Reasons for Judgment

Court File No.: 417/09
Date: 2025/05/21
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
Christine Gigler and Sigmund Gigler, Applicants
and
Kristy Ferreira, Respondent

Appearances:

• Darryl A. Willer, Counsel for the Applicants
• Deborah Barfknecht, Counsel for the Respondent

Heard: April 1, 2, 4, 14, 2025

Judgment by: T. Law

Introduction

[1] This is my decision after a four-day trial heard on April 1, 2, 4, and 14, 2025. The Applicants, Christine and Sigmund Gigler, are the paternal grandparents to the child, J.G. The Applicants’ son, J.G.’s father, passed away approximately six months after J.G. was born. The Respondent is J.G.’s mother, Kristy Ferreira. J.G. is now 20 years old and a student at the University of Guelph.

[2] The Applicants brought this motion to change seeking that the Respondent pay increased ongoing and retroactive child support and s. 7 expenses. Both parties took unreasonable positions and exhibited an inability to compromise. The Respondent refused to pay increased child support despite acknowledging she had an obligation to do so. The Applicants took a catch-all approach to s. 7 expenses, which included spurious claims for repayment of items such as protein bars and souvenir jackets. As a result of their conduct, this trial took four days before it was completed, an amount of time which was entirely unreasonable for the issues that were before the court.

[3] Almost every issue was in dispute at the beginning of the trial. As the evidence was presented, the parties appeared to reassess their positions and arrived at certain agreements, thus narrowing the scope of the trial considerably. It is disappointing that they were unable to communicate and arrive at these agreements prior to the commencement of the trial. The parties agreed to the following:

1. There has been a change in circumstances since Whitten J.’s child support order of July 22, 2016, necessitating a change to the order.
2. The Respondent shall pay retroactive table child support in the total amount of $14,856 for the period from January 1, 2017 to April 30, 2025.
3. Commencing May 1, 2025, the Respondent shall pay $233 per month in child support pursuant to the “summer” formula.
4. The Applicants shall waive their claim for s. 7 expenses prior to 2020.
5. The post-secondary s. 7 expenses commencing on September 1, 2023 and ending on April 30, 2027 are:
   • $15,043 for the period of September 1, 2023 to December 31, 2023
   • $30,000 for the period of January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024
   • $30,000 for the period of January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025
   • $30,000 for the period of January 1, 2026 to December 31, 2026
   • $15,000 for the period of January 1, 2027 to April 30, 2027.
6. The Respondent shall designate J.G. as the beneficiary of her life insurance with a face value of $60,000 for as long as she has an obligation to pay support and she shall provide annual proof that the policy is in effect to the Applicants.

[4] The specific issues to be decided by the court are as follows:

1. With respect to the retroactive s. 7 expenses between January 1, 2020 and August 31, 2023, which items qualify as s. 7 expenses and what should be the proportionate sharing for those expenses? What is the retroactive amount owing by the Respondent?
2. With respect to the post-secondary s. 7 expenses commencing on September 1, 2023, what should be the approach to sharing those expenses? What contribution should the child make, if any? What is the retroactive amount owing by the Respondent?
3. How should the Respondent repay the retroactive amounts owing? What should the repayment rate be?

Part One – Background

[5] The Applicants, Ms. Gigler and Mr. Gigler, have been married for 46 years. Ms. Gigler is 71 years old. Mr. Gigler is 72 years old. Both currently reside in Grimsby, Ontario. Both are retired. Their incomes currently consist of the Canada Pension Plan, Old Age Security, pension income, and withdrawals from their Retirement Income Fund. They have been the primary caregivers of J.G. for many years.

[6] The Respondent was 19 years old when she gave birth to J.G. She currently works for the Canada Revenue Agency, where she has been employed since October 2020.

