Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: CR-18-0029-00, CR-18-0050-00, CR-19-0089-00, CR-21-0067-00
Date: 2025-03-17

BETWEEN:
His Majesty the King
R. Kozak and K. Regimbal, for the Crown

- and -

Richard Belbas
A. Chuckal, for the Accused

Heard: Trial held Tuesday September 3, 2024, to Thursday September 19, 2024.
Sitting days: September 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 and 19, 2024 at Thunder Bay, Ontario

Justice S.J. Wojciechowski

Trial Decision

Introduction

[1] Richard William Belbas (“Mr. Belbas”) was the subject of four indictments from which 21 counts proceeded to trial over a three-week period commencing on September 3, 2024.

[2] The first indictment is CR-18-0050 from which counts 1, 2, and 3 proceeded, and count 4 was withdrawn.

[3] The second indictment is CR-18-0029 from which counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 20 proceeded, and counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, and 22 were withdrawn.

[4] The third indictment is CR-21-0067 from which counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 proceeded.

[5] Finally, the fourth indictment is CR-19-0089, and the two counts within that indictment were withdrawn at the outset of trial.

[6] As such, there were 21 counts within three indictments which were addressed during the three-week trial.

[7] Twenty counts involve allegations of fraudulent activities in which Mr. Belbas was charged for defrauding individuals for amounts above or below $5,000. Generally, each of these alleged frauds occurred when Mr. Belbas, after obtaining a monetary deposit, offered to provide services or goods that the Crown alleges were either partially or never delivered.

[8] The remaining count involves the breach of a probation order dated January 8, 2015. Generally, this alleged breach involves Mr. Belbas failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, and/or advertising services for sale, and/or using a name other than his own when offering goods and services to the public.

[9] The Crown did not bring a similar fact application in the context of these matters, and as such they are all to be considered individually on their own facts. In deciding the issues in all 21 counts, the facts and/or conclusions from one count have not been considered nor applied to another count or counts.

The Legislation Relating to Fraud

[10] The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code are as follows:

380 (1) Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security or any service,

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars; or

(b) is guilty

(i) of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or

(ii) of an offence punishable on summary conviction,

where the value of the subject-matter of the offence does not exceed five thousand dollars.

[11] Amongst the many counts found within the indictments, Mr. Belbas has charges under both subsection (a) and subsection (b) of section 380(1).

[12] In the early 1990s there were two Supreme Court cases released simultaneously which carefully addressed the elements of fraud: R. v. Zlatic, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29 and R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5. Though these are older decisions, they remain good law today.

[13] At paras. 26–27 of Zlatic, McLachlin J. (as she then was), writing for the majority, provided the accepted approach in considering fraudulent activities:

26 For the purposes of this case, it suffices to state that the actus reus of fraud will be established by proof of:

1. the prohibited act, be it an act of deceit, a falsehood or some other fraudulent means; and
2. deprivation caused by the prohibited act, which may consist of an actual loss or the placing of the victim's pecuniary interests at risk.

Correspondingly, the mens rea of fraud is established by proof of:

1. subjective knowledge of the prohibited act; and
2. subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another (which deprivation may consist in knowledge that the victim's pecuniary interests are put at risk).

27 Where the conduct and knowledge required by these definitions are established, the accused is guilty whether he actually intended the prohibited consequence or was reckless as to whether it would occur.

[14] A nearly identical description is provided by McLachlin J. (as she then was), writing for the majority in Théroux, at paras. 27–28. She also addressed the issue of recklessness at para. 26:

There appears to be no reason, however, why recklessness as to consequences might not also attract criminal responsibility. Recklessness presupposes knowledge of the likelihood of the prohibited consequences. It is established when it is shown that the accused, with such knowledge, commits acts which may bring about these prohibited consequences, while being reckless as to whether or not they ensue.

