Overview and Background Facts

1The plaintiff, mortgagee, moves for summary judgment in this mortgage enforcement action. The plaintiff holds a second mortgage charge on two residential properties in Vaughan, municipally known as 37 Aylin Crescent and 62 Laskin Drive, as security for a loan of $1,194,000 which the plaintiff made to the defendants, Ali Farahmand and 1989515 Ontario Inc. on June 22, 2022. The loan is in default and the plaintiff seeks judgment for possession of the charged properties.

2Ali Farahmand is the sole registered owner of 37 Aylin Crescent (“37 Aylin”). 1989515 Ontario Inc. (“198”) is the sole registered owner of 62 Laskin Drive (“62 Laskin”). Mr. Farahmand’s mother, the co-defendant Mitra Nourdeh (“Ms. Nourdeh”), is a director of 198.

3Mr. Farahmand is a lawyer. He appeared on this motion on his own behalf and as counsel for 198 and his mother Ms. Nourdeh.

4Mr. Farahmand never defended this action. The plaintiff filed a requisition that Mr. Farahmand be noted in default on October 10, 2023. Prior to the start of the hearing of this motion, Mr. Farahmand had not moved to set aside the noting in default.

5198 and Ms. Nourdeh previously had their own counsel. They were represented by Sahar Zomorodi of the Zomorodi Law Professional Corporation and delivered a statement of defence.

6After being served this motion seeking summary judgment, 198 and Ms. Nourdeh advised the plaintiff that they had changed counsel to the Niroomand Law firm. At a case conference on September 19, 2024, Fraser J. set a timetable for the delivery of materials and cross-examinations, and fixed the date of November 12, 2024 for the hearing of the summary judgment motion. 198 delivered a responding affidavit of Ms. Nourdeh. No cross-examinations were conducted.

7This motion came on for hearing before Verner J. Ms. Nourdeh was not present. As Verner

J. explained in her endorsement, “[o]n the eve of” the hearing, Ms. Nourdeh “fired her lawyer” (the Niroomand law firm). Verner J. stated that Ms. Nourdeh’s brother had attended and advised the court that Ms. Nourdeh had been hospitalized for a period of time and had just been released the day prior to the hearing. Verner J. granted an adjournment, directing that if Ms. Nourdeh was unable to attend, Ms. Nourdeh was required to send someone who was prepared to make submissions. See endorsement of Verner J. dated November 12, 2024.

8The motion subsequently came before me for hearing. Ms. Nourdeh did not attend or file any additional materials. Mr. Farahmand attended by telephone. He advised the court that, two days earlier, his mother had asked him to represent 198 and her. A change of representation in counsel had not been filed. The defendants had filed a compendium of documents, but not a factum.

9The hearing of this motion was not completed and was adjourned to continue another day. In the intervening week, Mr. Farahmand filed a notice of change of representation by 198 and his mother confirming that he was representing them. He also filed a notice of motion seeking an order setting aside the noting in default and permitting him to file a statement of defence, and an affidavit in support of his motion. Mr. Farahmand did not file a draft statement of defence.

10With the consent of the plaintiff, Mr. Farahmand’s motion to set aside the noting in default was heard together with the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff relied on its summary judgment motion materials both in support of its motion and in response to Mr. Farahmand’s motion. In short, the plaintiff asks that Mr. Farahmand’s motion be dismissed, and the order for possession of both 37 Aylin and 62 Laskin be granted.

11There is no issue that the loan has been in default since May 2023 and that no payments have been made on the loan since April 2023. There is also no issue that the standard charge

terms of the mortgage provide the mortgagee with the right to possession of the properties on default of the mortgage loan.

12The defendants resist judgment for possession of 37 Aylin and 62 Laskin. They allege that the mortgage charge on 62 Laskin was not authorized by 198 and is not valid and enforceable; that Ms. Nourdeh personally is not a party to the mortgage transaction; and that Ms. Nourdeh, in signing the documents on behalf of 198, did not understand the implications of signing the mortgage documents.

