Court File and Parties
Court File No.: FC-25-00000781
Motion Heard: 2025-05-27
Court: Superior Court of Justice - Ontario
Applicant: Dalia Mohamed Akram AbdelRahman Ahmed Nouh
Respondent: Mohamed Said Khalil ElAbbasy
Before: Associate Justice Kamal
Counsel: Rishab Lohan, for the Applicant
Reasons for Decision
Purpose of the Motion
The purpose of this motion is to promote the stability of the children and ensure that they are not used as pawns in their parents’ separation.
The Applicant brings an urgent motion, without notice, for various relief relating to prohibiting the Respondent from removing the children from Ontario and for video parenting time.
The motion is with respect to two children: Amira ElAbbasy, born December 9, 2011, and Zeyad ElAbbasy, born May 21, 2016. The children are 9 and 13 years of age.
The parties began their relationship on January 22, 2009, and married on July 23, 2010, in Egypt.
The Applicant mother sought leave for the motion to be heard without notice and before the Application is served.
Relief Sought
The Applicant mother also seeks the following orders on this motion:
a. An Order prohibiting the Respondent from removing the children from the jurisdiction of Ontario and Canada, until further order;
b. An Order requiring the Respondent to forfeit the children's passports to the Applicant’s Counsel or the court within 5 days from the date of an order of this court;
c. An Order permitting the concerned law enforcement agency to locate and seize the passports of the children in case the Respondent refuses to surrender and deposit the passports of the children with the Court or to the Applicant’s counsel, as ordered, within 5 days;
d. An Order permitting substituted service of this motion, Applicant's Application, 35.1 Affidavit, 35.1A Protection Affidavit, and Form 13.1 Financial Statement upon the Respondent via email, after compliance of the orders requested herein above; and
e. An Order facilitating immediate video parenting time between the Applicant and the children, to occur at minimum three (3) days per week without the direct or indirect interference of the Respondent.
The Application was recently issued, and it has not yet been served. A case conference has not been held in this matter.
Applicant's Position and Background
The Applicant mother’s position is that the motion should be heard before serving the Application for the following reasons:
a. There is a real and substantial risk that the children will be removed from Ontario if the Respondent is served with the Application or the Motion materials before an order is made;
b. The Applicant says the real and substantial risk is based on the following:
i. The Respondent has been verbally and physically abusive to her;
ii. As a result of an incident of violence, the Applicant left the home with the children in February of 2024 and was going to go to Egypt, where her parents reside. The police were called on that occasion;
iii. In response, the Respondent took the children’s birth certificates, passports, and the Applicant’s car keys. The Respondent left for Egypt in February of 2024 with the understanding that the children would join her in June 2024, but the Respondent did not send the children.
iv. The Applicant has not seen the children since February 2024.
v. In August of 2024, the Respondent moved to Kuwait with the children, without notice to the Applicant.
vi. In January 2025, the Applicant commenced a family law proceeding in Kuwait and obtained a temporary order prohibiting relocation and a final order granting primary care to the Applicant.
vii. The Respondent then left Kuwait with the children and returned to Canada.
c. The Applicant is of the view that the Respondent was evading the legal system in Kuwait by returning to Canada as he never informed her that he would be moving again with the children.
I note that I only have evidence from the Applicant mother as the Respondent was not served.
The evidence before me establishes a reasonable fear and risk the Respondent would leave Ontario if he were served with the motion materials. The evidence before me also establishes concerns that the Respondent has been physically, verbally, and emotionally aggressive and controlling.
Rule 14(4.2): Interest of Justice
- Rules 14(4) and 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (“FLRs”), set out the general requirement that a case conference must be held before a motion may be heard, and the exceptions to that requirement:
(4) No notice of motion or supporting evidence may be served and no motion may be heard before a conference dealing with the substantive issues in the case has been completed.
(4.2) Subrule (4) does not apply if the court is of the opinion that there is a situation of urgency or hardship or that a case conference is not required for some other reason in the interest of justice.
The onus is on the Applicant, as the moving party, to establish that there is a situation of urgency or hardship or other reason in the interest of justice that her motion should be addressed before a case conference.
Rule 14(4.2) of the FLRs separates urgency and “other reasons in the interest of justice”.
