Reasons for Judgment on Sentence

Court File No.: CR-23-10000374
Date: 2025-05-08
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between:
His Majesty the King – and – Jevor Brown

Appearances:
Rachel Verboom, for the Crown
Chris Angelini, for Mr. Brown

Heard: February 11, 2025

Judge: R. Maxwell

Overview

[1] Mr. Jevor Brown was convicted after trial of using an imitation firearm to commit an indictable offence, sexual assault with a weapon, sexual assault committed with Mr. Shayne Codrington, and forcible confinement.

[2] The facts as I have found them can be briefly summarized.

[3] At the time of the incident, the complainant was visiting Toronto from Montreal with three friends. They had driven to Toronto two or three days earlier. She and her friends had rented a unit on the 14th floor of 111 Bathurst Street through Air BnB. She was a 19-year-old student at the time.

[4] I accepted the complainant’s evidence that on the night of July 9 into July 10, 2019, she was sleeping in the condo unit and was awakened because two of her friends could not get back up to the unit from the lobby level. I accept the complainant’s evidence that the rented unit only came with one electronic FOB which allowed access to the elevators and doors at 111 Bathurst Street.

[5] I accept the complainant’s evidence that when she approached the elevator on the 14th floor, she saw two men standing near the elevators. It is an agreed fact that the two men who she encountered near the elevator were Mr. Brown and Mr. Codrington.

[6] When the elevator arrived on the 14th floor, the complainant entered the elevator. Mr. Brown and Mr. Codrington followed behind.

[7] After the elevator door closed, Mr. Codrington, who had been standing on the wall opposite to where the complainant stood near the panel of elevator buttons, approached her and removed her cell phone from her hands. When the complainant reached out to try and take her cell phone back, Mr. Codrington pulled out what appeared to be a firearm from his right-side pocket or waist. Mr. Brown remained standing on the opposite wall and watched the interaction.

[8] As the elevator reached the ground floor, Mr. Codrington concealed the firearm in his waist area. When the door opened on ground floor, Mr. Codrington appeared to press a button on the panel and the door closed again without anyone getting on or off the elevator.

[9] The video surveillance captures that as the elevator began to go up, Mr. Codrington again removed the imitation firearm from his waist area then reached out and lowered the right strap of the complainant’s dress. The complainant can be seen quickly lifting the strap back onto her shoulder. Seconds later, Mr. Codrington again lowered the right strap of the complainant’s dress and attempted to lower the front of her dress by pulling on the fabric at her breasts. The complainant held the front of her dress.

[10] While there is no audio on the video surveillance, it appears that the complainant briefly spoke to Mr. Codrington. Mr. Codrington then grabbed the complainant by her hair (which was styled in long braids) and pulled her off the elevator, which had stopped on the 8th floor. Mr. Brown, who had remained in the same position standing on the elevator wall opposite from the complainant, followed Mr. Codrington and the complainant off of the elevator onto the 8th floor.

[11] I found that Mr. Codrington forced the complainant into a stairwell and Mr. Brown followed them in. Once inside, Mr. Codrington forced the complainant to perform oral sex on him while holding a firearm to her and telling her to shut up. I found that Mr. Brown moved behind the complainant and penetrated her vagina first with his finger and then with his penis. I accepted that he touched the complainant aggressively on her buttocks and on her breasts as he was penetrating her with his penis. He did this while Mr. Codrington was sexually assaulting the complainant by forcing oral sex on her. I found that Mr. Codrington then penetrated the complainant vaginally while Mr. Brown was still present. The two fled the scene.

[12] The complainant attended the hospital the next day. She underwent a sexual assault examination. The swabbing was extremely uncomfortable for her.

Circumstances of the Offender

[13] Mr. Brown is currently 30 years old and was 25 years old at the time of the offences. He was born in Toronto. He has a supportive relationship with his mother and has lived with her throughout his life in the area of Jane and Finch Streets in Toronto. His father had some involvement in his life until the age of 10, but has otherwise not been a part of his life.

