Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: FS-19-95253
Date: 4 June 2025

BETWEEN:

Parmjot K. Kounsil
Applicant
Counsel: Mahzulfah S. Uppal (pbc@kblawyers.ca)

• and -

Harpreet Singh Kounsil
Respondent
Counsel: Peter M. Callahan (pcallahan@pmclaw.ca)

Heard: May 28, 31, June 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 19, 2024

Table of Contents

I. Overview
II. Issues
III. Credibility
IV. Date of Separation
V. Alberta Property
VI. Primary Residence for K.
VII. Decision Making
VIII. Method of Communication between Parties
IX. Transportation of K. to and from Parenting Time
X. Parental Consumption of Alcohol
XI. Limits on Relocation of K.’s Home
XII. Parental Travel with K.
XIII. Imputation of Income
XIV. Child Support
XV. Health and Medical Coverage for K.
XVI. Life Insurance for the Benefit of K.
XVII. Brayden Supervision Services
XVIII. Spousal Support
XIX. Costs
XX. Post Judgment Interest

I. Overview

1. The applicant/mother, Parmjot Kounsil and the respondent/father, Harpreet Kounsil, married in Ontario in July 2014. The couple then lived in Edmonton (where Harpreet had lived prior to marriage). The parties separated in 2018 or 2019 (the date is disputed). The parties have one child, K., born June 30, 2016. The parties and K. now live in Ontario.

2. Because the parties have the same surname (as do other members of the respondent’s family who were referred to in trial evidence), the parties will be referred to by their first names.

3. Despite the many issues in dispute and the acrimonious history between the parties, it is clear that they both love K. and he is a light in their lives.

II. Issues

4. At the outset of trial, the parties resolved several issues, including equalization and parenting time (including ancillary issues such as access to information, custodian of child’s documents, schooling, change of name and extra-curricular activities).

5. The trial issues are:

• Credibility;
• Date of separation;
• Alberta property;
• Primary residence for K.;
• Decision-making responsibility;
• Method of communication between parents;
• Transportation of K. to and from parenting time;
• Parental consumption of alcohol during parenting time;
• Limits on relocation of K’s home;
• Parental travel with K.;
• Income imputation for respondent;
• Child support from date of separation;
• Health and medical coverage for K.;
• Life insurance in favour of K.;
• Payment of Brayden Supervision expenses;
• Spousal support;
• Costs; and
• Post judgment interest.

III. Credibility

6. The court considered the credibility of the two parties who were the only witnesses called in this case.

7. Selecting between conflicting witness versions of events is decided on the balance of probabilities, which includes the assessment of credibility.

8. No witness ever has perfect recollection. All witnesses hold honest but mistaken beliefs.

9. Parmjot’s evidence was given in a calm and straightforward manner. She made concessions in cross-examination and admitted when she did not recall events.

10. The court was concerned with the vague and imprecise nature of much of Harpreet’s evidence, particularly on the issues of the Alberta property, his health and alcohol consumption and his finances. On these topics, Harpreet’s evidence sometimes differed from his own documents (such as the agreed statement of facts in the Alberta criminal case), differed from documents made by others (such as medical records) and, in the case of his financial records, Harpreet stated that he did not know or did not recall many transactions.

11. At best, Harpreet’s evidence was vague. He was evasive in cross-examination. At times, Harpreet’s evidence was more a manifestation of circumstances he wanted, as opposed to an accurate recollection. For instance, he minimized his role in the fraudulent real estate closing despite his admission of guilt in the criminal proceedings.

12. Parmjot argues that none of Harpreet’s evidence can be accepted because of these flaws. The court does not agree. Harpreet’s role in the fraudulent closing was wrong and he suffered criminal consequences for this. This does not mean that all of his evidence deserves no weight.

IV. Date of Separation

13. Parmjot says the date of separation is January 15, 2018. Harpreet says it is February 2019, despite using January 15, 2018 as the separation date in his pleadings and financial statements.

14. The court reviewed all of the evidence in the case, including the fact that Parmjot left Alberta with K. in January 2018 and Harpreet started a family law proceeding in Alberta in the summer of 2018.

