S.T. v. D.C., 2025 ONSC 3327

CITATION: T. (S.) v. C. (D.), 2025 ONSC 3327

COURT FILE NO.: FS-22-32470

DATE: 20250610

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

S.T.

Applicant

– and –

D.C.

Respondent

A.S. Richard, for the Applicant

Self-Represented Respondent (Not present at Trial)

HEARD: January 6, 7, and 8, 2025

VELLA J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1This uncontested trial proceeded over the course of three days.

2The Respondent Father (D.C.) failed to attend at court. The Respondent was called to court at the outset of trial, and there was no response. The Respondent was aware of the time, date, and location of this trial.

3The Applicant Mother (S.T.) seeks orders for divorce, parenting, child support (including imputation of income to the Respondent), a restraining order, an initialing order, and costs.

4The court received affidavit evidence from nine witnesses, transcript evidence (from a 2023 motion before Kristjanson J. during which the Respondent was sworn and testified, pursuant to r. 23(21) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99), an Assessment Report and Addendum pursuant to s. 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, and viva voce evidence from the Applicant.

Overview

5The Respondent only responded to the first Request to Admit (dated April 3, 2024). He failed to respond to the subsequent six Requests to Admit (dated variously between May 2 and December 10, 2024) as at the date of trial. The Applicant has demonstrated that she served the Respondent with the Requests to Admit 20 days or more before trial. Accordingly, pursuant to r. 22(4) of the Family Law Rules (“FLRs”), the Respondent is deemed to have admitted, for the purpose of this case, that the facts are true or that the documents are genuine within the meaning of r. 22(1) of the FLRs. The Applicant tendered an Updated Brief of the Respondent’s Admissions and Denials for ease of reference, as well as the Requests to Admit and the single Response.

6The following facts were admitted by way of the Requests to Admit, and/or from the unchallenged evidence adduced at trial, which I accept as credible and reliable. Much of the collateral witness affidavit evidence was based on direct knowledge and was in the nature of confirming and sometimes corroborating the Applicant’s testimony. Where the evidence constitutes inadmissible hearsay, I did not attach any weight to it. Furthermore, I accept the Applicant’s evidence with respect to statements made by the child to her regarding the child’s interactions with, and feelings towards, the Respondent. I find those statements to be fair and balanced (for example, the child’s expression of love for her father and desire to spend time more with him), and sometimes supported by the collateral witnesses and by the findings in the s. 30 Assessment Report and Addendum (more of which will be examined later in these Reasons). These out of court statements meet the threshold reliability requirement and were of assistance to the court in determining the views and preferences of the child, and her interactions when alone with the Respondent.

7The parties were married on June 4, 2017, but began cohabiting on December 3, 2014, when they moved into an apartment together. The Applicant’s name was the only name on the lease because she had a job and the Respondent did not.

8The parties separated on August 7, 2022.

9The parties have one child of the marriage, J.C., born on [redacted] (“J.C.” or “the child”). She was six years old as at the date of the trial.

10The Applicant lives with multiple sclerosis (M.S.) which relapses and remits. She works at the Ontario Association of Architects (O.A.A.) full time, as Manager of Policy and Government Relations. She has a support network of close family and friends who she can call on whenever she requires assistance with J.C.; however, she is able to, and does, look after J.C. full time, with the exception of scheduled parenting visits for the Respondent.

11The Respondent has a sporadic work history. He claimed to be a certified teacher when he met the Applicant but was taking a gap year. However, he lied to the Applicant, as she later discovered. He is not a teacher. He did obtain an undergraduate degree from the University of Toronto. His main areas of work have been as a coach of amateur soccer teams, and as an entry-level sales representative of sports equipment and attire. The Respondent typically only held these jobs for two to three months. He would end up quitting and telling the Applicant that the employers were racist and the jobs were below him. The Respondent’s view that he was often the subject of racism (including by the Applicant’s family) was a constant theme during their cohabitation.

12The parties come from rich and diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. The Applicant’s father is Roman Catholic. Her mother was Jewish. The Respondent told the Applicant he is of Chinese and Dominican heritage. The child is the beneficiary of this rich and diverse background.

13J.C. lives primarily with the Applicant and has parenting time with the Respondent.

14The Applicant was diagnosed with M.S. in 2007. At the time, she was living with her parents. That same year, her mother was diagnosed with stage 4 cancer.

15The parties met in July 2013 and began dating. The Applicant was comforted by the Respondent’s claim that he was not concerned about her medical condition of M.S. and would “walk with her” for life. She testified that she felt she had met “the one”. All of her past romantic interests would end the relationship upon learning of her medical condition, and she had grown disheartened.

16The Applicant was also in a vulnerable state when she met the Respondent because her mother had recently died after a five-year struggle with cancer. The Applicant was the primary caregiver for her mother and looked after the household for her father and siblings. When her mother died, she was devastated. Her family members retreated into their own lives in dealing with their grief, and the Applicant felt alone.

17There were early indicators of the Respondent’s inability to control his temper. The Applicant’s testimony about his temper is supported, and sometimes corroborated, in her witness’ affidavits.

18However, the Applicant was loyal to the Respondent for the reasons stated, and she was determined to make the relationship work. Early in their dating relationship, the Respondent developed a pattern of rage, contriteness, and then gentleness. One moment, as shall be further explored under the Best Interests of the Child section of these Reasons, he would lose his temper, resulting in physical intimidation, shouting, shoving, and verbal abuse. This behaviour would then be followed by a gentleness and an attempt to explain his rage away, as if he was only protecting her from some imagined suiter. Unfortunately, some of his rage and violent actions occurred in front of the child, beginning as early as infanthood up to and following separation. Eventually, the Applicant was able to break the cycle of enragement and violent actions and she left the Respondent, keeping J.C. with her.

19Also troubling, the Respondent developed what appears to be an unhealthy obsession with the child’s cleanliness and appearance. Early on, when J.C. was around three years old, he began telling her repeatedly that she “smells” and “stinks”. He embarked on a ritual of washing her armpits repeatedly with lemon juice, saying that the Toronto Public Health told him to do this. He also began giving the child more than one bath a day, and used a loofah to scrub her genitals, causing inflammation, rawness, and pain when the child would urinate. After separation, this pattern has continued and progressed to the point where he will, inexplicably, bathe his five- to six-year-old daughter in the public men’s washroom at the malls he now frequents with her during his Saturday parenting time. He will send her home in different clothes from what she dressed herself in to visit him. On one recent parenting visit, he inexplicably cut a chunk of hair from one side of her scalp, leaving a visible mess of thinned out scraggly hair. This will be further expanded under the analysis pertaining to the best interests of the child.

20Notwithstanding the Respondent’s pattern of harmful behaviour, the child has a strong and loving bond with him. This is acknowledged by the Applicant, who wants to ensure that this parental bond remains intact, subject to her overriding concern for the child’s safety and welfare. One such impediment that challenged the Applicant’s trust in him was the Respondent’s refusal to provide his address when he moved. He previously refused until he was asked for it by Justice Kristjanson under oath at the 2023 motion, and he currently refuses to provide his new address with proof in light of the concern that he has moved yet again from his Bloor Street condominium unit and may be homeless.

Issues

21The issues for determination in this uncontested trial are the following:

(a) Parenting orders: primary residence, decision-making, and parenting time and conditions for the Respondent;

(b) Retroactive and ongoing child support, including imputation of income to the Respondent;

(c) Restraining order against the Respondent;

(d) Divorce;

(e) An initialing order;

(f) Return of $10,000 advanced by the Applicant; and

(g) Costs (including enforcement of unpaid costs awards).

22The Applicant withdrew her claim for equalization in her Amended Application.

23In summary form, I have determined the issues as follows.

24The child’s primary residence will continue to be with the Applicant. The Applicant shall have sole decision-making authority, subject to conditions, including prior consultation with the Respondent on all significant decisions relating to health, education, and religion, as outlined in the Disposition and Costs section of these Reasons. All communications between the parties shall only be by way of AppClose and shall only be about the child.

25The Respondent’s in-person parenting time shall be suspended immediately, pending the provision of his current address and proof of his current residence.

26Thereafter, the Respondent’s in-person parenting time shall resume but on a supervised basis. The Applicant, or her designate, will be responsible for dropping off and picking up the child from the supervised access centre. Either party may have the parenting schedule and conditions reviewed upon the completion of 90 days of supervised parenting, the production of the supervision notes, and upon proof or completion of a parenting program, such as Caring Dads, and an anger management program of his choosing. He must provide proof of successful completion of these two programs from the service providers. Both parties shall have full access to the supervised parenting notes. The Respondent is responsible for the payment of the supervision fees, but either party may request and pay for the supervision notes. In the interim, the Respondent shall continue to have his current videoconference calls with the child for 30 minutes, four days a week, as per the current status quo and temporary parenting order. When and if unsupervised in person parenting time is sought, the logistics of the parenting exchanges will be the subject of the review.

27The Respondent shall not use any demeaning or derogatory language towards the child or in the child’s presence about the Applicant and the Applicant’s family. This includes a prohibition against telling the child that she “stinks” or “smells,” is otherwise unclean, or has bad odour.

28The Respondent shall pay table child support from the date of separation until the child is no longer eligible, based on an imputed income. On a prospective basis, he shall pay table child support based on an imputed income or actual income, whichever is higher. He shall disclose his income tax returns and notices of assessment by July 1 of each year, commencing July 1, 2025.

29A restraining order is granted with terms specified later in these Reasons.

30An initialing order is granted to protect the identity of the Applicant and the child.

31The Respondent shall refund the $10,000 advance made to him by the Applicant.

32A divorce is granted, as the statutory requirements have been met.

33A Support Deduction Order (S.D.O.) shall issue. The past outstanding costs awards in the respective sums of $3,000 and $18,000 shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office together with the costs awarded of this proceeding.

Juridical history

34There is a lengthy and relevant juridical history to this matter. It is evident that the Respondent selectively appeared at certain motions and conferences but was absent for the majority of court appearances. He has been found to be in persistent noncompliance with many of the court’s orders and fundamental financial disclosure obligations. I will review those orders that are particularly germane to the issues I must decide, including a determination of the best interests of the child.

