[34] There is a presumption that a successful party is entitled to the costs of a motion. See Family Law Rules, r 24(1). Modern costs rules are designed to foster three fundamental purposes: (a) to partially indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation; (b) to encourage settlement; and (c) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants. See Fong v. Chan, para 22.

[35] The main objective is to fix an amount of costs that is objectively reasonable, fair, and proportionate for the unsuccessful party to pay in the circumstances of the case, rather than to fix an amount based on the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant. See Boucher v. Public Accountants Council (Ontario), para 26.

[36] I endorse an order that Jaskaran shall pay Harmanpreet’s costs of this motion, fixed in the amount of $3,500, on or before July 12, 2025. Harmanpreet was the successful party, so she’s prima facie entitled to her costs of the motion. Jaskaran didn’t concede entitlement until the hearing. He also conceded some quantum but, again, not until the hearing. Jaskaran’s conduct lengthened and complicated this motion unnecessarily. That said, the motion was straightforward. Harmanpreet’s bill of costs includes time for reviewing disclosure, which wasn’t necessary for this motion. As a result, costs of $3,500 are fair, reasonable, and proportionate.

V. CONCLUSION

[37] When Jaskaran sponsored Harmanpreet to Canada, he made a promise to the government: he would financially support Harmanpreet while she established her life in Canada. She relied on that undertaking. Though Jaskaran isn’t required to stay married to Harmanpreet, he can’t abandon his financial obligations. It’s clear that Harmanpreet’s financial needs are greater than the SSAG range, and Jaskaran has the means to pay.

Agarwal J
Date: June 12, 2025