Ali v. Hariss, 2025 ONSC 3234

CITATION: Ali v. Hariss, 2025 ONSC 3234

COURT FILE NO. CV-24-00715146-0000

DATE: 2025-08-26

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MUHAMMAD ALI

Plaintiff

– and –

PATRICIA HARISS

Defendant

Self Represented and Acting in Person, the Plaintiff.

Michael L. Byers, Lawyer for the Defendant

HEARD: May 29, 2025

REASONS FOR DECISION

G. DOW, J.

1The defendant, Patricia Harris (improperly spelt in the title of proceeding as “Hariss”) sought dismissal of this action on the following grounds:

i) the claim is an abuse of process as a collateral attack or an attempt to relitigate on a decided matter;

ii) the claim was vexatious based on previous admissions and/or findings made as well as the failure to pay previous awards of costs made against the plaintiff; and

iii) the claim was frivolous at law as, on a plain and obviously reading, it had no merit and it was bound to fail.

2At the outset of the hearing, I heard a plaintiff request for an adjournment or extension, opposed by the defendant. The basis for the request was, to quote Mr. Ali, “mainly financial”. This appears to have been addressed by Justice Koehnen at Civil Practice Court on July 30, 2024 who provided the plaintiff with additional time and made today’s hearing peremptory. His endorsement explained to Mr. Ali that today’s date “cannot be changed for any reasons”.

3As a result, I was not prepared to adjourn the hearing. I was reinforced in this decision by two additional factors. The first was the that this request was not communicated to opposing counsel or uploaded to Case Center until the day before the hearing. I find that was insufficient notice given the basis for the request. In addition, Mr. Ali had prepared and uploaded his factum, dated May 20, 2025, a 45-page document which provided his position on the defendant’s motion. Thus, the matter was capable of proceeding on its hearing date.

BACKGROUND

4The plaintiff became a member of the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario (“CPAO”) on October 26, 2017. The defendant is a senior investigator for the plaintiff’s regulatory body, established under the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 8, Sched. 3.

5The event which began this matter was a complaint by Barry Vaters to the CPAO (regarding services provided by the plaintiff) on or about September 25, 2018 (see Reasons of CPAO Discipline Committee dated March 4, 2020 at paragraph 14). This complaint appears to have been made on a “Complaint Outline Form 7-1A”. This was attached to the end of the plaintiff’s factum. It details at 2018 T-2 Tax Return being done incorrectly by the plaintiff who then refused to refund the fee paid. The plaintiff raised before me that it was unsigned. I find that to be of no consequence given its use was supplemented by the complainant’s subsequent viva voce testimony and availability to be cross-examined by Mr. Ali (or his counsel) in proceedings summarized below.

6The Professional Conduct Committee (“PCC”) of the CPAO initially reviewed the allegation which the plaintiff apparently refused to respond to or cooperate with his regulatory body and/or provide documentation. The Discipline Committee hearing proceeded on February 11, 2020. Relying on an Agreed Statement of Facts, the Discipline Committee held the plaintiff had breached Rule 104.1 of its Professional Code of Conduct (see affidavit of Patrica Harris, sworn September 6, 2024, Exhibit 2).

7The plaintiff was reprimanded, directed to co-operate by providing full responses to requests made by Standards Enforcement Officers and fined $5,000. The fine was paid. The 47 paragraph, 8 page decision details what occurred including that the plaintiff was self-represented.

8The defendant was assigned to investigate the complaint in November, 2020 or not until after the initial discipline hearing and decision had occurred. The defendant’s 48 page report (with attachments totaling 1333 pages) dated February 23, 2021 detailed her findings. This included two interviews with the plaintiff which were recorded and transcribed. The plaintiff attached pages 47, 81, 78, 87, 88 and 182 of the transcript of those interviews in his responding factum.

9The PCC proceeded to conduct a hearing on various dates between August 4, 2021 to February 25, 2022. The plaintiff was represented at various times by three different counsel. Evidence was tendered by the PCC from Barry Vaters and the defendant (who was thus available for cross-examination) and, called by the defendant, himself and Dr. Shabnam Preet Kaur (a handwriting expert).

10The Reasons of the Discipline Committee dated, April 29, 2022 consisted of 124 paragraphs on 27 pages to conclude the plaintiff had committed professional misconduct. The reasons included the sanction of the revoking the plaintiff’s membership in the CPAO and a fine of $10,000. Costs were awarded against the plaintiff in the amount of $72,000. Neither apparently had been paid.

11The plaintiff did not appeal this decision within the 30 day time frame provided by the CPAO but later sought leave to extend this time to pursue an appeal. This occurred in February, 2024 which proceeded to a hearing for an extension. The Reasons detailing the Appeal Committee’s decision not to allow the appeal to proceed are dated March 28, 2024. These Reasons (as do the Reasons of April 29, 2022) contains reference to the plaintiff having mental health issues and a psychiatric report being tendered which was not contained in the material before me. I was not advised of any application for judicial review of these decisions.