[15] McLachlin J. further elaborates in para. 36:

A person who deprives another person of what the latter has should not escape criminal responsibility merely because, according to his moral or her personal code, he or she was doing nothing wrong or because of a sanguine belief that all will come out right in the end. Many frauds are perpetrated by people who think there is nothing wrong in what they are doing or who sincerely believe that their act of placing other people's property at risk will not ultimately result in actual loss to those persons.

[16] She elaborates again at para. 39:

To establish the actus reus of fraud, the Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused practised deceit, lied, or committed some other fraudulent act. Under the third head of the offence it will be necessary to show that the impugned act is one which a reasonable person would see as dishonest. Deprivation or the risk of deprivation must then be shown to have occurred as a matter of fact. To establish the mens rea of fraud the Crown must prove that the accused knowingly undertook the acts which constitute the falsehood, deceit or other fraudulent means, and that the accused was aware that deprivation could result from such conduct.

[17] She further states, at para. 40:

The requirement of intentional fraudulent action excludes mere negligent misrepresentation. It also excludes improvident business conduct or conduct which is sharp in the sense of taking advantage of a business opportunity to the detriment of someone less astute. The accused must intentionally deceive, lie or commit some other fraudulent act for the offence to be established. Neither a negligent misstatement, nor a sharp business practice, will suffice, because in neither case will the required intent to deprive by fraudulent means be present. A statement made carelessly, even if it is untrue, will not amount to an intentional falsehood, subjectively appreciated. Nor will any seizing of a business opportunity which is not motivated by a person's subjective intent to deprive by cheating or misleading others amount to an instance of fraud.

[18] Back to Zlatic, McLachlin J. reviews the concept of fraud, citing Dixon J.’s analysis in Olan:

31 In Olan, supra, Dickson J. (as he then was) had the following to say about the phrase "other fraudulent means" (at p. 1180):

... proof of deceit is not essential to support a conviction [for fraud]... . The words 'other fraudulent means' in s. 338(1) [now s. 380(1)] include means which are not in the nature of a falsehood or a deceit; they encompass all other means which can properly be stigmatized as dishonest.

Most frauds continue to involve either deceit or falsehood. As is pointed out in Théroux, proof of deceit or falsehood is sufficient to establish the actus reus of fraud; no further proof of dishonest action is needed. However, the third category of "other fraudulent means" has been used to support convictions in a number of situations where deceit or falsehood cannot be shown. These situations include, to date, the use of corporate funds for personal purposes, non-disclosure of important facts, exploiting the weakness of another, unauthorized diversion of funds, and unauthorized arrogation of funds or property.

32 The fundamental question in determining the actus reus of fraud within the third head of the offence of fraud is whether the means to the alleged fraud can properly be stigmatized as dishonest: Olan, supra. In determining this, one applies a standard of the reasonable person. Would the reasonable person stigmatize what was done as dishonest? Dishonesty is, of course, difficult to define with precision. It does, however, connote an underhanded design which has the effect, or which engenders the risk, of depriving others of what is theirs. J. D. Ewart, in his Criminal Fraud (1986), defines dishonest conduct as that "which ordinary, decent people would feel was discreditable as being clearly at variance with straightforward or honourable dealings" (p. 99). Negligence does not suffice. Nor does taking advantage of an opportunity to someone else's detriment, where that taking has not been occasioned by unscrupulous conduct, regardless of whether such conduct was wilful or reckless. The dishonesty of "other fraudulent means" has, at its heart, the wrongful use of something in which another person has an interest, in such a manner that this other's interest is extinguished or put at risk. A use is "wrongful" in this context if it constitutes conduct which reasonable decent persons would consider dishonest and unscrupulous (citations omitted)

[19] Based on the foregoing, I will now summarise the elements of the offence and relevant considerations with respect to a charge of criminal fraud.

The Elements of Criminal Fraud

[20] The actus reus of fraud has two components:

1. An intentional prohibited act. This will be falsehood, deceit, or “some other fraudulent means”. In practice, the meaning of “other fraudulent means” is based on a reasonable person standard. The essential element is some kind of dishonest act. The most important component here is that, to find a dishonest act occurred, the behaviour must be deemed objectively dishonest by the standards of the community.

