Endorsement

Overview

Court File No.: CV-24-620-00
Date: 2025/04/30
Superior Court of Justice – Ontario
Re: Milad Babadi, Applicant
And: Bruce Ritter, Respondent
Before: M. Gibson
Counsel:
Milad Babadi, Self-represented Applicant
Bruce Ritter, Self-represented Respondent
Written Submissions of the Applicant Milad Babadi: April 28, 2025

Overview

[1] The Applicant Milad Babadi was charged with several criminal offences, including criminal harassment, uttering threats, and child pornography. He was represented by the Defendant lawyer Bruce Ritter. The Applicant ultimately entered guilty pleas to criminal harassment and uttering threats, and received a suspended sentence. The child pornography count was stayed as part of the resolution. Mr. Babadi was dissatisfied with Mr. Ritter’s invoice for his legal services. Milad Babadi’s application for leave to assess the costs invoice of the Respondent Bruce Ritter was dismissed by Valente J. on 30 January 2025. Justice Valente subsequently ordered costs in favour of the Respondent on 28 February 2025.

[2] The Applicant refused to agree to the content of the draft order arising from these proceedings.

[3] The Applicant Mr. Babadi then repeatedly sought to file a motion for the recusal of Justice Valente, which he has styled “Notice of Motion for Judicial Recusal,” to set aside the decision of 30 January 2025, for a new hearing before a different judge, for a declaration of violation of his rights, and for an inquiry into judicial conduct of Justice Valente. He did not make this motion to Justice Valente, but rather sought to have a different judge hear the motion. He alleges judicial bias, procedural irregularities, collusion between court staff and opposing parties, and violation of his Charter rights to substantive equality and due process.

[4] It was explained by court staff to Mr. Babadi that, in this circumstance, his appropriate remedy if he considers that the decision of 30 January 2025 was wrongly decided, is to appeal. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Babadi has persisted in seeking to file a motion in the Superior Court of Justice. This has once again been re-submitted to the portal on 31 March 2025.

[5] Mr. Babadi has also sent numerous emails critical of court administrative staff. His communication with court administrative staff has been abusive and bullying.

Rule 2.1.02

[6] Pursuant to Rule 2.1.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a motion if the motion appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process of the court.

[7] Pursuant to Rule 2.1.02(2), subrules 2.1.01(2) to (7) apply, with necessary modifications, to the making of an order under subrule (1).

Notice to the Parties

[8] Pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(6), on 17 April 2025 I directed the registrar to give notice to the parties that the court is considering making an order for the motion to be stayed or dismissed as frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

[9] I directed that the summary procedure in Rule 2.1.01 would be followed in this matter, and that the determination would be made on the basis of written submissions. Pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(3)2., the Applicant might, within 15 days of receiving the Notice, file with the court a written submission no more than 10 pages in length, responding to the notice.

Applicant’s Submissions

[10] The Applicant Mr. Babadi first submitted what he described as an objection to the Notice. He subsequently filed written submissions dated 28 April 2025. Contrary to both the specification in Rule 2.1.01(3)2, and to my direction in my Endorsement dated 17 April 2025 specifying that these written submissions might be no more than 10 pages in length, Mr. Babadi has filed written submissions 14 pages in length.

[11] I have reviewed and considered the written submissions of the Applicant in accordance with the process specified in Rule 2.1.02. In them, the Applicant strenuously insists that his motion is not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process, and that he is entitled to a full hearing of his motion and an inquiry into the conduct of Justice Valente.

Assessment

Presumption of Judicial Impartiality

[12] I start with a necessary observation about the presumption of judicial impartiality. There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality and a heavy burden on a party who seeks to rebut this presumption: Langstaff v. Marson, 2014 ONCA 510.

[13] In R. v. Jaser, 2024 ONCA 448, at paras. 308-312, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently summarized the law in this regard:

[308] The principles relating to bias claims are well-known and have been discussed in many decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and this court.