[7] J.G. is currently 20 years old. He is in his third year of studies at the University of Guelph and resides outside of the Applicants’ home during the school year. He resides at the Applicants’ home during the summers. During his first year of university, J.G. went home almost every weekend. He now goes home approximately once every other weekend. He is an excellent student and a hard worker, having successfully made the Dean’s Honour Roll for the last two years. Unfortunately, J.G. also suffers from various mental health disorders including ADHD, attachment disorder, PTSD, depression, and anxiety. Despite these challenges, J.G. has developed into a responsible and motivated young man.

[8] The parties dispute their respective levels of involvement in J.G.’s early life and how he came to reside with the Applicants. It is unnecessary to make findings about these historical facts for the purpose of this trial. What is clear is that on July 22, 2016, the parties consented to a Final Order before Whitten J. That order stated that the Applicants would have final custody of J.G. The Respondent would pay child support in the amount of $200 per month plus $100 per month for her share of the s. 7 expenses. The Respondent was also to provide updated financial disclosure each year.

[9] The Respondent did not comply with the disclosure requirements in Whitten J.’s order. She did not respond to Ms. Gigler’s inquiries about her financial information until the Applicants commenced their first motion to change in or around 2017. Despite commencing that court proceeding, the Applicants allowed it to lapse, leading to its dismissal in February 2020. The parties provide different reasons for why this happened. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the Respondent would have been aware of her obligations to pay child support and provide annual financial disclosure as a result of those proceedings. Despite this, the Respondent continued to ignore her disclosure obligation and did not increase her child support payments after she obtained new and better employment in October 2020 with the Canada Revenue Agency.

[10] The Respondent’s failure to disclose her financial information in the face of a court order is egregious. In March 2023, when Ms. Gigler emailed the Respondent to let her know that J.G. had been accepted at five universities, the Respondent continued to ignore Ms. Gigler’s request that she provide her financial information. She failed to negotiate payment towards J.G.’s university expenses, which are clearly s. 7 expenses. The Applicants only found out that the Respondent had started a new job at the Canada Revenue Agency from J.G. in 2023. As a result, the Applicants commenced this current motion to change on June 22, 2023. The Respondent did not respond to the motion to change for ten months, until after the matter was set down for an uncontested trial.

[11] To say that the relationship between the Applicants and the Respondent is poor is an understatement. Both parties blamed the other for the current situation. In reality, both behaved unreasonably. As I stated during the trial, despite having the advice of experienced counsel throughout, it appears that the Applicants appeared completely absorbed with keeping an “expense sheet” rather than focusing on the recovery of actual s. 7 expenses. Some of the Applicants’ claimed expenses are clearly unreasonable and should never have been advanced. For her part, the Respondent, after failing to pay proper child support for years, came before the court to ask that repayment be further delayed and prolonged. The Respondent only provided her position on the claimed s. 7 expenses mid-way during the trial, leading to wasted court time. Both parties failed to have J.G.’s dental expenses reimbursed from the Respondent’s benefits plan simply because they failed to communicate with one another prior to trial. This is unacceptable and reflects poorly on both parties. More importantly, it has wasted resources that would have been better devoted to J.G. rather than this litigation.

Part Two – Application of the Child Support Guidelines

[12] The Applicant’s motion to change the terms in the existing support order and for payment of retroactive child support is governed by s. 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3. Subsection 37(2.2) states that a court making an order under subsection (2.1) shall do so in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97.

[13] One of the issues raised in this trial is whether the Child Support Guidelines, and in particular s. 7, apply to the Applicants, who are grandparents. Applicants’ counsel argued that this is a novel situation involving the obligation of grandparents, who had never lived with the Respondent in a family unit and who are not biological parents of the subject child. The Applicants’ position is that in these circumstances, it is unclear whether the child support regime set out in the Guidelines should apply to them.

[14] Section 31(1) of the Family Law Act states that every “parent” has an obligation to provide support for his or her child:

31 (1) Every parent has an obligation to provide support, to the extent that the parent is capable of doing so, for his or her unmarried child who, (a) is a minor; (b) is enrolled in a full-time program of education; or (c) is unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents.