The consideration of "interest of justice" provides the court with discretion to address situations that may not meet the strict criteria of urgency or hardship but still warrant expedited attention to ensure fairness and timely resolution.
In contrast to the considerations of urgency and hardship, the "interest of justice" is a more flexible and context-dependent standard. Urgency refers to specific and immediate circumstances, whereas “reasons in the interest of justice” permits the court to consider a broader range of factors, including considerations such as procedural fairness, the efficiency of the litigation process, the best interests of the child, and the complexity and practicality of the request.
The “interest of justice” ground must be read in conjunction with the primary objective of the FLRs and the Court’s need to deal with cases justly. See: Yelle v. Scorobruh, 2016 ONSC 3300.
In McDermott v. McDermott, 2005) to (5) and 17(4)]
This ground is to be used in exceptional circumstances and only when it is consistent with the overall objectives of the FLRs. It is not meant to be used as a “catch-all” ground.
In the present case, there is evidence that the Respondent has been verbally and physically abusive to the Applicant. There are allegations of family violence and coercive control.
Domestic violence is not limited to physical assault: it embraces a range of behaviours which includes mental and emotional abuse, with implications that spill over to children. See: CCAS v. I.B. et al., 2020 ONSC 5498 at paragraph 164.
Family violence can be insidious. It can take many forms, and frequently involves coercive and controlling behaviors which are usually very difficult to prove because they often take place in private. Abusers, especially those of the coercive and controlling kind, are often skilled manipulators; they can be charming, they can be convincing liars, and they can be very persuasive. Victims of family violence are often the only witnesses who can attest to their abuser’s behavior and unfortunately, they are sometimes not believed because of their inability to support their allegations with objective third-party evidence. See: Volgemut v. Decristoforo, 2021 ONSC 7382.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22 made the following observations about family violence:
- The recent amendments to the Divorce Act recognize that findings of family violence are a critical consideration in the best interests analysis (par. 146).
- The suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability is untenable. Research indicates that children who are exposed to family violence are at risk of emotional and behavioural problems throughout their lives. Harm can result from direct or indirect exposure to domestic conflicts, for example, by observing the incident, experiencing its aftermath, or hearing about it (par. 145).
- Domestic violence allegations are notoriously difficult to prove. Family violence often takes place behind closed doors and may lack corroborating evidence. Thus, proof of even one incident may raise safety concerns for the victim or may overlap with and enhance the significance of other factors, such as the need for limited contact or support (par. 145).
In cases where there are allegations of family violence that are established in the evidence, the Court ought to consider this evidence in considering what procedure is “in the interest of justice.” In my view, that is consistent with the primary objective of the FLRs in dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity.
The evidence also demonstrates that there is a reasonable concern that the Respondent may leave Ontario if he is served with the Application and motion materials.
With the added concern of the Respondent’s demonstrated pattern of leaving the jurisdiction when faced with family law disputes, this behaviour must also be considered in determining whether it is in the interest of justice to grant leave for a motion to be heard before a case conference.
The Application contains the relief sought in the Notice of Motion. I believe the evidence provided by the Applicant that the Respondent is erratic and aggressive and may react negatively to receiving notice of the Applicant's motion or the Application. The several instances of inappropriate behavior provided by the Applicant are alarming.
In this case, there are significant concerns related to family violence, coercive control, and flight risk. The interest of justice includes promoting stability and security for the children and ensuring that the legal system is not abused. In this case, the interest of justice calls for it to be appropriate for the motion to occur before the case conference.
Therefore, it is in the interest of justice that the motion proceed before the Application is served, and therefore, before a case conference is held.
Rule 14(4.2): Urgency
Though the Applicant mother did not specifically plead it, I take it as inherent in her submissions that the situation is one of urgency, as contemplated under Rule 14(4.2). This was a similar approach taken by Justice Mathen in Hodgson v. Hodgson, 2025 ONSC 476.
Rosen v. Rosen is the leading case with respect to determining urgency.