15. In cross-examination, Parmjot conceded that she left Alberta in January 2018, but, at the time of her departure, intended to return [1]. However, when she arrived in Ontario, Parmjot testified that she felt like she was out of prison and decided not to return. Parmjot did not recall the date that she told Harpreet of her decision, but thought it was January or February; at the latest, she definitely told Harpreet before April 2018. Parmjot’s family supported her in this decision.

16. Harpreet gave similar evidence: he did not recall when Parmjot said she was not coming back to Alberta but recalled receiving a text from Parmjot at the end of March 2018, instructing Harpreet not to speak to her or K. and to direct all communications to her father.

17. Harpreet later travelled to Ontario in the hopes of reconciliation, but the evidence is clear that this was a one-sided effort. Harpreet testified that Parmjot and her family were not inclined towards a reconciliation and treated him disrespectfully. It was merely his hope that the parties would reconcile.

18. Parmjot filed her 2018 income tax return reporting her status as separated. Harpreet did not provide his 2018 income tax return, just his notice of assessment for that year.

19. The court has also reviewed the indicia of separation as set out in the case of Kassabian v. Marcarian, 2025 ONCA 239 and considered when there was no reasonable prospect of resuming cohabitation.

20. I find that the date of separation was the end of March 2018, which is the approximate time when Parmjot informed Harpreet she and K. were not returning to Alberta.

V. Alberta Property

21. Much time was spent on the issue of the Alberta property, which is the subject of ongoing litigation between the parties in that province.

22. Following their marriage, Parmjot relocated to Edmonton, where Harpreet had been living. The parties lived in a rental apartment.

23. In June 2017, the parties signed a contract to purchase a new-build home in Edmonton.

24. The parties had differing evidence regarding the house. Harpreet felt that Parmjot was enthusiastic about the purchase and was engaged in selecting finishes and making design choices. Parmjot did not deny her participation but described the driving force behind the project as Harpreet.

25. The property was scheduled to close on January 10, 2018 and was extended to January 29, 2018. Parmjot did not sign the closing documents; her signature was forged. Further, false pay stubs (which purported to show that Parmjot worked at an Edmonton dry cleaner) were provided to the mortgage lender. The mortgage lender approved a mortgage to Harpreet and Parmjot jointly.

26. These frauds gave rise to serious consequences for both Harpreet and his lawyer, Mr. Rahl.

• Mr. Rahl was convicted of one count of forgery, sentenced to a nine-month conditional sentence order and had his license to practice law suspended for 18 months (reduced to 12 months).
• Harpreet was charged with knowingly using forged documents and obtaining credit by fraud. He entered into an agreed statement of facts with the Crown.

27. There is no dispute that:

• Parmjot was not in Alberta at the time of the real estate closing;
• Parmjot did not sign any of the real estate closing documents;
• Parmjot had no knowledge of the joint-mortgage proposal;
• Parmjot had no knowledge of the forged employment records given to the lender;
• Parmjot learned that her name was on the mortgage in August 2018, when she opened a bank account in Ontario.

28. During the trial, there was a dispute about whether Mr. Rahl or Harpreet was the person who forged Parmjot’s name. The court does not need to make a finding about that fact in this trial. It is sufficient to note that Parmjot did not sign her name to the closing documents, nor did she sign the mortgage documents.

VI. Primary Residence for K.

29. At the outset of trial, the parties resolved the parenting time schedule. Based on the amount of time scheduled with each parent, the parties agree that K’s primary residence is with his mother.

30. Parmjot therefore seeks an order that K’s primary residence is with her.

31. Harpreet says that there is no need for such an order since the parenting time schedule speaks for itself.

32. Since K’s primary residence is, in fact, with his mother, then the court finds that this should be captured in an order as a matter of practical reality. A non-party reading the June 3, 2024 order (such as a teacher or health professional) should not have to review the entire parenting schedule and calculate time with each parent in order to draw a conclusion about who has primary residence.

VII. Decision Making

33. The question for decision making is the best interests of K. The fact that both parents have parenting time (an issue which was settled before trial) does not lead to the inexorable conclusion that joint decision making is in the best interests of the child (Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, para 10).