[Emphasis added]

[15] Similarly, s. 37(1) states:

37 (1) An application to the court for variation of an order made or confirmed under this Part may be made by, (a) a dependant or respondent named in the order; (b) a parent of a dependant referred to in clause (a);

[Emphasis added]

[16] Thus, the question of whether the Guidelines should apply turns on whether the Applicants are “parents” within the meaning of the Family Law Act. Section 1(1) of the Act defines a “parent” as follows:

“parent” includes a person who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat a child as a child of his or her family, except under an arrangement where the child is placed for valuable consideration in a foster home by a person having lawful custody

[Emphasis added.]

[17] In Re Spring and Spring, 61 O.R. (2d) 743 (S.C.), the court summed up settled intention as follows:

[E]ach case will be decided on its own attendant circumstances. The applicant must show more than a mere display of common courtesy or hospitality. The facts of family life should be established, and the court will assess the relationships that have developed within the family unit. Material circumstances include: the place where the child lived; the manner in which the expenses of the child were discharged; the interest taken in the child's welfare, and the responsibilities assumed by the parties for the care of the child, including matters of discipline.

[18] While the more typical inquiry usually involves stepparents (see e.g. Chartier v. Chartier, paras. 39-40), there is nothing in s. 1(1) that precludes the definition of “parent” from being extended to other types of relationships. The central focus, as averted to at s. 33(1) of the Family Law Act, is whether there is a relationship of dependence such that the relationship would attract an obligation for child support.

[19] The Court of Appeal for Ontario in Cheng v. Cheng was asked to consider this issue. In that case, the appellant sought to amend her pleadings to proceed with a claim for child support against the grandparents on the basis that they had “demonstrated a settled intention” to treat the children as children of their family. The court allowed the amendment and stated that “[t]he Family Law Act does not exclude grandparents as persons who may be responsible for support of children”.

[20] In this case, it is clear that the Applicants have demonstrated a settled intention to treat J.G. as their child and continue to do so. The following facts support this finding:

a. The Applicants pursued and obtained a final custody order for J.G in 2016. They were clear that they, and not the Respondent, are J.G.’s primary caregivers.
b. The Applicants conceded their role as parents within the meaning of the Family Law Act when they applied for and received a child support order in 2016.
c. The Applicants supported J.G.’s significant medical needs, including appointments with specialists, counselling, and inpatient and outpatient treatment.
d. Ms. Gigler testified about the importance of a university education to her children. It was clear she extended this to include J.G.
e. The Applicants paid for all of J.G.’s expenses since at least 2016. This included all his health, extracurricular, and education expenses. They paid for mental health interventions over the years. They established and solely contributed to a Registered Education Savings Plan for J.G. They purchased a home in Guelph and took on a mortgage of over $600,000 so that J.G. could continue his studies while residing off campus.
f. J.G. depends on the Applicants emotionally. He texts with them every day and calls several times a week while he is away at university, comes home frequently during the weekends, and looks to them for emotional support. The Applicants are intimately familiar with J.G.’s emotional needs.
g. The Respondent has had only sporadic contact with J.G. and had not had any contact with him for many years prior to the trial.

[21] It was clear from the Applicants’ evidence that they intended and continue to intend for J.G. to be a part of their family as a dependent. The Applicants’ involvement and contributions go well beyond expressions of kindness or mere generosity. J.G. and the Applicants share a relationship that is not consistent with a typical grandparent relationship in that it is far more dependent and deeper than one would expect between “extended family”.

[22] I therefore find that the Applicants are parents within the meaning of s. 1(1) of the Family Law Act and that the Guidelines presumptively apply to the determination of quantum of support, including their proportionate share of ongoing and retroactive s. 7 expenses while J.G. was under the age of majority.

[23] However, there is still one other issue to be considered. Pursuant to s. 3(2) of the Guidelines, the court must make a determination as to whether the guidelines approach continues to be appropriate after the child reaches the age of majority. If the approach is inappropriate, the court may determine an appropriate amount of support, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each parent. In Park v. Thompson, para. 28, the court noted that the presumptive amounts set out in the Guidelines are frequently inappropriate where the adult child lives away from home.