The following factors are necessary for a finding of urgency, as set out in Thomas v. Wohleber, 2020 ONSC 1965:
a. The concern must be immediate; that is one that cannot await resolution at a later date;
b. The concern must be serious in the sense that it significantly affects the health or safety or economic well-being of parties and/or their children;
c. The concern must be a definite and material rather than a speculative one. It must relate to something tangible (a spouse or child’s health, welfare, or dire financial circumstances) rather than theoretical; and
d. It must be one that has been clearly particularized in evidence and examples that describes the manner in which the concern reaches the level of urgency.
- The Court recently wrote in Dyquiangco Jr. v. Tipay, 2022 ONSC 1441, at paragraph 6:
The Rosen test for urgency involves a two-step inquiry and is generally related to situations involving abduction, threats of harm and dire financial circumstances. This list is not exhaustive. The first step requires an inquiry when a case conference date is available. Absence of a proximate date may elevate a situation to urgent. The second step before bringing a motion obligates the parties to engage in a good faith dialogue to ascertain whether some temporary, reasonable compromise can be achieved pending the conference. Context is important. In Rosen, Wildman J. contrasted the situation where support was desperately needed, but refused, with a less compelling situation where the amount of support offered was within a reasonable range of the request.
In my view, there is a risk of harm if the two-step inquiry is strictly followed. The Respondent father, if served with the Application and motion materials, may remove the children from the jurisdiction or exert other forms of control and violence against the Applicant through the children.
Based on the evidence before me, the test for an urgent motion has been met.
Without Notice
The Applicant sought to leave to proceed with this motion “without notice”. Rule 14(12)(d) applies because “service of a notice of motion would probably have serious consequences.”
Ex-parte motions are to be granted only in exceptional and rare cases. See: A.M. v. J.M., 2016 ONCA 644 and Jagpal v. Nayyar, 2015 ONSC 5735, at paragraph 10.
When faced with an ex parte motion and supporting affidavit material, a court must balance the rights of the parties, the safety of children or parties, and all other exigencies before the court. See: J.A. v. O.G., 2011 ONSC 3302, at paragraph 91.
In my view, on a balance of probabilities established by the Applicant’s evidence, the Respondent is volatile and unpredictable; and he might have an extremely negative reaction to being served with notice of the Applicant’s motion. The Applicant has given numerous examples of inappropriate behaviour, that, taken together, are extremely concerning.
The risk faced by the Applicant, and more importantly to the children, exists with respect to the service of her Application and the Applicant’s requests for any interim relief.
In Hodgson v. Hodgson, 2025 ONSC 476, Justice Mathen found that when a Respondent is volatile and unpredictable, and might have an extremely negative reaction to being served with motion materials, it is appropriate to proceed on an urgent basis and without service of the motion materials. In the present case, the Application includes the relief sought in the motion. Therefore, it is appropriate for this motion to proceed before the service of the Application also.
I am, therefore, persuaded that:
a. Pursuant to Rule 14(4.2), hearing this motion in advance of service of the Application and before a case conference is appropriate; and
b. Pursuant to Rule 14(12)(d), proceeding on a without notice basis is required to avoid the risk of serious consequences to the Applicant and the children that might arise from service of this motion.
Legislative Considerations in Parenting Orders
Section 28 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (“CLRA”) sets out parenting and contact orders the Court may make.
Section 24 of the CLRA sets out the factors and considerations that the court must consider in making a parenting order or a contact order.
Section 24(1) directs that the court shall take into consideration “only the best interests of the child.”
The court is required by section 24(2) to “give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.” The primary consideration articulated in section 24(2) recognizes that there may in some cases be conflicts in attempting to weigh the enumerated best interests criteria.
Section 24(3) sets out a number of factors that the court must weigh in carrying out the best interests analysis.
The courts have been given a clear direction that any such difficulties in attempting to carry out the analysis should be resolved in favour of ensuring that the child’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being are promoted.
Section 24(3)(j) specifically highlights the occurrence of “family violence” and the impact of such violence as important considerations in determining where the best interests of a child lie in making parenting and contact orders. Section 2 of the Act defines the term “family violence” very broadly.
Section 24(4) of the Act dictates that in considering the impact of family violence pursuant to section 24(3)(j), the court must take into account several factors relating to family violence:
Factors relating to family violence
23(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph (3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
- Section 24(5) addresses the relevance of a person’s past conduct in conducting the best interests analysis as follows:
Past conduct
In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person, unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of the person’s decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the child.