35By endorsement dated November 17, 2022, Kraft J. issued, inter alia, an order granting the Applicant exclusive possession of the matrimonial home as being in the best interests of J.C., and a temporary parenting order. Her Honour dismissed the Applicant’s request for a restraining order, without prejudice to her right to return her motion for a restraining order if the Respondent declined to participate in these proceedings. A no-contact order was granted, as well as an order requiring that the parties communicate about J.C. only through AppClose in order, in part, to provide a record of any insulting, demeaning, or denigrating messages by the Respondent. The following temporary orders were also made:

(a) The parties were to make immediate arrangements to retain and attend parenting mediation with Christine Kim;

(b) J.C.’s primary residence would be with the Applicant;

(c) J.C. shall have in-person parenting time with the Respondent on Saturdays from 8:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. and on Wednesdays from pick up after school to 6:30 p.m.;

(d) Transfers were to take place in front of the Shoppers Drug Mart located at 2345 Yonge Street Toronto. The Applicant was to designate a third party to handle the transfer on her behalf;

(e) J.C. shall have video conference parenting time with the Respondent every day that she does not see him, on Sundays, Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, from 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., or whenever the child requested;

(f) The parenting schedule shall be reviewed when the Respondent secured appropriate and alternative accommodation for himself and the child to consider whether overnight parenting time should be implemented;

(g) The Respondent shall be restrained from engaging in cleaning the child’s armpits with lemon juice (the “lemon juice ritual”) and telling her that she smells;

(h) Neither party shall discuss this litigation with the child;

(i) Neither party shall denigrate the other in front of the child;

(j) The Applicant shall transfer $10,000 to the Respondent, to be characterized on a later date (intended to facilitate the Respondent’s move to a new residence, as he was unemployed);

(k) A police enforcement order was issued with respect to the parenting arrangements.

36At a motion heard on May 25, 2023, Kraft J. made a temporary change to the parenting schedule to enable the child to attend her aunt’s bridal shower and wedding as a flower girl. The Respondent refused to reschedule make-up time to Sundays for the two Saturdays he would miss as a result of this request. The Respondent did not appear before the court, nor did he file any responding material to support his refusal to change. Justice Kraft found that the Respondent had taken “unreasonable and rigid positions in this litigation” in addition to refusing to allow the child to participate in this bridal shower and wedding, including refusing consent to the child to see her therapist and refusing to participate in court-ordered mediation with Christine Kim after he initially agreed to it.

37Justice Kraft found that the bridal shower and wedding were culturally important to the child’s maternal family, and it was in the child’s best interests to participate and enjoy important family milestones. Her Honour further found that the Respondent’s “blanket refusal to allow [the child] to attend both events demonstrates that he has an inability to place [the child’s] needs and best interests ahead of his own.” Costs in the sum of $3,000, payable within seven days, were ordered but have never been paid by the Respondent.

38At a case conference held on July 21, 2023, Akazaki J. ordered that the parties shall retain Howard Hurwitz to conduct a s. 30 CLRA Assessment. The Applicant was to pay the fees and expenses, subject to re-apportionment at trial. In addition, the court ordered the following, inter alia:

(a) The Applicant was granted leave to bring a motion to strike the Respondent’s pleadings based on evidence of breaches of court orders;

(b) A trial management conference was scheduled for November 28, 2023.

The Respondent appeared at this case conference.

39At a three-hour motion to strike the Respondent’s Answer, heard on September 21, 2023, at which both parties appeared, Kristjanson J. made several orders. During the course of the motion, Her Honour received viva voce evidence from the Respondent and a certified transcript of the motion was tendered at trial. Her Honour found that Mr. Hurwitz had resigned because of the Respondent’s abusive conduct toward him and his staff. Her Honour appointed Ms. Lieberman as the s. 30 assessor, rejecting the Respondent’s objection which was based on the fact that Ms. Lieberman is Jewish (the Applicant has Jewish heritage) and not Black (the Father has Dominican heritage and is Black) and was therefore biased, finding the objection to be improper. The parties and the child were ordered to attend for assessment before Ms. Lieberman, if so requested, and on the dates and times required by her. Furthermore, in light of the Respondent’s behaviour towards Mr. Hurwitz and his staff and his refusal to participate in that process, Ms. Lieberman was vested with the authority to proceed with and complete the s. 30 assessment without the Respondent’s participation. Furthermore, she was vested with the authority to arrange for psychological testing of either party.

40Justice Kristjanson also observed that in the course of his submissions, the Respondent “made outbursts containing overtly racist and highly offensive comments based on applicant counsel’s identity as a racialized lawyer” which was “unacceptable conduct.” Her Honour also found that the Respondent refused to provide his address to the Applicant. However, in sworn viva voce testimony at the motion, he did provide his address.

41Justice Kristjanson made several orders, including striking the Form 10 Answer in its entirety, save for those paragraphs dealing with parenting time and decision-making responsibility. Her Honour granted leave to the Applicant to proceed to an uncontested trial on all claims and issues other than parenting time and decision-making responsibility, with the consequences of r. 1(8.4) of the FLRs applying. Her Honour limited the Respondent’s right to participate at trial and subsequent conferences only on parenting issues. The Respondent had no right to participate in or initiate any other step until he had paid all outstanding costs orders. He was ordered to pay $18,000 by January 5, 2024. This cost award is also still outstanding.

42Justice Kristjanson found that the Respondent was in non-compliance and breach of the following FLRs and Orders:

(a) Failure to produce his financial disclosure as required by the Automatic Order, paras. 5(a), (c), (d), (e), and r. 13 of the FLRs, and failure to serve or file a sworn Form 13.1 financial statement and supporting documents, or a Certificate of Financial Disclosure. He also failed to produce critical income information and financial information about his corporation (which documentation and information continues to be outstanding);

(b) Both orders of Justice Kraft. He failed to attend the court-ordered mediation before Christine Kim, and pay the costs of the motion in the sum of $3,000 (which sum continues to be outstanding);

(c) Breach of the order of Akazaki J. by failing to respond to the Applicant’s Request for Information due on August 28, 2023.

43In addition, and over the Respondent’s objection, Kristjanson J. ordered that the child shall attend play-based therapy with Dorothy Koziorz, that neither the therapist or the therapy records would be admissible into evidence, and that the Applicant would pay the upfront fees and expenses of the therapist.

44At a motion heard on April 2, 2024, Ramsay J. ordered, in part, that the Respondent was to refund the $10,000 advanced by the Applicant to her, and that the payment was subject to post-judgment interest (the requisite payment is still outstanding).

45At the Trial Management Conference (T.M.C.), heard July 29, 2024, Schabas J. reiterated that the Respondent may only participate at trial with respect to the parenting issues. Security was also ordered for the duration of the trial (a police officer attended throughout the trial, in the event the Respondent appeared). The Respondent did not appear at the T.M.C.

46At the Exit Pre-Trial held before Diamond J. on December 11, 2024, His Honour noted that the Respondent did not attend, and remains in breach of various court orders and cost orders.

47As at the commencement of trial, the Respondent had not cured any of these breaches of court orders and was still in substantial noncompliance with the disclosure requirements of the FLRs.

The law and findings under each issue

Issue 1: Best interests of the child – primary residence, decision-making, and parenting time

Legal Framework

48Section 16(1) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) provides that in making an order for parenting time or decision-making responsibility the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child. Section 16(2) states that when considering the factors in s. 16(3) to determine the best interests of the child, the primary consideration is the child’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being.

27Section 16(3) of the Divorce Act lists circumstances the court shall consider in determining the child’s best interests. The list is not exhaustive, but states:

In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all of the factors related to the circumstances of the child including:

(a) Child’s needs given the age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) The nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) Each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;

(d) The history of the care of the child;

(e) The child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) The child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) Any plans for the child’s care;

(h) The ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) The ability and willingness of each person of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) Any family violence and its impact on, amongst other things;

(i) The ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and,

(ii) The appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and

(h) Any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

28The existence of family violence is an important factor in determining what parenting orders are in the best interests of the child. Family violence extends beyond intimate partner violence to include abusive and harmful conduct committed against, or in the presence of, the children of the marriage. Section 2 of the Divorce Act defines the term “family violence” as follows:

family violence means any conduct, whether or not the conduct constitutes a criminal offence, by a family member towards another family member, that is violent or threatening that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour or caught that causes that other family member the fear for their own safety or for that of another person - and in the case of a child, the direct or indirect exposure to such conduct - and includes

a) physical abuse, including forced confinement but excluding the use of reasonable force to protect themselves or another person;

b) sexual abuse;

c) threats to kill or cause bodily harm to any person;

d) harassment, including stalking;

e) the failure to provide the necessities of life;

f) psychological abuse;

g) threats to kill or harm an animal or damage property; and

h) the killing or harming of an animal or the damaging of property.

49Section 16(4) of the Divorce Act dictates that in considering the impact of any family violence pursuant to s. 16(3)(j), the court must take into account several factors relating to family violence, as follows:

In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph(3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:

a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

h) any other relevant factor.

50The court is directed by s. 16(5) of the Divorce Act to only take into consideration the past conduct of any person if that conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time, decision-making responsibility, or contact with the child under a contact order.

51Furthermore, s. 16(6) of the Divorce Act mandates the court to give effect to the principle that the child should have as much time with each spouse but only insofar as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

52Decision-making responsibility entails the responsibility for making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including in respect of health, education, culture, language, religion, spirituality, and significant extra-curricular activities: Divorce Act, at s. 2(1).

53Unless the court orders otherwise, a person to whom parenting time is allocated under s. 16.1(4)(a) of the Divorce Act has exclusive authority to make, during that time, day-to-day decisions affecting the child: Divorce Act, at s. 16.2(2). Section 16.3 sets out the power to allocate decision-making responsibility.

54Furthermore, unless otherwise ordered, a person who has parenting time or decision-making authority has a right to obtain information about a child’s well-being from the other party and any other person who are likely to have such information (e.g., health care practitioners, school authorities): Divorce Act, at s. 16.4.

55In Barendregt v. Grebliounas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, at paras. 8-9, Karakatsanis J. stated the importance of the task of determining the best interests of a child:

Determining the best interests of the child is a heavy responsibility, with profound impacts on children, families and society. In many cases, the answer is difficult – the court must choose between competing and often compelling visions of how to best advance the needs and interests of the child.

The law relating to the best interests of the child has long emphasized the need for individualized and discretionary decision making. But children also need predictability and certainty.

56This case is no different. I have before me two different visions of what parenting order is in the best interests of the child. The first vision is presented by the Applicant and supported by her witnesses. The second, somewhat different, vision is presented by Ms. Lieberman in her report and addendum. The main difference in the respective visions is whether the Respondent’s parenting time (once he discloses his address) should be supervised or not. Of particular note, I have uncontested evidence before me that the child loves the Respondent and has a strong loving bond with him, and vice versa. However, a strong loving bond does not always imply that the bond is healthy or that the parent is able to meet the child’s needs.

57I have broad discretion under ss. 16.1(4) and (5) to fashion a parenting order that is in the best interests of the child, reflecting the particular circumstances of J.C.

58As stated by Chappel J. in V.K.G. v. I.G., 2023 ONSC 6329, 94 R.F.L. (8th) 283, at para. 101:

The Divorce Act imposes several duties on parties to a parenting proceeding, that their parenting remains focused on the child’s best interests, but children are safeguarded against unnecessary conflict, that parenting issues are addressed in an orderly manner, with all relevant information being provided to the court. The parties’ compliance with these important duties is a relevant consideration in crafting a parenting order that is in the child’s best interests.