[24] J.G. reached the age of majority on June 29, 2022. At that time, he continued to reside at home with the Applicants and continued to attend high school full-time. He started residing away from the home when he commenced university in September 2023. I therefore determine that the presumptive amounts in the Guidelines are appropriate while J.G. resided with the Applicants up to August 31, 2023. Commencing September 1, 2023, the presumptive amounts in the Guidelines are inappropriate.

Part Three – Retroactive Section 7 Expenses between January 1, 2020 and August 31, 2023

[25] Having determined that the approach in the Guidelines is appropriate while J.G. lived with the Applicants, the next question to be decided is what the Respondent’s retroactive s. 7 obligation should be. In this case, the parties agreed that the Respondent had an obligation to pay increased table child support and s. 7 expenses. They also agreed that only s. 7 expenses from 2020 onwards would be considered by the court for the purpose of a retroactive child support order. Therefore, I need not consider the factors outlined in Colucci v. Colucci, 2017 ONCA 892 or D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, which establish a framework to determine whether such an obligation exists and how far back it should go. Rather, the issue here is simply the determination of which of the claimed expenses are in fact s. 7 expenses and the proportionate share payable by each party.

[26] The relevant provisions of the Guidelines regarding s. 7 expenses read as follows:

Special or extraordinary expenses

7. (1) In an order for the support of a child, the court may, on the request of either parent or spouse or of an applicant under section 33 of the Act, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the parents or spouses and those of the child and to the spending pattern of the parents or spouses in respect of the child during cohabitation:

(a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment of the parent or spouse who has the majority of parenting time;

(b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child;

(c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses;

(d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs;

(e) expenses for post-secondary education; and

(f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities.

Definition, “extraordinary expenses”

(1.1) For the purposes of clauses (1) (d) and (f),

“extraordinary expenses” means

(a) expenses that exceed those that the parent or spouse requesting an amount for the extraordinary expenses can reasonably cover, taking into account that parent’s or spouse’s income and the amount that the parent or spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate, or

(b) where clause (a) is not applicable, expenses that the court considers are extraordinary taking into account,

(i) the amount of the expense in relation to the income of the parent or spouse requesting the amount, including the amount that the parent or spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate,

(ii) the nature and number of the educational programs and extracurricular activities,

(iii) any special needs and talents of the child,

(iv) the overall cost of the programs and activities, and

(v) any other similar factors that the court considers relevant.

Sharing of expense

(2) The guiding principle in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1) is that the expense is shared by the parents or spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child.

Subsidies, tax deductions, etc.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1), the court must take into account any subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits relating to the expense, and any eligibility to claim a subsidy, benefit or income tax deduction or credit relating to the expense.

[27] An order for contribution to special and extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Guidelines is discretionary as to both entitlement and amount: Julien Payne and Marilyn Payne, Child Support Guidelines in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009), at pp. 227, 231.

[28] In Titova v. Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, para. 23, the court summarized the steps for determining s. 7 expenses and the proportion attributable to each party:

a) Calculate each party’s income for child support purposes.
b) Determine whether the claimed expenses fall within one of the enumerated categories of s. 7 of the Guidelines.
c) Determine whether the claimed expenses are necessary “in relation to the child’s best interests” and are reasonable “in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation”.
d) If the expenses fall under paragraphs 7(1) (d) or (f) of the Guidelines, determine whether the expenses are “extraordinary” as defined in s. 7 (1.1).
e) Consider what amount, if any, the child should reasonably contribute to the payment of these expenses and then apply any tax deductions or credits.
f) Determine the proportion that each party should contribute to the expenses, with the guiding principle being that the expenses will be shared in proportion to their incomes.

[29] The onus is on the parent seeking the special or extraordinary expenses to prove that the claimed expenses fall within one of the categories under s. 7 and that the expenses are necessary and reasonable, having regard to the financial circumstances of the parties: see Park v. Thompson, paras. 20-26.

