Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: CR-22-91107533-0000
Date: 2025-05-26

Between:
His Majesty the King – and – Matthew Pinkney

Heard: March 31 and April 1, 2025

Counsel:
Dan Mideo, for the Crown
Abhinav Dang, for the Applicant/Defendant

Reasons for Decision
Regional Senior Justice Robert N. Edwards

Overview

[1] The applicant, Matthew Pinkney, seeks an order pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) that would exclude all evidence obtained as a result of a search of his motor vehicle arising out of a Highway Traffic Act (“HTA”) stop. Mr. Pinkney argues that the evidence should be excluded on the basis of an allegation that his rights as guaranteed under sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Charter were infringed.

The Facts

[2] The only evidence on the application came from Police Constable Panacci (“PC Panacci”) who made observations of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle on September 10, 2022. Those observations included Mr. Pinkney failing to stop at a stop sign as a result of which PC Panacci queried the vehicle’s licence plate which returned as being registered to Mr. Pinkney. The query also established that Mr. Pinkney’s driver’s licence had expired. The licence was not under suspension. In addition to this information, PC Panacci observed the rear licence plate was covered by a covering which was an infringement of the HTA.

[3] As a result of this information, PC Panacci determined that she would conduct a traffic stop. From the position where she made her observations PC Panacci then executed a U-turn and came up beside Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle. At a stop light she motioned for him to roll down his window. PC Panacci made a verbal inquiry as to whether Mr. Pinkney was “Matthew” to which he responded “yes”. PC Panacci then asked Mr. Pinkney to pull his vehicle over to the side of the road.

[4] With Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle at the roadside, PC Panacci pulled in behind him and then approached Mr. Pinkney’s driver’s side window.

[5] PC Panacci testified that she advised Mr. Pinkney that she had stopped him as a result of her observations that he had not stopped at a stop sign as well as the fact that his licence had expired. PC Panacci asked Mr. Pinkney to produce his driver’s licence, vehicle registration, and insurance information. Mr. Pinkney surrendered his expired licence as well as his vehicle registration. He did not have his insurance slip with him.

[6] As PC Panacci was standing beside the driver’s side window making these inquiries, she testified that she could smell “fresh cannabis” and made observations of “fresh shake” on the console area of the interior of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle. She stated that the smell was not of burnt cannabis. She stated that the shake was unburned. PC Panacci asked Mr. Pinkney how much cannabis he had in his vehicle to which he replied that he did not have any.

[7] PC Panacci testified that she believed there was fresh cannabis that was accessible to Mr. Pinkney as she could smell a strong odour of fresh cannabis. She also observed shake on the console which added to her belief.

[8] Having made the determination there was fresh cannabis in Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle which was readily accessible to him, PC Panacci determined that she needed the assistance of backup. She testified that her reason for seeking backup was because she is a female police officer, 5 feet 4 inches in height, and she had previous experiences where “things had not gone well” when confronting suspects by herself. Having sought backup, PC Lockwood attended the scene several minutes later. During this period of time, PC Panacci testified that she remained in her police cruiser having asked Mr. Pinkney to make efforts to find his insurance information on his cellphone.

[9] PC Panacci testified that after PC Lockwood arrived, she reattended at the driver’s side window of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle and advised him that she would be conducting a search of his vehicle and required that he exit his vehicle. PC Panacci testified that she had not told Mr. Pinkney that she would be conducting a search of his vehicle when she first made observations of the shake and the fresh smell of cannabis. She testified that she did not immediately tell Mr. Pinkney this because she wanted to wait for backup so that she could then conduct a search of the vehicle under the Cannabis Control Act, 2017 (the “CCA”).

[10] PC Panacci testified that when she initially commenced her search, she realized that she did not have any gloves. She returned to her police cruiser where she obtained gloves and then returned to Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle to complete her search. She testified that she found two bags in the interior of the vehicle – one of which was black and the other was red. The black FILA bag with a red string pull was located on the rear passenger side seat. It contained an open vacuum sealed bag which contained fresh cannabis as well as a clear zip-lock bag with fresh dry cannabis that appeared to be in a square brick. A small digital scale and loose Canadian currency was also located in the front pocket of this bag.