34. From the separation to the trial (a period of five years), there was no evidence of an ability to make joint decisions in the best interests of K.

35. Harpreet pointed to some text exchanges in the months leading up to trial. The court agrees that these were polite exchanges, but these exchanges dealt with the day-to-day logistics of video calls and pick ups and drop offs. There were no major decisions to be made.

36. The court saw no evidence of an ability of these parties to be joint decision makers. Further, some of the past evidence demonstrated instances of Harpreet showing questionable judgment, including insisting that he could parent while actively misusing alcohol.

37. One of the factors for the court to consider is a history of abuse. Parmjot alleges that she was abused physically, emotionally, and financially by Harpreet. She alleges that he also abused K. in that he carried K. (as an infant) while intoxicated. Harpreet denies the allegations of abuse and asks the court to find that Parmjot lied about these allegations for personal gain.

38. For the purposes of this trial decision, it is not necessary to make findings on the allegations of abuse. However, the mere gulf in perception between the parties illustrates their lack of common ground and speaks to their inability to collaborate and coordinate.

39. Given that Parmjot has been the primary care parent, and given the history of acrimony between the parties, the court finds that sole decision making is the most appropriate model and orders that Parmjot is the sole decision maker.

40. Parallel parenting: the court gives this proposal from Harpreet no weight given that it is a novel argument which was raised for the first time in written closing argument. It is clear from Harpreet’s written argument that he has not truly considered how parallel parenting would apply to K.’s life. The court declines to award parallel parenting.

41. The court accepts that, on each parent’s parenting time, they will make day to day decisions for K. that all caregivers make: clothes to be worn, appropriate outerwear, meals, homework, playtime, etc. That is not the same as the legal meaning of the term “decision making”, which deals with major decisions involving the child’s well-being, including religion, education, major extracurricular activities and health. However, day to day decisions must be consistent with major decision made by the decision-making parent.

VIII. Method of Communication between Parents

42. Parmjot seeks an order that consultations between the parties be in writing via text message or a family communications app such as AppClose.

43. The court agrees that the parties should communicate in writing (with exceptions being made for urgent situations or if the parties consent otherwise). There is benefit to using one modality of communication, whether it be by text or AppClose. The court orders the parties to try AppClose for a period of six months. If both parties consent to another mode of communication, they may switch.

IX. Transportation of K. to and from Parenting Time

44. Harpreet has parenting time on alternate weekends (from after school Friday to start of school Monday) and every Tuesday and Thursday from after school until 8pm. The schedule includes modifications to account for any of these days that are holidays or otherwise non-school days.

45. Parmjot’s position is that Harpreet should do all the driving in that he is responsible for all pick ups and drop offs. In cross-examination, Parmjot stated that she was not prepared to drive K. to Harpreet’s home.

46. At the time of trial, Parmjot was working part time after being let go from one of her registered nursing positions. She elected to keep working part-time because she wants to be the primary caregiver for K.

47. Where there is shared parenting, transportation is usually a shared responsibility. In most parenting scenarios, the parent at whose home the child is staying at, is responsible for getting the child to school. Likewise, the parent to whose home the child is going to after school is responsible for arranging transport from school to that parent’s home. Neither party offered law to contradict these basic propositions.

48. The court orders that both parents contribute to K’s transportation to and from parenting time. The court is not making orders regarding specific times that each parent must drive K., leaving the parties flexibility to establish a schedule that works for their personal and professional lives. If orders are required, the parties may contact the court for a further attendance.

X. Parental Consumption of Alcohol

49. A great deal of trial time was spent on the topic of Harpreet’s consumption of alcohol and whether this was an issue during the exercise of parenting time.

50. The evidence is that Harpreet started consuming alcohol at the age of 15 and has used alcohol on and off over the years. Harpreet denied that his alcohol consumption caused him any problems until February 2019 (the date that he says the parties separated), at which time he described feeling totally broken and drinking heavily.

51. Harpreet’s evidence must be contrasted with medical records which describe a history of alcohol misuse, including a March 1, 2021 report from an assessing neurologist which describes a longstanding history over the last 20 years of binge alcohol intoxication.