The Parties’ Incomes

[30] In this case, the parties agreed that their respective incomes between 2020 and 2023 are as follows:

Year	Kristy Ferreira (Respondent)	Christine Gigler (Applicant)	Sigmund Gigler (Applicant)	Applicants' Household Income
2020	$35,824	$65,741	$84,286	$150,027
2021	$60,468	$60,737	$52,860	$113,597
2022	$60,016	$64,719	$41,099	$105,818
2023	$67,889	$65,888	$52,094	$117,982

Section 7 Expenses

[31] The Applicants submitted charts of the s. 7 expenses claimed. During her evidence, the Respondent agreed to some, but not all of them. She agreed that the following were s. 7 expenses: J.G.’s medical/dental expenses, tutoring, YMCA gym membership, some of his school expenses, and some of his skiing-related expenses. However, many categories of expenses remained in dispute.

[32] After having reviewed the Applicants’ charts, the evidence, and the arguments provided by the parties, the following is my decision with respect to the remaining disputed categories of s. 7 expenses:

1. Cell phone: Caselaw is split as to whether the cell phone should properly be considered a s. 7 expense. Ms. Gigler’s evidence is that she purchased the cell phone for J.G. when he was in Grade 8 because his diagnoses of anxiety and attachment disorder meant that he needed to be in constant contact with herself and her husband. The Respondent’s evidence is that she agreed to the cell phone expense, however, did not agree with the cost as she viewed spending $87 per month on a cell phone to be unreasonable. She said that she agreed to share the calling portion of the cell phone plan, but not the data. I agree with the Applicants that in the current circumstances, J.G.’s cell phone is a s. 7 expense both as an extraordinary educational and health expense. However, the cost is excessive. I would reduce the cost of this expense to $40 per month, where receipts are provided.

2. Dandruff/acne treatment: The Applicants claim dandruff and acne treatment as s. 7 expenses. The undisputed evidence presented at trial is that J.G. suffers from significant anxiety that is exacerbated by his acne and dandruff. Ms. Gigler testified that J.G. would pick at his face until there were open sores, which would then become another source of anxiety socially. I accept that these expenses are required for J.G.’s health and are a s. 7 expense.

3. Snowboarding/skiing/skateboarding expenses: The undisputed evidence is that J.G. enjoys skiing, snowboarding, and skateboarding as extracurricular activities. These activities are important to J.G. and are reasonable and necessary to support his mental health. The Respondent consented to some of the ski expenses. I would include these expenses (including equipment costs) as s. 7 expenses.

4. School expenses: Minor school expenses, online resources, supplies and fees are not s. 7 expenses. However, J.G. did require a tutor at times. In my view, tutoring costs are reasonable and necessary extraordinary educational expenses.

5. Post-secondary expenses: Post-secondary expenses incurred before September 1, 2023 remained in dispute. I agree with the court in Craig v. Niro, 2022 ONSC 5178, paras. 24-25, that expenses incurred in connection with a program of study qualify as s. 7 expenses. This includes bedding and other set-up expenses for residence, as well as university application fees.

6. Car expenses: Ms. Gigler testified that while away at university, J.G. required the use of a car. There was no other reasonable way for him to travel to and from university. I agree that expenses related to the car are s. 7 expenses and incurred in connection to J.G.’s university program. The amounts claimed by the Applicants for car insurance, auto repairs, and driver’s education are reasonable.

[33] The following expenses claimed by the Applicants are not s. 7 expenses: parking passes, rail passes, energy drinks, non-dairy beverages, protein bars, souvenir jackets, expenses for vacations, concert tickets, minor school fees, supplies, and donations. These either do not fit into one of the enumerated s. 7 expense categories or are not “extraordinary” within the definition of s. 7(1.1).