Guiding Principles in Case Law
The assessment of the child’s best interests must take into account all of the relevant information regarding the child’s needs and the ability of the parties to meet those needs. See: Gordon v. Goertz.
The list of considerations relevant to the best interests analysis set out in section 24 of the CLRA is not exhaustive. The court is not required to specifically enumerate and analyze all of the criteria set out in section 24 of the Act, but rather must consider all of the relevant information in the particular case before it. See: Walsh v. Walsh; Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480 at paragraph 47; A.E. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189 at paragraph 89.
The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that the analysis of the child’s best interests in the context of parenting disputes must be undertaken from the lens of the child rather than the parents’ perspectives; parental preferences and rights do not play a role in the analysis except to the extent that they are necessary to ensure the best interests of the child. See: Young v. Young at paragraphs 74 and 202; F. v. N., 2022 SCC 51 at paragraph 61.
The definition of “family violence” in section 18 of the CLRA clarifies that in the case of a child, family violence includes both direct and indirect exposure to the violence. Accordingly, children may suffer family violence in the following ways:
The child may be the direct victim of family violence if the abusive conduct is inflicted specifically towards them.
The child may also be victimized by direct exposure to family violence of another family member, if they observe the violence or are close by when it occurs and are able to see or hear what is happening.
The child may also be indirectly exposed to and victimized by family violence towards other family members in many ways. For instance, they may experience the aftermath of the violence. This can include observing the family member’s physical injuries or emotional distress following the violence, hearing about the violence after it has occurred, seeing changes in the victim’s behaviour due to the violence, and becoming embroiled in a police or child protection investigation relating to the violence. Where the directly victimized family member is a parent, the child can also suffer indirect consequences of the violence if the parent’s physical, emotional and psychological well-being are compromised, since these consequences in turn often negatively impact their ability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs. See: S.V.G. v. V.G., 2023 ONSC 3206.
Having regard for the damaging impacts of family violence, the courts must construe family violence provisions in a broad and purposive manner so as to maximize the protective scope of the provisions for children and their family members who are facing family violence in its many forms. This approach is mandated by the general principles of statutory interpretation that legislative provisions must be construed in their entire context and grammatical and ordinary sense, and in a fair, large, and liberal manner that best ensures the attainment of their objects. See: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 at paragraphs 21, 40, 54 and 69.
Behaviour may constitute family violence within the meaning of the CLRA if it causes a family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person. It is well established in the law respecting restraining orders that the notion of fearing for one’s safety or that of another person extends not only to physical safety, but also to the person’s emotional and psychological safety. See: Lawrence v. Bassett, 2015 ONSC 3707; Tiveron v. Collins, 2017 ONCA 462; Stephens v. Somerville, 2021 ONSC 1958; Reis v. Lovell, 2022 ONSC 1201 at paragraph 52.
While I have considered all the best interest factors in arriving at my decision, I refer below to those that are most relevant in these circumstances.
The list of best interest factors is not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather it calls for the court to take a holistic look at the children, their needs and the people around them. See: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480 at paragraph 47.
Prohibiting Removal from Ontario
The Applicant seeks an order prohibiting the Respondent from removing the children from the jurisdiction of Ontario and Canada until further order.
Section 28(1)(c) specifically allows the Court to make such an order.
The factors set out in section 24 are to be considered in making such an order.
In the present case, three main considerations guide my decision:
a. The potential risk that the Respondent may remove the children from Ontario if this order is not granted;
b. The impact of family violence and coercive control by the Respondent; and
c. The children’s needs, given the children’s age and stage of development, such as the children’s need for stability.
As previously mentioned, there is a reasonable concern that the Respondent will remove the children from Ontario if this order is not granted. The Respondent has done so in the past. First, he moved to Kuwait with the children, without notifying the Applicant.
Then, when the Applicant mother successfully obtained a family law order in Kuwait, the Respondent left Kuwait and came back to Canada with the children – again without telling the Applicant.
The Applicant has been in a legal chase with the Respondent around the world – literally. This is not in the best interest of the children.