[14] Mr. Brown attended high school but left in grade 10 or 11 before receiving his diploma. He had difficulties at school. His mother believed Mr. Brown was unfairly singled out by teachers at his school because of his race, contributing to his frustrations at school and ultimately, his departure from school.

[15] Mr. Brown has three children, ages 12, 10, and 8. He would like to re-establish a relationship with his children.

[16] Mr. Brown struggles with mental health issues. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Angelini provided a report from the Southwest Centre for Forensic Mental Care. Mr. Brown was the subject of a fitness hearing in October of 2023, at which time he was found to be suffering from significant psychotic symptoms and mood symptoms. He has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. A schizoaffective disorder could also not be ruled out.

Position of the Parties

[17] The Crown seeks a sentence of 8 years in custody. Mr. Brown has been in custody on these charges between July 16, 2019 to February 5, 2025, a total of 2032 days. When credited on an enhanced basis pursuant to R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26 that is the equivalent of 3048 days or 8 years and four months.

[18] The Crown requests that the equivalent of eight years of pre-sentence custody be noted on the Indictment, that the passing of sentence be suspended, and that Mr. Brown be placed on probation for a period of 3 years. The Crown also seeks a weapons prohibition under s. 109 of the Code for a period of 10 years, a SOIRA order for 20 years pursuant to s. 490.11 of the Code, a DNA order, and a non-communication order under s. 743.31 of the Code in relation to the complainant and Mr. Codrington.

[19] On behalf of Mr. Brown, Mr. Angelini submits that a global sentence of five years is a fit and proportionate sentence, having regard for Mr. Brown’s secondary role as a party to the use of a firearm in the sexual assault and his degree of moral culpability.

Analysis

[20] I begin with the most fundamental principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Code.

[21] The overriding purpose of sentencing is to encourage respect for the law and the maintenance of a “just, peaceful and safe society”. As the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 58, the individualization of the sentencing process means that these objectives will not necessarily point to the same sentencing disposition. Sentencing judges need to prioritize and blend different objectives of sentencing so as to properly reflect the seriousness of the offence and the responsibility of the offender.

[22] Section 718.1 provides that the sentence I impose must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The sentence I impose must reflect the circumstances of the offence and the attributes of the individual responsible for the crime: see also R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 37; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089.

[23] Section 718.2 directs that a court must take into consideration the principle that a sentence should be increased or reduced for any relevant aggravating or mitigating factors related to the offence or the offender.

[24] Sentencing ranges and a review of similar cases are useful in ensuring that the parity principle is met and that similar penalties are imposed for similar offences of a similar nature involving similar offenders. Sentencing ranges are, however, only guidelines. The sentencing of an individual is, necessarily, an individualized process, as the Supreme Court reiterated in Lacasse.

[25] I will begin by addressing the gravity of the offence as this drives the analysis of what the appropriate range of sentence is in this case.

[26] I would note at the outset that Parliament has seen fit to create separate offences for certain types of particularly serious categories of sexual assault and provide enhanced punishment for these categories of sexual assault. As Dambrot J. (as he then was) observed in R. v. Bohorquez, 2019 ONSC 1643, at para. 91:

[T]he offence of sexual assault with another person contrary to s. 272(1)(d) of the Criminal Code is exclusively an indictable offence, and carries a maximum punishment of 14 years. This makes the offence of sexual assault with another person an inherently more serious offence than sexual assault, and diminishes the precedential value of sentences imposed in most other sexual assault cases.

[27] In this case, Mr. Brown has been found guilty of committing a sexual assault with a weapon contrary to s. 272(1)(a) and sexual assault with another person contrary to s. 272(1)(d) of the Code. Both of these offences attract enhanced punishment under the Code, in that they each have a maximum sentence of 14 years rather than the 10-year maximum of sexual assault. These are extremely serious offences.

[28] While this case may lack some of the aggravating features that move the seriousness to the extreme end of the scale such as incidents which go on for a longer period of time or that involves particularly degrading behaviour or significant gratuitous violence, there can be no question that the offences Mr. Brown committed with Mr. Codrington are extremely serious. Where the gravity of the offence is high, the importance of denunciation as well as general and specific deterrence in sentencing is necessarily high.