[11] Also located on the rear seat of the vehicle was a black Guess satchel which held small bags of different colours. It was ultimately determined that these small bags contained a white powder suspected to be cocaine as well as a pink and green crystal substance suspected to be fentanyl. Also located by PC Panacci under the front passenger seat was a red satchel which ultimately was determined to contain a loaded handgun.

[12] In cross-examination, PC Panacci was asked whether or not she could smell any cannabis when she initially pulled up beside Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle and engaged in a conversation. She stated that she did not smell any cannabis in that brief encounter that probably lasted 30 seconds.

[13] Also in cross-examination, PC Panacci was asked to explain the difference between the smell of fresh cannabis and burned cannabis. While PC Panacci had some difficulty putting into words the difference in the smells, she stated that she had training to differentiate the smell of fresh versus burned cannabis and that those smells were quite different; one is more stale and burned while the other is fresher.

[14] As for her observations of the shake, PC Panacci stated that Mr. Pinkney told her that the shake was from a prior day. Nonetheless, it was PC Panacci’s evidence in cross-examination that she “smelt what she smelt”, and what she smelt was fresh cannabis. She stated that during the period of time while she was standing at the driver’s side window the smell did not dissipate and it remained through the entirety of the time while she was standing at the window.

[15] When she was asked in cross-examination as to whether or not she told Mr. Pinkney that she could smell a strong odour of cannabis PC Panacci replied that she asked him how much cannabis he had in the vehicle and he stated that he didn’t have any. She confirmed that she did not tell Mr. Pinkney that she was going to search his vehicle when she first made the observations of the shake and the smell of the fresh cannabis because she was waiting for a second police officer to arrive as backup.

[16] In cross-examination it was suggested to her that Mr. Pinkney had indicated that the shake was from a previous day. PC Panacci confirmed this is what Mr. Pinkney told her but regardless she stood by her evidence that “I smelt what I smelt – I smelt fresh cannabis”. It was also suggested to PC Panacci that the smell dissipated quickly as she was standing beside the driver’s window. PC Panacci responded that the smell did not dissipate and that it remained throughout the time that she was standing by the window.

[17] In cross-examination, PC Panacci confirmed that based on her observations of the shake and smell, she decided to do a search of the vehicle under the CCA but that she did not tell Mr. Pinkney. When pressed as to why she didn’t tell Mr. Pinkney, PC Panacci stated that she did not want Mr. Pinkney to change his behaviour (to this point he had been completely compliant) and because she had been told by her supervisors not to do searches by herself. As such she was waiting for backup.

[18] With respect to the accessibility of cannabis being transported in a motor vehicle, PC Panacci conceded in cross-examination that “readily accessible” means anywhere that a driver can reach while driving. She confirmed that the trunk of a vehicle is not accessible. PC Panacci asked whether or not the backseat of a motor vehicle was accessible. Her evidence in cross-examination was that it was accessible.

[19] After the backup that PC Panacci had requested arrived on the scene, she testified in cross-examination that she returned to Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle and asked him to step out so that she could do a CCA search. She confirmed that this was the first time that she told Mr. Pinkney that she was going to do a CCA search.

[20] As to the observations of the shake that PC Panacci had testified to in-chief, in cross-examination she stated that the shake was readily visible and while acknowledging that it was nighttime, she noted that there was street lighting. It was suggested in cross-examination that PC Panacci in fact never saw any shake to which she responded, “you can suggest that; I don’t make up my evidence”. It was also suggested that PC Panacci made up the evidence with respect to the smell as a pretext to do a search of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle to which she firmly disagreed.

[21] In cross-examination PC Panacci was shown a series of photographs marked as Exhibits 1 – 5 reflecting the interior of the vehicle. It was suggested that none of the photographs even when magnified reflected the existence of any shake. When shown the enlarged magnified pictures, PC Panacci referred to a number of spots that she suggested reflected the shake that she saw on the evening in question. She did acknowledge that no specific photographs were taken of the shake. Perhaps more significantly the shake itself was not seized so that it could become an Exhibit.