Proportion of Section 7 Expenses Payable by Each Party

[34] The Applicants’ position is that all valid s. 7 expenses should be paid on a 50-50 basis while the Respondent’s position is that s. 7 expenses should be paid in proportion to their household incomes. In essence, the Applicants argue that even if the Guidelines applies, the guiding principle outlined at s. 7(2) should not apply to them.

[35] I agree with the Applicants that the court has discretion to apportion s. 7 expenses in a different manner than pro-rata to incomes, depending on the circumstances of the case: see Salvadori v. Salvadori, 2010 ONCJ 387; Buckley v. Blackwood, 2019 ONSC 6918. The court may consider the parties’ capital assets, income distribution, debts, third party resources, access costs, support obligations, receipt of support and other relevant factor: see Delichte v. Rogers, 2013 MBCA 106, para. 38. The court may also order the payment of s. 7 expenses in proportion to the parties’ household incomes: see Zhao v. Xiao, 2023 ONCA 453, leave to appeal refused, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 40890.

[36] In this case, I find that a fair sharing of the valid s. 7 expenses would be in proportion to the parties’ household incomes. I find that sharing the s. 7 expenses on a 50-50 basis would be unfair to the Respondent, whose financial resources are far less than those of the Applicants, whose net worth is currently over $1.3 million according to their financial statement. While proportionate sharing would mean the Applicants pay a greater percentage of the s. 7 expenses, there is no hardship or inequity to them. I therefore find that the Applicants have not rebutted the presumption of proportionate sharing of expenses as set out at s. 7(2) of the Guidelines.

[37] Neither party provided evidence of the tax credits or benefits attributable to the s. 7 expenses claimed by the Applicants as required by s. 7(3) of the Guidelines. I have included such credits in the software calculations attached as appendices to this decision. However, those calculations will not be precise given the lack of information provided by the parties.

[38] Based on my calculations and the proportionate sharing of valid s. 7 expenses outlined above, the Respondent owes a total of $6,331 ($1,196 in 2020, $2,164 in 2021, $1,084 in 2022, and $1,887 in 2023) in retroactive s. 7 expenses from January 1, 2020 to August 31, 2023.

Part Four – Post-Secondary Section 7 Expenses from September 2023 onwards

[39] As stated previously, the presumptive amounts set out in the Guidelines are inappropriate from September 1, 2023 onwards given J.G.’s residence outside of the home. This was acknowledged by the parties when they agreed on an alternate mechanism to address the payment of child support after that date. Specifically, the parties agreed that while J.G. lived away from home for university, the Respondent would pay the “summer” amounts of table child support plus share in the cost of J.G.’s post-secondary expenses. The court will adopt the mechanism agreed to by the parties as it is fair in this case. The issue for the court to decide is how J.G.’s post-secondary expenses should be shared and how much J.G. should contribute to those expenses.

[40] During the trial, the parties agreed that J.G.’s post-secondary expenses for every four-month semester is $15,000 ($30,000 per year). This number includes tuition, fees, textbooks, and school supplies. I will assume that these are the gross amounts agreed to and will assign to the Applicants the full amount of the child’s tuition tax credits. The court’s calculation will therefore be imprecise on this point.

[41] The evidence before the court is that J.G. is an excellent student with ambitions to become a lawyer. He finished his first two years of university with excellent grades. He is a hard worker. He is also well aware of his family’s financial circumstances. He has been diligent in securing summer employment over the last few years. In 2023, J.G. worked part time at No Frills and made $11,304 in employment income for that year. In 2024, he earned $15,002 from working 12-hour shifts at Taylor Steele while taking a summer course. Although J.G. has attempted to secure a summer position for 2025, it is unclear if he will secure employment for this summer. Despite J.G.’s diligence in obtaining summer employment, he has nevertheless had to rely on the Ontario Student Assistance Program (“OSAP”) and take out a line of credit to fund his studies. J.G. has significant anxiety about how he will afford his continued post-secondary education.