[29] In terms of moral blameworthiness and Mr. Brown’s degree of responsibility, I consider it to be high. Mr. Brown and Mr. Codrington were opportunistic in their targeting, confining and attacking of a vulnerable young woman. They violated her in a very demeaning and degrading way, causing her extreme fear and exposing her to great risk. I have rejected Mr. Brown’s arguments that he acted under duress in committing the sexual assault on the complainant. Mr. Brown is an adult who made a decision to join Mr. Codrington in confining and sexually assaulting the complainant while using an imitation firearm to intimidate the complainant.

[30] I accept that Mr. Codrington and Mr. Brown had different roles in the incident and that there was a “leader/follower” dynamic between Mr. Codrington and Mr. Brown. Mr. Codrington led the attack on the complainant. He had the imitation firearm. He robbed and sexually assaulted the complainant in the elevator before the incident in the stairwell. He used gratuitous violence against the complainant, pulling her by the hair from the elevator to the stairwell. With that said, once the parties were in the stairwell, Mr. Brown played an active role in the attack and was opportunistic, sexually assaulting the complainant while she was being sexually assaulted by Mr. Codrington who was in possession of an imitation firearm. Mr. Brown and Mr. Codrington were, at that point, working in tandem. Mr. Brown, now fully aware that Mr. Codrington had what appeared to be a firearm, took advantage of the threat that the presence of the imitation firearm presented and sexually assaulted the complainant.

[31] I would note that Mr. Brown’s degree of moral blameworthiness must be assessed in the context of his significant mental health issues. I accept that he suffers from a significant mental health disorder. While there is no evidence that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia at the time of the offences, he was diagnosed with the disorder in 2023. It is quite likely that Mr. Brown was experiencing some mental health issues at the time of the offences which would have had some impact on his ability to reason through his options. While there is no suggestion that his mental health issues impaired his reasoning ability to the extent that he is not responsible for his conduct, his diminished mental health is a factor I consider to be relevant on sentence, as it informs his degree of moral blameworthiness for his actions.

[32] Mr. Angelini also urges me to consider the impact of anti-black racism on Mr. Brown’s life. I accept that there is some basis to conclude that Mr. Brown’s life has been impacted negatively by anti-black systemic racism, reflected in his failure to thrive at school, his lack of supports and resources in the community to support his social and mental health, and his inability to obtain work beyond temporary jobs. Mr. Brown is a sad example of someone who needed much more support than he received growing up. His mental health issues have gone largely unmanaged other than when he has been engaged with the courts. His education lapsed. His social network does not seem to be robust, although he has the support of his mother.

[33] However, I do not accept that these experiences impact on Mr. Brown’s moral blameworthiness for these offences. I have not been provided with sufficient information, beyond the basics I have just outlined, about Mr. Brown and how his background may have influenced the commission of these offences. As such, I see no diminished responsibility on the basis of Mr. Brown being a black male who has experienced institutional anti-black racism.

[34] The circumstances of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender lead to a conclusion that the principles of denunciation as well as general and specific deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives in this case. While rehabilitation is a relevant consideration for all offenders, the principle of rehabilitation is of secondary importance, given the nature of the offences and the circumstances in which the offences were committed.

[35] I also accept, given that this will be Mr. Brown’s first custodial sentence, the sentence must be tailored to the individual circumstances of the offender rather than solely for the purpose of general deterrence: R. v. Priest, [1996] O.J. No. 3369, at para. 23.

Aggravating and Mitigating Features

[36] Turning to s. 718.2 and the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors, there are several aggravating features in this case. First, I agree with the Crown that there was a degree of planning involved in this matter. While I accept that Mr. Brown was not part of the offences which took place in the elevator, he was present to see what happened. There was a degree of forethought in following Mr. Codrington and the complainant into the stairwell where she would be secluded then proceeding to sexually assault the complainant with Mr. Codrington while Mr. Codrington was armed with an imitation firearm.