   With respect to this component, regardless of whether the behaviour is fraud, deceit, or something else, the individual must have acted voluntarily and intentionally. Careless or negligent behaviour will not meet the threshold for criminal fraud.

2. A deprivation. To establish criminal fraud, the conduct in question must not only be dishonest, but also have fraudulent consequences. More specifically, there must be a causal connection between the dishonest conduct and some form of deprivation to the victim or victims, with the deprivation being in relation to real property, or services.

   Therefore, this element has two subcomponents:

   • Was the victim deprived?
   • Was the deprivation a direct or indirect result of the dishonest conduct?

   In Zlatic, at para. 26, McLachlin J. (as she then was) notes that this deprivation need not be actualized. It is sufficient if the act in question places “the victim’s pecuniary interests at risk.”

[21] The mens rea of fraud also has two components:

1. Subjective knowledge of the prohibited act. Despite not being expressly indicated in the statute, the mens rea component of fraud requires a high degree of subjective awareness on behalf of the accused with respect to all relevant circumstances related to the allegedly fraudulent conduct.

   Some uncertainty remains in this area of law with respect to the question of recklessness. Théroux does not exclude a court from finding fraud where the defendant behaves recklessly. As held by the majority, “[w]here the conduct and knowledge required by these definitions are established, the accused is guilty whether he actually intended the deprivation or was reckless as to whether it would occur”: see para. 28.

2. Subjective knowledge that the prohibited act may result in a deprivation. For this element, wilful blindness, recklessness, or knowledge are sufficient to prove the accused had the foresight to understand the risks associated with their fraudulent actions. This must directly connect back to the actus reus claimed in the first stage. It is generally irrelevant for an accused to claim good intentions, or that they thought the situation would “work out”, where it is clear they were aware of the possible, and likely, consequences.

Summary of the Law

[22] To conclude, criminal fraud requires the following:

1. An intentional and deceptive act resulting in a deprivation, and
2. Subjective knowledge of the deceptive act and subjective foresight as to the likely consequences of that act, i.e., the deprivation.

[23] Section 380 of the Criminal Code is generally considered a very broad provision, with flexible definitions and some reliance on the “reasonable person”. The meaning of “other fraudulent means” is essentially unlimited by existing case law, constrained only by what a “reasonable person” might consider to be dishonest. Furthermore, the deprivation component can include mere risk of harm.

Approach to Assessment of the Evidence of Richard Belbas

[24] After the Crown closed its case, Richard Belbas provided evidence in support of his defence.

[25] First, it is important to state the obvious: Richard Belbas is presumed innocent of all charges, and a finding of guilty on any one count is entirely dependent upon the Crown leading evidence which establishes the relevant allegation of fraud, or breach of probation, beyond a reasonable doubt. Richard Belbas does not have to prove his innocence. The Crown must establish the essential elements noted above with respect to each of the counts. That is the starting point with respect to any assessment of the evidence.

[26] In order to assess the nature of the evidence provided by Richard Belbas, reference to the case of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, is necessary. In doing so, I am aided by the article "Doubt about Doubt: Coping with R. v. W.(D.) and Credibility Assessment", 22:1 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 31 by David M. Paciocco.

[27] The framework for the W.(D.) credibility analysis aims to explain what reasonable doubt looks like in the face of conflicting evidence offered to the trier of fact, with the following three considerations:

• First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously, you must acquit.
• Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in a reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
• Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence of the guilt of the accused.

[28] This “credibility” analysis is not simply one which relates to whether a witness was being truthful or honest, but also whether the evidence offered is reliable in all the circumstances.

[29] At page 10 of his article, Paciocco says:

A criminal trial is not a “credibility contest”. It is a trial to determine whether the Crown has proved the guilt of the accused on the specific charges alleged, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is, therefore, wrong to decide criminal cases where there is conflicting evidence about whether the accused is guilty, simply by deciding which version of events is preferred. The decisive question is whether, considering all the evidence as a whole, the Crown has proved the guilt of the accused on the specific charges alleged, beyond a reasonable doubt.