13Mr. Farahmand urged that the plaintiff should not be entitled to a judgment for possession of 37 Aylin, which is his matrimonial home, because his wife did not sign the mortgage commitment document, and because there are triable issues about whether she properly consented to the granting of a charge on 37 Aylin as security for the loan.

Position of the Parties and Evidence on the Motion

14198, in its statement of defence, denies that it is liable in contract to the plaintiff because 198 did not authorize the granting of a mortgage charge on 62 Laskin as security for the loan. It is 198’s position that Ms. Nourdeh’s spouse, Farzad Farahmand, was a co-director and that his consent was also required for 198 to grant a mortgage charge on 198’s property, 62 Laskin. Further, 198 states that the plaintiff (mortgagee) did not obtain documents from 198’s Minute Books to assure itself that the plaintiff had, in fact, received proper authorization from 198 for the granting of the mortgage charge on 62 Laskin.

15198, in its statement of defence, alleges that it was not a borrower and did not receive any of the funds advanced under the loan. 198 states that the loan was solely for the benefit of Ali Farahmand, and that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the conflict of interest between 198 and Ali Farahmand and failed to send each party to obtain its own independent legal advice before advancing the loan to Ali Farahmand.

16Ms. Nourdeh, in her affidavit, acknowledges that she signed the mortgage documents on behalf of 198. Ms. Nourdeh acknowledges that she has been the director of 198 since its inception. She was the sole director of 198 when it acquired 62 Laskin on March 8, 2019. In her affidavit, Ms. Nourdeh now acknowledges that, in fact, her spouse, Farzad Farahmand, Ali Farahmand’s father, was not a director of 198 at the time that 198 granted the charge on 62 Laskin as security for the loan, and that she was the sole director of 198 when she signed the mortgage documents on behalf of 198. Ms. Nourdeh acknowledges that Farzad Farahmand, only became a co-director of 198 after the mortgage charge was granted. Ms. Nourdeh states that, nevertheless, even before her spouse became a director of 198, it was her understanding that decisions regarding significant transactions of 198, such as mortgaging the property required the joint approval of her and her spouse.

17Ms. Nourdeh, in her affidavit, states that she signed the mortgage documents at the request of her son. Ms. Nourdeh states that 37 Aylin is her son’s principal residence and matrimonial home, and she believed that 37 Aylin was intended to be the primary security for her son’s loan from the plaintiff. She states that the mortgagee’s primary recourse for recovery should be 37 Aylin.

18Ms. Nourdeh, in her affidavit, states that the plaintiff, as mortgagee, did not fully explain the implications of the mortgage to her, and did not require that she received independent legal advice, separate from her son. She states that she was not aware that she was binding 198 as a borrower and did not intend to authorize 198 to grant 62 Laskin as collateral for her son’s loan.

19On his own behalf, Mr. Farahmand resists an order for possession of 37 Aylin on the basis that the plaintiff, knowing that 37 Aylin was his matrimonial home, did not obtain the written consent of his wife, Sahar Hajimohammadi, and failed to require that Ms. Hajimohammadi obtain “proper Independent Legal Advice”. Mr. Farahmand advanced this defence, for the first time, in his notice of motion to set aside the noting in default against him, filed during the hearing of the summary judgment motion.

20Mr. Farahmand, in his affidavit, stated that he had not been involved in the defence of the enforcement action, had not spoken with the lawyers and had solely relied on what his mother told him. He stated that there has been a “gross misunderstanding” as he believed that a defence had been filed for him as well. Mr. Farahmand stated that he had only learned that he had been noted in default when his mother asked him, two days before the return of the motion, to represent her and 198 on this motion.