[37] Second, I agree that the manner in which the sexual assault was committed in this case increased the risk to the complainant of contracting a sexually transmitted disease. The fact that there was full penile penetration and that Mr. Brown’s DNA was found on vaginal swabs taken from the complainant raise this risk. The gross violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and the psychological weight of fearing exposure to a sexually transmitted disease are aggravating features in this case.

[38] Third, I accept that the impact on the complainant has been very significant. While no Victim Impact Statement was filed, I accept, based on the complainant’s testimony on the trial, that the incident has had a significant psychological impact on her. Being attacked and sexually violated by two strangers while visiting the city, in a place where she no doubt believed she was safe, in a residential building where she was staying, is terrifying and scarring. It was made even more frightening by the fact that the accused brandished what appeared to be a firearm during the sexual assault. I have no doubt that the impact on the complainant has been profound.

[39] Fourth, Mr. Brown has a criminal record, albeit brief and unrelated to crimes of violence. He has a conviction from March of 2016 for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, for which he received a fine of $750 and a one-year driving prohibition on sentencing. Further, in November of 2017, he was convicted of being unlawfully in a dwelling house. The passing of sentence was suspended, and Mr. Brown was placed on probation for one year.

[40] In mitigation, I consider the fact that Mr. Brown’s incarceration took place during the Covid-19 pandemic. He experienced lockdowns at the institution during the period of the pandemic. I accept that the harsh conditions of pre-trial detention punctuated with numerous lockdown periods is a mitigating factor to be taken into consideration on sentence: R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754.

[41] I must also consider the principle of parity. Mr. Codrington was found guilty after a trial before Akhtar J. of two counts of sexual assault with a weapon, two counts of using an imitation firearm to commit an indictable offence and sexual assault with another. He was also found guilty of robbery and forcible confinement. He was sentenced to 10 years in custody.

[42] Mr. Codrington was clearly in a different position from Mr. Brown in that he was found guilty of additional violent offences arising from the events in the elevator. He was also a principal to the use of the imitation firearm in the offences and used gratuitous violence against the complainant.

[43] The Crown recognized in her submissions that the circumstances of Mr. Codrington’s offending conduct attracted a sentence reflective of these additional aggravating features and consistent with other cases in which the offending conduct involved aggravating features not present in Mr. Brown’s offending conduct, such as R. v. Kavanaugh, 2009 ONCA 759, and R. v. Assing.

Sentencing Caselaw – Range of Sentence

[44] The leading authorities in Ontario set the starting point for a penetrative sexual assault involving adults at three to five years in custody, absent highly mitigating circumstances. In R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, citing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, noted that our understanding of the profound physical and psychological harm that all victims of sexual assault experience has deepened. The Court affirmed a higher range of sentence than had previously been in place, having regard for our understanding of the profound and long-term impact of sexual assault trauma on complainants.

[45] The Crown submits that there are features in this case which warrant a sentence which goes beyond the range set out in A.J.K., in particular, the extremely vulnerable position of the complainant, the degradation of the gang sexual assault, the impact on the complainant, the opportunistic and intentional nature of the attack, and the use of a firearm in committing the sexual assault.

[46] In support of its position that this case has exceptional features and warrants a sentence higher than the three to five year range set out in A.J.K., the Crown points to R. v. R.M., 2020 ONCA 231, where the offender was convicted of sexually assaulting a sex trade worker who was repeatedly sexually assaulted at knifepoint by the accused and another male. There was penile penetration. One accused held the knife to the complainant’s throat while the other sexually assaulted her, then rotating between them. They threatened to kill the complainant and robbed her of $500. This was a cold case, solved decades after the incident through DNA analysis. The Court of Appeal upheld a global sentence of eight years for the first-time offenders who were 17 years old at the time of the offence. The Crown submits that there are similarities between the exceptional aggravating features present in the R.M. case and this case.

[47] The Crown further relies on R. v. Sousa, 2023 ONCA 100, where the offender was convicted after trial of sexually assaulting a stranger who was passed out at a party. The victim was taken to an isolated place where she was forced to perform oral sex on the accused before being penetrated vaginally and anally. The Court recognized the extreme degradation of the victim. The Court reduced a 10-year custody sentence to 8 years. At para. 39 of Sousa, the Court reiterated that sentences can go beyond the established range where there are exceptional aggravating features.