[309] Impartiality lies at the heart of the judicial process; it is vital to the integrity of our justice system. In Marrone, Zarnett J.A. said, at para. 92: “It is a fundamental right of a party to a judicial proceeding that the judge is, and appears, impartial. Bias is the inverse of impartiality.”

[310] A century ago, this foundational principle was captured in the often-quoted words of Hewart L.C.J. in R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, at p. 259: “…a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” See also Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 2021), at p. 33.

[311] The test for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias is whether a reasonable person, properly informed and viewing the matter realistically and practically, would conclude that the decision-maker could not decide the case fairly: Committee for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394, per de Grandpré J. (dissenting); Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area No. 23 v. Yukon Territory (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, paras. 20-21; and Marrone, at para. 93.

[312] The test is a stringent one. In R. v. Dowholis, 2016 ONCA 801, para. 18, the court said, at para. 18: “There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality and a heavy burden on a party who seeks to rebut this presumption.” See also Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, para. 59; R. v. S. (R.D.), para. 117, per Cory J.; R. v. Ruthowsky, 2018 ONCA 552, para. 21; R. v. Grant, 2016 ONCA 639, para. 128; and Marrone, at para. 94. The presumption may only be rebutted by “cogent evidence that demonstrates that something the judge did or said gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias”: R. v. Richards, 2017 ONCA 424, para. 45. See also S. (R.D.), at para. 117.

[14] The presumption of judicial impartiality is a strong one. In this matter, there is no cogent evidence that demonstrates that anything the application judge did or said gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

[15] Moreover, if Mr. Babadi considers that Justice Valente’s decision was wrongly decided, the appropriate remedy is to appeal, not to seek, in a procedurally deficient way, to have the same level of court revisit the decision.

Frivolous, Vexatious and Abuse of Process

[16] In Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720, at paras. 15-22, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered in detail the crisis of frivolous and vexatious self-represented litigants in the courts:

[15] Rule 2.1.01(1) provides that the court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The determination may be made in a summary manner and on the basis of written materials.

[16] Rule 2.1 responds to an ever-increasing problem in the courts: vexatious and abusive litigants. Justice Yves-Marie Morissette of the Court of Appeal of Quebec addressed the challenges associated with vexatious litigants in his 2019 article entitled “Querulous and Vexatious Litigants as a Disorder of a Modern Legal System”, 24 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 265. He introduces his article, at pp. 265-66, by explaining the problem that such litigants pose to other parties and all stakeholders in the administration of justice:

Some self-represented litigants never let go. Not only do they resist any reasonable attempt to settle a dispute consensually, but they also forever refuse to accept defeat in the courts. They continue to fight on, in any available forum, until they are forced to stop. Whatever the “initial dispute” that they had with an employer, a neighbour, an ex-spouse, a relative, a government agency, or any other person or institution, there is a strong probability that this dispute will have evolved and eventually degenerated into an all-out war fought on every front, at first in a tribunal or a court of law, against one or several parties, and later against those parties' lawyers, the lawyers' partners, their professional regulators or their insurers, the court personnel, judges in person, or even the judicial council if its decisions are subject to judicial review. Whenever possible, they will seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Among the many self-represented parties, these abnormally belligerent and obdurate litigants only account for a very small percentage of parties who go to court in person and without counsel. But they are a real and threatening burden for other parties and for all stakeholders in the administration of justice (be they the parties themselves or lawyers, judges, court administrators and court personnel). The situation of the parties targeted in the “initial dispute” is usually the worst. Apart from the often considerable legal and professional costs they may have to incur because of lengthy, repetitious and spurious proceedings, they may also develop a sense of despair at the ineffectiveness of the legal system.

[17] In describing appellate experience, he writes, at p. 285, that appellate courts are not designed to cope with the burden imposed by vexatious litigants:

[Appellate jurisdictions] seem to be designed and staffed (perhaps understandably so) on the assumption that they will only deal with serious disputes and appeals deserving to be heard. But vexatious litigants, who always exercise any de plano right of appeal they may have, and who always seek leave to appeal when such leave is required, are frequent flyers in these courts and are present in a higher proportion on appeal than in first instance. [Emphasis in original.]