In my view, the evidence suggests one of the Respondent’s motives may be to avoid family law proceedings. For that reason, it is appropriate for the order to prohibit the Respondent from removing the children from the jurisdiction of Ontario, rather than Canada broadly.
The evidence also demonstrates that the Respondent has engaged in controlling behaviours, including taking away the Applicant’s phone and car keys when they were in conflict. The Respondent has also taken away the children’s passports and birth certificates. The Respondent attempted to harm himself when the Applicant advised that she would leave the home. All of this demonstrates controlling behaviour that cannot be condoned by the Court. The evidence before me demonstrates that the Respondent has been willing to move the children around the world as one of his controlling behaviours.
Furthermore, the children need stability. All children need stability. In the present case, one of the children is on the spectrum (ASD Level 2). This is another consideration in ensuring the children are not removed from their home in an effort to either exert control or avoid and frustrate family law litigation.
Accordingly, it is in the best interests of the children, at this time, to grant an order prohibiting the Respondent from removing the children from the jurisdiction of Ontario.
The Children's Passports
- With respect to the children’s passports, the Applicant seeks the following two orders:
a. An Order requiring the Respondent to forfeit the children's passports to the Applicant’s Counsel or the court within 5 days from the date of an order of this court; and
b. An Order permitting the concerned law enforcement agency to locate and seize the passports of the children in case the Respondent refuses to surrender and deposit the passports of the children with the Court or to the Applicant’s counsel, as ordered, within 5 days.
Section 28(1)(c)(v) of the CLRA permits the Court to make an order requiring the delivery of the children’s passport to the court or to a person or body specified by the court.
Sections 34 to 39 of the CLRA deal with the enforcement of parenting orders. Section 37(1), (2) and (3) of the CLRA states that where a court is satisfied upon reasonable and probable grounds that a person prohibited by court order or separation agreement from removing a child from Ontario proposes to remove the child from Ontario, the court in order to prevent the removal of the child from Ontario may make an order for the person to deliver the children’s passport and any other travel documents to an individual or body specified by the court.
Section 37(7) of the CLRA a court may give such directions in respect of the safekeeping of the property, payments, passports or travel documents as the court considers appropriate. In my view, this includes a police enforcement provision regarding the children’s passports.
In my view, in order to give meaning to the non-removal order, it is appropriate to grant the order requested regarding the children’s passports. It is appropriate for the Respondent to immediately deposit the children’s passports at the Applicant’s counsel’s office located at 116 Albert Street, Suite 300, in Ottawa. In light of the Respondent’s conduct in removing the children in the recent past, the orders requested are appropriate in ensuring stability for the children. Therefore, it is in the best interests of the children to grant these orders.
These arrangements can be made via a process server at the Applicant’s expense.
Video Parenting Time for the Applicant
The Applicant seeks an order granting video parenting time between the Applicant and the children, to occur at minimum three (3) days per week without the direct or indirect interference of the Respondent.
As mentioned above, parenting orders are made pursuant to section 28 of the CLRA.
Section 24(6) must also be considered in determining the parenting time arrangements that are in the child’s best interests. It recognizes that children should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with their best interests:
Allocation of parenting time
In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
After an incident of conflict in February of 2024 that involved physical, verbal, and emotional violence from the Respondent to the Applicant, the Applicant left the home with the children and was going to go to Egypt, where her parents reside. However, the Respondent took the children’s birth certificates, passports, and the Applicant’s car keys. The Respondent left for Egypt in February of 2024 with an agreement between the parties that the children would join her in June 2024 after the school year, but the Respondent did not send the children.
As a result, the Applicant has not seen the children since February 2024. The Applicant still resides in Egypt.
The Applicant mother was involved in the children’s lives until the separation. Having considered the best interest factors, it is appropriate for the Applicant to have parenting time with the children.
The Applicant mother has longstanding history of caring for the children until the separation. The evidence before me is that the nature and strength of the children’s relationship with the Applicant mother was strong and their relationship needs to be supported. The most appropriate way to do that is through video parenting time.
The Applicant mother is also able to support the children’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage. While the Applicant mother led little evidence with respect to the children’s culture, the evidence before satisfies me that the Applicant mother has a deep understanding of the children’s needs in this regard and is able to support the children.