21To place the defendants’ positions in context, it is useful to review the mortgage documents:

22The Mortgage Commitment, dated June 17, 2022, provides that Rajinder Pahal will advance a loan of $1,194,000 at a fixed interest rate of 11.99% (interest only) for a 12- month term secured by the grant of a second mortgage on 37 Aylin and 62 Laskin. On the first page of the mortgage commitment, the lender is shown as the plaintiff, Rajinder Pahal, and the mortgagor is shown as Ali Farahmand. The addresses of 37 Aylin and 62 Laskin are listed as the two properties over which a mortgage charge will be granted to secure the loan.

The last page of the mortgage commitment shows that the loan commitment was accepted and signed by Ali Farahmand and Ms. Nourdeh on June 17, 2022, as borrowers. The bottom of each page of the mortgage commitment, including the first page and every page thereafter, has a line for the “Initials of Borrowers”. On each page, beside Initials of Borrowers, are the initials, “A.F.” and “M.N.”
The Schedule of Additional Provisions attached to the Mortgage Commitment is signed by Ali Farahmand and Ms. Nourdeh as mortgagors. “Ali Farahmand” and “Mitra Nourdeh Re: 62 Laskin” are printed beneath their respective signatures.
The Acknowledgement of the Standard Charge Terms, acknowledging receipt of a duly completed copy of the mortgage, together with all schedules and standard charge terms, dated June 22, 2022, is signed by Ali Farahmand, 1989515 Ontario Inc. per Ms. Nourdeh and Sahar Hajimohammadi as consenting spouse. Mr. Farahmand does not dispute that his wife signed the acknowledgement and received a copy of the mortgage and its terms.
The Certificate of Independent Legal Representation and Identification, dated June 22, 2022, provided to Rajinder Pahal by Azin Ghorbankhani, AG Professional Corporation, certifies that Mr. Ghorbankhani examined and confirmed the identity of the borrowers, Ali Farahmand and 1989515 Ontario Inc. (Ms. Nourdeh). Mr. Ghorbankhani certifies that the borrower was examined by him and acknowledged that he fully understood the nature and effect of the documents relating to the “above noted transaction.” The Reference line on the Certificate refers to “Ali Farahmand and 1989515 Ontario Inc.” and the “Mortgage Reference No. 37 Aylin Crescent, Ontario L6A 4Z8.”
Azin Ghorbankhani provided an Undertaking to Rajinder Pahal and Mr. Pahal’s lawyers, NDM Law Professional Corporation, to receive and pay out the mortgage loan funds, in relation to 1989515 Ontario Inc. and Ali Farahmand and the mortgage on 37 Aylin and 62 Laskin.
The Acknowledgement Re Standard Charge Terms, acknowledging receipt of a duly completed copy of the mortgage, dated June 22, 2022, is signed by Ali Farahmand, 1989515 Ontario Inc. per Ms. Nourdeh, stating beneath the signature line that she has authority to bind the corporation, and Sahar Hajimohammadi, as consenting spouse.
An Acknowledgement and Direction to the mortgagee’s lawyer, Nanvit Dhillion of NDM Law Professional Corporation, to register the charges on title, dated June 22, 2022, is signed by 1989515 Ontario Inc., Ali Farahmand and “Sahar Hajimohammadi as consenting spouse”. The Re line on the Acknowledgement states only “charge” and the charge to be registered on title is not otherwise specified and is not attached to the Acknowledgement and Direction.

Ali Farahmand’s Motion to Set Aside the Noting in Default

23A defendant noted in default may move to have the noting in default set aside “on such terms as are just.” The Court of Appeal has summarized the well-established relevant factors to be considered, as follows: (1) the parties’ behaviour; (2) the length of the defendant's delay; (3) the reasons for the delay; (4) the complexity and value of the claim;

(5) whether setting aside the noting of default would prejudice a party relying on it; (6) the balance of prejudice as between the parties; and (7) whether the defendant has an arguable defence on the merits. See Franchetti v. Huggins, 2022 ONCA 111 at paras. 6-10; Intact Insurance Company v. Kisel, 2015 ONCA 205, 125 O.R. (3d) 365 at paras. 12-13.