[18] Vexatious litigants are a drain on our system of justice. In addition to being a burden on the opposing parties, they are a burden on the judiciary and court personnel. At least the judiciary has mechanisms to attempt to address the conduct of vexatious litigants, but court personnel are ill-equipped to do anything when faced with a barrage of telephone calls, emails, and other communications frequently characterized by incendiary and rude remarks. The cost and time incurred by opposing parties is significant, and adverse costs awards frequently cannot be relied upon to discourage future comparable behaviour.

[19] In his article, Morrisette J.A., at pp. 274-76, lists the signs of “a querulous disposition” as follows:

• the litigant is virtually always self-represented
• the litigant’s attitude is characterized by marked obduracy
• persistent reiteration and amplification
• arguments are often unintelligible or highly confused
• written submissions contain much that is not legally relevant to the dispute
• the style of written submissions is quite distinctive (opaque and long written materials, faulty terminology and syntax, emphatic tone reinforced by different fonts and styles, multiple appendices and supporting documents, and the expression of a keen desire for moral vindication)
• marked lack of due diligence in the advancement of claims
• exhaustion of all rights of review, appeal, or revocation any time there is an adverse judgment
• unsustainable allegations and gratuitous complaints against members of the legal profession; and
• a cessation of proceedings only when the litigant cannot pay legal fees and costs.

[20] Similarly, in Gao v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6497, paras. 14-15, Myers J. described the characteristics typically found in vexatious litigants:

• bringing multiple proceedings to try to re-determine already determined issues
• rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings
• persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals
• failure to pay costs awards
• bringing proceedings for a purpose other than the assertion of legitimate rights
• bringing proceedings where no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought; and
• inappropriate submissions in both form (curious formatting, many pages, odd or irrelevant attachments, multiple methods of emphasis, numerous foot and marginal notes) and content (rambling discourse, rhetorical questions, repeated misuse of technical terms, references to self in the third person, inappropriately ingratiating statements, ultimatums, and threats).

Gao was approved by this court in Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, para. 9; Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625, para. 13; and Rallis v. Myers, 2019 ONCA 437, para. 5.

[21] It is important for the courts to be gatekeepers of our system of justice. Abusive litigants should be screened out of the system so that parties with true justiciable disputes may have them adjudicated by the courts.

[22] That said, two points merit special emphasis. First, not all self-represented parties are vexatious litigants. Second, even a vexatious litigant may raise a legitimate issue that justifies consideration by a court. It is in part for this reason that r. 2.1.01 is intended for the clearest of cases.

[17] In para. 11 in Gao, Myers J. succinctly observed regarding the attribute of the summary nature of Rule 2.1 that:

Rule 2.1 provides a summary process for a hearing in writing to determine if an individual proceeding or a motion in a proceeding ought to be dismissed where it appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. The hearing process is quick and limited. This prevents the hearing of the motion from itself becoming a vehicle for a party who might be inclined to inflict the harms of frivolous proceedings on the opposing parties and the civil justice system.

[18] As recently stated at paras. 2-3 in Talwar v. Grand River Hospital, 2025 ONCA 35:

[2] Under r.2.1 of the Rules, this court may stay or dismiss a proceeding that appears on its face frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. Vexatious litigants put a strain on the justice system that affects all levels of the judiciary as well as counsel: Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720, para. 18. The power to dismiss an appeal under r.2.1 is to be used only in “the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process.”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, para. 8.

[3] Some hallmarks of vexatious litigants include exhausting all rights of review, appealing any time there is an adverse judgment, and bringing multiple proceedings in an attempt to re-determine settled issues: see Lochner, at paras. 19-20; Mukwa v. Farm Credit of Canada, 2022 ONCA 320, para. 9. Each of these hallmarks is evident in the case at bar.

[19] The Court of Appeal observed at para. 17 in Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board:

It is apparent that there is a degree of overlap in the meaning of the terms frivolous, vexatious and abuse of process. What I take from the authorities is that any action for which there is clearly no merit may qualify for classification as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. The common example appears to be the situation where a plaintiff seeks to relitigate a cause which has already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.