59These duties are generally articulated in s. 7 of the Divorce Act.

Factual Findings

60The Applicant adduced evidence, aside from her own testimony, to support her allegations of family violence perpetrated by the Respondent, including harmful conduct directed at J.C. The evidence included photographs of J.C. showing missing hair, statements by J.C. about her recent parenting time with the Respondent spent in malls and public men’s washrooms, the lemon juice ritual and harsh scrubbing of J.C.’s genital area, direct observations such as the visible change of clothing upon J.C.’s return from her parenting time, and missing items of clothing upon her return. In addition, J.C. began using derogatory language towards the Applicant that mimicked the language used by Respondent toward the Applicant during the marriage, and sometimes acted out physically towards the Applicant, again reflective of the physicality the Respondent sometimes directed towards the Applicant in the presence of J.C. The affidavits of friends and family members, including parents of J.C.’s friends, also support the veracity of these allegations, and some of these words and conduct on the part of the Respondent are reflected in the report from the s. 30 assessment.

61In addition, the Respondent has admitted the following facts, arising either from his Answer to the first Request to Admit or his lack of response to the remaining Requests to Admit:

(a) He consistently lied about searching for employment or pursuing entrepreneurial endeavours;

(b) He threated the Applicant’s family, and forbade them from coming to their home during their marriage;

(c) He accused the Applicant’s sister of trying to take J.C. away from him;

(d) He accused the Applicant’s family of trying to take J.C. away from him;

(e) He said the Applicant was “not a real woman” and was a “f-king loser”;

(f) On August 8, 2018, in the middle of the night, the Respondent had a fit of anger. He went through the Applicant’s phone and found messages between her and her then manager at the O.A.A. She had sent photographs to the manager of J.C. as a baby because the manager had recently had his own child. The Respondent accused the Applicant of having an extra-marital affair with her manager. He went on a screaming tirade with foul language in front of J.C.;

(g) On August 12, 2018, still in a fit of rage (which lasted four days), the Respondent came home in the evening, resumed yelling at the Applicant, and threw dishes against the wall, waking a three-year-old J.C. He also threw all of the tableware onto the floor from the table. When the Applicant tried to take J.C. from his arms, to calm things down, the Respondent physically prevented her from leaving the apartment and told her that if she went to her father’s home he would “send a bitch to f-k [her] up”. The Applicant attended at a police station that night with her sister, leaving J.C. behind, as the Respondent would not release her, and reported this incident. The police said there was nothing they could do;

(h) The Respondent has expressed a hatred for the Applicant’s family in front of J.C.;

(i) The Respondent has threatened physical harm to the Applicant in front of J.C.;

(j) On an evening in August 2020, the Applicant, Respondent, and J.C. were in their car in the parking garage. The Respondent had a fit of rage and punched the rear-view mirror, breaking it and cracking the windshield. He was bleeding and had to be bandaged;

(k) In May 2022, when J.C. was 4 years old and beginning pre-school, the Respondent decided she smelled badly, so each day before preschool, against the Applicant’s will, he wiped J.C.’s armpits with lemon and told her she smelled and that this was the reason for using lemon juice. He often told J.C.: “you smell” and “you stink”. He asserted that the Applicant did not know how to care for J.C. in the face of her protests.

(l) On September 15, 2022, the Applicant and J.C. were naked in the bathroom and about to take a shower. When the Respondent attempted to burst in, the Applicant told him they were naked. However, the Respondent forced the door open, pinning the Applicant between the door and the wall and shimmied into the small bathroom. After he forced his way in, he was face-to-face with the Applicant and shoved her with his forearm. He stated that the Applicant could not keep J.C. away from him. The Applicant went into the shower alone to calm the situation. The Respondent again wiped J.C.’s underarm with lemon juice and told the Applicant that he was not afraid of her, the “cops,” or lawyers. The Applicant had just retained a lawyer, who sent a letter indicating that the Applicant wished to separate from the Respondent;

(m) The parties lived separate and apart in the matrimonial home from September 2022 to November 5, 2022, when Kraft J. ordered that the Applicant and J.C. would have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home;

(n) The Respondent made a (false) report to the police, alleging that the Applicant was a danger to J.C., had been violent with her, and that she could not care for J.C. because she had M.S., schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. This report was made immediately after Kraft J. made the exclusive possession order and a temporary order that J.C. would have her primary residence with the Applicant;

(o) After the Applicant brought a motion to strike the Respondent’s pleadings and appoint a new s. 30 assessor (Ms. Lieberman), the Respondent made a further (false) report to the Toronto Police Service (TPS) alleging that the Applicant had kidnapped J.C., that she struggled to walk due to her M.S., and that she gave cough medicine to J.C. to make her drowsy and fall asleep;

(p) The Respondent contacted the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (CAST) and (falsely) advised that J.C. was being abused in the Applicant’s home and was not being bathed while in the Applicant’s care;

(q) On December 17, 2023, following Kristjanson J.’s release of her decision on December 15, 2023, striking his pleadings, save for parenting and decision-making, appointing a new s. 30 assessor, and ordering that J.C. be permitted to receive therapy, the Respondent contacted the CAST again. He reported that the Applicant had kidnapped J.C., that she was faking being Jewish, that she was compromised due to her M.S., that she was drugging J.C., and that she was non-compliant with medication for four years, impacting her mobility. He advised that the Jewish Family and Child Services (JFCS) was hiding information from him, and that CAST must investigate.

62The evidence on the whole presents a troubling picture of the Respondent that impacts his ability to properly care for J.C. It shows a lack of insight into his own behaviours and the harmful impacts on J.C., and an inability to place her best interests ahead of his.

63Prior to separation, the Respondent engaged in fits of verbal and physical rage against the Applicant, followed by excuses and explanations that started before marriage and persisted throughout their period of cohabitation. Later on, J.C. was exposed to some of these fits. For example, I note the following:

(a) Before they began cohabiting, the Applicant and Respondent were walking home down a street. The Applicant ran into her brother’s fraternity brother, Rocco. Rocco gave her a hug and asked how she was. After Rocco left, the Respondent got very quiet and walked ahead of the Applicant. When she asked him what was wrong, he used profane language and asked if she was “f-king him”. When she protested, he sought to explain his angry reaction away by saying he didn’t think Rocco was a nice person and apologized.

(b) On a subsequent occasion, before they began cohabiting, they were walking in a mall. The Applicant saw a friend, Aaron, and gave him a hug. Again, the Respondent got very quiet and walked ahead, upset. When they got to the car, the Respondent slammed the door and started yelling at her. He held on to her arm very tight, pointed a finger, and continued yelling. He again used profane and derogatory language towards her. This went on for 30 minutes. She did not want to break the relationship because they were about to move in together and she wanted it to work. She felt she could fix things and was comforted by the Respondent’s apparent contriteness and gentle behaviour afterwards. He convinced her that these fits of anger were well intentioned, and he had only her interests at heart.

64The Applicant testified that the Respondent would hold on to her arm tightly in that manner, and not let her go, with increasing frequency after they began living together.

65On more than one occasion, the Respondent made threats of violence against the Applicant’s friends/acquaintances and family. On one occasion, he made good on his threat. He followed a male friend of the Applicant’s, whom he thought disrespected him, and pushed him down to the ground. The Applicant was told of this afterwards.

66On many occasions, the Respondent yelled and screamed at the Applicant, belittling her “womanhood” because she was unable to breastfeed (due to her medical condition), and calling her a “f-king loser”. Sometimes, this occurred in J.C.’s presence.

67On some occasions, the Respondent would hit the Applicant with his shoulder as he walked by after an argument.

68Throughout their marriage, the Respondent engaged in a pattern of conduct that had the effect of isolating the Applicant and J.C. from the previously close maternal extended family. This included having a verbal fight with the Applicant’s sister (in the sister’s home), during which the Respondent attempted to physically intimidate her, and announcing that he did not want the Applicant’s family coming into his “space”. This was corroborated by the sister’s affidavit.

69The Respondent has also engaged in a concerted effort to interfere with the Applicant’s employment with a view to having her dismissed. Two affiants from the O.A.A. gave written evidence. K.D. has been the Executive Director of the O.A.A. since 2011. The Applicant reports to her directly in her role as manager of policy and government relations at the O.A.A.. K.A. has been the human resources manager since May 2022. She was promoted to chief operating officer in October 2024. She also provided an affidavit.

70These witnesses described the Respondent’s efforts to undermine the Applicant’s position at the O.A.A. and “out” the Applicant’s medical condition (which was already known to the O.A.A.).

71On September 13, 2023, K.A. was advised by the O.A.A.’s former president that the Respondent called her on September 12, 2023 and referenced the Applicant’s need for help. The Respondent then contacted K. A. on September 14, 2023, and asked her to confirm the Applicant’s employment status and information about her employment, which K.A. declined to share. The Respondent told her that the Applicant was probably not fit to work because of an ongoing medical condition, and he thought she might not be able to carry out her job duties on a regular basis. He also volunteered that he was in court and having issues with the Applicant. It was clear to K.A. that the Respondent was attempting to share the Applicant’s confidential medical information inappropriately and put her job security at risk by contacting people who had have influence over the Applicant’s career.

72K.D. echoed this observation. She received a voicemail from the Respondent on or around September 20, 2023, asking for information about the Applicant’s competence and ability to work. He stated that the Applicant was not fit to work because of her health issues related to multiple sclerosis and felt obligated to bring this to K.D.’s attention. He also mentioned being in the court proceeding with the Applicant.

73Both of these witnesses deposed as to the Applicant’s diligence, capability, and impressive work, and that the O.A.A., while aware of her multiple sclerosis, had never had to offer an accommodation and that her medical condition is not an impediment to the Applicant’s ability to work at a high level. The O.A.A. is pleased with the Applicant’s work performance.

74As foreshadowed above, the Respondent has also engaged in harmful behaviours with J.C. that constitute family violence within the meaning of the Divorce Act, in the form of psychological and physical abuse:

(a) He repeatedly told J.C. that she “smells” and “stinks”. This occurred before separation, several days a week;

(b) He backed up his allegations by engaging in the ritual of routinely rubbing J.C.’s underarms with lemon juice, claiming that Toronto Public Health told him to do so. He blamed the Applicant for not knowing how to keep J.C. clean. After separation, J.C. began saying to the Applicant that she does not need a bath because she doesn’t smell, and she doesn’t need nice smelling lotions either;

(c) When the Respondent bathes J.C., he uses a loofah to scrub her private parts to the point of making them raw, red, and hurting her (causing stinging when J.C. has to urinate);

(d) Since separation, the Respondent routinely washes J.C. twice over the course of his Saturday parenting time;

(e) In or around October 2024, the Respondent inexplicably cut a chunk of hair from the side of J.C.’s scalp, leaving a scraggly mess of hair behind. This action prevented J.C. from wearing her hair the way she likes to and has had to be covered up with her remaining hair;

(f) More recently, beginning in late 2024, the Respondent has been taking J.C. into public men’s washrooms at public malls to bathe her during the course of his Saturday parenting time;

(g) The Respondent routinely removes the clothes J.C. has selected to wear to visit him during parenting time and replaces them with his own chosen clothing. On one occasion, he threw out her brand-new sandals. On another occasion, he threw out a sweater her best friend gave to her and told her that no child of his was going to wear secondhand clothing.