[30] If the court is not sure whether the evidence presented by the accused is accurate, then that version of events has not been entirely rejected and an acquittal must be entered. At the same time, even if the evidence presented by the defence is not accepted by the court, this does not automatically mean the accused should be found guilty. Affirmative evidence tendered by the Crown is necessary for a successful prosecution. An accused is not required to prove his or her innocence.

Richard Belbas’ Criminal Record

[31] During his examination in chief, Richard Belbas led evidence as to his past criminal convictions which included the following:

1. On April 4, 2001, he was convicted of one count of fraud over $5,000 and one count of fraud under $5,000, in addition to a conviction of false pretences, for which he was given a 1 year conditional sentence plus three years probation.
2. On March 30, 2004, he was convicted of 2 counts of failing to comply with a probation order, and was given a suspended sentence with 1 year probation.
3. On March 10, 2006, Mr. Belbas was convicted of 1 count of fraud under $5,000, for which he received a fine of $5,000.
4. On February 21, 2012, he was convicted of 5 counts of fraud under $5,000 and one count of theft under $5,000, for which he received a 6 month probational sentence plus three years’ probation.
5. On March 28, 2023, Mr. Belbas plead guilty to 3 counts of fraud under $5,000 and 2 counts over $5,000, for which he received a three month conditional sentence order.
6. On January 7, 2015, he was convicted of 1 count of fraud over $5,000, for which he received a sentence of 45 days in jail plus three years’ probation.
7. On January 7, 2015, he was convicted of a further single count of fraud under $5,000 and one count of failing to comply with a probation order, for which he was sentenced to 90 days of jail and three years of probation.
8. On May 29, 2017, Mr. Belbas was found guilty of 1 count of failing to comply with a probation order, for which he was given a suspended sentence plus two years of probation.

[32] The case of R. v. Hussein, 2023 ONCA 253, 425 C.C.C. (3d) 528, at para. 26, provides some direction on what a court should make of a history of criminal convictions:

[26] The criminal convictions of anyone who testifies, including accused persons who choose to do so, are presumptively admissible as evidence relevant in challenging their credibility as witnesses. Convictions for crimes of dishonesty, including offences against the administration of justice such as breaching court orders, and theft-based offences such as robbery, are of obvious relevance since they provide “particularly informative” circumstantial evidence that the accused has a dishonest character. [Citations omitted]

[33] And in R. v. King, 2022 ONCA 665, 163 O.R. (3d) 179, the Court of Appeal had the following to say:

[140] The nature of the previous conviction directly affects the extent to which it bears upon credibility. Historically, convictions for offences such as direct acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, theft and disrespect for the administration of justice have been considered particularly informative of a witness’ honesty. [Citations omitted]

[34] The fraud convictions set out above are but one factor which bears upon the credibility of Richard Belbas. As noted at the outset of these reasons, any evidence provided by Mr. Belbas will have to be considered within the context of the individual factual matrix of each count.

[35] However, some general comments and observations are appropriate now, which I will apply in assessing the evidence from Mr. Belbas when compared to evidence from the Crown witnesses.

General Comments Relating to All Counts

[36] First of all, in a number of situations, Mr. Belbas did not “take the money and run”. Instead, after agreeing on a price, and once Mr. Belbas was paid a deposit, he did not disappear. In most cases, he continued to interact with his alleged victims, promising to deliver the goods as originally agreed, or reassuring the alleged victims that the work was going to get done.

[37] Counsel for Mr. Belbas argued that the extent of these ongoing communications suggests that Richard Belbas intended to complete the work which he represented would get done, and that at no time did he enter into an agreement with individuals without the intention of completing the job. Richard Belbas took money from his clients in exchange for a bona fide undertaking to perform the work expected of him, and when challenges arose in the completion of the work, Richard Belbas regularly communicated with his clients on these challenges.