This Case

[20] Rule 2.1.02 should be interpreted and applied robustly so that a motion judge can effectively exercise his or her gatekeeping function to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process: Scaduto, at para. 8.

[21] In the present case, Mr. Babadi’s pleadings in his motion materials and written submissions in response to the Notice are a textbook exemplar of many of the hallmarks of vexatious litigants noted by the Court of Appeal:

• Self-represented
• Attitude characterized by a marked obduracy
• Persistent reiteration and amplification
• Bombastic written submissions containing much that is not legally relevant to the dispute
• Distinctive style of written submissions, including emphatic tone reinforced by bold font, expression of a keen desire for moral vindication
• Querulous response when there is an adverse judgment
• Unsustainable allegations and gratuitous complaints against members of the legal profession, including judges
• Bringing multiple proceedings to try to re-determine already determined issues
• Ignoring the provisions of the Rules and the specific direction of the Court regarding length of submissions
• Bringing proceedings for a purpose other than the assertion of legitimate rights
• Inappropriate submissions in both form (exceeding page limits, multiple methods of emphasis) and content (rambling discourse, grandiose and inflated rhetoric, inappropriately ingratiating statements, ultimatums)
• Barrage of emails and other communication to court administrative staff which, although superficially clothed in exaggerated civility, are characterized by incendiary, bullying and rude remarks.

[22] This case is not a close call. The abusive nature of the motion is apparent on the face of the pleadings and the motion the Applicant seeks to have heard. The Applicant’s motion contains scurrilous and gratuitous insults against the application judge, and unsubstantiated allegations of collusion of court staff with other litigants. There is no basis on which to grant Mr. Babadi the relief he seeks. His submissions are bombastic, contrived and hollow. They are replete with random superficial invocation of legal principles and cases inapt to this case. Mr. Babadi’s pleadings and submissions bear all the hallmarks of being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.

[23] There is no merit in Mr. Babadi’s motion and it is not in the interests of justice to grant the relief sought. It is not incumbent upon the Court to indulge Mr. Babadi’s narcissism or paranoia, or to provide him a performative platform to impugn a judge’s integrity or fairness through a collateral attack without any evidentiary foundation or, as Myers J. framed it in Gao, to allow “the hearing of the motion itself becoming a vehicle for a party who might be inclined to inflict the harms of frivolous proceedings on the opposing parties and the civil justice system.”

[24] This is one of the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading.

[25] Mr. Babadi’s motion will be stayed.

[26] Mr. Babadi asserts that anything less than the full Inquisition he seeks to be licenced to pursue would be “constitutionally indefensible” and would be a transparent effort to deflect scrutiny of judicial conduct. He asserts that this would constitute “impermissibly weaponizing Rule 2.1 to suppress legitimate access to the courts - an outcome directly contrary to the rule of law and the open court principle.” This is a bogus argument. To reiterate, if Mr. Babadi considers that the decisions of Justice Valente dated 30 January 2025 and 28 February 2025 are wrongly decided, his remedy is to appeal in accordance with the Rules.

[27] Moreover, the Court will not tolerate abusive and harassing behaviour towards court administrative staff who are striving to diligently perform their duty of service to the public and to litigants. No litigant, whether self-represented or otherwise, should assume that they can engage in such conduct with impunity.

Order

[28] The Court Orders that:

1. The motion sought to be filed by Milad Babadi on 31 March 2025, or any previous or subsequent attempt to file a motion in the Superior Court of Justice arising from the decisions of Justice Valente dated 30 January 2025 or 28 February 2025, seeking a new hearing before a different judge, for a declaration of violation of his rights, and for an inquiry into the judicial conduct of Justice Valente, is stayed as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process;
2. Pursuant to Rule 2.1.02(3) and Rule 37.16, Mr. Babadi is prohibited from making further motions in this proceeding without leave of the Court; and,
3. The approval of Mr. Babadi as to the form and content of this Order is dispensed with.

M. Gibson
Date: 30 April 2025