52. Harpreet’s evidence must also be contrasted with Parmjot’s evidence, which described first-hand observations of Harpreet’s alcohol use during the marriage (including hiding alcohol in the apartment) and intoxication during the marriage, including abusive, angry behaviour and one occasion when Parmjot took Harpreet to the hospital, concerned about how lethargic he was.

53. The court also notes that, despite introducing hundreds of pages of medical records, Harpreet did not review them, nor did he disclose all the records, including records from the Grey Nuns Hospital in Edmonton and the records from recent treating professionals in Ontario.

54. When confronted with evidence from the records, Harpreet provided vague responses or denials. He denied the accuracy of the March 1, 2021 report of a 20-year history of binge alcohol intoxication, although that record was made based on his own information. On October 21, 2020, an assessing physician recorded that “Harpreet states that he is currently separated from his wife. He states she left him abruptly in January 2018 and he feels this may be related to his alcohol use”. During cross-examination, Harpreet stated that he did not know where this information came from, despite the record clearly stating that he was the source.

55. In cross-examination, Harpreet testified that he experienced hallucinations a few times when he stopped drinking. He conceded that he had attended several rehabilitation programs.

56. The evidence is clear that Harpreet’s alcohol consumption was highly problematic. Some significant events from the more recent past include:

• March 7, 2019: admission for visual and auditory hallucinations; assessment queried alcohol-induced psychosis and alcohol-induced delirium.
• October 5, 2020: Harpreet charged with impaired driving and excess blood alcohol.
• October 12, 2020: ER attendance with tactile and visual hallucinations. Substantial alcohol use reported. Alcohol withdrawal suspected.
• March 1, 2021: admission after ten days of hard drinking.
• July 1, 2021: admission for visual and auditory hallucinations due to alcohol consumption.

57. Harpreet’s evidence is that he has not consumed alcohol since July 1, 2021.

58. The court was sufficiently concerned that it made a pre-trial order that Harpreet not consume alcohol within 24 hours of parenting time.

59. Harpreet has other medical conditions which are negatively impacted by alcohol use. On February 28, 2018, Dr. Dhawan at the TB clinic strongly encouraged Harpreet to remain abstinent from drinking alcohol because of his TB status. On April 1, 2021, Dr. Muratolglu (neurology) stated that Harpreet probably also has length-dependent neuropathy from alcohol disuse.

60. Harpreet gave vague evidence about the recovery treatments and programs he has pursued. The thrust of this evidence is that he did not find in-patient programs helpful and programs like Alcoholics Anonymous triggered his cravings. He had access to programs at Etobicoke General, but, at the time of trial, he testified that he was no longer in therapy, no longer taking medications (anti-depressants, anti-anxiety medications and anti-craving medications) and was not seeing his addiction counsellor. Updated medical records were not provided to the court.

61. Harpreet testified that he was able to stop drinking on July 1, 2021 because he reframed his relationship with Parmjot (thinking of her as a co-parent rather than partner) and focusing on his relationship with K. (whose birthday is June 30). Harpreet reports that returning to Sikh temple and following Sikh teachings more closely (such as eating a vegetarian diet, avoiding tobacco and alcohol) have been helpful for him.

62. Harpreet deserves congratulations for the significant progress he has made. However, the court was concerned by Harpreet’s bald statement that he was “100% cured” and that he would be able to maintain his alcohol abstinence without supports or professional help. Alcohol use disorder is known to be refractory, as demonstrated by Harpreet’s own records which note periods of abstinence, followed by periods of alcohol use and/or misuse, leading to profound medical and psychiatric complications as well as criminal charges on one occasion.

63. Both parties are focused on the best interests of K. It is vital that K. has the best versions of his parents and that safety risks be limited during transportation and parenting time.

64. The court accepts that Harpreet intends to remain abstinent. However, Harpreet has chosen to follow a path of abstinence without the supports of health professionals and/or medications. This is Harpreet’s choice, but that choice does not give the court comfort. Therefore, out of abundance of caution, and given Harpreet’s stated plan never to consume alcohol again, the court orders that Harpreet not consume alcohol for 24 hours prior to and during parenting time. Harpreet shall not transport K. if he has consumed any alcohol.