[38] However, remarkable in these exchanges is the number of times Mr. Belbas apologized and promised to meet his obligations within the context of new timelines he proposed. In many of these instances, the apologies, excuses, and promises were endless, spanning days, weeks, or even months. And in a number of these circumstances, which I will be shortly reviewing, Mr. Belbas at no time actually delivers the goods, finishes the construction or renovation contract, or returns monies to the alleged victims.

[39] In some circumstances, it may be that Mr. Belbas simply became overwhelmed with his workload and, as such, was unable to deliver as promised. Of course, this would have made more sense had the timeline been revised once or twice and the contract eventually fulfilled. However, where the agreed upon contract is never completed, and deposits are not refunded, the number of unfulfilled promises coupled with a litany of excuses reflects an obvious inference that Mr. Belbas’ representations were hollow, made without any intention to complete them.

[40] Again, there are cases in which I accept that Mr. Belbas took on too much and was simply unable to complete the contract he undertook on a timely basis. But there are also situations where the efforts to deceive the client or clients are reflected in the ongoing communications which hold out solutions and promises to fix situations which are never resolved.

[41] The fact is that Mr. Belbas plead guilty to a number of fraudulent activities before this trial proceeded. This observation is not made for the purpose of lending credibility to any suggestion that “once a fraudster always a fraudster”. As already noted in these reasons several times, each of the circumstances behind each count must be evaluated separately. But the nature of the crimes committed in the past by Mr. Belbas involve fraud, an element of dishonesty to which he plead guilty several times. Mr. Belbas deceived others in the past by offering goods and services and making promises that he did not intend to deliver. That is what he plead guilty to, and this element of dishonesty provides background against which his testimony can be evaluated.

[42] There are also instances when Mr. Belbas did not use his real name when dealing with clients, and other occasions when the business name he used did not contain any reference to his name. Mr. Belbas maintained that this was because an individual, Pino, was posting negative press on social media accounts and Mr. Belbas was trying to avoid potential clients being scared off from hiring “Richard Belbas”. However, this practice was done during a time when Mr. Belbas was subject to a probation order that strictly prohibited the use of any aliases or names other than his own. Mr. Belbas states he was simply trying to avoid the unfair comments posted on social media in order to secure clients and earn a living. But clearly, despite being subject to a court order requiring him to use his own name, he purposely deceived some of his clients by using the name “Richard Ellis” or “Rick Ellas”, and by doing so intentionally ignored the terms of his court mandated probation order.

[43] In addition, there were also occasions when Mr. Belbas maintained that he enlisted others to assist him with his service contracts, but was unable to provide a last name, or an accurate last name, and no one else ever met these individuals despite asking to do so.

[44] Claude was an older French man who was allegedly supplying sea cans to Mr. Belbas for his clients, but who never came through and who was Mr. Belbas’ reason for leaving several contracts for the delivery of sea cans unfulfilled.

[45] Dennis was a wholesale supplier who worked for Manshield and was able to get cheap windows and building supplies from Toronto or the United States for use on Thunder Bay construction sites. The evidence led in a number of cases was that Dennis was chronically late in delivering product, and in all cases failed to deliver any supplies at all. Mr. Belbas initially maintained that he did not know Dennis’ surname – but eventually speculated that it was something like “Hardak” – despite allegedly using Dennis’ services time and time again within the context of an ongoing “reliable” business relationship. While some clients asked to speak to Dennis, no such contact was ever facilitated by Mr. Belbas.

[46] Chris, who was an electrician hired to do work on one job but failed to show up on time as promised by Mr. Belbas, did not have a last name known to Mr. Belbas. And when a client asked to meet Chris to discuss the work he was going to do, Mr. Belbas constantly made excuses as to why Chris was not available, including suggesting that the client “had just missed him”.

[47] Based upon the evidence led by Mr. Belbas and a number of his clients, I find that Claude, Dennis, and Chris were simply false identities created by Mr. Belbas in an effort to place blame for the unfulfilled contracts on someone else. Where I have found Mr. Belbas guilty of fraud in situations involving Dennis or Claude or Chris, part of that finding is based upon these three fake contractors being created to further the deceit and fraudulent activities being perpetrated by Mr. Belbas. In addition to the criminal convictions and the endless excuses and delays, the creation of these false personas form part of the evidence which casts an unreliable light upon the credibility of Mr. Belbas.