12Instead, these decisions were the subject of reconsideration motions brought by the plaintiff. They proceeded to a hearing February 10, 2025 and are detailed in the 48 paragraph, on 13 pages, set of Reasons dated March 13, 2025. That decision allowed motions by the PCC to dismiss some eight summonses the plaintiff requested be issued and to hear both reconsideration motions together. The hearing on the merits was apparently to proceed in July, 2025. This Statement of Claim was issued February 21, 2024.

ANALYSIS

13Regarding the first submission by the defendant in requesting this action be dismissed on the basis of the legal doctrine of abuse of process, I have compared what occurred to this plaintiff in his dealings with the regulatory body of his profession and the allegations in the Statement of Claim. At its core, the plaintiff has alleged the defendant, by her actions (as detailed in the Statement of Claim) committed an actionable legal wrong against the plaintiff. This includes allegations that she discriminated against him (without specifying the nature of the discrimination) lacked competence in the nature and the extent of her investigation, hid information (from presumably the PCC), and ignored certain facts known to her.

14As described in Wright v. Urbanek, 2019 ONCA 823 (at paragraph 8) an abuse of process arises when the claim being advanced misuses “the court’s procedure in a way that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”. This includes where the claim is “in essence an attempt to relitigate a matter” that has already been decided.

15All of the plaintiff’s complaints and concerns regarding the defendant’s conduct stem from her efforts in the investigation of the plaintiff’s regulatory body into his conduct. It is very important that the defendant was not the decision maker in determining whether the plaintiff had committed professional misconduct. It is even more important that any of the defendant’s actions or failure to do something in her investigation was subject to being tested by the plaintiff in the proceeding before the Discipline Committee, by raising how she discriminated against him, showed how her investigation failed to be competent, presented or confronted her with the information she allegedly hid and/or confirmed what facts she allegedly ignored.

16As a result, I agree the action is an abuse of process and ought to be dismissed.

17Regarding the submission the Statement of Claim as drafted, is vexatious, this legal concept is where the claims have no merit or lack a legal basis. One aspect of determining whether a claim is vexatious is where the claim moves from one proceeding to another on “grounds and issues raised in the earlier proceeding” (Silliphant v. Eastern Ontario Regional Laboratories, 2024 ONSC 6363 (at paragraph 49). That is what appears to have occurred here.

18As a result, I agree the claim is drafted as vexatious and ought to be dismissed.

19Regarding the submission the claim is frivolous, this is akin to asking whether it is “plain and obvious” the claim cannot succeed (Dosen v. Meloche Monnex Financial Services Inc. (Security National Insurance Company), 2021 ONCA 141 (at paragraph 27). Having reviewed the allegations in the Statement of Claim and accepting a generous reading of the allegations is required, along with the nature, extent and results of the proceeding, I find this claim cannot succeed. I particularly rely on the fact that the defendant was an investigator and not the organization which decided the plaintiff had committed professional misconduct and should have his membership in this organization revoked.

20As a result, I agree the action is frivolous and ought to be dismissed.

21The final step in the analysis is to consider whether leave to amend ought to be granted. Having found the plaintiff’s action to be an abuse of process, vexatious and frivolous, it follows any subsequent attempts to redraft the substance of what the plaintiff alleges to be a legal wrong committed as against him by this defendant cannot alter that conclusion. As stated in Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstoc, 2022 SCC 19 (at paragraph 18) “the power to strike hopeless claims is ‘a valuable housekeeping measure essential to effective and fair litigation’ ”. As a result, I decline to allow leave for the plaintiff this pleading.

CONCLUSION

22The action is dismissed without leave to amend.

COSTS

23The defendant uploaded its Bill of Costs in the event of its success as required by Rule 57.01(6) and sought $29,655.08, inclusive of partial indemnity fees, HST and disbursements. Counsel for the defendant acknowledged that he is also counsel to the CPAO which raised a concern by me that the quantity of time recorded may include portions not directly related to this proceeding. Counsel did submit that, to the contrary, this may have resulted in some economies of time expended given his ongoing familiarity with the matter.

24My review of the Bill of Costs includes junior counsel spending over 47 hours (more than five full workdays) in preparing the motion material. This accounts for more than 1/3 of the amount claimed. This is in addition to counsel who made submissions before me spending more than 32 hours in attending to this matter. I find the time expended does not indicate any economies and to be modestly excessive.

25As a result, and mindful of the factors identified in Rule 57.01, I conclude the quantum sought ought to be reduced and fix the amount payable by Muhammad Ali at $25,000, inclusive of fees, HST and disbursements. Given Muhammad Ali’s earlier submission of financial constraints, I also order the time for payment be extended from the usual 30 days to within the next 180 days.

Mr. Justice G. Dow

Released August 26, 2025

CITATION: Ali v. Hariss, 2025 ONSC 3234

COURT FILE NO. CV-24-00715146-0000