24The factors are not to be applied as rigid rules. Overall, the court must consider “the strong preference for deciding civil actions on their merits, the desire to construe rules and procedural orders non-technically and in a way that gets the parties to the real merits, and whether there is non-compensable prejudice to either party[:]” Franchetti at paras. 8-10.

25Mr. Farahmand filed his notice of motion to set aside the noting in default in the midst of the hearing, after several previous appearances by the co-defendants on the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, including a case conference. I have some skepticism that Mr. Farahmand never spoke to the lawyers that he believed were representing him, relied entirely on his mother to instruct counsel on his behalf in all respects, and only became aware, two days before this hearing, that neither of the previous counsel had advanced a defence on his behalf, as he believed, especially given that he had been noted in default more than a year earlier.

26However, even if I were to accept that Mr. Farahmand acted quickly upon learning of the fact that he had been noted in default, Mr. Farahmand has not advanced an arguable defence on the merits, even on the low threshold of a defence which has an “air of reality”.

27Mr. Farahmand, in his notice of motion, states that the plaintiff did not obtain the written consent of his spouse when the plaintiff knew that 37 Aylin was their matrimonial home, and that his spouse is not willing to consent to a charge on the matrimonial home.

28However, the evidence in the record before me is to the contrary. The mortgage charge granted by 37 Aylin is registered on title to 37 Aylin as Instrument YR3445309, in which the mortgagor, Mr. Farahmand, attests that his spouse consents to the mortgage. The charge was registered by the plaintiff’s lawyer, Dillion of the NMD law firm, who had a direction signed by Ms. Hajimohammadi, as the consenting spouse. A photo of Ms. Hajimohammadi’s driver’s licence is found in the motion record, together with the signed consent. Ms. Hajimohammadi acknowledged receipt of the mortgage documents as a consenting spouse.

29It is fair to say that, on review of the documents, there is no express written consent by Ms. Hajimohammadi in that the mortgage commitment letter is not signed by Ms. Hajimohammadi, and the direction to Mr. Dillion simply refers to registration of a “charge” and is otherwise blank, and it appears that no schedule was attached.

30When faced with Ms. Hajimohammadi’s acknowledgement that she received a copy of the mortgage commitment which she signed in her capacity as the consenting spouse, Mr. Farahmand did not dispute that Ms. Hajimohammadi was aware of the mortgage charge when it was granted. Mr. Farahmand largely retreated to his additional or alternate argument that the plaintiff had not required that Ms. Hajimohammadi receive independent legal advice.

31In the year and a half since she was served with the notice of demand, Ms. Hajimohammadi has not brought an action against the plaintiff, or against her husband. Ms. Hajimohammadi has not provided an affidavit on this motion. In short, there is no evidence before the court to support Mr. Farahmand’s bald assertion that his wife did not consent to the mortgage charge on 37 Aylin, other than the fact that Ms. Hajimohammadi did not sign the mortgage commitment letter, or any document in which she expressly consented to the granting of a charge on 37 Aylin.

32It follows that there is also no evidence before the court that Ms. Hajimohammadi did not understand that Mr. Farahmand had granted a mortgage charge on their home, when she acknowledged receipt of her copy of the mortgage, as the “consenting spouse.” As already stated, Ms. Hajimohammadi has not alleged misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence or any other concern about the mortgage.