[48] If I am wrong on the non-existence of these individuals, and if they were actual persons whom Mr. Belbas dealt with to secure services or products, then Mr. Belbas failed to provide disclosure to his clients about the unreliable nature of these individuals. In the situation with Dennis and Claude, both of these men were allegedly associated with Richard Belbas for the purpose of providing construction supplies or sea cans. In none of the relevant fact scenarios which I was asked to review do Dennis or Claude actually make a delivery of product. Notwithstanding, in his discussions with his clients, Mr. Belbas continually maintains his faith in Dennis and Claude to come through with whatever Mr. Belbas promised would be delivered by them. At no point in the evidence of Mr. Belbas’ clients, nor that of Mr. Belbas, is there any reference to any discussion in which Mr. Belbas discloses the failure in the past of these individuals to actually show up with building materials or sea cans. In the face of this non-disclosure, the fraud committed by Mr. Belbas is grounded in the third category of “other fraudulent means”.

[49] Finally, in a number of the alleged frauds, Mr. Belbas provides a “cheaper” option to his clients by purchasing construction materials through a home improvement store called Menards located in Duluth, Minnesota. Offers are made to clients for Mr. Belbas to pick up supplies at Menards, or to have Menards deliver them, at a price which is less than could be obtained north of the border.

[50] I make the observation now that in each and every case where this offer is made, no product from Menards is actually delivered. However, because of the extra effort in obtaining the product from an American city located 3 to 4 hours southwest of Thunder Bay, Ontario, the offer of Mr. Belbas is always accompanied by a request for monies up front. If he is going to secure goods from a US merchant, he needs to be paid up front, and also requires payment of any corresponding duty which must be paid at the Canadian border.

[51] Again, in each instance where the Menards option is offered, Mr. Belbas secures an advance payment but never delivers any goods from Menards. In some cases he tells the client that the delivery person with the goods was a no show, or that he is continually waiting for a delivery which never shows up. In some cases, Mr. Belbas ends up purchasing goods from a Canadian source to replace those which were not delivered “as expected”.

[52] Subject to my assessment of the facts within each case, in some instances these promises to purchase goods from Menards forms part of the basis for my finding of fraud, in that the representations of Mr. Belbas are simply a guise to extricate extra money from a client without ever intending to actually deliver any US building supplies.

Construction Background

[53] While Richard Belbas was cross examined on each of the counts, he also was asked questions generally about his contracting experience in Thunder Bay.

[54] Richard Belbas admitted that he had a lot of experience providing contractor services in Thunder Bay. A good contractor, Richard Belbas agreed, gives receipts to clients and keeps in touch with clients, either by telephone call or text. He also said, in cross examination, that a good contractor provides a rough time estimate for the completion of a project. Clients should also expect to be kept up to date on the progress of the work, as well as the delivery of items and supplies needed to do the work. And where necessary, a good contractor seeks out and provides explanations for delays as they occur within a construction or renovation project.

[55] His contracting experience started with Tristan Contracting, which belonged to Richard Belbas. Then, he provided services through Craig Contracting with partner Chris Craig commencing in 2012, followed by three companies owned by Richard Belbas: Richard Belbas Enterprises, RW Contracting, and RNB Contracting.

[56] It was clear throughout the trial that Mr. Belbas possesses skills of a general contractor, and employed others at times to assist in the construction and renovation work he performed. In most cases, the work that was actually completed by Mr. Belbas was assessed as well done, completed to a professional standard, and without complaint.

Attempts at Restitution

[57] The evidence of Mr. Belbas was that he made efforts to compensate his clients and provide refunds by way of cash payments or services – such as snowplowing – when his business relationship with his client resulted in goods or services which had been paid for but not supplied or provided.