75These behaviours are not justified. I do not need expert evidence to conclude that they have the effect of damaging J.C.’s self-esteem and self-image. This course of conduct is psychological abuse under the Divorce Act. The unjustifiably hard and repeated scrubbing of her genital area is physical abuse. The Respondent knew, or ought to have known, that his actions have a detrimental impact on J.C.’s health and well-being. The Respondent seems to have convinced himself that his actions are justified and are in J.C.’s best interests. However, he is gravely mistaken and lacks insight into the consequences of his actions and behaviours towards and in front of J.C., putting into question his ability to care properly for J.C. and to meet her needs and well-being at this point in time.

76In addition, the court has a record of the Respondent’s refusal to abide by its orders, including those made in J.C.’s best interests. The breaches include continuing his lemon juice ritual after an order that he refrain from doing so, and his refusal to communicate in a timely manner, or sometimes at all, via AppClose about J.C. He has also violated the parenting schedule repeatedly. He is punctual in picking up J.C. at the prescribed time, but he is chronically late by about 15 minutes in returning her.

77By way of example, on Christmas Day 2024, the Respondent was supposed to return J.C. by 6:30 p.m., pursuant to Kraft J.’s order. Instead, J.C. video-called the Applicant, informing her that she and the Respondent were at her paternal grandmother’s home and would be home at 8:00 p.m. The Applicant texted the Respondent to bring her home immediately, and to not use J.C. as the go-between. The Applicant’s lawyer sent an email to the Respondent at 7:37 p.m. advising the same.

78The parenting exchanges were ordered to take place in front of a Shoppers Drug Mart and to be facilitated by a third party on behalf of the Applicant. The Respondent often thwarted these exchanges by intimidating the persons facilitating the exchanges or by being late without notice. For example, the Applicant’s father, M.T. (who engaged in most of the parenting exchanges in front of Shoppers Drug Mart), deposed that the Respondent was chronically late for drop-off transfers by thirty minutes or more. This pattern of conduct was supported by those who assisted in the parenting exchanges including: L.J., H.C. and T.C..

79In fact, as a result of the Respondent’s alienation of the people the Applicant relied upon for parenting exchanges in front of the Shoppers Drug Mart, the Applicant suggested that the exchanges now take place in the lobby of her apartment building, to which the Respondent readily agreed. The routine is that the Respondent stays on the outside of the building and the Applicant waits for J.C. in the lobby, so that they both can see J.C. enter the building and go to her mother. However, on one occasion, the Respondent aggressively followed J.C. into the lobby, intimidating the Applicant.

80The Respondent also refused to attend at a court-ordered mediation before Christine Kim and declined to participate in the court-ordered s. 30 assessment with Ms. Leiberman. The Respondent’s misconduct in the form of harassment was also found to be the cause of the resignation of the original s. 30 assessor, Mr. Hurwitz.

81In addition, the Respondent refused to disclose his residential address until Kristjanson J. asked him to directly under oath. Since that evidence was given, J.C. recently reported to the Applicant that the Respondent says that he has two homes now, one being Riverdale Farm. J.C. has also reported that she has not been to the Respondent’s home for the five consecutive Saturdays prior to the trial, instead spending the time in public places like the mall (e.g., the Eaton Centre), as the Respondent says he is moving. The Respondent has been asked in writing whether he is moving, and if so, what his address will be. He has declined to respond. He also has not advised what his parenting plan will be for next Christmas.

82Also of concern is the fact that the Respondent failed to appear at trial, notwithstanding the fact that he had leave to address the parenting issues, and could have asked for leave to adduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses or at least be heard on the issues affecting J.C. He was well aware of the fact that this court would be asked to make parenting orders that could impact his future time with J.C., but he did not attend and gave no notice of his intentions. This is consistent with his behaviour with Ms. Lieberman. He spoke to her on the telephone, after many attempts to engage him were made, but he declined to participate in the formal assessment, depriving Ms. Lieberman of an opportunity to consider whether a psychological assessment of him was warranted, and of opportunities to both interview him and observe him interacting with J.C. This was anticipated based on the Respondent’s past conduct during the course of the litigation, hence the order made that the s. 30 assessment could be done without the Respondent’s participation. Furthermore, the Respondent consistently denied consent for J.C. to participate in play-based therapy, despite this court finding that therapy is in her best interests.

Section 30 Assessment Report and Addendum of Ms. Lieberman

83The court had the benefit of Ms. Lieberman’s Assessment Report, dated February 20, 2024 (s. 30 Report) and her Addendum, dated November 21, 2024 (Addendum). Unfortunately, Ms. Leiberman was unable to attend court due to a medical issue. The Applicant does not agree with all of her recommendations and wanted an opportunity to cross examine her. Nonetheless, her s. 30 Report and Addendum were made exhibits. Ms. Leiberman made a number of parenting recommendations, including, most prominently and in an overview manner, the following:

(a) Given the high-conflict nature of the parties’ relationship (she also called them “high conflict caregivers”), the parties communicate only through an internet-based application.

(b) The Respondent’s in-person time with J.C. should be suspended pending provision of his residential address, including proof.

(c) Once he provides his address with proof, his parenting time should be every Wednesday when he picks up J.C. from school until he drops her off at the Applicant’s apartment building at 6:30 p.m. He will also have parenting time every Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. He would be responsible for pick-ups and drop-offs at the Applicant’s apartment building.

(d) Overnights with the Respondent should not occur until the Respondent has satisfied the following requirements: proof of residential address; two two-hour observations of him with J.C. with at least one of them being in his home; two individual interviews of the Respondent by a qualified assessor; and, if that assessor should deem it necessary, a psychological evaluation.

(e) The Applicant will be solely responsible for making yearly medical, dental, and optical appointments for J.C. With respect to significant medical decisions, the Applicant will provide the Respondent with four weeks’ notice before implementing the medical decision or, if not practical, as much notice as possible. This notice provision is not intended for minor decisions such as non-emergent medical decisions, including treating everyday viral and bacterial infections.

(f) For major decisions regarding religion, the Applicant will have decision-making authority. However, with respect to day-to-day decisions, they will rest with the parent who has care of J.C.

(g) Decisions regarding education would be joint, with a conflict resolution model employed when no agreement can be reached.

(h) A detailed holiday and special occasion schedule was defined with essentially equal parenting time as between the Applicant and the Respondent.

84Ms. Lieberman set out several recommendations over all parenting domains, spanning several pages. She modified some of her recommendations in her Addendum (including, notably, the suspension of in-person parenting time pending proof of residence).

85The Applicant submits that little weight should be given to some of the recommendations for several reasons. Ms. Leiberman did not have the benefit of records from the CAST, JFCS, or the TPS. She did not have the benefit of the Respondent’s participation in the assessment and therefore could not determine, for example, whether he should undergo a psychological assessment or observe him and the child together in his residence.

86While a s. 30 assessment report is of benefit to the court, I am not obliged to accept all or any of the recommendations. In part, this is because I have a more fulsome evidentiary record than the assessor had. Also, this assessment is somewhat out of date.

87As with any witness, I can accept all, some, or none of that witness’s opinions and findings.

88The main difficulty I have with Ms. Lieberman’s assessment, in addition to the Respondent’s lack of participation in the assessment, is that she does not appear to place much emphasis on the Respondent’s questionable behaviours with J.C. or her own adverse assessment of the Respondent’s attitude and ability to act in J.C.’s best interests. For example, she makes note of the lemon juice ritual, the Respondent becoming “obsessed with the idea that J. had an odor,” and the Respondent’s “vigorous” bathing of J., causing inflammation, but this conduct did not seem to raise alarm bells for Ms. Lieberman with respect to ongoing contact. She also did not appear to pursue the Applicant’s report that J.C. “has become self-conscious about her smell and has often said ‘let me smell my armpits’”. It does not appear that Ms. Lieberman approached this sensitive issue with J.C. during her interview. Further, she did not have the benefit of knowing of the Respondent’s more recent habit of bathing J.C. in men’s public washrooms. As well, not much emphasis appears to have been placed on the reports that J. was exposed to family violence directed to the Applicant in her presence. Furthermore, Ms. Lieberman does not characterize the manifestation of the Respondent’s “cleanliness” obsession with J.C. as a form of abuse or at least as determinantal to her wellbeing and showing a lack of insight.

89Also, Ms. Lieberman made some clinical observations regarding the Respondent that are consistent with the Applicant’s characterization of the cycle of intimate partner violence in the form of his rage outbursts followed by regret and a gentler attitude, his attempts to discredit the Applicant based on her medical condition, and his falsehoods with respect to his view of the Applicant and her extended family members. These observations were based on two telephone calls Ms. Lieberman had with the Respondent.

90Some of her observations and communications with the Respondent are documented in her report. The following are direct quotations from the s. 30 Report, except where modified with square brackets. I have initialized the parties’ and child’s names:

(a) From the two phone calls that this writer had with Mr. C., he presented in very different ways. He was aggressive and argumentative during the first phone call, and was more amicable and cooperative during the second phone call” (at p. 17);

(b) During this first interaction [on December 15, 2023], Mr. C. was belligerent, assertive and accusatory. He stated that he believed that this writer was hired because they were Jewish, and he felt that it was a conspiracy to protect Ms. T. He also shared that he believes that because Ms. T. has multiple sclerosis (MS), she is not “able to care for J.C. and does not take J.C. anywhere” (at p. 17);

(c) This writer continued to attempt to have Mr. C. agree to participate in the process, but Mr. C. continued to go on a tangent about racism. He made insulting remarks towards Ms. T.’s counsel, and Ms. T. regarding her MS. He also reiterated that he does not believe in therapy for his daughter J.C. The conversation was not moving forward, and this writer felt uncomfortable; therefore, the conversation was ended (at p. 17);

(d) During the phone call [on January 26, 2024] … [t]here were times during the conversation that Mr. C. referred to himself in the third person, which this writer found odd (at p. 19);

(e) Mr. C. went on to say that he and Ms. T. are very invested in J. He feels that they are both good parents and has nothing against Ms. T. Mr. C. also said that he respects Ms. T and her family (at p. 20).