Position of Mr. Pinkney

[22] The primary thrust of the defence argument in this case is that smell by itself does not provide the basis for grounds to search under the CCA. It is argued that the evidence of PC Panacci is not credible particularly as it relates to her observations of the shake. Defence counsel points to the fact that no photographs were taken of the shake. Moreover, the shake itself was not seized as evidence. Fundamentally, it is argued that not only is PC Panacci’s evidence not credible she was lying to the court when she states that she made immediate observations of the shake when she was standing by the driver’s side window of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle.

[23] If the court determines that there was no basis for the search of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle then it is argued that Mr. Pinkney’s section 8 and section 9 Charter rights were infringed and the evidence obtained as a result of the search should be excluded. It is suggested that the first two factors that the court must consider in the section 24(2) analysis weigh heavily against the inclusion of the evidence while acknowledging that the third factor weighs in favour of inclusion.

[24] While counsel in his oral argument focused on the alleged breach of Mr. Pinkney’s sections 8 and 9 Charter rights it is only fair to note that the Application brought before the court is one based on alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

[25] In his written argument counsel for Mr. Pinkney argues that at no time did PC Panacci ever advise Mr. Pinkney that she was detaining him for a CCA investigation and that his detention was based on the pretext of providing time for Mr. Pinkney to renew his licence and/or insurance online while she waited for backup to arrive. As such, it is argued that Mr. Pinkney’s sections 9 and 10 Charter rights were infringed and that the evidence seized should be excluded under section 24(2).

Position of the Crown

[26] Crown counsel argues that PC Panacci’s evidence was credible and that she was able to draw a distinction in her evidence between the smell of fresh unburned cannabis and the smell of burned cannabis. As it relates to her observations concerning the shake, while acknowledging that the better course of action would have been to seize the shake and/or to take photographs, the fact remains that PC Panacci’s evidence was credible in terms of what she saw. This evidence is bolstered by her evidence in cross-examination when confronted with the enlarged pictures (Exhibits 1 – 5) where she says she could observe the shake.

[27] As it relates to the progress from an HTA stop to a CCA search, Crown counsel argues that no explicit warning is required and that when PC Panacci asked Mr. Pinkney how much cannabis he had in his vehicle, this was enough and that PC Panacci’s explanation for the delay was understandable due to officer safety.

[28] As it relates to the section 24(2) analysis, Crown counsel acknowledges that if this court was to determine that PC Panacci had lied to the court the seriousness of the breach of Mr. Pinkney’s Charter rights would favour exclusion. If, on the other hand, the court determines that PC Panacci was wrong in her conclusions albeit correct with respect to her subjective belief, then the breach would be much less serious. As it relates to the impact on Mr. Pinkney’s Charter protected interest, Crown counsel argues that there is a much-reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle transporting cannabis.

The Legal Principles

[29] Mr. Pinkney seeks a remedy that would exclude all of the items found as a result of the search of his vehicle. Mr. Pinkney argues that his section 8 Charter rights was infringed as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure.

[30] In order for a search to be considered reasonable it must be one that has been authorized by law; the law must be deemed reasonable and the search must be carried out in a reasonable manner; see R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265, at para 23.

[31] The law is clear that a warrantless search is one which is presumptively unreasonable. In this case, the search of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle was a search conducted without a warrant and as such the burden is on the Crown to establish on a balance of probabilities that the search was one which was authorized by law. In this case, the Crown relies on the CCA and specifically section 12(3) which provides:

(3) A police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that cannabis is being contained in a vehicle or boat in contravention of subsection (1) may at any time, without a warrant, enter and search the vehicle or boat and search any person found in it.

[32] It is not illegal to transport cannabis in a motor vehicle. Certain conditions apply which allow for the transportation of cannabis in a vehicle. Specifically, in accordance with section 12(2), the cannabis must be in its original packaging and not opened, or alternatively, the cannabis must be packed in baggage that is fastened, closed or is not otherwise readily available to any person in the vehicle.

[33] Section 12(3) of the CCA requires a police officer to have reasonable grounds to believe the cannabis is in a motor vehicle in contravention of the CCA. A police officer exercising the powers provided for in the CCA must subjectively form an honest belief that there are reasonable grounds to believe that cannabis is contained in the vehicle in contravention of the CCA. The belief must also be objectively reasonable. Objectively, a reasonable person who might find themselves placed in the position of the officer must be able to conclude that there are reasonable probable grounds to believe that cannabis was contained in the vehicle contrary to the provisions of the CCA.