XI. Limits on Relocation of K’s Home

65. Parmjot seeks an order that she not relocate K.’s residence outside of the Greater Toronto Area (defined as Peel Region, Region of Halton, City of Toronto and York Region) except in accordance with the relocation provisions in the Divorce Act.

66. Harpreet seeks an order that neither party change their current residence to one that is more than 25 kilometers from Brampton City Hall without the written consent of the other party or a court order.

67. Neither party gave trial evidence of a desire or plan to move. Neither party expressed any concerns about K.’s current school.

68. It is unclear to the court why an order with an arbitrary geographic boundary is necessary. Both parties currently live in Peel Region and there is no stated intention to move. It is the expectation of the court that ample notice would be given by either parent planning a move to a location further away than they currently live, which would permit the parties to negotiate, mediate or return to court if necessary.

XII. Parental Travel with K.

69. The parties agree that they shall be permitted to travel with K. but disagree as to the terms.

70. Broadly speaking, the positions of the parties can be summarized as follows:

• Parmjot: No consent required for GTA travel; consent required for travel outside GTA; notice required for travel outside GTA, within Ontario (72 hours), North America & Caribbean (20 days), outside North America & Caribbean (30 days).
• Harpreet: No consent required for North America & Caribbean; consent required for travel outside North America & Caribbean; notice required for North America & Caribbean (one week), outside North America & Caribbean (three weeks).

71. Parmjot did not provide a specific rationale for the terms of the order she seeks.

72. Harpreet testified that he did not want to be deprived of the chance to get last minute deals on travel.

73. The ability to book last minute travel is a luxury afforded to parents who have mutual trust, respect, and collaboration. The court hopes that will happen in future for these parties, but it was not present during the trial.

74. Neither party spoke of any anticipated travel.

75. The court makes the following orders regarding travel with K.:

• These orders apply to travel during agreed upon parenting time. If a party wishes to travel with K. outside his or her parenting time, the consent of the opposite party is required.
• Notice will be provided of any travel outside the GTA. For trips within Ontario, notice can be provided on the day of travel. Within North America and the Caribbean, two weeks notice is required. Outside North America and the Caribbean, four weeks notice is required. Notice includes as much information as available regarding itinerary, including travel arrangements and contact information. A full, detailed itinerary will be provided at least 72 hours prior to travel outside Ontario.
• Parental consent is required for any travel outside Ontario. Consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. The travelling parent shall bear the cost of preparing any travel consents required and the consenting parent shall execute the needed documents in a timely way.
• Consent of both parents is required for passport applications. Consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
• Because the parties previously agreed that Parmjot be the custodian of K.’s government documents, Parmjot shall be the parent who applies for K.’s passport with Harpreet’s consent unless the parties agree otherwise in writing.

XIII. Imputation of Income

76. Parmjot asks the court to impute income to Harpreet. Harpreet opposes this and submits that his financial documents accurately represent his income. The parties agree that Harpreet should pay table child support based on his income.

77. Prior to trial, the court made a temporary, without prejudice child support order based on Harpreet earning $35,000 per year.

78. The positions of the parties on income imputation to Harpreet are as follows:

Year	Parmjot Position	Harpreet Position	Notes
2018	60,000	19,746	H argues that 2018 should not be included because he relies on the 2019 separation date
2019	60,000	17,250
2020	60,000	25,500
2021	60,000	19,509
2022	60,000	21,524
2023	56,450.48	56,450
2024	60,000	67,700 (Jan 1 to Mar 31), 34,700 (Apr 1 onwards)	H began receiving sick leave benefits on April 1, 2024

79. Parmjot’s position is that Harpreet’s annual incomes cannot be accurate given his reported expenses which range from $75K to $145K per year.

80. There is no dispute between the parties about the annual income earned by Parmjot since 2018.

81. Section 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, permits the court to impute income to a party in certain circumstances. The relevant circumstances in this case are:

• section 19(1)(a): where income may be imputed if a spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed unless the lack of employment is required by the needs of a child or the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse; and
• section 19(1)(f): the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so.

82. Onus: the party seeking imputation bears the onus to establish an evidentiary basis for the finding (Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, para 111).