91During her interview with J.C., Ms. Lieberman noted that J.C. stated that she loved staying at the Respondent’s home because she gets to watch TV and YouTube, and he makes her wings and fries and sometimes gives her McDonald’s for lunch. She recorded J.C. as saying, “Daddy doesn’t work. His only job is to keep me safe” and “[m]y parents both love me and I love them both a lot” (at pp. 21-22).

92Ms. Lieberman also interviewed several of the individuals who were witnesses at this trial. Of note, there was an internal consistency between what Ms. Lieberman recorded as being told, and the contents of the respective trial affidavits.

93In her conclusions, at pp. 33-34, Ms. Lieberman, stated:

Through documents read, and given the fact that Mr. C. refused to participate in this section 30 assessment, it is felt that the animosity that he has created between him and Ms. T., is preventing Mr. C. from putting J.C.’s best interests first at all times

It is this writer’s opinion that Mr. C. has contributed greatly to the conflict embedded in the dispute between him and Ms. T. … J.C. has been exposed to too much parental conflict, and this exposure is likely contributing to some of J.C.’s behavioural difficulties and transitional issues that she is currently experiencing, and therefore, she would likely benefit greatly from continued therapeutic interventions.

She also concluded that at this time, the Respondent does not have the ability to work with the Applicant in the best interests of J.C.

94Ms. Lieberman did not express an opinion as to whether the Respondent was at risk of causing harm to J.C.

95The court would have benefitted from a psychological assessment of the Respondent and his participation in the s. 30 assessment.

96The fact that J.C. values her relationship with the Respondent, loves him, and has a strong bond with him is not outweighed by the fact that the Respondent’s actions and behaviours have been harmful to her, and that he seems unable to put her best interests ahead of his own or his conflict with the Applicant. While I place an emphasis on J.C.’s views and preferences, it is not tenable to expose her to the Respondent’s instability, rage outbursts, and harmful behaviours without some controls in place. She is only six years old and must not carry the burden of having to choose whether to see the Respondent and under what circumstances. However, I must fashion a parenting order that will preserve and eventually enhance her bond (and hopefully time) with the Respondent, while safeguarding her well-being, consistent with her best interests.

Application of legislative factors to best interests of the child analysis

97I will now review the factors set out by s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act, in the course of determining J.C.’s best interests, in order of how they are listed in the legislation.

98In this case, stability has two particular focusses. First, I am concerned with stability in the sense of J.C. eventually having two homes. Right now, the court has no confidence that the Respondent has a home that is suitable for J.C. The fact that J.C. had not been to his home for five Saturdays prior to trial, coupled with his prior reluctance to disclose an address and his refusal to provide proof of residence as directed by Kristjanson J., and also his statement to J.C. that he now has “two homes,” leads to the inference that the Respondent does not currently have a stable home environment. The fact that he stated that he rented a condominium unit, with the help of his mother, in the building next door to the Applicant’s lawyer’s office building (given the Respondent’s documented racialized derogatory comments to this lawyer, as noted in Kristjanson J.’s endorsement), makes his suggestion that he is living in that building all the more suspicious.

99Second, stability means having some form of ongoing, regularized contact with the Respondent. As stated, J.C. has a loving bond with both parents and a strong tie to her parents’ respective identities and extended families. This is particularly so in relation to her maternal extended family.

100The child has been primarily cared for by the Applicant since the date of separation. Prior to that, both parties played a role, though the Applicant played the larger role.

101The Applicant’s actions and words display a willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the Respondent. For example, she proposed a modification in the parenting exchange to eliminate the third party (which had aggravated the Respondent), and offered that J.C. spend Christmas Days with the Respondent and Christmas Eves with her, since the former was the more important day for the Respondent and his extended family. The same cannot be said for the Respondent, who undermines the Applicant’s parenting decisions and portrays himself to be, in the words of J.C., the “no work dad” whose only job is to look after J.C. He contrasted his role with the Applicant’s role of earning income and therefore not being able to devote her whole time to J.C. and he conveyed this to J.C.

102The court had limited evidence on which to consider the views and preferences of J.C. However, it is clear that J.C. loves her father and enjoys spending time with him. It is also clear that J.C. is too young to make decisions about the quality of care offered by the Respondent and his parenting style, and she wants to please him. It is also clear that J.C. loves her mother, is happy living with her on a day-to-day basis, and has a very positive day-to-day relationship with her. She still looks forward to having overnights with her father.

103J.C.’s cultural and religious upbringing and heritage is nurtured by the Applicant, whereas the Respondent has shown that he resented having professionals who are Jewish involved in the s. 30 assessment. As noted by Kristjanson J. at para. 21 of her endorsement dated December 15, 2023, he made “outbursts containing overtly racist and highly offensive comments based on the applicant counsel’s identity as a racialized lawyer”. The Applicant’s deceased mother was Jewish and her extended family observed both Roman Catholic and Jewish traditions. The Respondent’s past conduct suggests that he is not supportive of J.C.’s Jewish heritage or at least is suspicious about the neutrality and professionalism of those with Jewish heritage.

104The court only has the benefit of the Applicant’s parenting plan.

105Ms. Lieberman concluded that while the Applicant has the ability and willingness to care for and meet the needs of the child, and the Respondent is willing to care for and meet the needs of the child, it is unlikely that he presently has the ability to care for and meet her needs or act in J.C.’s best interests. I agree with this conclusion for the reasons already reviewed.

106The Applicant is willing and able to communicate and cooperate with the Respondent on matters affecting the child. Again, this is apparent by her willingness to change the parenting exchanges from Shoppers Drug Mart to her apartment building, her willingness to expand the Respondent’s parenting time on Saturdays from what was ordered, and the numerous times she has attempted to communicate with the Respondent about the child on AppClose. This is in stark contrast to the Respondent’s refusal to respond to the AppClose communications and insistence on in person communication. I also agree with Ms. Lieberman’s conclusion that the Respondent is unable to put his animosity for the Applicant aside, that this interferes with his ability to act in J.C.’s best interests, and that the Respondent is responsible for a “high conflict caregiver” relationship with the Applicant.

107There are court orders in place prohibiting the Respondent from telling the child she smells and prohibiting him from rubbing her armpits with lemon juice.

108As per s. 16(3)(j) of the Divorce Act, I have found, for the reasons stated, that family violence is a paramount consideration in determining the best interests of J.C. I am particularly attuned to the psychological and physical abuse the Respondent has directed towards her as a result of his obsession with, and harmful notions of, cleanliness and body image with respect to J.C.’s alleged body odour, hair, genital area, choice of clothes to wear, and the number and location of baths and hair-washing (in the men’s public washrooms). This course of family violence is compounded by the earlier family violence perpetrated on the Applicant by the Respondent in the presence of the child prior to separation. The impact of the family violence against the Applicant has revealed itself in the form of the child sometimes repeating the Respondent’s derogatory and angry language against the Applicant that he used. She would repeat the language to the Applicant after separation when the child would become unhappy with the Applicant. This latter behaviour by J.C. has now largely disappeared.

Decision-making authority and government documents

109In light of the parties’ inability to communicate, primarily the result of the Respondent’s refusal to respond in a timely manner, or at all, to the Applicant’s texts on AppClose, and the Respondent’s inability to put aside his animosity toward the Applicant in order to focus on J.C.’s best interests, joint decision-making is untenable. The Mother shall have final decision making with respect to the major decisions affecting J.C. relating to heath, education, and religion. The Mother shall provide four weeks’ notice of any major decisions to the Respondent via AppClose and invite and consider the Respondent’s views. In the event that four weeks’ advance notice is not practicable, then the Applicant shall give as much notice as is possible. If the Respondent does not respond within one week of the notice being sent, or if the parties cannot agree, the Applicant shall have the final decision-making authority and shall inform the Respondent of her decision.

110The Applicant shall also be the holder of government-issued documents for J.C. and shall have the right to apply for or renew government documents, including passports. The Respondent’s consent is dispensed with. However, the Applicant shall provide duplicate copies of J.C.’s government-issued documentation to the Respondent via AppClose.

111The Respondent shall have decision-making authority for day-to-day matters during his in-person parenting time with the child. The Respondent will also have the statutory rights with respect to matters affecting J.C. as set out in the relevant sections of the Divorce Act. However, the Respondent shall not engage in the harmful behaviours with J.C. reviewed in these Reasons.

Parenting time and supervision

112In V.K.G., at para. 129, Chappel J. summarizes the principles and factors that guide the court in deciding whether supervision of parenting time is in the best interests of the child. This analysis takes place within the context of the factors set out in s. 16 of the Divorce Act.

113In my view, once the Respondent has discharged the prerequisite I have imposed below, and his in-person parenting time resumes, that in-person parenting time must initially be in a supervised setting. This is for the following reasons:

(a) I am very concerned about the type of behaviour and conduct that J.C. is being exposed to relating to bathing in men’s public washrooms, and the prior routines of rubbing lemon juice under her armpits and scrubbing her genital area with loofahs or other forms of scrubs. I am concerned about the impact of the Respondent’s obsession with, and ideas of, cleanliness as applied to a six-year-old girl (including telling her she smells and stinks) is having on the child’s self-esteem and sense of body image. As stated, this conduct amounts to family violence within the meaning of the Divorce Act; it is having a detrimental impact on the child’s psychological health and well-being.

(b) The Respondent lacks insight into how his animosity towards the Applicant and her extended family has clouded his ability to act in the best interests of J.C.;

(c) The Respondent’s refusal to provide proof of his current residence, despite requests, and the uncertainty regarding whether he currently has a stable residence, gives rise to an inference that he does not currently have accommodation that is suitable to have J.C. over at;

(d) The Respondent’s refusal to engage in the s. 30 assessment in light of his anger issues, obsessions about the Applicant and the child, lack of insight into his inability to place the child’s best interests ahead of his own, and his lack of insight about his notions of “cleanliness” as applied to J.C. raises concerns about his ability to interact in a healthy way with J.C.;

(e) The Respondent’s statements to Ms. Lieberman that he respects the Applicant’s family is contradicted by the evidence of not only the Applicant herself, but also her witnesses, and raises concerns about his honesty and/or ability to perceive reality accurately;

(f) The fact that the Respondent persistently breaches court orders, and in particular parenting orders, raises concerns that alternative parenting conditions (such as supervised parenting by a non-professional supervisor) will also not be followed;

(g) The Respondent has an inability to place J.C.’s best interests ahead of his ongoing high-conflict relationship with the Applicant.

(h) The Respondent’s failure to appear at trial on the parenting issues (and seek leave to participate on the parenting issues) means that this court does not have a parenting plan proposal or any other evidence from him to rebut the Applicant’s evidence or proposed parenting plan (which is suspension of parenting time pending production of proof of residence, followed by six months of professional supervised parenting time at an access centre).

114In making this supervision order, I recognize that the imposition of supervision will negatively affect the quality of parenting time between J.C. and the Respondent. I do not make this decision lightly. However, the court must make its determination of what is in the best interests of J.C., and not the best interests of the parents. In this case, J.C.’s well-being while in the presence of the Respondent is paramount.