[58] Some time was spent explaining his relationship with Christopher Watkins, a lawyer who was hired by Mr. Belbas to assist him with criminal charges of fraud that he was facing. His evidence was that he ultimately provided Mr. Watkins with $100,000 which was meant to be paid back to his clients in order to make up for the shortfall in services or goods which Mr. Belbas had originally promised to provide. However, Mr. Belbas believed that something else must have been done with these monies he gave to his lawyer, since the evidence of many of his former clients in this trial was that they were never paid back for their losses.

[59] With respect to monies paid to Mr. Watkins, I do not place much, if any, weight on the evidence that $100,000 was made available to compensate Mr. Belbas’ clients. Whether or not attempts were made to compensate Mr. Belbas’ clients has little to do with whether he committed fraud in his dealings with these individuals. As Crown counsel submitted during submissions, a shop lifter who exits a store and gets caught does not “make it all better”, or somehow extinguish the crime which was committed, by offering to give the stolen goods back.

[60] My decisions in this matter look at the circumstances of the relationships between Mr. Belbas and his clients and whether there were deceptive practices carried out by Mr. Belbas with the intent to deprive individuals of their money. While it may be that efforts were made by Mr. Belbas to address the impact of his actions by directing his lawyer to provide compensation through a fund of $100,000, that does not exculpate Mr. Belbas from any of the fraudulent activities in which he engaged.

[61] Mr. Belbas also provided evidence that, on a number of occasions, he wanted to or was in the process of working things out with his clients, but because they went to the police he was no longer able to communicate with them.

[62] The evidence led during the trial contradicted this assertion, in that Mr. Belbas interacted with Mr. Mantis after a report was made to the police, and ultimately the deposit monies taken for the undelivered sauna were returned. Mr. Belbas also had similar discussions with Margaret Lanktree as well as Alina and Robert Gluchowski which occurred after the police were involved.

[63] Similar to the issue relating to monies allegedly provided to Mr. Watkins, the interactions or lack of interactions with clients after Mr. Belbas failed to perform as expected is not something which impacts upon the core determination of whether or not he is guilty of fraud.

Review of Each Count

[64] Following the presentation of evidence, the facts in relation to each of the counts is described below with reference to the person or persons who were involved in the alleged frauds committed by Mr. Belbas.

[65] While each count of fraud has to be considered individually as to whether or not the elements of the alleged offence have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the activities amongst the 20 counts can be described in one of three ways.

[66] One group of alleged fraudulent activities involves the supply of sea cans.

[67] A second group involves the construction and supply of saunas.

[68] And the third group of alleged fraudulent activities involves construction or renovation work undertaken on a residential or commercial property.

[69] Again, each factual matrix is to be considered without reference to similar fact situations, but for the purposes of these reasons the alleged fraudulent activities are reviewed within the three generalized categories.

The remainder of the decision contains detailed findings of fact and law for each count, as well as the court's conclusions and reasons. For the sake of brevity, the full text is not reproduced here, but the above sections reflect the structure, legal analysis, and findings as set out in the original decision.

Summary

[528] To summarize the findings set out above, in addition to the finding that Richard Belbas breached the terms of the probation order dated January 8, 2015:

a) Richard Belbas is found guilty of committing fraud over $5,000 contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code with respect to five counts involving: Robert Bencharski; Joe and Gloria Dolce; Jim Einarson and Patricia Paradis; Alina and Robert Gluchowski; and Tracy Wilson.

b) Richard Belbas is found guilty of committing fraud under $5,000 contrary to section 380(1)(b) of the Criminal Code with respect to twelve counts involving: Frank Iazzolino; Bryan Heppler; Robert Mattas; Nikos Mantis; Judith Loewen; Alana Stones; June Gaw; Hean Loi; Margaret Lanktree; Robert Chambers; Dennis Stanchuk and Wendy Marshall; and Blake Van Winckle.

c) Richard Belbas is acquitted with respect to the counts involving: Sheldon Paarsalu; and Kelly Revell.

d) Finally, the count against Richard Belbas involving Cindy Merrill is withdrawn.

“Original signed by”

S.J. Wojciechowski

Released: March 17, 2025