[42] The Applicants’ position is that J.G. should be contributing to this post-secondary education. Their position is that J.G.’s contribution should be fixed at 50% of his combined employment income and student loans/grants. After deducting that amount from the total post-secondary costs, each adult household would assume the balance of the costs in equal shares.

[43] The Respondent also agrees that J.G. should contribute to his post-secondary education. The Respondent’s position is that J.G., the Applicants, and the Respondent should each contribute 1/3 to his post-secondary expenses.

[44] I reject the approaches proposed by both parties. In my view, while J.G. should be expected to contribute towards his post-secondary expenses, a child-focused solution should aim to reduce his stress around paying for his education to ensure that he has a successful academic career. Furthermore, J.G. should be allowed to keep some of his earnings so that he is able to derive some personal benefit from his labour: see Marsh v. Jahewski, 2011 ONSC 3793, para. 78. Finally, while J.G. has access to OSAP and a line of credit, these costs must be repaid when he finishes school; they are therefore merely deferred debts and should not be treated as income for this purpose.

[45] The Respondent’s proposal that J.G. contribute to 1/3 of his post-secondary expenses ($10,000 per year) is unrealistic and does not take into account the fact that J.G. may be unable to secure a job that covers that cost despite his best efforts. The Applicants’ proposal would include J.G.’s loans as income and would leave J.G. with little discretionary income should he be unable to find a well-paying job in the summertime. In addition, it seems unfair to have the Respondent contribute to 50% of the balance when her income is significantly less than theirs.

[46] In my view, a breakdown that is fair to J.G. is one where he contributes a minimum of $4,000 per year and up to one-third of his yearly income from employment, scholarships, and OSAP grants (not loans) towards his post-secondary expenses. The Applicants and the Respondent would then share the balance in proportion to their household incomes.

[47] From the information provided, J.G.’s 2023 income is $15,360 ($11,304 in employment income + $2,056 in OSAP grants + $2,000 scholarship) and his 2024 income is $20,261 ($15,002 in employment income + $3,259 in OSAP grants + $2,000 scholarship). His 2023 contribution shall be fixed at $5,120 and his 2024 contribution at $6,753.67. For 2025, I will use the minimum amount J.G. shall contribute, or $4,000, given he has not been able to find employment as yet. This number may be readjusted in 2026 upon J.G. and the parties exchanging copies of their respective income tax returns and notices of assessment.

[48] The income of the Applicants and the Respondent for 2023-2025 were agreed to be as follows:

Year	Kristy Ferreira (Respondent)	Christine Gigler (Applicant)	Sigmund Gigler (Applicant)	Applicants' Household Income
2023	$67,889	$65,888	$52,094	$117,982
2024	$74,892	$75,083	$45,725	$120,808
2025*	$74,892	$75,083	$45,725	$120,808

*estimated

[49] Based on my calculations which are attached as appendices to this decision, the Respondent owes a total of $15,874 ($3,332 in 2023; $8,616 in 2024; $3,926 for four months in 2025) with respect to retroactive post-secondary expenses from September 1, 2023 to April 30, 2025.

[50] If all goes according to plan, J.G. will finish his undergraduate degree by April 30, 2027. On a go-forward basis, I anticipate that the Respondent’s contribution to J.G.’s post-secondary expenses will be approximately $650 per month given the parties’ 2025 incomes and J.G.’s contribution. In order to ensure that the Respondent’s future contributions are enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office, I will order that she pay $650 per month in s. 7 expenses commencing May 1, 2025 until April 30, 2027. These payments can be adjusted upon the parties exchanging their respective income tax returns and notices of assessments.