115Therefore, the Respondent’s in-person parenting time with J.C. is suspended effective immediately, pending the Respondent completing the following:

(a) Disclosure of his current residential address with proof of his occupation of that residence.

116Once the precondition is satisfied, on proof provided to the Applicant via AppClose and to the Applicant’s lawyer via email, the in-person parenting time will proceed as follows. It shall be supervised by a professional supervisor and exercised at a supervised access centre from 10:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays. The Respondent will pay for the supervision facility and supervisor, while the Applicant will arrange for the drop-off and pick-up of J.C. at the supervised access centre. Both parties have the right to access the supervision notes, and either may pay for copies of the supervision notes.

117In the interim, however, the Respondent shall continue to have virtual parenting time with J.C. on Sundays, Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, from 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., or whenever the child requests, effective immediately. This will ensure that J.C. will maintain regular parenting contact with the Respondent but in a manner that will safeguard her well-being. I am not satisfied that the virtual parenting time needs to be supervised, despite the Applicant’s request.

118Either party shall have the right to have this parenting arrangement reviewed no earlier than 90 days after the commencement of supervised parenting, and, with respect to a request by the Respondent, his completion of a parenting course, such as Caring Dads, and completion of an anger management course.

119The review can include not only a request to remove the requirement for supervision, but also who might be the supervisor, such as an extended family member, or at the other extreme, to add further restrictions. By that time, the court should have the benefit of the supervision notes, and the parenting course and anger management course results, as well as evidence about the suitability of the Respondent’s accommodation for J.C.

120As requested by the Applicant, I will hear the review motion, but subject to my availability. I cannot predict whether I will be available by the time the review motion is brought. I am not seized of the review motion.

Issue 2: Child support and s. 7 expenses and imputation of income to the Respondent

121Section 15 of the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, provides that a payor’s annual income is to be determined in accordance with ss. 16 to 20. Section 16 provides that a payor’s annual income is their income set out under the heading “Total income” in the T1 General form on their income tax return, subject to ss. 17 to 20 and adjusted in accordance with Schedule III.

122Section 19(1) of the Guidelines permits the Court to impute income to a payor as it considers appropriate in the circumstances. The section sets out a list of circumstances where the Court may impute income, which includes a spouse being intentionally unemployed or underemployed, and failing to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so.

123While the Court has discretion under s. 19(1) to impute income, it must do so based on the evidence: Jeevanantham v. Thiruchelvam, 2023 ONCJ 487, at paras. 20, 33. The Court cannot select an arbitrary figure: Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 44, 52.

124The court has limited evidence concerning the income of the Respondent. This is entirely because the Respondent refused to comply with his financial disclosure obligations, even when backed up by court order.

125However, there is some evidence to guide the court in making the requisite findings.

126The court has a Form 13: Financial Statement (Support Claims) sworn by the Respondent on November 24, 2022. That statement lists his income as $35,400, comprised of monthly support payments of $2,950 from a former spouse/partner (prior to the Applicant). It states that his yearly expenses were $35,112 (his rental payments are not listed) and he listed no assets except for $20,179.84 in debts comprised of student loans. It states he has been unemployed since November 2021 and that the prior year he earned $1,000. It is not a complete statement.

127In 2020, the Respondent earned $21,562 based on sporadic employment.

128The Respondent is also the director of Panodigm Inc., which is a federal corporation incorporated on July 15, 2022. The court has no evidence about what type of business Panodigm operates, or what the corporate revenues are. Again, this is entirely the fault of the Respondent, who failed to disclose any financial information relating to this company.

129In his testimony given on September 21, 2023 before Kristjanson J., he testified that his monthly rent at his (last known) residence was $2,300 per month.

130The Respondent has an undergraduate degree from the University of Toronto and has admitted that there is no impairment or impediment to him working, with the exception that he will not work during his parenting time (Saturdays and Wednesdays after daycare). The evidence demonstrates that the Respondent has been quick to quit full-time jobs on the basis of his perception that the jobs were either “beneath” him or his superiors were racist.

131The court has no evidence as to whether the Respondent continues to receive spousal support or who is paying his rent. What the court has is evidence that the Respondent is or was in a condominium unit for which he was paying $2,300 per month, or $27,600 a year, for rent, and that his expenses after separation (excluding rent) in 2022 totalled $35,112. It is plausible that he is paying his expenses with the spousal support he recorded as receiving. I am drawing an adverse inference that he continues to receive spousal support, which is comparable to his annual expenses (which did not include rent), as he recorded no other income and has failed to provide updated financial disclosure.

132The evidence before the court is uncontested and leads me to conclude that the Respondent is either intentionally unemployed and/or underemployed. The Respondent is capable of earning income at a university graduate level. The Respondent has told J.C. that he is a “no work daddy” and that his only job is to look after her. The Respondent is content that the Applicant pay all child-related expenses.

133The Respondent has completely eschewed his financial obligations related to J.C. The Respondent has paid no child support and made no contribution to s. 7 expenses since the date of separation.

134The evidence justifies the conclusion that income should be imputed to the Respondent from the date of separation. The Respondent is not entitled to be a “no work daddy” if that means he declines to obtain any employment whatsoever.

135The Applicant submits that the court should impute annual income to the Respondent of $62,712 plus a gross-up of non-taxable income. That figure was arrived at by adding his annual expenses from his 2022 Financial Statement (just shy of the annual spousal support he recorded) to the monthly rent he is paying based on his testimony.

136For the reasons stated, I am prepared to impute income to the Respondent at the amount submitted by the Applicant, as grossed-up. There is no reason why the Respondent is not working full-time at a level commensurate with his undergraduate degree and his work experience. Based on the DivorceMate calculations submitted by the Applicant, reflecting an imputed income of $62,712, grossed-up to $78,604, to the Respondent, the table child support owed by him effective February 1, 2025 is $732.00 per month. The Respondent shall pay this amount on an ongoing basis from and including February 1, 2025, based on this imputed income until the child is no longer eligible for child support. This amount is subject to variation in the event that the Respondent earns more than the imputed amount, in which case the amount shall either be increased according to the Child Support Guidelines table amount, or the court is satisfied that the amount should be reduced.

137The Applicant seeks child support from the date of separation up to and including January 2025, totalling $20,215, based on an imputed income (reflecting a base of $62,712 plus a gross-up of non-taxable income) as follows:

(a) 2022: $41,074 - $371 x 5 months = $1,855

(b) 2023: $79,119 - $737 x 12 months = $8,844

(c) 2024: $78,604 - $732 x 12 months = $8,784

(d) 2025: $78,604 - $732 x 1 month = $732

138I accept the calculations as founded in the evidence and the adverse inference I have drawn against the Respondent. The Respondent shall pay the sum of $20,215 in child support up to and including January 1, 2025. An S.D.O. shall issue, which will also cover the s. 7 expenses and outstanding cost awards payable by the Respondent.

139The Applicant also seeks a contribution to the s. 7 expenses she has incurred since the date of separation. She has proven that she has incurred the following expenses, which are properly characterized as s. 7 expenses: namely, daycare expenses (necessary because the Applicant works full time); summer camp, and J.C.’s ongoing therapy. The proportionate amount owed by the Respondent, based on his imputed income for each year and the Applicant’s actual reported income, is $11,205.21 from the date of separation up to and including January 1, 2025 as follows:

(a) Daycare (The French Connection): $10,431.21

(b) Summer Camp (Camp Pal-O-Mine): $618.00

(c) Therapy (Toronto Family Therapy): $156.00

The Respondent shall pay $11,205.21 as accrued s. 7 expenses and this shall be enforceable by the Financial Responsibility Office (FRO) by way of the S.D.O.

140On an ongoing basis, the Respondent shall continue to pay a contribution to s. 7 expenses on a basis that is proportionate to his and the applicant’s annual income; namely, 46% by the Respondent based on his imputed income and 54% by the Applicant. For 2025, the Respondent shall contribute on this proportionate basis to J.C.’s daycare, summer camp, and therapy expenses. In the event that there are any other s. 7 expenses, the Applicant shall provide advanced written notice of same (via AppClose) and the Respondent shall respond with his consent or denial within seven days of the day the message is sent. If the Respondent does not respond within seven days, he shall be deemed to consent. In the event that the parties cannot agree to any s. 7 expense, they shall proceed to dispute resolution as set out under the Disposition and Costs section.

Issue 3: Restraining order

141The Applicant seeks a restraining order against the Respondent under s. 46 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”), and based on the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction to make any order that is in the best interests of the child.

142Pursuant to s. 46 of the FLA, the court may issue a restraining order if the moving party has “reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody.”

143The burden of proof is on the moving party, and the standard of proof is reasonable grounds to fear, which is lower than the civil standard of a balance of probabilities: L.A.B. v. J.A.S., 2020 ONSC 3376, at para. 23. However, it will not be granted lightly, since it involves an impairment of the subject party’s freedom of movement and liberty. Moreover, a breach could give rise to quasi-criminal remedies if found to be in contempt of court under r. 31 of the FLRs, or criminal remedies under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code: Stave v. Chartrand, 2004 ONCJ 79, at para. 19; J.K. v R.K., 2021 ONSC 1136, at para. 29.

144In other words, the moving party must prove that her subjective fears of harm (for her and/or her child) has a reasonable basis; for example, based on the opposite party’s past conduct and/or words and, if available, judicial findings in another forum (e.g., criminal court).

145In an endorsement by released November 17, 2022, at para. 43, Kraft J. extensively reviewed the jurisprudence and extrapolated a number of the legal principles underlying the court’s discretion to order a restraining order, noting specifically that a restraining order will not be granted lightly given the potential adverse consequences that could be experienced by the responding party should he breach the order. Her Honour also noted that in borderline cases, the court must consider what other protections may be available, such as a no-contact order made pursuant to s. 28 of the CLRA (with respect to children only). The court should take into account the passage of time from the last incident giving rise to the moving party’s fear and, I would add, any mitigating steps taken by the responding party in the interim.

146To the list of factors established by the jurisprudence cited by Kraft J. in that endorsement, I would add the observation that intimate partner violence is difficult to prove, and that even if only one event is proven, the court must take the realistic potential future harm to a victim of intimate partner violence to be a relevant, if not compelling, factor in balancing the prejudice to the Respondent if a restraining order is granted, versus that potential of future harm.