83. Starting Presumption: For a parent to meet their legal obligation to support a child, they must earn what they are capable of earning (Drygala v. Pauli, para 32).

84. Disclosure: The first step in the imputation analysis is whether the party resisting the imputation made sufficient financial disclosure. In this case, I find that Harpreet did not make sufficient disclosure in three respects:

• He did not disclose his corporation income information from Alberta;
• He did not provide evidence about large deposits and transfers to and from his accounts; and
• He did not disclose his application for CPP disability (apparently rejected) and the appeal process.

85. Intentionality: Section 19(1) asks whether a spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed. Intentionality simply refers to voluntariness and does not require the court to find that a parent is unemployed for the purpose of avoiding child support (Drygala, paras 25–26, 28, 36).

86. Reason for unemployment: Section 19(1) of the Guidelines does not permit imputation if a parent’s unemployment is due to childcare or reasonable educational or health needs of the parent.

• Childcare is not a relevant consideration in this case.
• Educational needs of Harpreet are not relevant in this case.
• Health needs of a parent: Harpreet missed some work due to health conditions over the years (for instance, a car accident, surgery of ankylosing spondylosis, etc.), but none of these absences were for significant periods of time. Parmjot’s own evidence is that Harpreet was unable to work (driving his taxi or truck) due to his intoxication, which is also a health issue.

87. Amount of imputation: Any imputed income must be grounded in the evidence; the amount cannot be arbitrary and there must be a rational basis for the amount selected (Drygala, para 44; de Pimentel v. Rodriguez, 2024 ONSC 2844, para 18).

88. The court is troubled by Harpreet’s failure to disclose his Alberta corporate tax returns and his lack of explanation for the transfers in and out of his accounts. The court is also troubled by absence of evidence about how and where Harpreet accessed the funds to purchase and maintain the Edmonton house when the parties agree that Parmjot did not contribute to this property. In 2018 alone, Harpreet paid $21,000 for the house mortgage, plus utilities, plus mortgage insurance, and $3,400 for appliances, all on a reported income of $19,746.

89. Harpreet’s financial statements do show him taking on an increasing amount of debt over the years, but the overall debt is less than Harpreet’s reported annual expenses. Simply put, the math does not add up. At the same time, the court finds that Parmjot did not have evidence of Harpreet earning more than his reported income (other than her suspicions).

90. In the absence of other admissible evidence, the court imputes minimum wage income to Harpreet for 2018 to 2022 (de Pimentel, para 18). The court accepts Harpreet’s evidence of his income for 2023 and 2024.

91. If the parties cannot agree on the minimum wage for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022, they may request an appointment before me to make supplementary submissions.

XIV. Child Support

92. Child support is the right of the child. K. is entitled to child support from the date of separation (March 31, 2018).

93. The parties agree that Harpreet must receive credit for any amounts paid to date.

94. By June 30 of every year, commencing in 2025, the parties shall provide copies of all income information to the other pursuant to section 21 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, including their income tax returns (with all attachments), notices of assessment, notices of reassessment and financial statements or any corporations in which either party has an interest. This information will be used to calculate the appropriate child support for the following 12 months in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

95. A support deduction order shall issue.

96. The parties may set off any child support owing by Harpreet against equalization owing by Parmjot.

97. If there is any dispute about what Harpreet has paid to date and what is owing, the parties may request a 9am attendance before me through the trial coordinator.

98. Section 7 expenses will be shared proportionate to income.

XV. Health and Medical Coverage for K.

99. No trial time was spent on this issue, although it was contemplated by the draft orders filed by both parties.

100. Parmjot seeks an order that each party maintain full health care and medical coverage for K. which is available to a party through their work so long as that coverage is available at a reasonable cost. Such coverage shall continue for so long as K. is a dependant within the meaning of the Divorce Act, and the cost of the coverage remains reasonable.

101. Harpreet seeks an order which is almost identical. The only difference is that his draft order does not include the caveat that coverage shall be maintained only if the cost is reasonable.

102. The parties desire that these benefits be maintained for at least another nine years and perhaps even later if K. pursues post-secondary education.