Part Five – Repayment Rate

[51] The parties agree that the Respondent has paid $6,400 in support pursuant to Whitten J.’s order that is not accounted for in the above calculations. Therefore, the total retroactive support owing by the Respondent to the Applicants is as follows:

Description	Amount
Retroactive Table Child Support	$14,856
Retroactive Section 7 Expenses between Jan 1, 2020 and Aug 31, 2023	$6,331
Post-Secondary Section 7 Expenses from Sept 2023 to Apr 30, 2025	$15,874
Less: Support paid	$6,400
Total amount owing	$30,661

[52] At trial, the Respondent claimed that she is only able to afford a “global amount” of child support of $9,000 per year or $750 per month. She says that she has accessed loans to retain a lawyer and is unable to access any more loans. She provided no proof of any attempts to apply for loans from the bank. She does, however, show a personal loan of $23,000 from a “family friend” on her financial statement. She provided no evidence of who she borrowed this money from, the repayment terms, and whether she is able to borrow additional money from that person. However, I do acknowledge that based on her income, the Respondent’s ability to pay the child support owing in one lump sum would be impossible.

[53] At trial, the Respondent admitted that she was aware she needed to pay more child support going back to at least 2023. It is extremely troubling that despite this knowledge, she deliberately chose to ignore her obligations by refusing to voluntarily increase her payment of child support at any time during these proceedings. The Respondent’s evidence was clear that she was aware she was grossly underpaying child support, yet for various “other factors” chose not to increase her contribution to her son’s support or expenses.

[54] Balancing the Respondent’s current financial circumstances, her conduct with respect to her support obligations to date, and the fact that any delay in repayment of the child support puts the Applicants and J.G. under further financial pressure, I order the Respondent to pay the child support owing as follows: commencing May 1, 2025 until April 30, 2027, $100 per month and commencing May 1, 2027, $800 per month until the debt is paid off.

Part Six – Orders

[55] I order as follows:

1. Commencing May 1, 2025, the Respondent shall pay table child support (summer formula) to the Applicants for J.G. in the amount of $233 per month based on her 2024 income of $74,892.
2. The Respondent shall pay a total of $30,661 in retroactive child support on the following schedule: a. Commencing May 1, 2025 until April 30, 2027, $100 per month; b. Commencing May 1, 2027, $800 per month until all amounts owing are paid off.
3. Commencing May 1, 2025 and for each month thereafter until April 30, 2027, the Respondent shall pay $650 per month for J.G.’s post-secondary expenses.
4. The Respondent’s contribution to J.G.’s post-secondary expenses shall be calculated as follows: a. J.G. shall contribute $4,000 per year or one-third of his income (not including any OSAP loans or other student loans), whichever is greater, towards his post-secondary expenses. b. The balance of the post-secondary expenses shall be shared by the Applicants and the Respondent in proportion to their household incomes. c. Upon exchange of tax returns and notices of assessment, the parties shall determine whether the Respondent had underpaid or overpaid post-secondary expenses for the previous calendar year. The Respondent shall reimburse the Applicants for any underpayment and shall be reimbursed by the Applicants for any overpayment.
5. The Respondent shall maintain J.G. on her benefits program available to her through her employer for as long as she has an obligation to pay child support and shall coordinate and cooperate with the Applicants to maximize coverage for J.G.
6. The Applicants shall provide the Respondent with confirmation of J.G.’s enrollment in school each semester to enable her to maintain him on her benefits.
7. Any medical and dental expenses not covered by the Respondent or the child’s insurance (if available) shall be paid by the Applicants and the Respondent in proportion to their household incomes.
8. The Respondent shall designate J.G. the beneficiary on her life insurance with a face value of $60,000 for as long as she has an obligation to pay support and provide annual proof the policy is in effect to the Applicants.
9. The parties shall exchange tax returns and notices of assessment every year on or before June 30. The Applicants shall provide the Respondent with a copy of J.G.’s tax returns and notices of assessment. They shall use this information to adjust table child support for the next 12 months as well as underpayment/overpayment of post-secondary s. 7 expenses for the previous calendar year.
10. If the parties are unable to settle costs, the Applicants may serve and file their cost submissions by June 30, 2025 and the Respondent may serve and file her cost submissions by July 4, 2025. Cost submissions shall be no more than 5 pages in length, double-spaced, 12-point font. Offers to settle and bills of costs shall not be counted in the page limit.

T. Law
Released: May 21, 2025