147The Applicant submits and testified that she has reasonable grounds to fear for her own physical and psychological safety because the Respondent has done the following:

(a) threatened to kill her in the past;

(b) threatened to physically harm her (admitted fact);

(c) physically and verbally attacked her (e.g., intentionally pushing his shoulder into her body and pinning her against the wall or pushing his shoulder into her as he walks by);

(d) damaged her physical property (such as throwing her phone against the wall and smashing it) (admitted fact);

(e) made repeated, abusive complaints to the TPS, CAST, and JFCS, sometimes in retaliation to her bringing a motion or after receiving an adverse decision in this proceeding (admitted fact);

(f) contacted her employer with a view to putting her job at risk (based on allegations that she was unable to physically manage her job due to her medical condition) (supported by the affidavit evidence of K. D. and K. A.);

(g) intimidated her father, her friend (H. C.), and made good on a threat against a prior friend (Aaron, whom he stalked and then pushed down in a public area), which causes the Applicant to be afraid (supported by the affidavits of M.T. and H. C.).

148The Applicant has established that the Respondent committed acts of family violence against her – psychologically and physically – in the past. Since the date of separation, there has been a repetition of acts of intimidation, including when he forced his way into the lobby of the Applicant’s apartment building to drop off J.C. and stared at her before leaving, contrary to the agreement that he would stay on the outside of the building looking in, on December 7, 2024. He also engaged in communications in the fall of 2023 with the Applicant’s employer, leading K.A. to conclude the following:

It was clear that [the Respondent] was attempting to share [the Applicant’s] medical information inappropriately and put her job security at risk. He was not just calling the receptionist; he was calling people with influence over [the Applicant’s] career.

149Balanced against this evidence, and the other factors above, is an additional consideration; namely, whether a restraining order will unduly interfere with the Respondent’s ability to have meaningful parenting time and contact with J.C. In fashioning a restraining order, this factor is important.

150The Applicant has proven that her subjectively held fears are reasonably based, that they have persisted after the date of separation, and that a restraining order ought to be ordered. I am satisfied that she is entitled to a restraining order.

151Section 46(3) of the FLA sets out the terms that a court may impose in a restraining order, including “any other provision that the court considers appropriate”: see also, Marshall v. Reid, 2018 ONSC 648, 7 R.F.L. (8th) 210.

152Accordingly, a restraining order will issue restraining the Respondent from being within 200 metres from any known location of the Applicant, with the limited exception of parenting exchanges, in which case the Respondent shall not come within 10 metres of the Applicant during any parenting exchange. Furthermore, the Respondent is restrained from entering into the building of any residence occupied by the Applicant (currently, the matrimonial home) and is further restrained from being within 200 metres of the Applicant’s place of employment (currently, the O.A.A.). The terms of this restraining order permit for the safe exchange of J.C., whether it be at the Applicant’s residence, the Respondent’s residence, or a supervised access centre, since the 10-metre restriction will allow both parties to keep their eyes on J.C. during exchanges without permitting physical contact between the parties. This restraining order shall be in place pending its removal by mutual agreement or further court order.

153Furthermore, the Respondent is restrained from contacting or communicating with the Applicant, directly or indirectly, such as through family members, friends, employers and co-workers, health care practitioners, or acquaintances, with the limited exception that written communication through AppClose about parenting issues related to J.C. (only) is permitted.

154It is noted that the Applicant must provide the Respondent with any change of residential address for as long as the Respondent has any parenting rights with respect to J.C. (as he currently does); therefore, the Respondent will know the location he must stay away from. Furthermore, in the event the Applicant leaves her current place of employment, then she must give notice to the Respondent of her new place of employment if she seeks to have this restraining order enforced with respect to the restriction on the Respondent’s ability to approach her new place of employment.

155Furthermore, this order will not prevent the parties from communicating about the child in relation to parenting issues (only) via AppClose.

156The Applicant also requested that the restraining order include a term prohibiting the Respondent from making false allegations of harm against the child or being unable to care for the child due to her medical condition to the CAST, JFCS, the TPS, and the child’s school. However, I find that this is an unwieldy term and that the Applicant may have other remedies available to should false allegations continue to be made by the Respondent, including accessing any internal processes available at these institutions.

157In addition, the Applicant requested that the restraining order extend to prohibiting the Respondent from “threatening, intimidating, molesting, harassing or annoying or causing a third party to contact, threaten, intimate, molest, harass or annoy [the Applicant or the Applicant’s family members]”. The family members did not seek this relief and were in any event not parties to this proceeding. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to issue the requested order.

158I recognize that this restraining order will be registered on C.P.I.C. The Respondent is entitled to a review of this restraining order in one year’s time from the release of these reasons, provided there has been no breach of the restraining order in the interim. Accordingly, this order shall be in force until withdrawn by the Applicant or changed by a further court order.

Issue 4: Divorce

159The Applicant seeks a divorce.

160All the requirements in the Divorce Act have been met in the evidence before this court.

161A divorce shall be granted.

Issue 5: Anonymity Order

162The Applicant seeks an order initializing the names of the parties, her family members, and the child, in order to protect both her and the child’s privacy interests. I have considered the principles outlined in M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207, including the fundamental principle that the court’s proceedings must be open to the public in order to foster transparency and maintain the trust and confidence of the public in the justice system.

163In this case, an order initializing the names of the parties, child, extended family members and friends/co-workers (which otherwise would lead to the identities of the parties and the child) is warranted, as the privacy interests of the individuals involved outweigh the minimal impairment to the open court principle that will be caused by this order.

164In this matter, there is highly sensitive information about the young child that, if publicly associated with her, would likely affect her self-esteem and self-image, and cause significant emotional and psychological harm to her. Furthermore, there are sensitive family violence allegations that have attracted police involvement and children’s aid societies’ interventions. In addition, there is information in these Reasons that relate to the child’s therapy.

165The Reasons also contains sensitive information relating to the Applicant’s medical condition and her employment.

166The public will still have the benefit of the Reasons for jurisprudential use. The public and the media will still have the ability to report and comment on this case if deemed newsworthy.

167Like Chappel J. stated in V.K.G. at para. 7, I do not consider it necessary to give notice to the media before making this order, given that the initialization represents a limited restriction on the open court principle, and the ability of the media to report on this case.

Disposition and Costs

168The court makes orders:

Anonymity Order

169An anonymity order initializing the names of the parties, the child and the extended family members shall issue.

Divorce

170The Applicant, S.T., may obtain a divorce on an uncontested basis and shall bear the costs for same.

Parenting

171S.T. shall have decision-making responsibility of the child, J.C., born on [redacted], as further clarified below.

172S.T. shall make significant decisions about J.C.’s education, health care, and religion, and any other major decisions. S.T. shall provide D.C. with four weeks’ notice of her intended decisions, unless such advance notice is not possible, in which case S.T. shall provide D.C. with as much notice as possible. D.C. shall then have one week within which to provide his views, which shall be considered by S.T. If the parties cannot agree, or D.C. fails to respond, S.T. shall have final decision-making authority and she will inform D.C. of her decision (all via AppClose). When J.C. is in the care of D.C., D.C. shall abide by S.T.’s decisions in this regard.

173Subject to paragraph 171 above, during the period when J.C. is living with or in the care of a party, that party can make day-to-day decisions about J.C., for example about, doing homework, meals, visiting with their friends, use of computer, etc. However, the Respondent shall not do the following:

(a) engage in the lemon juice ritual with J.C.;

(b) clean J.C.’s armpits with lemon juice;

(c) bathe J.C., unless reasonably necessary because of an event during his parenting time that has resulted in J.C. being dirty;

(d) bathe J.C. more than once during the parenting time allocated to him;

(e) when bathing J.C., the Respondent shall refrain from cleaning her genital area with a loofah or any other object used to wash the body;

(f) bathe or wash J.C.’s hair or style J.C.’s hair in public washrooms;

(g) take J.C. outside in the winter with wet hair;

(h) cut her hair; and/or

(i) tell J.C. that she smells.

174The Applicant and the Respondent shall:

(a) prefer J.C.'s best interests to their own and at all times keep the best interests of J.C. in mind;

(b) encourage each party's continued involvement in J.C.'s life;

(c) encourage J.C. to have a good relationship with each party, and make every reasonable effort to promote love, affection and respect between J.C. and the other party;

(d) refrain from making disparaging or negative remarks to J.C. about the other party, and discourage others from doing so in the presence of J.C.;

(e) refrain from doing anything that would estrange or alienate J.C. from the other party, or seek to undermine J.C.'s love, affection, opinion of, and respect for the other party;

(f) exchange information and communicate about J.C. through AppClose, unless it is an emergency (i.e. J.C. is in need of emergency medical care, death, car accident, other accidents), in which case they shall communicate through call or text;

(g) keep all communications between them child-focused, cordial, brief, clear, and to the point;

(h) remain courteous and polite in communications with each other at all times;

(i) keep their communications devoid of profanity, insults, antisemitic comments, comments about the Applicant’s medical condition, threats, and/or inflammatory or threatening comments;

(j) keep their communications free of exclamation points, words in bold or capital letters, repeated question marks, unnecessary adjectives, emojis, sarcasm and rhetorical questions;

(k) keep their communications free of rehashing, blaming, criticizing or making personal judgments of the other party or past events;

(l) communicate only about J.C. and be either future-focused regarding an emerging problem; or informative, such as providing information about a medical appointment;

(m) limit their communications to 10 messages per week, except in the case of an emergency;

(n) not share their communications with J.C. or third parties without the other's consent;

(o) share all documents regarding J.C. by scanning the document and then emailing it to the other party, rather than requiring J.C. to transport documents between them;

(p) not establish and/or maintain a social media/networking account for J.C. or in J.C.’s name;

(q) refrain from posting any pictures on social media of the other party and refrain from making any derogatory comments about the other party on social media;

(r) refrain from discussing with J.C., or with a third party in the presence of J.C., present or past legal proceedings, issues between the parties in any such legal proceedings, or any conflicts between the parties; and

(s) ensure that all information or documentation pertaining to the parties' separation and divorce, including all related personal correspondence and email communications are not accessible to J.C..

Parenting Time

175The Respondent shall not be allocated unsupervised parenting time with the child J.C., born [redacted], until he has satisfied the following conditions:

(a) provides his address and proof of residential address;

(b) completes a parenting class, such as Caring Dads, and an anger management course, and provides proof of completion.

176Until the Respondent satisfies the conditions set out in paragraph 174 above and subject to paragraph 180 below, the Respondent’s parenting time, shall be supervised by a third-party supervision service. The Respondent’s in-person parenting time shall take place at a supervision center within 10 kms of the Applicant’s residence, or if there is no such supervision centre, then the supervision centre that is closest to the Applicant’s residence. The Respondent shall bear the costs of the supervision service.

177Upon satisfying the conditions set out in paragraph 174 above, and a minimum of 90 days after the commencement of supervised parenting time, the Respondent may seek a review of his parenting time for the purpose of being allocated unsupervised parenting time and/or other in person parenting time arrangements.

178J.C. shall reside primarily with the Applicant.

Regular Parenting Time

179Once the Respondent has provided proof of his current address to the Applicant, J.C shall have supervised parenting time at a supervised access centre with the Respondent on Saturdays from 10:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. The Applicant shall arrange to drop off and pick up J.C. at the supervised access centre.