103. Parmjot’s proposed language creates uncertainty (the parties may disagree over what constitutes a reasonable cost). However, Harpreet’s order does not provide any flexibility for either party if they face an unreasonable price for benefits. Given the number of years that these benefits are needed, and that it is impossible to predict what employers the parties may work with in future, the court finds that it is important to preserve flexibility for the parties in the event of rising costs for health benefits.

104. The court orders that each party maintain full health care and medical coverage for K. which is available to each party through their work so long as that coverage is available at a reasonable cost.

XVI. Life Insurance for the Benefit of K.

105. No trial time was spent on this issue, although it was contemplated in the draft orders filed by both parties.

106. Parmjot seeks an order requiring Harpreet (and only Harpreet) to obtain and maintain a life insurance of at least $150,000 on the following conditions:

• Harpreet to provide annual proof of policy;
• Harpreet to provide annual proof that he has not borrowed against the policy;
• If Harpreet dies without the life insurance policy in place, there shall be a first charge against his estate;
• Harpreet shall designate Parmjot as sole irrevocable beneficiary of the life insurance policy in trust for K., as long as K. is entitled to child support.

107. Harpreet seeks an order that each party shall designate K. as the irrevocable beneficiary for any life insurance policy either party owns and name the opposite party as trustee on behalf of the child.

108. The court agrees that both parties should maintain life insurance for the benefit of K. The parties are welcome to consent to an order which imposes the same requirement on both of them. However, given the limited financial circumstances of both parties and given that there was no trial evidence about the cost of obtaining and maintaining these policies, it is impossible to determine whether such a plan is financially prudent and/or viable. The court therefore declines to give the life insurance order sought by either party.

XVII. Brayden Supervision Services

109. For a period of time, Harpreet’s parenting time was supervised by Brayden Supervision Services. He paid a total of $18,622.44 to Brayden for supervision fees. He asks the court to order that Parmjot pay 1/3 of that amount ($6,207.48). Parmjot opposes this position.

110. The court declines to make this order. The supervision services were required solely due to Harpreet’s medical issues which are addressed elsewhere in this decision.

XVIII. Spousal Support

111. Harpreet’s draft order contains a clause requiring Parmjot to make a lump sum payment of $10,000 for spousal support.

112. There was no evidence at trial regarding this entitlement and the court declines to make this order.

XIX. Costs

113. The parties are urged to agree on costs. If they will not, written costs submissions will be served, filed and uploaded to Case Centre on the following schedule:

• Applicant by July 4, 2025 at 4pm;
• Respondent by August 1, 2025 at 4pm.

114. No reply is permitted.

115. These deadlines cannot be varied unless by court order. If submissions are not received by these deadlines, the court will proceed on the basis that costs are not being sought.

116. Costs submissions will be double spaced, in 12-point font, and five pages, maximum (exclusive of offers, authorities and bills of costs).

117. The submissions and bills of costs will identify any step in the proceeding (including trial) which requires costs to be assessed. The submissions and bills of costs will exclude any step for which costs have already been awarded.

XX. Post Judgment Interest

118. Post judgment interest shall run at 5% from 30 days after the date of these reasons.

L.B. Stewart
Released: June 4, 2025

Footnotes

[1] Parmjot originally told Harpreet in July 2017 that she planned to leave, but did not because Harpreet threatened suicide. Parmjot’s evidence was that she then resigned herself to her life circumstances.

[2] Kassabian v. Marcarian, 2025 ONCA 239.

[3] Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, para 10.

[4] In this case, religion is not a contested issue as both parties are members of the Sikh faith and K. is also being raised in that faith.

[5] There was some lack of clarity in Parmjot’s draft order which spoke of travel within North America & Caribbean without consent.

[6] Harpreet’s position also lacked clarity. While he suggested that consent was not required for travel within North America and the Caribbean, his position is also that the other parent shall sign and notarize any documents required for travel which is effectively consent.

[7] See prior footnote re: lack of clarity in Parmjot’s draft order.

[8] Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, para 111.

[9] Drygala v. Pauli, para 32.

[10] Drygala, paras 25–26, 28, 36.

[11] Drygala, para 44; de Pimentel v. Rodriguez, 2024 ONSC 2844, para 18.

[12] de Pimentel, para 18.