The parties are both from Egypt. The children’s maternal extended family is in Egypt and the mother is currently in Egypt. Regular video parenting time will promote the children’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage.
The Applicant mother also has years of experience as an Emergency Educational Assistant. One of the children is on the spectrum (ASD Level 2). The Applicant’s training can assist her in attending to the child’s plan of care since her diagnosis.
Section 28 of the CLRA allows the Court to determine any aspect of the incidents of the parenting time. The Court may make any additional order it considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child and requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party specified by the court in a manner that is appropriate for the child.
In light of the practical realities of this family, including the geographical considerations, the age, and stage of development of the children, it is in the best interests of the children for there to be video parenting time between the Applicant and the children, to occur at minimum three (3) days per week.
It is also important to indicate that this parenting time should occur without the direct or indirect interference of the Respondent. This means that the Respondent shall not:
a. refuse to allow the children to participate in the video call;
b. interrupt the video calls;
c. end the calls early without a valid reason;
d. withhold (or fail to provide) the necessary devices including internet access and private space;
e. create distractions during the video call; and
f. schedule conflicting activities during the parenting time.
- This also means that the Respondent shall not speak negatively about the Applicant before or after the parenting time – or at any time – so that it does not undermine or disrupt the children’s parenting time with the Applicant.
Substituted Service
The Applicant also seeks an Order permitting substituted service of this motion, Applicant's Application, 35.1 Affidavit, 35.1A Protection Affidavit and Form 13.1 Financial Statement upon the Respondent via email, after compliance with the orders requested herein.
The main reason for this request is that the Applicant does not know where the Respondent and the children are residing since they returned from Kuwait.
The written motion materials provided me with little information about whether the email address suggested for the Respondent would actually bring these materials to the Respondent’s attention.
The Applicant was affirmed in today’s attendance to provide evidence as to her knowledge of this email address.
The Respondent has been recently communicating with the children’s school teacher with that email address through the email address. The Applicant received emails from the children’s teacher including communication from the Respondent.
It is important for the Respondent to receive notice of this endorsement and order, as well as the Application and motion materials in a timely manner.
For that reason, an order is granted that service of this endorsement, the order, and the Notice of Motion, Affidavit, Applicant's Application, 35.1 Affidavit, 35.1A Protection Affidavit, and Form 13.1 Financial Statement be served upon the Respondent via email at msksia@yahoo.com.
Jurisdiction of an Associate Judge
I have considered my jurisdiction as an Associate Judge to decide the issues in this motion. Rule 42(8)6 of the FLRs allows me to make a temporary parenting order or contact order under the Children’s Law Reform Act or the Divorce Act.
The substantive orders requested in this motion are pursuant to section 28 of the CLRA, which are explicitly parenting orders. Section 37 permits the enforcement of parenting orders. Orders pursuant to these sections are within the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge pursuant to the FLRs.
Rule 42(8)1 also allows me to make orders pursuant to Rule 6 (Service of Documents).
Rule 42(8)16 allows me to make any order that is necessary and incidental to the power to make a temporary order that is within the jurisdiction of the associate judge.
In my view, all of the relief sought in this motion is within the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
Return of this Motion
Rule 14(14) of the FLRs requires that an order made on a motion without notice shall require the matter to come back to the court and, if possible, to the same judge, within 14 days or on a date chosen by the court.
In the present case, returning the motion in 14 days is not appropriate because the order must be served, as well as the Application and the motion materials must be served. The Respondent then must be given time to respond to the Application as well as the motion, if he wishes.
Accordingly, the Applicant shall immediately serve the following materials on the Respondent via email:
a. This Endorsement and the related issued Order;
b. The Application, 35.1 Affidavit, 35.1A Protection Affidavit and Form 13.1 Financial Statement; and
c. The Notice of Motion and Affidavit for this motion.
The Respondent may respond to the Application in accordance with the Rules.
Once the Respondent has served and filed his Answer (or the time to do so has passed), the parties shall contact the Trial Coordinator to schedule a return date before me to address the next steps regarding this motion.
Costs of this motion are reserved to the return date.
___________________________
Associate Justice Kamal
DATE: May 27, 2025