33In Bank of Montreal v. Featherstone (1989), 1989 CanLII 4218 (ON CA), 68 O.R. (2d) 541 (Ont. C.A.), the Court of Appeal held, at paras. 13 and 14, that it was an error for the trial judge to have concluded that a spouse who did not receive independent legal advice prior to signing a guarantee was not liable, especially given the absence of a finding “that they [the spouses] did not in fact understand the nature of the transaction or that they did not understand that they were signing guarantees.” The court further explained as follows:

The failure of a wife to obtain independent legal advice before executing a guarantee will not in every case entitle her to escape liability under the guarantee. The obvious purpose of the bank in requesting a certificate of independent legal advice is to avoid, if possible, the spouse’s later raising defences such as non est factum, unconscionability, fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence. The burden of proving each of these defences rests upon the person seeking to set aside the guarantee. In this case, however, there was no evidence to support any of these defences nor were any of these defences pleaded, apart from an allegation that Mr. Breen advised these defendants that the guarantees imposed no legal liability upon them. They called no evidence to this effect.

34In my view, the decision in Bank of Montreal v. Featherstone is dispositive. Ms. Hajimohammadi is not seeking to set aside the mortgage on the basis that she did not understand it, or on the basis of any of the other defences set out in the passage above. The issue of the plaintiff’s failure to require Ms. Hajimohammadi to obtain independent legal advice does not arise.

35To the extent that Mr. Farahmand seeks to set aside the mortgage on the basis that Ms. Hajimohammadi did not consent, there is no evidence from Ms. Hajimohammadi that she did not consent. Mr. Farahmand does not state in his affidavit that the direction provided to the plaintiff’s lawyer (i.e. that Ms. Hajimohammadi was a consenting spouse) was untrue.

36For all of these reasons, I would not, at this juncture, set aside the noting in default against Mr. Farahmand. While the mortgage documentation is less than complete, for the reasons stated, I am satisfied that Ms. Hajimohammadi was aware of, and did consent to, the granting of a charge on 37 Aylin as security for the loan to her husband and 198.

37It being otherwise undisputed that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property, I would grant summary judgment to the plaintiff for an order requiring delivery by the defendants of vacant possession of 37 Aylin.

Whether Judgment Should be Granted for Possession of 62 Laskin

38On a motion under Rule 20.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, the court must grant summary judgment if it is satisfied there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. There will be no genuine issue requiring trial when a court is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits. A fair and just determination on the merits may be achieved when the summary judgment process allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, apply the law to the facts, and is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result: Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1

S.C.R. 87 at para. 49.

39The responding party is obliged to put their “best foot forward” with respect to the existence or non-existence of material issues to be tried. The responding party is not permitted to rely solely on allegations or denials, but must provide affidavit material with the specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. The motion judge is entitled to assume that the evidentiary record is complete. See Moffitt v. TD Canada Trust, 2023 ONCA 349, 483 D.L.R. (4th) 432; Mazza v. Ornge Corporate Services Inc., 2016 ONCA 753, at para. 9.

40It is undisputed that Ms. Nourdeh was the sole director of 198 at the time that she signed the documents. It is undisputed that the corporate profile of 198 showed that Ms. Nourdeh was the only director. Ms. Nourdeh acknowledges that she held herself out as having the authority to bind 198. Ms. Nourdeh, however, pleads that the plaintiff should have known that 198’s By-Law No. 2 (respecting the borrowing of money, the issuing of securities and the securing of liabilities) and the Certificate of Incumbency, which she signed, were not from 198’s Minute Books, but were prepared by Mr. Ghorbankhani, the lawyer representing 198. Mr. Farahmand, in his notice of motion and before me, baldly suggests that the signatures of Ms. Nourdeh on the By-Law and the Certificate of Incumbency are a forgery.

41Even if there are irregularities in the preparation of some of the documents, and even if Ms. Nourdeh and her spouse had privately agreed between themselves that Ms. Nourdeh required her spouse’s consent for 198 to borrow monies or grant 198’s property as collateral, I accept, as the plaintiff argues, that the application of the indoor management rule as provided in s. 19 of the Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B. 16, is dispositive. As the Court of Appeal explained in Froom v. Lafontaine, 2023 ONCA 519, 168 O.R. (3d) 102 at para. 46, “a party dealing with a corporation acting in good faith and without knowledge of any irregularity, is entitled to assume that the corporation has complied with its internal policies and procedures.”