[34] The Court of Appeal in R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, para 81, makes clear that the statutory standard of reasonable grounds to believe does not require proof on the balance of probabilities. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Something more than suspicion is required to establish reasonable grounds.

[35] The reasonable grounds relied upon by the Crown to support the suggestion that the search of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle was reasonable flows from the observations of PC Panacci as it relates to the shake as well as her sense of smell as it relates to the smell of fresh cannabis.

[36] In R. v. Polashek, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the trial judge that there were a constellation of factors capable of establishing reasonable grounds for the search of the accused’s vehicle. Those grounds included a smell of marijuana and drugs that were prominent in the area of the arrest.

[37] While the decision of the trial judge was upheld, Rosenberg JA held that generally speaking the presence of the odour of marijuana standing alone could not establish reasonable grounds to believe that the occupant of a vehicle is in possession of marijuana. In reaching this conclusion, Rosenberg JA indicated that the smell of marijuana is highly subjective and that if the court authorized an arrest solely on that basis it would for all intents and purposes result in an unreviewable discretion in the hands of police officers. While this was the ultimate decision of Rosenberg JA, he did not foreclose that there could be circumstances where the smell of marijuana could provide the requisite reasonable and probable grounds for an arrest. In allowing for this possibility, Rosenberg JA noted that some police officers as a result of their experience or training may be able to establish that they in fact do possess sufficient expertise that their opinion of present possession based solely on smell alone could be relied upon.

[38] The decision of the Court of Appeal in Polashek was recently reviewed by Harris J. in R. v. McKenzie-Walcott, 2022 ONSC 1350. Harris J., relying on Polashek, found that the smell of marijuana was not enough on its own to form grounds that there was marijuana in the car. The applicant’s rights in McKenzie-Walcott under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were found to have been breached and the evidence of the cannabis, hash and the handgun which were discovered during the course of the search were excluded.

[39] In R. v. Valentine, 2014 ONCA 147, paras 54–55 the Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of smell as an indicia giving rise to grounds for a police search as follows:

[54] The appellant raises an argument previously considered by this court regarding the precarious reliability of “smell” evidence given that the sense of smell is highly subjective and largely incapable of objective verification: R. v. Polashek (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 434 (C.A.).

[55] While this court has cautioned against placing undue reliance upon evidence of smell, it has also recently confirmed that “there is no legal barrier to the use of such evidence”: R. v. Morris, 2013 ONCA 223, para 8; see also R. v. Hoang, 2013 ONCA 430, para 5.

[40] One of the issues which this court is called upon to determine is whether or not the bag located on the rear passenger seat was within reach of Mr. Pinkney. This issue was addressed in a number of cases which I brought to the attention of counsel prior to argument. One of those cases was a recent decision of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Guerrier, 2024 ONCA 838, para 25 where, at para 25, Miller JA stated:

[25] … The phrase suggests that “fastened closed” presupposes that the alcohol contained in baggage that is fastened closed is not readily available. So “fastened closed” in this context requires something more than just closed by design: it means that the alcohol contained in the baggage must be closed in a manner that results in it being not readily available. Open alcohol placed in a gym bag that can be opened effortlessly by the passenger seated next to it by pulling a zipper is readily available, and so is not contained in baggage “fastened closed”.

[41] In another recent decision of the Court of Appeal, R. v. Williams, 2024 ONCA 69, para 60, Zarnett JA dealt in part with the authority to search a vehicle under section 12(3) of the CCA. At para 60, Zarnett J stated:

[60] The authority to search under s. 12(3) allows a search of bags readily accessible to the occupant of the vehicle, even if fastened closed: R. v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 5343, paras 56, 61–62. The satchel in which the firearm was found was open and readily accessible to the appellant from the driver’s seat.

[42] The Phillips decision referenced by Zarnett JA was decided by Fowler Byrne J. In Phillips at paras 61 and 62 of her Reasons, Fowler Byrne J. held:

[61] In these circumstances, it was reasonable for the police to search a backpack that was within arm’s reach of Mr. Phillips and which was only secured by a zipper. …

[62] Likewise, even a fully zipped up backpack is not sufficiently “fastened” so as to be inaccessible to any occupant of a vehicle. Accordingly, when interpreting whether cannabis that is not in its original packaging is fastened closed, it should be interpreted as fastened closed in a manner that does not make it readily accessible. A zipped-up backpack, within reach of an occupant of a motor vehicle, is readily available and therefore not fastened closed within the meaning of the CCA.