180Outside of the parenting time allocated to the Respondent, he shall not visit J.C. at school, including for lunch, unless the Applicant provides her prior written consent.

181J.C. shall have videoconference parenting time with the Respondent on Sundays, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, from 5:30 pm to 6:00 pm or whenever J.C. requests, within reason, effective immediately. Once the supervised visits commence, the videoconference parenting time shall be on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays from 5:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. or whenever J.C. requests, within reason.

182If the Respondent is late by more than 15 minutes for videoconference parenting time with J.C., then the videoconference parenting time shall not take place. The Respondent’s videoconference parenting time with J.C. shall be supervised by a third-party supervision service.

Communicating with J.C.

183During J.C.’s supervised parenting time with the Respondent, she may contact the Applicant whenever she wishes, within reason, and the Respondent shall facilitate such contact.

Exchange of contact information

184With respect to the supervised parenting time schedule for J.C. set out above, the Applicant and the Respondent shall:

(a) provide each other with their email addresses, current addresses and a phone number where they can be reached at all times.

(b) Subject to paragraph 174, the Respondent’s supervised parenting time schedule may be altered if both parties agree in writing.

185There shall be no make-up time for supervised parenting time missed by the Respondent unless the parties agree otherwise.

Scheduling Health Appointments and Information About J.C.

186The Applicant shall have sole responsibility for making medical and dental appointments for J.C., and she shall be responsible for taking J.C. to all medical, dental and other health care appointments (e.g. counselling, physiotherapy).

187The Applicant shall inform the Respondent of J.C.’s medical and dental appointments, but the Respondent shall not attend them.

188Promptly following any appointment during which J.C. has received service from a medical or health professional, the Applicant shall provide a medical or dental update to the Respondent.

Information About J.C.

189The Applicant and the Respondent shall each have the right to receive information from J.C.'s teachers, school officials, doctors, dentists, health care providers, summer camp counsellors or others involved with J.C..

190The parties shall cooperate and execute any required authorization or direction necessary to enforce the intent of paragraph 188.

Education

191The Applicant and Respondent shall each arrange their own parent-teacher meetings. They shall both be provided with separate report cards for J.C., and they shall both notify the school authorities to request that separate report cards be provided.

Documents

192The Applicant shall keep and hold the passport issued in J.C.’s name, her SIN card, OHIP card and her birth certificate. The Applicant shall provide the Respondent with a duplicate copy of these documents.

193The Applicant can apply for the passport of J.C., or the renewal of government issued documentation for J. C., without the consent of the Respondent.

Travel

194If the Applicant plans a vacation with J.C., she shall give the Respondent at least 60 days’ notice before the planned trip, providing the flight information, the trip itinerary, as well as contact information for J.C. during the trip. If the Applicant provides the Respondent with at least 60 days’ notice before the planned trip, J.C. shall travel with the Applicant regardless of the parenting schedule.

195For each parenting day missed by the Respondent as a result of a vacation taken by the Applicant with J.C., the Applicant shall provide the Respondent with two options to make up his supervised parenting time with J.C. and the Respondent shall choose one of the options. This shall be communicated via AppClose. If the Respondent chooses not to engage with the Applicant and/or negotiate his replaced supervised parenting time within two weeks of the Applicant leaving for her time away, then the Respondent shall forfeit the supervised parenting time.

196The Applicant shall be free to travel with J.C. outside of Canada to any Hague Convention signatory country without the consent of the Respondent. The Respondent’s consent for J.C.’s travel outside of Canada to a Hague Convention signatory country is hereby dispensed with.

Relocation

197In the event that the Applicant intends to undertake a relocation with J.C. that will significantly impact the Respondent’s relationship with J.C., the Applicant must provide the Respondent with at least 60 days’ written advance notice of the intended relocation, setting out the expected date of the proposed relocation, the address of the new place of residence and contact information of herself and J.C., and a proposal as to how his supervised parenting time with respect to J.C. could be exercised.

198In the event that the Respondent intends to undertake a relocation that will significantly impact his relationship with J.C. He must provide the Applicant with at least 60 days’ written advance notice of the intended relocation, setting out the expected date of the proposed relocation, the address of the new place of residence and contact information of himself, and a proposal as to how his supervised parenting time with respect to J.C. could be exercised.

199The Applicant, with whom J.C. has her primary residence, may change the J.C.’s place of residence from the city of Toronto, but will not move J.C. more than ten kilometres from her present school. If the Applicant proposes to change J.C.’s place of residence, she must provide the Respondent with 60 days’ notice of the proposed move. The notice must include the address of the proposed new place of residence, the date of the proposed move, and if necessary, a proposed supervised parenting time arrangement.

200If the Applicant and the Respondent cannot agree on revised supervised parenting arrangements that may result from the Applicant relocating, they will seek a resolution of the issue in court.

Child Support

Table

201For purposes of determining child support for J.C., born [redacted], the Applicant’s annual Guidelines income is $92,322.89, and the Respondent’s annual Guidelines income shall be imputed to $62,712.

202Beginning January 1, 2025, the Respondent’s Guidelines income shall be the greater of his annual income or $62,712.

203The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant as child support for J.C.:

(a) monthly Table child support in the amount of $732, starting February 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month thereafter; and

(b) his share of J.C.'s section 7 expenses as set out in the section 7 expenses paragraphs below; until a terminating event, a variation of child support, a review resulting in a change of child support, or any other change in child support set out in this Order.

Arrears of Table

204As of the date of this Order, the Respondent owes the Applicant arrears of child support in the amount of $20,215.00.

205These child support arrears payments are in addition to the on-going child support set out in this Order.

Section 7 Expenses

206As of the date of this Order, the Respondent owes the Applicant arrears of child support in the form of section 7 expenses in the amount of $11,205.21.

207J.C.’s section 7 expenses include:

(a) Daycare;

(b) Summer camp;

(c) Therapy;

(d) Post-secondary educational expenses, including but not limited to tuition, books and room and board; and

(e) any other special or extraordinary expenses agreed on in advance or ordered by a court, and neither party shall unreasonably withhold consent.

208For apportioning of special or extraordinary expenses, the Respondent’s income is 46 percent of the parties' combined incomes. Therefore, the Applicant shall pay 54 percent of J.C.’s special or extraordinary expenses.

209The parties shall contribute to J.C.’s special or extraordinary expenses as detailed at paragraph 206 above. If the parties cannot agree, they shall use the section of this Order entitled Dispute Resolution to resolve this issue.

210Until the child support is adjusted by an amending agreement, court order or arbitration award, the Respondent shall continue to pay table child support and the parties shall continue to pay their respective contributions to J.C.’s special and extraordinary expenses as per this court order.

Termination and Review

211Child support for J.C. terminates when J.C. is no longer a "child of the marriage" as defined in the Divorce Act.

212Once a year, if either party asks in writing, the Applicant and the Respondent shall review the amount of child support payable and, if they do not agree about any change, they shall use the section below entitled Dispute Resolution to resolve the issue(s).

213Until the child support is adjusted by an amending agreement, arbitration award, or court order, the Respondent shall continue to pay the table child support and any contribution to J.C.'s section 7 expenses as per this court order.

214Within 30 days of any written request for disclosure by either party, both parties shall, in writing, provide the following information to the other:

(a) the documents required in s. 21(1) of the Guidelines that have not previously been provided;

(b) current information about J.C.'s section 7 expenses;

(c) current information about a party's claim of undue hardship, if any, and the household's standard of living;

(d) details of Canada Child Benefit or other child benefits received in the previous year and anticipated in the coming year; and

(e) any other information needed to review child support.

Dispute Resolution

215If the Applicant and the Respondent disagree about a reviewable or variable term, they shall first try to resolve the dispute through negotiation, either between themselves or with their respective counsel, on the following terms:

(a) The party seeking a change shall make the request for the review or variation by giving the other, in writing:

i. notice of the proposed change;

ii. evidence supporting the proposed change; and

iii. any requests for information from the other necessary to determine the issue.

iv. A request under subparagraph 214(a) shall be answered within 15 days.

216After exchanging any information required by the terms set out immediately above, the Applicant and the Respondent shall meet through their personal representatives to resolve the issues in dispute. If they come to an agreement, the Applicant and the Respondent shall sign and date an amending agreement before witnesses.

217If the Applicant and the Respondent are unable to resolve a dispute through negotiation, either party may bring an application to the court to resolve the dispute. Except in the case of an emergency, the party making an application to the court shall give the other party no less than 5 days' notice of the application.

218Paragraphs 2 and 9 of the order of Justice Ramsay dated April 2, 2024, ordering the Respondent to refund $10,000 paid by the Applicant to the Applicant and bearing post-judgement interest of 7% from the date of the Order, are confirmed.

Restraining Order

219Subject to the terms of this Order, the Respondent D.C. shall refrain from directly or indirectly contacting the Applicant. The Respondent shall refrain from threatening, intimidating, molesting, harassing or annoying or causing a third party to contact, threaten, intimidate, molest, harass or annoy the Applicant S.T pursuant to s. 46 as follows:

(a) subject to the terms of this Order, the Respondent shall not telephone or communicate with the Applicant directly or indirectly;

(b) the Respondent shall not contact the Applicant’s employer;

(c) the Respondent shall not contact the Applicant’s health care practitioners;

(d) subject to the terms of this Order, the Respondent shall not come within 200 meters of the Applicant’s residence or anywhere that the Applicant is known to be, including her place of employment, save and except for parenting transfers, as ordered by the court, wherein the Respondent shall not come within 10 metres of the Applicant, and for the purposes of attending court.

Costs

220Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the order of Justice Kraft, dated May 25, 2023, awarding costs of $3,000.00 and bearing post-judgment interests of 6% from the date of the Order, are confirmed. These costs are enforceable by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office.

221Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the order of Justice Kristjanson, dated December 15, 2023, awarding costs of $18,000.00 and bearing post-judgment interest of 7% from the date of the Order, are confirmed. These costs are enforceable by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office.

222The Applicant shall provide and upload her bill of costs and cost submissions (not to exceed 5 pages double spaced) within the next 10 days to my judicial assistant and upload same to Case Centre. I will release my decision on costs by endorsement. These costs shall also be enforceable as support by the Director, Family Responsibility Office.

Enforcement

223Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, the costs set out in paragraphs 219 and 220 above shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.

224Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed. A support deduction order will be issued.

225This Order bears post-judgment interest of 5% from the date of this Order. Where there is default in payment, the payment in default shall bear interest only from the date of default.

226The approval of the Respondent to the form and content of the Order is dispensed with. Paragraphs 2 and 9 of the order of Justice Ramsay dated April 2, 2024, ordering the Respondent to refund $10,000 paid by the Applicant to the Applicant and bearing post-judgement interest of 7% from the date of the Order, are confirmed.