[48] The Crown also relies on R. v. Myers, [2000] O.J. No. 1787, aff’d [2002] O.J. No. 965 (C.A.) in which the offender pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting a woman he dragged off a street while walking home. He removed her clothing and pushed her to the ground which was covered in ice. The complainant suffered hypothermia and bruising during the attack. The offender was 26 years old with alcohol addiction. He had a criminal record for violence. He expressed remorse for his conduct. He was sentenced to nine years in custody, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

[49] On behalf of Mr. Brown, Mr. Angelini relies on the decision of R. v. Blake, 2020 ONSC 5658. In Blake, the accused picked up a sex trade worker under false pretenses and told her he was going to teach her a lesson. He grabbed her by the throat and choked her until she could not breath. He bit her in various places on her body. He brandished a knife and threatened to kill her. He then forced vaginal sexual intercourse on the complainant. He then drove her to a side street, let her out of the car, and threw $20 at her before driving away.

[50] Spies J. undertook a comprehensive review of sentencing caselaw and discussed a sentencing range in circumstances involving penetrative sexual assault which caused bodily harm, involved choking, and forcible confinement. Spies J. concluded, at para. 64:

In this case I am considering a global sentence that is not only what is appropriate for a penetrative sexual assault simpliciter, but one that caused bodily harm as well as the choking, threatening to cause death and forcible confinement, all committed by Mr. Blake in order to succeed in the forced vaginal sexual assault of the complainant. Given all of these aggravating factors/additional offences, in my view the appropriate range of sentence is as suggested by the Crown of between five to eight years.

[51] Spies J. rejected the defence position that a sentence in the range of four to five years was appropriate. She also rejected the Crown's submission that eight years in custody was a fit sentence, given the aggravating features in the case. Spies J. weighed the aggravating factors, which included that the attack was unprovoked, committed on a vulnerable person who was confined, the high degree of gratuitous violence, and the deep psychological trauma to the complainant. Against those factors, Spies J. considered the mitigating circumstances, including the fact that the accused had no criminal record and good prospects for rehabilitation, had family support, and had been gainfully employed in the past. The offender was sentenced to six years in custody.

[52] Spies J. reviewed a series of cases relied on by the defence in Blake, to which Mr. Angelini referred. In R. v. Quesnelle, 2010 ONSC 3713, aff’d 2014 ONCA 634, the accused punched and sexually assaulted two women, one of whom was a sex trade worker. The accused forced anal intercourse on the complainant who worked in the sex trade. The second complainant sold drugs to the accused. He forced oral sex on her when she refused, followed by anal intercourse. The assaults went on for hours. The accused had a criminal record, although it was dated and did not involve violent offences. The trial judge concluded that the accused had moderate chances of rehabilitation, as he had been under the influence of drugs at the time of the offences and had made considerable efforts to overcome his actions. He received a global sentence of six and a half years in custody.

[53] In R. v. Razak, 2019 BCSC 1677, the accused was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm, attempting to choke to enable robbery, and sexual assault. The accused first engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with a sex trade worker, but then choked her and forced her to perform various sexual acts. He directed demeaning verbal attacks at the complainant, making her kneel and “pray to her God” while threatening to kill her or have her killed. The complainant suffered physical and psychological injuries. The accused was a youthful first-time offender. He was sentenced to four and a half years in custody.

[54] In R. v. McMillan, 2020 ONSC 3299, Dambrot J. (as he then was) imposed a sentence of seven years on two offenders jointly charged in a gang sexual assault. The accused were also convicted of administering stupefying substances for purposes of assisting in the commission of an indicatable offence. Dambrot J. noted the prolonged, violent, and degrading nature of the assaults on the vulnerable complainant who was severely intoxicated at the time of the incident.