42It is undisputed that Ms. Nourdeh held herself out as the sole director of 198 and signed all of the necessary documents representing that she had the authority to bind 198. The plaintiff acted in good-faith reliance on Ms. Nourdeh’s representations and the documents she signed, and the plaintiff was entitled to do so.

43Mr. Farahmand, on behalf of Ms. Nourdeh, argued, on this motion, in the alternative, that, as Ms. Nourdeh did not understand that 198 was a mortgagor/borrower, she did not

understand that, by signing the documents, 198 was granting a mortgage charge over 62 Laskin.

44Ms. Nourdeh had counsel when she filed her statement of defence. She did not plead that she had not understood that 198 was granting a mortgage charge over 62 Laskin as security for the loan. Ms. Nourdeh then had new counsel, independent of Mr. Farahmand, when she prepared her affidavit in which she stated, for the first time, that she did not understand the significance of the documents that she signed.

45Ms. Nourdeh, however, does not explain why or how it is that she did not understand the significance of what she signed. Ms. Nourdeh does not state that she did not read the documents. She did not state that Mr. Farahmand or their lawyer did not explain the documents to her. Ms. Nourdeh does not suggest that she was misled by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s lawyer on the transaction. Nor does she suggest that she was misled by Mr. Farahmand, or by 198’s lawyer on the mortgage loan transaction. She does not suggest that they failed to advise her of the implications of the mortgage commitment. She simply baldly asserts that she did not understand the implications, and that the plaintiff did not ensure that she understood. The only available inference is that it was Ms. Nourdeh’s own failing that she did not understand, or did not make inquiries, even of her son or their lawyer, and that she incorrectly assumed that recovery on default would be only or primarily against 37 Aylin. On Ms. Nourdeh’s evidence, even if accepted in its entirety, there is no air of reality to a defence of non est factum.

46Ms. Nourdeh’s defence, as alternatively advanced, is that 198 should be excused from liability because the plaintiff failed to ensure that she understood the implications of the mortgage commitment which she signed, and that the plaintiff should have required her to obtain independent legal advice separate from her son. In effect, she argues that, in the circumstances, it would be unconscionable to enforce the mortgage charge on 62 Laskin. Ms. Nourdeh says this is particularly so as 198 did not receive any of the funds advanced by the plaintiff under the loan, and as the entirety of the approximately $1.2 million loan was advanced to Mr. Farahmand.

47The plaintiff received a certificate of independent legal advice from the lawyer representing Mr. Farahmand and 198 (Ms. Nourdeh). The certificate is less than what might be expected, refers in the title to 37 Aylin only, and does not refer to Ms. Nourdeh or any advice provided to her in the body of the certificate. Ms. Nourdeh, however, does not state that she did not meet with Mr. Ghorbankhani, or that he misled led her in any manner. Nor does she suggest that her son misled her. Nor does she suggest that Mr. Ghorbankhani, or her son, were not available to answer her inquiries about the transaction, had she asked.

48A person who asserts actual undue influence in the guaranteeing of the debt of another person has the obligation to prove it. A person who asserts presumed undue influence must show that “there exists a relationship in which the law considers it fair to presume undue influence without the requirements to produce evidence of actual undue influence. If the presumption exists, the burden then shifts to the other party to rebut that presumption.” Where the presumption of undue influence in a spousal or like relationship arises, the

lender is on notice that it must take reasonable steps to protect itself from a later claim by the guarantor/spouse that the guarantee is vitiated by undue influence or misrepresentation. See Royal Bank of Canada v. Biddell, 2015 ONSC 6535 at paras. 55-57, citing CIBC Mortgage Corp. v. Rowatt (2002), 2002 CanLII 45110 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.). See also JGB Collateral, LLC v. Rochon, 2020 ONCA 464, 151 O.R. (3d) 601 at para. 30.