Analysis

[43] I am satisfied that PC Panacci both subjectively and objectively had reasonable grounds to search Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle pursuant to the provisions of section 12 of the CCA.

[44] Not only did PC Panacci smell fresh cannabis but she observed shake on the console of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle. It is argued that PC Panacci was lying to the court when she says that she smelt fresh cannabis as well as observed shake. Contrary to the views expressed by defence counsel I found PC Panacci to be an honest and credible witness who readily acknowledged, without being pressed, concerns about her investigation that some might argue did not meet the standards of a well-trained police officer. In that regard specifically, she acknowledged that she did not turn on the audio portion of the audio-visual capabilities of her cruiser. She readily acknowledged that if she had turned on the video, it would have picked up the HTA offence of failing to stop at the stop sign. She readily acknowledged that there were deficiencies in her notes. While PC Panacci could be criticized for these failures in police procedure they do not, in my view, impact on her credibility. Rather they reflect positively on her credibility as she readily conceded these deficiencies without being pressed either in-chief or in cross-examination.

[45] I accept that when PC Panacci attended at the driver’s window of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle, she in fact did immediately smell a fresh odour of cannabis and that she did in fact make observations of shake on the console. I accept her evidence that she was able to differentiate between the smell of fresh cannabis and the smell of burnt cannabis. Her smell and her observations gave her, in my view, the necessary objective and reasonable grounds to conduct the search that she did.

[46] Counsel for Mr. Pinkney argues that the cannabis that was found in the bag in the rear driver’s seat was being transported in accordance with the provisions of the CCA because the bag was fastened, and it was out of reach of Mr. Pinkney. I have to decide whether the bag was readily accessible. In my view, I have no doubt that in fact the bag would have been and in fact was readily accessible to Mr. Pinkney. Mr. Pinkney could simply have reached behind him to the rear passenger seat and the bag would have been easily accessible to him. The cannabis that was being transported in that bag was being transported contrary to the provisions of the CCA.

[47] As it relates to the issue of whether Mr. Pinkney was ever advised that his detention had progressed from what is conceded to have been a valid HTA stop to a CCA search, the evidence, in my view, establishes that PC Panacci had made the determination to conduct a CCA search as soon as she smelt fresh cannabis and observed the shake on the console. She had reasonable grounds to do so. The question this court must answer is whether PC Panacci had grounds to delay providing Mr. Pinkney with the real reasons for his continued detention. As Mr. Pinkney sat in his vehicle on the side of the road while PC Panacci went back to her cruiser, his belief was that he was detained for an HTA stop not a CCA investigation.

[48] I accept the evidence of PC Panacci that she purposely delayed telling Mr. Pinkney the real reason why he was detained. While Mr. Pinkney had good reason to believe he was only being detained for an HTA stop he also knew that he had been asked if he had any cannabis in his vehicle which he denied. PC Panacci had been trained and warned by her superior officers not to conduct a search of a vehicle when she was alone. She had prior experience of searches that “had not gone well”. Because of her safety it was reasonable for PC Panacci to wait for backup before informing Mr. Pinkney of the real reason why he was detained; that being to conduct a CCA search of his vehicle. When backup arrived PC Panacci returned to Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle and asked him to step out so that she could conduct a CCA search. By doing so, PC Panacci provided sufficient information about the reasons for Mr. Pinkney’s continued detention.

[49] While the Notice of Application and the factum filed on behalf of Mr. Pinkney raise issues concerning section 10 of the Charter little to no evidence or argument was elicited addressing this issue.

[50] Section 10(a) of the Charter provides that everyone has the right on arrest or detention to be informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest or detention. In R. v. Nguyen, 2008 ONCA 49, para 16 summarized the common law roots to this right as follows:

The right to be informed of the reasons for detention as enshrined in the Charter and the Canadian Bill of Rights is a codification of the common law described most famously in the case of Christie v. Leachinsky, [1947] A.C. 573 (H.L.). In Christie, the common law right was essentially described as follows: a person is entitled to be informed of the reason why he or she is being restrained, unless the circumstances are such that he or she knows why. The reasons do not need to be expressed in technical or precise language, but must, in substance, inform the person as to the reason why the restraint is being imposed.