[55] The court in R. v. Henderson, 2018 ONSC 3550 sentenced the accused to four years and two months for a sexual assault on a sex trade worker which involved serious aggravating factors including the fact that the complainant was choked then dragged to a secluded area, and significant gratuitous violence. The Court observed that the range of sentence it considered appropriate on the facts of the case was three to five years. With respect, I disagree with the conclusion in Henderson that the appropriate range of sentence for a sexual assault involving the type of aggravating features which were present in that case would be three to five years. In my view, the court in A.J.K, in setting a range of three to five years, contemplated circumstances of a sexual assault simpliciter. While it is certainly possible, in the presence of significant mitigating factors, that a sentence for a sexual assault which involves serious aggravating features might still fall within the range discussed in A.J.K., as a general matter, the more aggravating features that are present in a case, the more likely the sentence will exceed the range of three to five years in order to meet the principles of sentencing.

The Sentence in this Case

[56] Sentencing in sexual assault cases is always very difficult because the sentence is driven primarily by the particular facts of the case. In that sense, reference to other cases is often of little assistance because the cases are distinguishable on the facts.

[57] There is no dispute between the parties that a penitentiary sentence is required in this case.

[58] In my view, having regard for the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the circumstances of this offence and this offender, and bearing in mind the principles of sentencing I have outlined, the appropriate sentence in this case is one of 6 years. Mr. Brown has served more than the equivalent of 6 years in pre-sentence custody and is in a time served position on all counts. The sentence on each count will be as follows:

• On Count 6 on the Indictment of sexual assault with a weapon, 6 years; pre-sentence custody of 3 years and 8 months or 1339 real days will be recorded on the Indictment, which will be treated as the equivalent of 6 years after enhanced Summers credit and additional Duncan credit [1];
• On Count 8 on the Indictment of sexual assault committed with Mr. Codrington, 6 years concurrent to the sentence on Count 6; pre-sentence custody of 3 years and 8 months or 1339 real days in custody will be recorded on the Indictment, which will be treated as the equivalent of 6 years after enhanced Summers credit and additional Duncan credit;
• Finally, with respect to Count 4 on the Indictment of forcible confinement – 18 months custody concurrent to the sentence on Count 6; pre-sentence custody of 1 year or the equivalent of 18 months after enhanced Summers credit will be recorded on the Indictment.

[59] In the particular circumstances of this case, given that the complainant and the accused are unlikely to ever cross paths again, coupled with the ancillary orders I will make, I do not consider it necessary to place Mr. Brown on probation.

[60] The parties are in agreement that pursuant to R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729, Count 2 on the Indictment of using an imitation firearm to commit the indictable offence of sexual assault is subsumed by the conviction for sexual assault with a weapon. As such, Count 2 on the Indictment of using an imitation firearm to commit the indictable offence of sexual assault will be marked stayed.

[61] I make an order pursuant to s. 109 of the Code prohibiting Mr. Brown from possessing any firearms, ammunition, and other weapons as defined by the Code for 10 years.

[62] There will be an order under s. 487.051 of the Code authorizing the taking of a sample of a bodily substance that is reasonably necessary for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis.

[63] There will be an order under s. 490.013(2.1) of the Code to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 for 20 years.

[64] Given that Mr. Brown is now out of custody and has served his sentence, I will not make an order under s. 743.21 of the Code concerning contact with the complainant or Mr. Codrington.

[65] I thank both counsel for their excellent advocacy and professionalism.

R. Maxwell J.
Released: May 8, 2025

[1] I would note that after the reasons for sentence were released orally on May 6, 2025, I reviewed the case of R. v. Brown, 2025 ONCA 164. In Brown, the Court emphasized that in the decision in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, it cautioned against treating the mitigating effect of harsh conditions of pretrial custody as a deduction from the appropriate sentence. In keeping with the Court’s comments in Brown and Marshall, it would have been preferrable to state the disposition in this case as “time served” in light of 1460 days (or four years) of presentence custody, treated as the equivalent to 2190 (or six years) on an enhanced Summers credit basis, without making reference to a “Duncan credit”. However, this different articulation of sentence does not impact my evaluation of a fit sentence in this case. I recognized harsh pre-trial conditions as a mitigating factor, at para. 40 of these reasons, and I considered it as such in arriving at a fit sentence in this case.