49A familial relationship does not automatically give rise to an actual or constructive presumption of undue influence: see Bank of Montreal v. Utility Engineers Corporation, 2025 ONCA 311, citing Rose-Terra Investments Inc. v. Chetti, 2024 ONCA 427, at para.

To ground such a presumption, the transaction must be “manifestly disadvantageous”:

Rose-Terra Investments Inc., at para. 16.

50In the cases provided to the court, the guarantor provided evidence of undue influence or which “showed the existence of a relationship in which the law considers it fair to presume undue influence” See, for example, Biddell at para. 28 in which the guarantor/spouse deposed that her husband misrepresented the financial viability of his company, and “actively deceived her” about his company and the risk, and Bertolo v. Bank of Montreal (1986), 1986 CanLII 150 (ON CA), 57 O.R. (2d) 577 (Ont. C.A.) in which the guarantor was the borrower’s mother. She had no business experience, little formal education, was not fluent in English, was unable to read and discern financial documents, and had modest assets.

51In contrast, Ms. Nourdeh has not pleaded misrepresentation or undue influence, nor does she even suggest that there was undue influence on her by her son. Furthermore, she does not suggest circumstances that she says show a constructive presumption of undue influence, other than that Mr. Farahmand is her son and she states that the loan was disbursed to him. Ms. Nourdeh does not suggest that the plaintiff knew that the loan was being advanced solely to Mr. Farahmand. Mr. Farahmand and 198 were the borrowers. The plaintiff was in receipt of the Undertaking from the lawyer representing Mr. Farahmand and 198, which did not provide details about the distribution of the loan.

52Ms. Nourdeh had not provided any evidence about her education, work experience, business experience or knowledge. Furthermore, she has not provided any evidence about her directorship of 198, or 198’s other assets, or her own financial circumstances. Ms. Nourdeh held herself out as the sole director of 198, the co-borrower/mortgagor. The plaintiff was in receipt of a Certificate of Independent Legal Advice and was aware that Mr. Farahmand and 198 (Ms. Nourdeh) had legal representation.

53Undue influence was not pleaded, and even if it were, Ms. Nourdeh has not shown that there is an air of reality to her position that the plaintiff was required to explain the mortgage documents to her and ensure that she receive separate legal advice, or that the plaintiff’s entitlement to possession of 62 Laskin should be set aside as unconscionable.

54It is regrettable if Ms. Nourdeh erroneously believed that the mortgagee had to exhaust its remedies against 37 Aylin first as the primary means of recovery of the debt; however, Ms. Nourdeh’s mistaken impression does not afford her a defence to the enforcement of the mortgage.

55It follows that, as 198 and Ms. Nourdeh have not put forward evidence which, even if accepted, raise a triable defence or a basis to find that the plaintiff should not be granted judgment for possession of 62 Laskin, I am satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

56In conclusion, the plaintiff shall have judgment for possession of 37 Aylin and 62 Laskin.

Order to go accordingly.

S. E. Lavine, J.

Released: June 5, 2025

Pahal v. Farahmand et al, 2025 ONSC 3370

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Rajinder Singh Pahal

– and –

Ali Farahmand, Mitra Nourdeh and 1989515 Ontario Inc.

RULING ON MOTIONS

The Honourable Justice S. E. Lavine

Released: June 5, 2025

Pahal v. Farahmand et al, 2025 ONSC 3370

Case Summary

Overview and Background Facts

Position of the Parties and Evidence on the Motion

Ali Farahmand’s Motion to Set Aside the Noting in Default

Whether Judgment Should be Granted for Possession of 62 Laskin

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

– and –

RULING ON MOTIONS

Pahal v. Farahmand et al, 2025 ONSC 3370

Case Summary

Overview and Background Facts

Position of the Parties and Evidence on the Motion

Ali Farahmand’s Motion to Set Aside the Noting in Default

Whether Judgment Should be Granted for Possession of 62 Laskin

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

– and –

RULING ON MOTIONS