[51] More recently the issue of the right to be informed of the reasons for detention in the context of a CCA search was addressed by the Court of Appeal in R. v. McGowan-Morris, 2025 ONCA 349. In his reasons, Trotter JA reviewed the jurisprudence as it relates to section 10(a) of the Charter, at paragraphs 31-42. I summarize the law from my review of Trotter JA’s reasons as follows:

a) The purpose of section 10(a) is to ensure that a person ‘understands generally the jeopardy “in which he or she finds herself.”
b) In order to comply with section 10(a) the police must adequately communicate the reason or reasons for the detention and they must communicate those reasons promptly (thus complying with the informational and temporal components of section 10(a)).
c) The informational component requires the police to at a minimum advise the detainee in clear and simple language the reasons why he or she is detained.
d) Section 10(a) requires the police to explain what they are investigating. It does not require the police to explain to the detainee how they will investigate the matter and what steps they might take.

[52] There is no dispute that when PC Panacci asked Mr. Pinkney to pull his vehicle over to the side of the road that this was a valid HTA stop. I have accepted the evidence of PC Panacci that having smelt an odour of fresh cannabis and having observed fresh shake she had reasonable grounds to conduct a section 12(3) CCA search of Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle. Mr. Pinkney, in the normal course, should have been told immediately that the HTA stop had progressed to a CCA search of his vehicle, however, I am satisfied that the delay in informing Mr. Pinkney of the real reason for his detention was justified by the exigencies in which PC Panacci found herself, i.e., she was alone and without backup.

[53] Once backup arrived PC Panacci returned to Mr. Pinkney and asked him to step out of his vehicle so she could conduct a CCA search. While more could have been said about the reasons for his detention PC Panacci did advise Mr. Pinkney she had moved from an HTA stop to a CCA search. This provided Mr. Pinkney with sufficient reasons for his detention.

[54] The switch from an HTA stop to a CCA search may not have been perfect but the minimum requirements summarized by Trotter JA in McGowan-Morris were met by the evidence of PC Panacci. Mr. Pinkney could be in no doubt that when he was first asked whether he had cannabis in his vehicle (which he denied) and that when he was later asked to step out of his vehicle so a search could be conducted under the CCA that he was no longer being detained for not stopping at a stop sign.

[55] No issue was taken at the hearing of this application as it relates to Mr. Pinkney’s section 10(b) Charter rights. No evidence was adduced nor was there any written or oral argument provided to the court regarding Mr. Pinkney’s section 10(b) rights. As such, I do not intend to engage in any discussion on this issue.

[56] Having decided that there was no infringement of Mr. Pinkney’s Charter rights and that the search of his vehicle was justified under section 12(3) of the CCA, I nonetheless will deal briefly with the section 24(2) analysis had I decided the search was not justified.

[57] I agree entirely with the submissions of both counsel that if I had found that PC Panacci was lying to the court about what she smelt and observed that it would be difficult to countenance the admission of the evidence obtained through what could only then be described as an illegal search. While the evidence seized from Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle is clearly reliable, in a situation where the legal justification for the search would have been based on unreliable and untruthful police evidence, it is difficult to conceive of how the court would allow the admission of this evidence applying the framework of the Grant analysis.

[58] But I did not find PC Panacci untruthful. I found her credible. If, however, I had concluded that despite her candour PC Panacci did not inform Mr. Pinkney of the reasons for his detention and thus breached his section 10(a) Charter rights, I would have concluded that this breach was relatively minor and that the invasion of his privacy by searching his vehicle would be in no way comparable to a search of his home where his expectation of privacy is much higher. The evidence of the drugs and firearm seized from Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle is real and reliable. If I had found a breach of Mr. Pinkney’s Charter rights, I would not have excluded the evidence seized as a result of the CCA search.

[59] For the reasons set forth above the application to exclude the evidence seized from Mr. Pinkney’s vehicle on September 10, 2022, is dismissed.

Released: May 26, 2025

Regional Senior Justice Robert N. Edwards